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THE
MORAL CLASS BOOK,
OR THE
LAW OF MORALS;
DERIVED FROM
THE CREATED UNIVERSE,
AND FROM
REVEALED RELIGION.

INTENDED FOR SCHOOLS.

> "*Nil enim prodest, quod lædere non possit idem.*"
> The statutes of the LORD are right; rejoicing the heart:
> The commandment of the LORD is pure; enlightening the eyes.
> PSALM XIX. 8.

BY WILLIAM SULLIVAN, L.L.D.
FELLOW OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES AND
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY; AND PRESIDENT
OF THE SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.

SECOND (STEREOTYPE) EDITION WITH ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

1871

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PUBLISHERS'

ADVERTISEMENT TO THE PRESENT EDITION.

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THE Publishers of the Moral Class Book, now offer the second edition of this work. The first was wholly exhausted in the short space of six months. More than a year has elapsed since that edition was disposed of. The Author was unwilling that another edition should appear before a revision could be made, which it was not convenient to do, until very lately.

The present edition has been arranged in a better manner, than the former one was; several new chapters have been added, and among them, one on the nature of evidence; *and several on* civil society, *and the moral duties of* citizens, *in the United States.*

The work has been stereotyped, under the expectation (derived from the reception of the former edition,) that it may be extensively useful.

The publishers are not aware that any school *book, comprising a system of moral rules, in all cases, and for all classes, is extant, in the United States, but* this; *and so far as they are enabled to judge, from what they have heard of the former edition, in various parts of the United States, they conclude, that this may be a useful book, in* families, *as well as* schools. *They, also, are led to believe, that the demand for moral instruction is increasing; and they hope to be useful in contributing to supply that demand.*

DEDICATION.

TO THE CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES.

You are *now* an interesting part of the Inhabitants of this country. *In a short time*, you will be an important part of the many millions, who are engaged in the serious business of life. You will be called on to perform many duties. The purpose of this volume is to prove to you, that by performing these duties in a proper manner, and from good motives, you will make life *pleasant*, as well as *useful.* No rule of conduct is prescribed in this volume, even tending to prevent the enjoyment of *any* REAL GOOD ; but all the rules prescribed therein, are intended to produce the *greatest* good, which can be had in human life. You need not be reluctant to study these pages, because they treat of *morals ;* for, whether this volume convince you of the fact, or not, *it is a fact, that* TO BE TRULY HAPPY, ONE MUST BE TRULY MORAL.

WM. SULLIVAN.

Boston, (*Mass.*) *March* 1, 1833.

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.

Let it be supposed, that all persons in the United States, who are more than twenty years of age, were inquired of, "What are your *motives*, in all the acts which you do, or omit?" The answer would be, substantially, this: "To get all the good I can, and avoid all the evil I can." Suppose, that they were then inquired of; "What do you take to be good, and what, evil?" The answers to this question, would probably divide the whole number into classes, among which these might be found: *First*, Educated persons who consider human life a phenomenon, not to be accounted for, nor worth the attempt to account for; and that in passing through it, one must be governed by circumstances, and manage as well as he can. *Second*, Those who are intent on *worldly good*, and who think it can be found in riches, distinctions, and superiority over others; and who are strangers to all motives which do not conduce to these ends. *Third*, Those who think that this system of being is vexatious and intolerable; the product of malignant design, and who sincerely believe, that anything may be done that can be, if the operation of human laws can be avoided. *Fourth*, Those who consider human life as intended to be a continued scene of sorrow and probation, and whose motives are, to bear affliction so well, as to be rewarded for it, in a future existence. *Fifth*, A very numerous class, who never had a serious thought why human life *is*, or what its end may be, or what is to come after it ; and who have no motives that they can define, or account for ; but who are governed merely by imitation and habit, and who think all men mortal, but themselves.

Suppose that any one should see, that such is the condition of the human race, and should task himself with the labor of inquiring into this mystery of human life ; resolving to throw off all prejudices of education, habit, and custom, and to govern himself, in his research, by *plain common sense ;* and suppose that he should come to the conclusion, that man's state of being is from AWFUL AUTHORITY, and unquestionable *benevolence ;* that man is necessarily a part of a created universe, and that whatsoever man experiences, of suffering or sorrow, (independently of the operation of general laws, indispensable to the whole system) arises from ignorance, or disobedience :

Suppose that in looking back on his own life, and on the lives of others, he can clearly discern, that all disappointments and miseries, can be traced to misapprehension of the purposes for which life was given ; and that if he, and others, had been better instructed, and had observed proper rules, of conduct, life might have been far more useful, individually, and socially :

Suppose he should think that the errors of life may be referred to defective instruction in *youth ;* and that the most important of all teaching is that, which has been most neglected, namely, HOW TO

LIVE ; and that all other teaching, when *this* is neglected, tends, as readily, to individual and social evil, as to individual and social good :

Suppose it to be obvious that excellence in professional pursuit, in mechanic arts, and in all the sciences, depends on knowing and observing *accurate rules*, might it not follow, that there may be rules for *living*, applicable to all who live, as certainly as that the atmosphere is necessary to all who live by breathing :

Suppose it should be perceived, that in all those actions which are adapted to give *pleasure*, and to make human beings satisfied with themselves, and with each other, there are rules, which, if well observed, would make of life a *beneficent gift*, to be dutifully acknowledged :

Then, would it be assuming too much, to offer the result of examination, though begun in mere speculative curiosity, in the hope that it might have some influence on the *young*, and lead them to some better knowledge of the purposes intended in human life ?

It is admitted by all, that there is a *science* in the conduct of human life. It is believed that the teaching of this science should begin, as soon as any other teaching begins.

Teaching, in all things that are worth learning, is conducted by a series of rules, the application of which is not known to the pupil when he begins his course of instruction. If one should desire to make his son a practical ship builder, for example, the son would be placed where he could see the rules carried into effect, which would successively lead him to the attainment of the intended object. At the expiration of his apprenticeship, he would be able to build a ship by the application of the scientific and practical rules wherein he had been instructed, and in *no other way.* If he find, in any case, that he has erred, he would consider whether he understood his rule, and whether it had been rightly used, and would correct his own errors. Morals must be taught in like manner. The object of this volume is so to teach; that is, to show, that there are moral rules, and their reasonable foundation; and, also, that these rules are not for one, or two classes of persons, but equally for all the members of society.

It is well known that there are persons who maintain, that the general diffusion of knowledge tends rather to disorder society, than to regulate it for the better. They doubt, especially, as to *that* education which raises young persons above the condition wherein they may find themselves in adult life; they assert that desires and expectations are thus excited which cannot be satisfied; and that the good which might have been had, with more limited information, is lost, without compensation for the loss. This opinion must be founded on the exclusion of all instruction in philosophical views of human life, which have their authenticity in just views of Christian revelation. Can any sensible man maintain, that a cultivator of the earth, or that an artificer in materials which come from the earth, will be disqualified to pursue his vocations contentedly, and profitably, because he is well informed as to the real condition of the human race, the action of matter on matter, the true causes of (what is called) the inequality of social life, and the true principles of social union? Admit, that mere knowledge, which has no chastening of moral teaching is mischievous, dangerous, selfish ; yet, so chastened, it becomes enlightening, and consoling, wherever and whatever human condition may be. The law of morality is alike applicable to all men. It is a heavenly light, which shines in the retired apartment of the philosopher, in the halls of legislation, on the bench of justice, in the sacred desk, on the fields of the farmer, on the work bench of the mechanic, in the domestic circle, in the social assembly, in the cottage and palace, in the chamber of the sick, and which even sheds its beam before the startling step, and on the grim visage of DEATH.

There may be persons who are of opinion, that no system of moral teaching deserves notice, unless it be founded on that peculiar creed which is *the right one.* What difference, as to morals, can it make, whether a person maintain one, or another, of the many constructions which are given to the BIBLE ? Whether one believe that a just and inexorable JUDGE pronounces awful punishment, and forever, on guilty man ; or that there is a merciful and beneficent FATHER, who exacts obedience to his laws, and who punishes transgression, and who has pleasure in beholding life well spent, the law of morals, as to earthly being, must be the same. The moral system, herein proposed, applies to any creed, and every creed, alike. It leaves to every one his own creed, only insisting that *there can be but one true system of moral laws for all men.*

All that this volume assumes to do is, to demonstrate that there is a SUPREME BEING ; that there is a created universe ; that man has his proper place therein ; that by the mere light of reason, man *may* have an immortal spirit ; that through Christian revelation, this is certainly so : that as man properly belongs to this system of being, and is immortal, there must be rules of conduct for him, in this life; that he can know what these rules are; and that if he know them, and obey them, he attains to his best condition on earth.

NOTE. The Words of a *school* book should be proper words, and properly used. Two or three words are used in this book, which some writers may not use; as responsibility for responsableness; accountability, for accountableness. These are *English* words. Difference in termination, does not in this case make a difference in meaning. If any rule is violated in preferring the one termination to the other, it is only that of taste. Sound, and ease in pronouncing, have led to a preference.

Whether it be best to write participles with double consonants, is questionable. The rule of grammarians, that the double consonants are to be used or not, a sa syllable of the word is accented or not, is unsatisfactory, and not easily applied. *Referred*, for example, is so written in obedience to this rule. The last *r* in this word is useless, in speaking, and writing. The present usage has been conformed to; but, sound, saving of space and labor, and appearance, are thought to be very sufficient reasons, why it should not have been.

A few errors of the press were not noticed in time to be corrected, before the plates were cast. They are, however, such as to be easily discerned, and corrected, by any one who uses this book.

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THE

MORAL CLASS BOOK.

CHAPTER I

Introduction.

Every thoughtful person finds that inquiries arise in his mind of this nature, What am I? Whence am I? For what purpose do I exist? What is this which is called life? What is the power of thinking? Will the consciousness of being cease when this life ends? If not, will that consciousness relate to the acts done in this life? If so, in what manner, and with what consequences? If I doubt what answers I must give to these questions, why do I doubt? Is it beyond my power to remove my doubts? If I believe nothing of a future state of being as a consequence of the present being, have I done what I ought to do, to inform myself whether this be so or not? If I have a sentiment of being liable to account in a future life for my conduct in this, is it a mere sentiment, or is it founded in reason, and binding on me as a conviction, from which I cannot free myself?

Inquiries also arise in many minds of this nature: If there be a Supreme Being who created and who governs the universe, and who is supremely good and wise, why are the good and wise on earth, sometimes subjected to suffering and to sorrow? Why is there, to such persons, so much of pain in body and in mind? Why do disappointments and afflictions fall on those who strive to perform their duty in all things? Why do not the punishments of divine justice fall on those who violate the laws of the Supreme Being? Why is it, that worldly prosperity, respect, and honor, are often bestowed on those who violate all the laws which the righteous Judge of all the earth must have prescribed?

Why is it that man is so commonly the bitter and relentless enemy of man? Why is it that he hazards the destruction of his own property, his own liberty, and even his own life, to destroy property, liberty, and life in others? Why is it that we take pleasure in depreciating the good qualities of others, and in presenting their faults, follies, and errors, to the notice of those who were before ignorant of them? Why do we feel emotions of dissatisfaction when others prosper, and regard the welfare of others as though it were a wrong done to ourselves? Why do we mourn over that which is past and which cannot be recalled; and tremble at that which has not come, and which may never come? Why is it that kind acts done to others are frequently forgotten by them; and sometimes regarded by them as a grievous burthen; and sometimes repaid by acts of unkindness, and reproach, and even of injury? Why is it that so much of human life is spent in vain and profitless pursuits? Why is it that when disabled and suffering, in body or mind, that we can so rarely console ourselves with the fact, that we did not cause our own distress? Why is it that family connexion (seemingly ordained as a necessary condition of human life) is so often a cause of irritation and vexation? Why are children sometimes inclined to regard parents rather as tyrannical and heartless rulers, than as affectionate and worthy governors; and why are parents sometimes led to regret that they have given birth to offspring, who are fastened on them by ties which cannot be broken? Why is it that unceasing parental care, and the wisest precaution in rearing children, are repaid by that bitter disappointment which must be hidden within the heart, and wept over unseen by any human eye? Why is it that when parental care has been successfully applied, and when we see the coming forth of fruits, intellectual and moral, that in one little moment the blast of destruction passes over, and the remaining act is, to close the sepulchre on the remnant of lost hopes and joys?

What is that principle of our nature that compels us to some sort of action; and which will drive us into such as is hurtful to ourselves and to others, if we are not directed to those of an opposite character? Whence comes that sense of disappointment when success has crowned our pursuits? Why is it that one, in the enjoyment of bodily ease, and of worldly wealth, and apparently in command of abundance in those things which the world calls good, and for which mortals submit to unceasing toil, is, sometimes, the most disgusted of all men with life; finding no pleasure in the smiling earth, in the busy haunts, nor any good under the sun? Why is it that men need forcible and irresistible powers of government among themselves? Why do those who know that power is difficult to hold, and more difficult to use aright, earnestly desire it? Why is it that those who have power, either do not, or cannot, use it honorably to themselves, and beneficially for others? Why are so many of the human race subjected to the most miserable poverty; so many wretched from the misuse, and abuse of bodily and mental power; so many deprived of personal liberty; and so many hung up between the heavens and the earth by order of their fellow-men, in the presence of curious thousands, who laugh at the exhibition of death, admire the firmness, or despise the weakness of one who, in full possession of all his faculties, knows, that within a few moments he shall be dead by violence?—How does it happen that good and virtuous men, in reflecting on the change which is soon to come, and when the places that have known them will know them no more forever, do feel a sense of doubt, and even of despondency, as to their future destiny; and would gladly be assured that all they have habitually thought to be true, is unquestionably so?

Inquiries of this nature may be indefinitely multiplied. It is of little use to make them, if there be no answers to them. They have been answered, in general, among the learned; and in a learned manner. Can they be answered to the comprehension of the many, and especially of the young? Let us suppose that no small part of all that we see of folly, error, and crime, and consequent suffering and misery, arises, not from the laws of the Creator, but from ignorance of these laws, or wilful disobedience of them; then it would follow, that the remedy lies in making these laws known. When and how is this to be done? Not by leaving to each individual to find out the meaning and force of these laws through painful experience, and when the consequences of ignorance and disobedience are already fastened on him; but to make them known, before the responsible action of adult life begins. If there be rules for human life, which come from a Lawgiver who cannot err; if these rules are laid down for subjects who are entrusted with the liberty of obeying or disobeying, it is inadmissible to suppose that these rules cannot be found out, and made known to all who are to be affected by them.

To disclose these rules and make them operative, is a duty to ourselves, and to each other. The mode of doing it may be differently thought of by different persons. That which seems most likely to be effective is to address human reason, in a simple and intelligible manner, and in such manner that the opening mind may comprehend the truths which are taught. Such is the purpose of this work. As these pages are intended for the use of children, we shall address only their own good sense. They will be called on to judge by the light of reason wherewith their Creator has blessed them. If the intention with which this work is undertaken be proper and practicable, those who will bestow the time and attention necessary to that end, may, it is humbly hoped, be enabled to answer many of the inquiries before suggested, so far as the enlightened minds, which have left a record of their thoughts, can assist and guide us in this search after truth.

The design of this volume, then, is to prove, that there is a SUPREME BEING, however incomprehensible that Being may be to the human mind; that HE is the Creator, the Preserver, and Governor of the universe; that HE created man as we see man to exist, in his earthly frame, in his physical action, in his intellectual powers, and with an immortal spirit; that HE ordained laws for man's Government, on the observance of which earthly good depends: That life on earth is connected, for good, or for ill, with a future life: and that *death* is the inevitable, though awful change, ordained to end mortal being, and to begin that which will endure forever.

CHAPTER II.

On the Nature of Evidence.

1. IT is intended to offer evidence, of sufficient certainty to constitute *proof*, of the propositions which have been, and which may be stated, in this volume. There may be some propositions which are only matters of opinion. It is therefore deemed expedient, if not indispensable, that the nature of evidence should be defined. It is intended to maintain all essential propositions, by *intuitive*, or by *demonstrative* evidence, or by both.

2. *Intuitive* evidence is that which is derived through the senses. Every one acts from the conviction that his senses are to be relied on. This sort of evidence is so called, from the Latin word *intueor*, which implies, *seeing by the mind*. The mind perceives, instantaneously, through the senses, whether it is day or night, whether a sound is pleasing or terrifying, whether an effluvia is grateful or offensive, whether an object is smooth or rough, whether a liquid is agreeable or disgusting.

Intuitive evidence is also had from long continued experience; as when one has been accustomed to apply certain demonstrative rules in art, or science, he may perceive, *intuitively*, their application, as cases arise. So, also, one may have an intuitive perception, whether an action be moral or immoral, becoming or unworthy. Some persons acquire the power of deciding, intuitively, on moral and intellectual qualities, by using their senses of hearing and seeing, as to the individual who is the subject of their observation. It must be admitted, that such persons have occasion, sometimes, to correct first impressions.

3. *Demonstrative* evidence, is that which is used when something known is applied, to arrive at that which is unknown. Demonstrative comes from the Latin word *demonstro*, which signifies to demonstrate, or to show. A great proportion of our knowledge depends on this evidence. How much a particular object measures, or how much it weighs, is known by using some rule of measure, or standard of weight. There are known or admitted rules in all philosophy, and in all the sciences. There are rules in manners, morals, and in religion. If one would know whether an act done, or proposed to be done, be right or wrong, he must make it *certain* by the application of some acknowledged rule. All that is not certain, intuitively, through the senses, by repeated experience, or often applied rules, can be made certain only by the use of some acknowledged rule or principle which is certain in itself. One comprehensive example will show this to be so: A ship has been driven about on the ocean, for some days by a storm. It is again calm and the sun reappears. The navigators desire to know where they are. Their ship, the sea, the skies, the sun, are intuitively known to them, but these objects would be known to them, in like manner, and the appearance of them would be precisely the same, if they were some hundreds of miles, either way, from their actual position. To know where they are, on the wide ocean, resort must be had to *demonstration*.

4. Mariners know how to ascertain their distance, north or south from the equator, and how far they are east or west, of the meridian line, which passes through the Royal Observatory of Greenwich, near London. *Meridian* is made from two Latin words which signify the middle of the day. An imaginary or geographical line is drawn from the north to the south pole, on the surface of the globe. A line is supposed to be drawn along the Heavens corresponding with, or parallel with, the line on the globe. When this line in the Heavens comes to the middle of the sun, it is noon, or middle of the day. By a *demonstration*, conducted with the help of mathematical instruments called a quadrant, or sextant, (from the number of degrees which these instruments respectively measure,) and by the use of scientific tables, contained in a book,* always carried to sea, the question as to *latitude* can be easily answered. The instrument is used to ascertain how high the sun is at noon, above the natural horizon of the observer; that is, what is the sun's altitude, measuring by degrees. The day of the month, being known, the tables, in the Practical Navigator, are consulted to know, what the sun's *declination* is on that day; that is, how far he seems to have gone, from the equator, north or south, on that day. Twice in the year, (20th or 21st of March, and 22d or 23d of September,) the sun seems to rise exactly east, and to set exactly west, or in the line of the equator; on all other days he seems to have declined, or gone north, or south, of the equator. The altitude of the sun being known, his declination for that day being known, then, if the ship and the sun be north of the equator, the degrees of the sun's declination are subtracted from the degrees of the sun's altitude, and the remainder from 90 degress, and the remainder, then, is the latitude of the ship. If the ship be north of the equator, and the sun's declination be

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* The book used by all American mariners, and probably by many English mariners, is the work of Dr. *Bowditch*, called the Practical Navigator. It is, like all other works of this eminent philosopher, perfect for its purpose.

south of the equator, the degrees of declination are added to the degrees of altitude, and the sum is deducted from 90 degrees, and the remainder is the ship's latitude. When the ship is south of the equator, the same rules, reversed, give the latitude. Though this seems very simple, yet to make what mariners call *an observation of the sun*, with accuracy, requires, at least, knowledge how to use the instruments and tables, which the skilful and scientific have prepared for demonstration.

5. The question, *where are we?* is only half answered, because it is obvious that whether the ship be in the Pacific, or the Atlantic ocean, the observation of the sun gives the same result, the latitude of that line, being the same all around the globe. Another *demonstration* must be made, to know the distance from the meridian line of Greenwich, (which is that adopted by the practical navigator) and whether the distance be east or west, therefrom. This can be done by complicated calculations, founded on observations of the moon, and of certain fixed stars, called lunar observations, from *luna* the Latin for moon. But the usual mode is the simple one of depending on a chronometer, (a word made out of two Greek words, signifying a measurer of time, in which sense all timepieces are chronometers) which is set at the true time of the place from which the ship departs, and which keeps that time throughout the voyage. When the sun is at the meridian, wherever the ship may be, it is then noon where she is. Then noon at that place is to be compared with noon, by the chronometer, at the place of departure. If the chronometer show the hour of eleven, the ship is 15 degrees east of the port of departure; if it show the hour of one, the ship is 15 degrees west of the port of departure; and so of all other hours, and parts of hours, allowing fifteen degrees to an hour. Thus human ingenuity has enabled the mariner, (who may be in a thousand far different positions, in all of which he beholds *intuitively* the same sea, and the same skies,) to *demon-*

strate the exact point of the globe at which he certainly is.

If one will take the trouble to observe what he does himself, and what others around him are doing, in the various employments of life, he will learn how much of human thought and action, may depend on *demonstrative* evidence.

6. Rules are applied to all human conduct. If one does right, he conforms to some rule; if he does wrong, he violates some rule. This is so in all stations, and conditions, in private or public life, throughout society. In religious belief, right and wrong, or duty and disobedience, depend on what the religious belief is, and on the rules founded in that belief. One may be very sincere in that belief, and may strictly conform to the rules which he recognizes, but he may be essentially wrong in both. Of this, however, he is to judge. No one can read with another's eyes, nor perceive and reason with another's mind. Not so with *morals*. They are the same for all men. However ignorant, or debased men may be, there is still the same law of right, and justice. To what extent they do wrong, who know not, and could not know, how to do right, is a question independent of the *existence* of the law.

7. *Probability* is the third sort of evidence, by which is meant, that in any supposed case in which one finds himself called on to act, or to decide, and is in doubt, he must infer, from all that appears to him to be certain, how he shall act, or how he shall decide. He must gather and apply all the reasons he can, for and against the act he would do, or would not do, and be governed, the one way, or the other, by the reasons which weigh most. When one would form an opinion, and has no intuitive evidence to guide him, nor any known rule or principle which he can apply, he can only judge of the *probability* of a result. Suppose one were desirous to know what a youth of *fourteen*, would prove to be at the age of *twenty-one*. There are some facts, in such a case, which are intuitively known,

and some which may be known by demonstration. All these facts are to be taken into view, comprising, among others, the youth's physical frame, his disposition, his manners, his attainments, his intellectual powers, his habits. Then the *ifs*, or chances, are to be taken into view, and among them, these ; *if* his health continue, *if* his willingness to be instructed continue, *if* he make a good use of his time, *if* he fall into no temptation from evil example, *if* he feel the obligation of the moral rules which are prescribed to him, the probabilities or chances are, that he will be an honor to his family connexions, and an ornament to society. However probable it may seem that all these *ifs* will be solved favorably, there is nothing *certain* as to their being so.

7. Suppose a youth of fourteen to be a disobedient, idle, worthless person ; is there any *probability* that he will become a worthy man ? The probabilities are against his becoming so. Yet, it is not *certain* that he will not. He may discern the error of his ways : he may be put in the way of good instruction, and may profit by it : he may escape from evil associates, and evil habits : he may awaken to a sense of self-respect, and sincerely repent of his follies: he may delight in relief from his opprobrious course, and may become a truly worthy, and justly respected person. But, the *probability* is against him.

8. *Presumptive* evidence, is the fourth sort, on which human opinions and actions are founded. This word presumptive, is derived from the two Latin ones, *præ,* meaning before, and *sumo*, meaning to take, and is applied, as to evidence, thus :—One knows, or assumes, that certain facts are proved; then it follows, therefrom, that other facts must be admitted.

Thus, if a stranger in a town or city, desired to know the points of compass ; if he *presumed*, that he was facing the north, or any other cardinal point, it would follow where the other points were. If one has received a favor from some unknown person ;

and if he know but one person who had the power, and the will, to do that favor, it may be presumed that the favor came from that person. If one were seen flying from a house with a deadly weapon in his hand, and a person were found to have been slain in that house, it may be presumed that the fugitive was the author of the crime which had been committed. But, in all these, and in all other cases, to which presumptive evidence may be applied, there may be error.

9. The difference between demonstrative and presumptive evidence is, as to the former, that if the rules or principles be in themselves certain, and are truly applied, the result is certain. In presumptive evidence, however clear the facts may be from which the inference is drawn, that inference may be erroneous; and however clear the inference may be from the facts *presumed* to be true, the presumption, as to the facts, may be erroneous.—Suppose a crime to have been committed, and A. brings together such facts, as to raise an irresistible *presumption* that the crime was committed by B. It may, nevertheless, be that A. is the guilty person, and B. innocent; and that A. contrived the *presumed* facts, to throw the guilt on another, and escape himself. In many of our daily transactions, and sometimes in very serious ones, presumptive evidence is the only guide given to us.

10. Among the reasons why there are so many disappointments, sorrows, and vexations in life, are these: As to *intuitive* evidence, the senses may be imperfect, or they may not have been disciplined, and the perceptions obtained through them are erroneous; the mind may be feeble, or undisciplined, and incapable of receiving correct impressions; or all these causes may combine. In many cases, persons judge of evidence under prejudices derived from various sources, and according to their actual condition and qualities; and frequently, one judges of evidence when blinded by self-love, misconceptions of interest, or passionate excitement, in which cases, it is found, at last, that he has

only been preparing for himself, causes of penitence.

In *demonstrative* evidence, sometimes improper or inaccurate rules are taken; or good ones are unskilfully or erroneously used; or both causes of error, unite. This occurs, not only in merely physical demonstrations, or measurements of things obvious to the senses, and in things of science, but also in the *great concern of life*, moral and religious deportment.

11. In *probable* evidence error arises from taking too few, or too many, or unsuitable materials, into the computation; or from using all that should be taken, injudiciously; or, from both causes. But more commonly, perhaps, especially among young persons, from acting thoughtlessly, and without any evidence, but only from sudden impulses. This is one obvious reason why children are so much less happy than they should be, at that time of life when they should be happiest. Yet, it is not the children only who are to be commiserated in this respect; for parents, guardians, and instructers, must share in the blame, or misfortune, whichsoever it may be.

12. In *presumptive* evidence, as commonly used, is found a prolific source of human error, folly, and of consequent sufferings. *That*, is taken to be true which is not true, and, consequently, the inference is false. The facts taken to be true may be so, but the inferences drawn from them, may be entirely false. Every moral person must see how deep is the obligation to know, whether that which he *presumes* to be true is satisfactorily known to him to be so; and the still deeper obligation to feel assured, that he draws a just inference from that which his reason and his conscience, allow him to regard as truth.

As before intimated, we hope to show, that all the material propositions in this volume, are maintained on that intuitive or demonstrative evidence, to which the common sense of mankind will assent. As to all which must depend on probability and presumption, every one has that liberty which belongs equally to all, of weighing the evidence offered, and of drawing his own conclusions.

CHAPTER III.

Proofs of the Existence of the SUPREME BEING.

13. THERE *is a* SUPREME BEING, *who is the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of the Universe.* Those who read the BIBLE, and who believe what it teaches, need no proof of this proposition. But such belief may be entertained, either from common impressions, without regard to proof; or from having been accustomed to regard those with respect, who are seen to treat the *Bible* with reverence, and who profess to live according to its rules. It is not intended to take any thing to be unquestionably true, merely because it is said to be so. The solemn and awful truths contained in the Bible itself, depend on the evidence of their truth. And although it is the express purpose of this volume to make the truths of the Bible clear and unquestionable, and as being, at the same time, the true exposition of morals, and rational Christianity, yet, for the present purpose, we lay the Bible out of the question, to be answered, which is, Whether enlightened reason can arrive, independently of the scriptures, at the certainty that there is a SUPREME BEING?

It is not known, intuitively, that there is a Supreme Being, as it is so known to us, that there are other beings. No one has seen the Deity, nor is his personal existence known to us, as we know each other. But his existence, power, and government may be known to us, by necessary and clear *demonstration*, through facts and truths, which are as undeniable as our own existence.

14. Does any one doubt that there is an existing material universe? Does any one doubt that he is a part of that universe? Did any human being form himself? Could any one of those from whom

he sprung, form himself? If intellectual, spiritual man could not be originally the Creator of himself, could the material world, which is without intellect or spirit, create itself, and subject itself to the laws which we know, from experience, do govern it? The natural universe could come into existence in but one of two ways. 1. It created itself, out of nothing. 2. It was created by some Being who had power to create it. Human reason rejects the first supposition. The second, therefore, must be admitted. To this assertion it may possibly be replied, No. The supposition of creation is not proved.

15. It may be asserted that all things may have existed from eternity, just as we see them. What intelligible thought does this assertion communicate to a reasonable mind?—What is eternity? Can the human mind form any conception of eternity? Add thousands to thousands, and millions to millions, till the power of computation is exhausted, and it comes to no more than a succession of years. Men are incapable of judging of duration but by measures of successive periods of time. Let us ascend to the highest possible duration of which we can conceive, we shall find a material universe existing there; the question would be the same then, as it is now: How came it into being? Did it create itself? The answer to such inquiries has always been, in every age of the world, by the most exalted minds, that the universe could not be its own creator. When, and in what manner it was created, may not be intended for us to know. It is enough for us to know, that it had a Creator.

16. It is among the deplorable errors of our race, that in those things which are incomprehensible by mortals, we reason on the agency of the ALMIGHTY, as though it must be likened to our own. We are utterly incompetent to form any conception of the DEITY in this state of being, but through his works; and by his revelation of himself, made in such manner as to be level with our humble and finite powers. Our duty, then, is to learn all we can of HIM, of his

majesty and power, his beneficence and laws, from the contemplation of his works. Every step which we take in exploring the works of the MOST HIGH, forces upon us, more and more strongly, the conviction that all which we are made capable of understanding, proceeds from infinite wisdom, and from awful authority. We have only to trust, in this examination, to our own senses, and to the inferences which we draw from what they disclose to us, to be assured of the existence, of the presence, and of the government of such a Being.

17. There are few who have had the benefit of instruction, probably few who are sensible of existence, who have not raised their eyes, in a cloudless night, to the starry firmament, and who have not felt some emotion, however undefined, that all which they see there, was the work of some incomprehensible Being, and that it continues to exist in pursuance of his laws. Familiar as this continually recurring spectacle may be, it is ever magnificent and ever new, and ever fills the mind with astonishment and awe. Examined by the light of science, and contemplated in its systematic regularity, the feeling of reverence and awe sinks deeper and deeper;—and well has it been said,

'An undevout astronomer is mad!'

18. How wonderful is it that such a comparatively insignificant being as he who moves on the surface of this little globe, and whose mortal frame is held to it by the irresistible power of attraction, should be able to foretell, with unerring certainty, the very moment when the light of the sun will be shut out from the earth by the intervening of its satellite: nay, the precise moment when a comet was visible from our little globe at a time long past, when he was not in being himself; and when it will be again visible, when he must be gone, and perhaps unremembered on the earth.

19. Omitting always the light derived from revelation, in the present view of the subject, we know, in these days, the Author of the Universe only by

approaching towards him in the contemplation of his works. In doing this it will be demonstrated to all rational minds, that everywhere the proofs of an infinitely wise and powerful Deity are clearly disclosed.

CHAPTER IV.

Proof drawn from the Firmament.

20. The usual course of instruction in our schools makes known only that part of the firmament which is called the solar system, and of which our own planet is a part. This system, it will be remembered, comprises the sun, the eleven planets, the two rings and seven moons of one of them (Saturn); the four moons of another (Jupiter); and the moon of our own planet. All these planets have the sun for the centre of their system, and seem to us to be dependent on him for light and heat, and are well known to move around him with the most exact regularity, while the moons of such of these planets as have them, move with the like regularity around them. Each of these planets, and each of their satellites, revolve in measured time as they move. What must that power be, which appointed to the unconsumed and undiminished sun, his place, and to the planets, which move around him, their unchangeable orbits? The sun is 520 times larger than all the planetary globes which revolve around him, and one million 300 thousand times larger than our own globe. Such is the power of this luminary that the planet Herschel is held in its orbit, lighted and warmed by his brilliancy at the distance of 1800 millions of miles from his surface. Who upholds these orbs in their paths, and prevents them from rushing into one common ruin? If it be answered, it is the law of their being; who, then, ordained that law?

21. Besides the sun, and the planets which revolve around him, there belong to the same system, comets, or hairy stars, so called from the Latin word for hair, *coma.* The design, purpose, magnitude, and motion of these erratic bodies, are incomprehensible by mortals. Yet, the learned have observed them to the extent of knowing that they have their destined paths, and move with exact conformity to the laws of their being. One of them is known to be 11,200 millions of miles from the sun, at its greatest distance, and to move at the rate of 880,000 miles in one hour, when nearest to him. The tail of the comet which appeared in 1680 was computed by Sir Isaac Newton to be 80 millions of miles in length!

22. Magnificent and glorious as the solar system may be,—what is it in magnitude and distance, when compared with the numberless worlds and systems beyond it! In every clear night the naked eye may discover nearly a thousand fixed stars, which are supposed to be such luminaries as the sun.—If all these luminaries are suns, and have their attendant planets as we know our sun to have, it would comprise a mass of matter equal to 1320 millions of globes of the size of our earth. The assistance which the human eye has obtained in extending its view into the works of the Almighty by artificial means, discloses to us the certainty, that orbs exist at such a distance from us, that a cannon-ball moving at the rate of 480 miles an hour, would require nine millions of years to pass from some of them to the earth. The sun is computed to be 95 millions of miles from the earth; yet in eight minutes and a quarter, the light reaches the earth from that luminary. What must be the magnitude of luminous bodies, which are seen with the help of glasses at such a distance, that it would require some years for light to come from them to the earth? Telescopes, (so called from two Greek words, which mean *seeing at a distance,*) have been made, which magnify objects 200 times. Thus, if the moon be looked at, it is brought 200 times nearer than it is, and mountains and cavities are clearly dis-

tinguished. But such is the distance of the fixed stars, that when seen by the help of such telescopes, they still appear no larger than brilliant points.*

23. It is said by some modern astronomers, that stars are seen at such distance, that light must have left them four hundred years before it strikes on our earth. Beyond all that is now known to us to exist, there may be still other systems, and all of them in motion according to the laws assigned to them ; all of them preserved and governed by one awful incomprehensible Power. All of them may be, and probably are, the abodes of intelligent beings, capable of comprehending and adoring the Universal God. Where shall the imagination fix the boundaries of creation ? From whatever point on the surface of our sphere the eye is directed towards the firmament, worlds on worlds, systems on systems, are disclosed. Are we in the centre of the universe ? Are we in some remote extremity of the universe ? What is the centre, what is an extremity of the universe ? If there be a centre, if there be limits to the works of the Almighty, what is there beyond them ; and who and what exists, where the Almighty Creator does not exist and reign ?

24. If one is astonished at the magnitude and distance of these luminaries, how much more so must he be, when he tries to think of them collectively, and in motion ! It is known, that like the substances on the earth, they are held by the law of attraction ; and also known what strength it requires to move a weight of a few hundred pounds. If one could suppose our comparatively small earth to be a perfectly smooth ball on a plain, it is believed that it would require a mechanical force which no human mind can compute to give it any motion. Yet it is known that it moves at the rate of 68,000 miles in every hour, revolving as it flies, yet so easily and surely, that there is no perception of its motion. The planet Mercury moves at the rate of 1750 miles in a single minute ; a motion which may be measured

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* Treatise on Astronomy, by Professor Farrar, Cambridge, Mass. page 30.

by supposing a ball to pass from America to Europe in one minute and three quarters, or around our earth in seventeen minutes.

25. If no more were known than the motion of our own little planet, we should have *proof* that Creation was *designed*. The north pole of the earth, during all its evolutions, points nearly in a straight line to the north star, which is the termination of the astronomical, or imaginary pole, formed by supposing the central line of the earth, (from the south pole to the north pole,) to be continued to the north star. Around this polar line, the earth daily turns, making its annual circuit of 596 millions of miles. So immeasurable is the distance of the earth from this northern pole, that there are no means of measuring its deviation from one straight line, although the diameter of its orbit is nearlv 200 millions of miles. Thus, if one could take a wire a million of miles in length, and pass one of its extremities through the centre of an orange, and then move the orange in a circle, the diameter of which is one mile, the whole length of wire would deviate so little from the same straight line as not to be susceptible of measurement. All the luminaries above, *seem* to revolve around the same polar line. It is in consequence of the earth's diurnal revolution, and of its annual circuit around the sun, that there is day and night over the whole surface of the globe, of continually varying inequality as to length, and that the vicissitudes of the seasons occur. But if the earth's own revolution could be in the precise line of the equator, there would be days and nights of equal length in all latitudes; there would ever be burning summer at the equator; continual spring in our latitudes, and endless winter in those of the north. Happily, the earth does not so revolve. If a ball be thrown through the air, it may be supposed to revolve on an axis at right angles with the line in which it is moving. The earth revolves on an axis which lies across its path, and in an inclination thereto, exceeding one sixteenth of a circle, that is, about twenty-three and a half degrees out of 360,

into which all geographical and astronomical circles are divided. It is to be observed, that this is precisely that inclination of the axis to the line of the orbit, which is adapted to make the most favorable distribution of day and night, and of the varying seasons, over the whole of the earth.*

26. If the magnitude, the distance, the brightness, the motion of the spheres of the firmament, and all of these together, speak not to human reason in the name of THE ALMIGHTY, then may man number himself with the reptiles of the earth, and lie down with them in the dust of their common mother. Who that claims to have the use of his senses and the exercise of his reason, will venture to say, that these things are not so? Will he be hardy enough to say, that these are the works of accident or chance? If so, how came they into being, to be the subjects of accident and chance? What are accident and chance, when spoken of in relation to organized systems, which move by unerring laws, through endless ages?

CHAPTER V.

Proofs drawn from the Globe.

27. IF we limit our attention to the Globe on which we live, and consider its connexion with and dependence on the sun, its own atmosphere, its waters; and consider its objects, and animals, whether beneath or on its surface; wherever, and however minutely we push our inquiries, we shall find, and no less in the least of the animal or vegetable kingdoms, than in the glorious orbs above us, irresistible proofs of the existence and government of the Deity.

28. On the nature and properties of the common air, which surrounds this Globe, volumes might be written, and every truth contained in them would serve to prove the power and wisdom of its Creator. The progress of science, by actual experiment, in

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* See annexed explanation.

NOTE.

ON THE EARTH'S MOTION.

Among the thousands of instances which might be cited to prove *design* in the created universe, that one in which the inhabitants of the earth are most deeply concerned, is the mode of revolution, daily and yearly, of the earth itself. On the earth's motion depends the equal distribution of light over all the earth's surface, and that warmth whereon vegetation depends; and on vegetation depends all animal life. An attempt will now be made to present this subject in such manner that a child may understand it, with the aid of illustrations taken from familiar objects.

Suppose a smooth pine table, seven feet square, placed with its sides towards the four cardinal points. Divide the table into four equal parts, by drawing one line from the north to the south side, and one line from the east to the west side. Take a common hoop of wood, seven feet in diameter, formed into a perfect circle. Mark the hoop into 360 equal parts, (or degrees); cut the hoop into two equal parts, where the first, and the 360th degrees meet, and where the 180th and 181st degrees meet. Place that half of the hoop which contains the first 180 degrees, perpendicularly over the north and south line of the table, so that the first degree will touch the north end of that line, and the 180th degree the south end of that line, and so that there will be an arch over that line divided, or marked, into 180 equal parts or degrees. Insert two pins in the table, three feet apart, in the north and south line, and each of them 18 inches distant from the point where the two lines cross each other. Take a thread nine feet long, tie the ends together, cast the thread over the pins, stretch the thread tight with a pencil, so as to form the thread into a triangle of equal sides; pass the pencil all around the pins, keeping the thread tight, the pencil making a mark on the table as it goes, and it will form a figure, nearly in a circle, which is called an *ellipse*. Make a hole through the table, at the centre of the ellipse. Tie a thread around the hoop at the 66½ degree (accurately 66-32-60ths) and extend this thread to the centre of the ellipse, and continue it, in the same direction, through the hole in the centre, to the floor, and fasten it there. Cut out the entire ellipse and remove it from the table, leaving the central thread as it was. The table will now represent the plane, or level of the earth's orbit, or path around the sun. The ellipse will represent the orbit. The sun's place in this orbit will be in the same plane, or level, at a point northwardly of the centre of the ellipse, and westwardly of the north and south line. The central thread of the ellipse, if extended in the same straight line, northwardly, would come very near the north star; and if extended southwardly in the same straight line, the whole length of thread would represent that great polar line, around which the sun, moon, and stars, seem, to an observer on the earth, daily to revolve, because the earth does, in fact, turn completely over in every twenty-four hours.

Having found the earth's orbit, the sun's place, and the relation which the earth's orbit bears to the north star, and the great polar line, we have to find the earth's place, and its motions.

Pass a knitting needle through a small round apple, beginning at the stem, and passing through the exact middle of the core, leaving the apple midway of the needle. Tie a thread around the thickest part of the apple at right angles with the needle, to represent the equatorial line of the earth. Place the apple in the ellipse, at the centre of the north side, so that the thread around the apple can just be seen, when the eye is looking along the exact level of the table. Incline the needle over towards the north, so as to bring it exactly parallel with the central thread of the ellipse, and then mark the degree on the hoop to which the needle points, and it will be found to be 23 and a half degrees (accurately 23 28-60ths) below the central thread of the ellipse, where it is tied to the hoop. This inclination of the needle shows what is called the obliquity of the earth's axis, (which is the needle) to the plane or level (which is the table's surface) of the earth's orbit. The apple being held in this position, place a sharp instrument on the north and south line on the table, so as to enter the skin of the apple, and turn the apple round, the needle being kept parallel with the central thread, and the sharp instrument making a line all around the apple; it will be found to describe a curved line, crossing the equatorial thread, at two opposite points, one half of which curved line will be on one side of the thread, and the other half on the other. This line, marked by the sharp instrument, will be the *ecliptic* line seen on common globes. Move the apple round the whole extent of the ellipse, keeping the needle always precisely parallel with the central thread, and causing the apple to turn 365 times on the needle in its circuit. If a lamp were placed, nearly in the centre of the ellipse (as before stated for the place of the sun) the apple would be illumined by the lamp, exactly as the earth is illumined by the sun, throughout the year. The effect would be, that, notwithstanding the earth is a globe, and lighted by a *fixed* body of light, all parts would receive, in the course of the year, an equal degree of light; and, so far as is possible, an equal degree of warmth. Thus the inequality of days and nights is accounted for, by the constant, and gradual change of exposure, of the earth's surface to the sun. From the same cause arises the succession of the seasons. It is impossible to conceive of any other motions of the earth, which would produce the same effects. It is equally impossible to conceive, how the earth could have been better adapted to the production of vegetable being, and, consequently, to the support of animal life, over a greater extent of its surface, than is now known to be the fact. Let any one turn the apple in the ellipse in any manner that he can imagine, and decide, for himself, whether he could make of the earth, a better place of abode for man, over all its surface, than it is now made to be.

Explanation of the Plate. The ellipse, the sun's place, and the twelve representations of the earth, (corresponding with the twelve successive months) are, nearly, the same as they are in nature, with this difference; that the earth's axis, (the line from N. to S.) is represented as being in the same plane, or level, with the orbit; which it is not, as has been before shown. The true inclination cannot be easily represented, in a plate. Suppose the most northern circle to represent the earth's place for the month of *December;* the most western circle, *that* for *March;* the most southern one, *that* for *June;* the most eastern one, *that* for *September.* As the earth turns on its axis, towards the east, 365 times in a year, one half the globe must always be illumined, and the other half, not. The sun's illuminating line moves onward, daily, while night advances in the rear, with equal step; so that when the earth has completed its circuit, all parts of it will have had an equal share of light. While the earth is passing through March, and September, on some day, (about the 21st) the equatorial line must turn directly towards the sun, making equal days and nights over the whole earth. This can occur but twice in the year. The poles are seen to be respectively illumined, and darkened, six months in the year.


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modern times, has enlarged surprisingly our knowledge of the agency of this subtle fluid on animal and vegetable existence. We can touch but sparingly on this abundant topic, and can only select some of the more prominent truths in proof of the proposition.

29. From the Earth's surface, the atmosphere (which is from two Greek words meaning *vapor* and *sphere*) is supposed to extend upwards about 45 miles. It comprises the common air, the electric fluid, fluids that ascend by evaporation, and all substances less heavy than itself. This whole mass is subject to the power of attraction. It goes with the earth in its annual flight, and daily revolution. It is sometimes so still that the lightest substance is unmoved by it; sometimes chilling, and binding in fetters all that it can act upon; sometimes suffocating with its heat; sometimes fanning with its healthy breeze; sometimes scattering pestilence in its transit; sometimes prostrating human abodes; and uprooting the fast holding of the 'gnarled oak.' Subtle and active as it is, its pressure is 15 pounds to every square inch, so that a common sized man sustains a pressure of 32,000 pounds; which would instantly crush him, if it were not from the counter pressure of the air, fluids, and solids, within him. The pressure of the whole atmosphere on the earth, is computed to be five thousand million of millions of tons; a number of which the human mind can form no conception. The components of the common air are ascertained, by very modern experiments, to be two gases, (the word *gas* cannot be otherwise defined, for common purposes, than by the words elastic airy fluid) of which 21 parts in 100 are oxygen, and 79 nitrogen. Oxygen is a word made out of two Greek words signifying *acid*, and *to generate*; and is so called from the power which oxygen has, to form acids. This is supposed to constitute the principle of *vital* air. Nitrogen, is composed of two words from the same language, signifying *nitre*, and *to produce*; which term is intended to describe that part of the air, which produces nitre, which is a salt commonly called salt-petre.

30. Some chemists consider the air to be composed of 21 parts of oxygen, 78 of *azote*, 1 part of carbonic acid, and some atoms of hydrogen; a substance which forms eight parts in nine of common water.* Azote is derived from two Greek words, signifying *depriving of life;* it is that part of the air which is called nitrogen by some chemists. When separated from other parts of the air, the respiration of it is fatal to animal life. The oxygen of air, drawn into the lungs by breathing, is there separated from the other components of the air, and unites with the blood. The nitrogen and hydrogen are emitted from the lungs; and the latter, in cold weather, is seen in the form of vapor; and is so changed by the natural heat of the body. This heat is said to depend on respiration, by which there is a continual accession of oxygen to the system, from the common air. How it is that animal heat is created and continued, (being always greater than the heat of the external air,) has not been accounted for. The most that seems to be known is, that animal heat depends on the circulation of the blood; and this, on respiration.

31. The common air is a general and powerful agent, throughout the whole range of animal and vegetable life. It seems to have been commissioned to keep alive, and to destroy; ever performing each duty, in proper time, and circumstance. Wherever there is motion, the presence of the air seems indispensable. If it contain the principle of animal life, so neither dissolution, nor decomposition, (necessary to the unceasing process of reproduction) can go on without it. Wherever human sagacity can discern its laws of action, they appear to govern uniformly, and inevitably.

32. Science has been able to do little more than

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* This compound is adopted in the *Encyclopædia Americana*, edited by Dr. Francis Lieber, assisted by Edward Wigglesworth, and Thomas G. Bradford; a work of exalted merit. Comparing the price of this work with its pages, it is, perhaps, the cheapest work ever published in this country; and comparing its cost with its value in useful information, decidedly the cheapest. It is a Library in itself, and ought to be in every *reading* family.

to arrive at some knowledge of the qualities and properties of matter, and of their rules of action. It has made no approach to the knowledge of *essence.* Thus, what the air itself is, no one knows. But it is known, that the something in it, which is called oxygen, is the part necessary to combustion, to the conducting and preservation of heat, to the existence, and continuance of animal and vegetable life. Nitrogen has none of these properties; and seems to have been mingled with oxygen, to temper its action. It is like 21 drops of a liquid mingled with 79 drops of a liquid of opposite quality. It is said that if there were only oxygen in the air, it would inflame and consume every thing, even metallic substances. If there were only nitrogen, there could be no flame, no heat; no animal, no vegetable life.

33. Considering the wonderful properties of the common atmosphere, even in the limited knowledge hitherto had of it, one might put on those, who deny Supreme Intelligence, to answer the inquiries: By what power was the air made fit for man, and for all animals on the earth, however, comparatively, great or small: For every member in the countless variety of the vegetable kingdom; and by what power, were all and every one of these adapted to its action?

By whom was that property of the air imparted, which in some yet unknown principle of action can dissipate the hardest substances, and convert the most solid into fluids? And by whom were these substances so formed, as to be subject to such action? It may be more proper to ask, whether these things *could be so,* but through some *Intelligence,* however incomprehensible by man?

CHAPTER VI.

Proofs drawn from the Action of Water.

34. In further support of the proposition, that the material world must have been the work of design,

and that all its parts are necessarily connected and fitted to each other, we have briefly to notice the element of water. It is seen that the air is connected with animal and vegetable life ; so also is water, and both are indispensable. No one is ignorant that if no rain should fall on the earth in our climate, from the commencement of spring to the end of autumn, all vegetable being would perish, and probably most of animated beings.

35. By whose order and will is it, that the waters are gathered into clouds, and poured out upon the earth ? By whose designing is it, that the ocean, to which all rivers flow, is ever of the same fulness ; and that the rivers flow on from year to year from unexhausted fountains ? Who has ordained the ocean to be the fountain of the rains that descend upon it, and of the rivers that render their unceasing tribute to it ? What power was that which planned, and forever keeps in action, the silent, unseen process of evaporation, through which the waters are gathered into clouds, borne by the winds, and commanded to fall on the refreshed and fertilized ground, and to replenish the streams, intended to adorn and beautify the earth, and to minister to the comfort of man, and give scope to his enterprise, and his inventive genius ? What intelligence was that which so apportioned the water to the earth, and the earth to the water, that by the action of natural laws, the earth is neither too wet nor too dry to permit vegetation, nor to furnish the medium essential to animal and vegetable being ? This circulation of the waters, from the ocean to the atmosphere, from the atmosphere to the mountains, from the mountains to the ocean, is, like the beams of the sun, and like the common air, too familiar to excite one thought of Him who ordained it ; or to inspire one emotion of gratitude or praise.

36. It is not by evaporation only, (it is believed) that these fountains are supplied. When the analogies of the natural world are considered, it is probable that water returns to the fountains, not only through the air, but through the earth. If the

depths of the sea bear a proportionable relation to the height of mountains, it may not be deeper any where than five nine thousandth parts of the earth's diameter. It may be that the waters pass through the earth by attraction, or pressure, and become purified from salt in the transit. It may be that they are sent on their way to visit deep buried mines, and to take their qualities, and to bear them in a state of solution to the surface, for the convenience, comfort, or restoration of the human family; or to revisit the light of the sun, pure limpid and healthful, to continue vegetable and animal existence.

37. The saltness of the ocean is one of its qualities, which has excited the curiosity of philosophers. This quality may not be necessary to the preservation of its purity, for this is supposed to depend on its unceasing motion. Whence its saltness, which is found to be nearly the same in all parts, is derived, is unknown. Although there are mines of salt, and salt springs, in different parts of the earth, yet the saltness of the ocean must have some, however unknown connexion, with the orders of existence. Sea-water yields, by a well-known process, great quantities of this essential article. The presence of salt, in the human blood, is indispensable to its healthy condition ; the absence of salt from the blood, is one cause of disease, and may be a cause of inflammatory diseases. It may be, that the air which we breathe derives qualities from the saltness of the ocean, which are indispensable to human life. There is yet much to be discovered, probably, on this peculiarity of ocean waters.

38. The tides and currents of the ocean, are among the striking proofs of design, and order, originating in Supreme Intelligence. The tides must, in the present state of science, be referred to the attractive power of the sun and moon. There is motion in the waters of the sea, not only from the regularity of tides, but also from the action of the winds, and from unceasing currents, which are, respectively, found ever in the same latitudes, and to a surprising extent, and always moving with the

same velocity in respective parts. The whole volume of waters, like the human blood, may have its destined round to perform, in some appropriate time, and in obedience to some salutary and necessary law. While this continued motion is going on, the tides continue their regular rise and fall; the rivers send their tributes; and the process of evaporation performs its ordained duty.

39. Beneath the surface of the mighty deep, there is a world hardly known to man. He knows what the tremendous tumult of its surface may be, and how to sustain himself unharmed upon it. He knows how to draw some of its inhabitants from their abodes, and to enrich himself with their products. But its deep recesses, and its contents, are far deeper than his investigation can extend. All that is going on, throughout this vast expanse of the waters of the globe, are closed to human view; and the millions and millions of animated beings, as varied, probably, as those which are submitted to man's observation on the earth, and in the air, and in the waters which are on the surface of the earth, are, and must forever be, unknown to man. Yet, how can he doubt, that whatsoever lies, and is beneath the ocean's surface, is the work of that Power, who formed and sustains all that the earth bears on its surface? No thoughtful mind can behold the ocean without feeling that it has come into the very presence of its Creator. It seems to be, like the ever-enduring forest, such as it was when it first began to be.

40. The art and science of man can make no change in this monument of eternal power. Yet the ocean, seemingly the same from age to age, is ever submitting to the law of unceasing revolution. The same law reigns among all that its sublime expanse conceals from all human power, but that of imagination. The ocean presents relation connected with human art, ingenuity and science, by which its pathless surface is made to be the means through which nations know each other, in opposite hemispheres, and through which knowl-

edge, refinement, and the light of eternal truth are conveyed from those who can read and understand, to those 'who sit in darkness and who see no light.'

CHAPTER VII.

Proofs from Geology.

41. The presence and the agency of the same infinite mind is disclosed to us on and beneath the surface of the globe. The interior of the globe is known but imperfectly, even within the comparatively small extent to which it has been penetrated. The utmost extent (and this in some very few places) in which the earth has been penetrated, is less than one nine thousandth part of its diameter. The knowledge which we have, has been obtained by the excavation of mines, from natural caverns, in searching for water, or from examination, requiring a research less deep than is required for those purposes. Some very learned discussions of facts have been presented to the world of late years, and different theories have been founded on these, as to the changes to which our planet has been subjected.

42. These learned writers agree that at some time, and while the earth was the abode of many animals in different orders of being, it must have undergone some general convulsion, the proof of which is clear, from the examination of its exterior, and of its interior, so far as it is known. One of these writers says, 'the structure of the globe, in all its parts, presents the appearance of a vast ruin. The confusion and overthrow of most of its strata, the irregular succession of those which remain in their original situations; the wonderful variety which the direction of the veins and the forms of the caverns, display; the immense heaps of confused and broken substances, the transposition of enormous blocks to a great distance from the mountains of which they appear to have formed a part,

make us feel, that the history of our globe reaches back to periods far anterior to the existence of the human race.'

43. These expressions, undoubtedly founded in fact, are not (as will be elsewhere shown) inconsistent with the scriptural account of the beginning of things. There are not materials from the researches hitherto made, sufficient to form any satisfactory opinion of what the earth was, before this universal convulsion occurred.*

44. It is well ascertained that among all the researches made, no bones of the human frame have been discovered. The suggestion that human bones might be more easily decomposed than those of other animals has been considered by philosophers; and it is denied, that there is any such difference, in this respect, as will account for their absence. It is hence inferred that man was created since that convulsion to which these fossil remains are to be referred. In whatever mode the absence of all fossil remains of man may be accounted for, this fact is not incon-

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* The proofs that it did occur, are seen in many forms, some of which are the following. In lands far distant from the sea, in every quarter of the earth, shells of animals, whose proper element is the sea, are found in immense quantities; and also at elevations above the level of the sea varying from 6000 to 13000 feet. What is surprising is, that many of them are of an order which no longer exist. The most common proofs, next after that of shells, are remains of fishes, and some of these of descriptions now unknown. These remains are found in similar elevations, embedded in clay, in slate, and even in solid rock. Specimens of this sort have been noticed in many places, and among others in the Province of Burgundy in France, in grey calcareous hard stone; and at Narterre near Paris, the remains of a fish exceeding 10 inches in length have been found in a solid bed of stone, at the depth of 17 feet. These, and a multitude of other marine substances, and fossil remains, (fossil is from a Latin word which signifies to dig, and is applied, in science, to substances found in a state of preservation) seem to prove the action of overwhelming waters, or that the ocean has retired from the face of the earth. The action of tumultuous waters, conforms to the received opinion as to the deluge. These are fossil remains of various land animals. They are found in all elevations and in different sorts of earth, and in stone and marble. Remains of animals are found which show that there were animals unlike any which now exist on the earth; and remains are found in one quarter of the earth where no such living animal is now found. This is said to be the case as to a species of opossum, found near Paris, which is known to exist only in South America.

sistent with the Mosaic account. Moses is supposed to have written 2500 years after the time at which he fixes the creation of the world. His work may have been composed in part, from other works then existing; and it is remarkable, that the geological computations refer the appearances on which they rest, to a date which is consistent with that which Moses assigns to the creation. It is not improbable that the globe had then undergone some tremendous convulsion, and that a new creation had then been made; and that in some prior state of the globe, animals had existed on it, though man did not; and that man was then created; and that a new order of animals was created.

45. It is also probable that the deluge was not that convulsion from which these remains are to be dated; nor is it by any means proved, that the deluge would have occasioned such convulsion. The objection to this may be that Moses speaks of six days as the time within which the creation was made. But it is far from being certain that Moses intended six diurnal revolutions of the earth, as we now measure days. This expression may have been used by him figuratively; and it is said that the Hebrew prophets are often to be so understood; and the prophet Daniel is referred to in proof, that the word day must mean some other lapse of time than the natural day. Geological theories rather confirm the Mosaic account in assigning to man his origin, at the same period which that account assigns to him.

46. It is to be remarked, that there are two classes of philosophers who entertain opposite opinions as to the changes which have occurred in the earth. The one is called Neptunists (from Neptune the god of the sea) who refer these changes to the action of water; the other is called Vulcanists, (from Vulcan one of the fabled gods as well of the Greeks as Romans, who is supposed to have taught the use of fire as applied to metals;) who refer these changes to the action of fire. The latter suppose that the earth was in a state of igneous fu-

sion, or a liquid mass intensely heated; that it gradually cooled, and was covered with water at a subsequent period.

47. The Neptunists hold, that the earth was first in a state of watery solution, and that the present formation arose from the drying, and from the gravitation of floating parts, and from crystallization, &c., in which form so many substances are known to us. Snow, sugar, salt, frost on the windows, in winter, are crystallizations. Both theories may be in some way true, since there are so many proofs of the action of both these elements in geological science.

CHAPTER VIII.

Geological Proofs continued.

48. Geology is understood to be that science which treats of the origin of non-organic substances, that form the solid crust of the globe. It includes the structure of the earth, and the nature, qualities, and changes through which the materials of which this crust is composed, may have passed. Mineralogy is the science of defining, and classing these substances: Mineral, therefore, is a very comprehensive term. The substances which it includes, may be properly considered in reference to the power and design of the Creator, in adapting them to the use of man, and man to use them. Perhaps it is not an unreasonable supposition, that the convulsions which interest the curiosity of geologists, were intended to make the earth a convenient and proper place for human abode. Whatever may be thought of this, it is certain that the inexhaustible treasury which is beneath the surface, but within human reach, can be and is, used by man. None of it was placed there in vain, though all the benefit hitherto derived from it, may be far short of that which further experiments may disclose.

49. It is foreign to the present object to enumerate the parts of the mineral kingdom. This has been done by different authors, as is well known, and especially by those who have favored the reading world with chemical discussions, as well as by geologists. The limits of the present object will only permit a brief allusion, for the purpose of showing the consistency of these provisions of the Creator, with the condition which he has assigned to man, and with the faculties which have been given to him. And for these purposes, we may refer to the quantity, variety, and position of coal, which is so indispensable to daily comfort, and to the generation and application of heat, seen in so many and so important uses. The quality imparted to this mineral, constitutes it an agent, by which all other minerals are wholly, or in part, disengaged from the substances with which they are connected, and then fitted to the purposes for which they appear to have been intended. The well known qualities of iron, silver, gold, copper, tin, zinc, lead, platina, and the compounds made of them, are in some way, brought into a state for use by heat. Heat, also, is applied to a great variety of substances, of which lime is a constituent part, and which are called calcareous.* Chalk is said to be 'a very ancient chemical decomposition of the altered and obliterated remains of shell fish.' Every description of marble may be reduced to lime, by the action of heat.

The almost endless variety of substances, which are known under the common name of stone, all of which are defined and classed, are seen to be intended for human good, not only for necessary purposes, but for those of convenience and elegance. The admiration of successive ages has been secured by the exercise of skill and genius, on marble, devoted to poetic beauty, to historical illustration, or individual renown.

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* From being combined with lime, from the Latin word calx, which signifies lime, and also chalk.

50. To the mineral kingdom, acted upon by science, and art, mankind are indebted also in a thousand ways which can only be glanced at in this limited view. In the various departments of useful industry which bind the individuals of nations together, and which happily connect and make nations dependent on each other, we see, in numberless varieties, the use of minerals. From the same treasury, through the same means, we see the uses of the mineral kingdom, in relieving bodily infirmity, dispelling pain, restoring health, and prolonging life. There are uses, too, though less obvious ones, in all that class of mineral productions which are called the *precious* gems. These include a great variety under the names of topaz, emeralds, garnets, rubies, sapphires, the components of which are well ascertained by chemical action. But the same action is said to have 'dethroned the king of the precious gems, the diamond, by proving that it cannot resist fire, as all true gems do ; and it is now reduced to the class of combustibles, and is ranked with sulphur, amber and coal.' Dethroned, as it may be by chemists, it has not lost its rank among what are called riches, nor ceased to sparkle among the lovers of ornament. Yet, by the laws of nature it is no more than purest charcoal, and like it may be made to disappear by fire.

51. We may intrude no farther within the province of the Naturalist. We have ventured so far, only to awaken the thoughtful mind to the truth, that in the regions which the light of the sun does not visit, and whose treasures are brought forth only by human labor, there are, as every where there are, claims to gratitude and to admiration, due only to that Power from which they could proceed.

To test the truth of these suggestions let us only suppose that the mineral kingdom had been denied to the earth, or that man had been denied the intelligence, or the physical capacity to avail himself of it, what would have been the condition of the human family at the present day ?

CHAPTER IX.

Proofs from the Vegetable Kingdom.

52. We are next to notice the works of the Creator in the vegetable kingdom. We include in this all that vegetates, that is, all that grows on, and has a connexion with, the earth, by roots.

It has been shown, in a former chapter, in what way the inequality of days and nights, and the variation of the seasons are caused. It is seen that there is continued summer at the equator throughout the year; and continued winter half the year, at the two polar regions, alternately; and that every year is divided, in these regions, into one long day, and one long night. Between this hardly varying summer, and this perpetual winter, (either at one pole, or the other,) are found delightful spring, and grateful autumn; fruitful summer, and cheerful winter. Within these balanced and tempered regious, are found, *or may be*, every vegetable production essential to human comfort, and welfare. We must leave to the researches of young aspiring minds to trace out the connexion, which necessarily exists, between this variety, and the enterprise, employment, comfort, improvement, and happiness, of the human race. It would be an easy and pleasing labor to show, that from these sources may be drawn innumerable proofs of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, in adapting man to use the products of his bounty, and in adopting these products to his use. Still more pleasing would it be to demonstrate, that principally from this variety of vegetable product, the intercourse and consequent refinement of mankind is directly, or remotely derived; in short, that from the vegetable kingdom more than from any other, and all other sources together, in some form, varied as it may be by art and science, come all the commercial dealings of nations. But this is only incidental to the illustration intended to be made.

53. It is not our purpose to intrude into the department of natural history. This is a source, no

doubt, of pure religious emotion, and of pious reverence, in all its varieties and divisions. We only allude to it, to illustrate the object in view; we do not treat of it; though we know not of any study which is better adapted to enlarge and elevate the mind, and improve the heart of man, than that of the natural world, when engaged in and pursued with the conviction, that we are perusing the volume which *God* has opened for our instruction, intending thereby to disclose himself through means adapted to our earthly condition.

54. The vegetable world has this in a manner peculiar to itself, that it is every where, in every grade, from first formation to decay, pleasing and beautiful to the human mind. Even those vegetable substances which contain, by some unknown law, qualities which are poisonous, pain-imparting, or life-destroying to man, are nevertheless beautiful in their growth, and development. There are general laws prescribed, to the vegetable, as there are to the animal kingdom. To these laws all that is nourished by the earth, refreshed and fed by moisture from the clouds, or warmed and expanded by the beams of the sun, must submit and conform. Yet so varied is vegetable being, that if its varieties were not organized and fitted to render submission and obedience, they could have no place in the scale of Creation.

55. The most imposing object in the vegetable kingdom is the solemn forest. Single trees on a plain, or a sufficient number to form a grove, are objects of beauty, and consequently of pleasure. The dark close forest carries the mind back through an indefinite lapse of time, and conveys to it a sentiment of the actual presence of the work of the Creator, as it came from his hand unchanged by any act of man. With this seeming stamp of originality on it, yet the long enduring forest which appears ever the same, is silently and hourly submitting to the laws of Nature; ever varying and changing; and though life, among its members, like life among the members of the human family, has

its limits ; and within some definite term, not one of all that are seen will remain, yet it is still the same forest, to the human eye. From the most deep-rooted, and long enduring of this vast assembly, down to the many perfect vegetables which are invisible to the naked eye, there are general laws of beginning, continuing, and ending the term of life. Yet, between these extremes there are many genera, or kinds, capable of precise and well understood classification. Among these classes each has its own order of being ; and these are again subdivided, and known by distinctions of form, internal structure, and in foliage, in flowers, in fruits, in juices, and fragrance. Each of them seems to have been given for some purpose pleasing, convenient, or necessary to the animal kingdom. This is the inexhaustible treasury for the supply of life, for the restoration of health, for the rejoicing of the senses, for daily necessities, and luxurious gratification.

The continuance of vegetable life, unaided by human ingenuity is provided for by natural causes. The winds bear about the germinating influence ; yet, however close the neighborhood of various orders may be, there is no confusion from age to age, nor is the order of nature ever deranged or impaired. It is this regularity of the laws of the Creator, this adaption of vegetable to animal life, that should be numbered among the proofs of design in the system of creation.

56. If we are struck with awe in raising our thoughts towards this incomprehensible Being that spoke the worlds of the firmament into existence and motion, so also should we be penetrated with reverence and gratitude, in beholding the grandeur, the utility, the variety, the delicacy, the beauty, the coloring and the fragrance of the natural robe of the earth. All this is the common experience of every observing mind. It is seen to be so, and the inquiry is no further pursued. But what is that principle of reproduction which belongs to all the vegetable kingdom ? How is it that the acorn buried in the cold ground, comes forth in a form which

bears no resemblance to what was buried, and rises with recurring seasons, by the joint ministry of its mother earth, the refreshing rains, the nursing air, and the far coming light and heat, till its roots, searching out their own fastenings, and its limbs gradually rising and expanding, can resist for ages the ordinary violence of the storm? And has not every vegetable product, in some form, the germ of reproduction? And by whose care is it that all are preserved, and continued, and fitted for duration, each one in its own line of succession, through thousands of years? Can he who sees no divinity in the flower which he crushes beneath his foot, make by his own power, the simplest product of the vegetable race? Can he, unaided by the operation of the natural world, furnish himself with supplies for his craving wants, for a single day? If the commands of the Deity given in the very Creation itself, could be disobeyed by the teeming earth, how long would the mortal frame of ungrateful and thoughtless man, be saved from mingling with its kindred dust?

CHAPTER X.

Proofs drawn from the Animal Kingdom.

57. On a sphere so variegated as we know our own to be, and forming as we see it does, from its atmosphere, its waters, its minerals, its vegetables, a place fitted for use, and intended to be used, the purpose of Creation would seem to have failed, if it were not inhabited. All those animals which are inferior to man have been most diligently examined, and divided into classes by learned naturalists. The several genera and the species, belonging to each, have been accurately defined. It is foreign to our purpose to go into detail in this department of natural history. The present purpose will be accomplished if attention can be awakened to some gene-

ral truths, which prove in this, and in all other parts of created being, the original and continuing presence of the AUTHOR OF THE UNIVERSE.

58. The first fact that strikes us, is the exact order which prevails throughout animated being. Each family of the animal kingdom has its peculiar place assigned to it; to that place it is perfectly adapted, and to none other. In that appropriate sphere it comes into being, finds its own share in the created world; in that it continues, and in that it expires. All its instincts, propensities, faculties, pleasures, aversions, enmities, and wars, have their own peculiar objects. For each of these innumerable classes, from the elephant to the smallest mite that the microscope discloses to us on the dried fruit, or the purest lily's leaf, and in the transparent drop of spring water, there are laws of being, far more definite, and far more faithfully obeyed, than any which proud intellectual man can make and enforce.

59. That life is a blessing, and intended to be so understood and enjoyed, is proved by the sense which every living thing seems, instinctively, to have of its value. The endless diversity which is found in preserving, and continuing life, is among the striking proofs of design. Is it not surprising, that among the thousands of varieties, which have been distinctly enumerated and classed, as belonging to the earth, and its waters, mingled together, as they seem to the human eye, that every species appears to know and preserve its place; and each one to keep distinct from all others, from age to age? What is it that preserves each one, and prevents that confusion, which would bring on, in a very short succession, one common ruin? There are some general laws which seem to be common to all animal existence, and among them the necessity of food. From this fact it is certain, that all animated nature is subject to daily waste, which demands a daily supply. This demand appears to be intended to be satisfied in part, from the vegetable creation,

and in part from the fitness of some animals to furnish food for others.

By this law, the created world seems to go through a successive change, by which animals of one kind become parts of others; and the vegetable world makes the like contribution to animal life; and the latter again makes its contribution to the common mother of all, which in due course of exercising its functions, sends forth its preparation for the same revolutionary course. Certainly in all this, there is abundant proof, to every contemplative mind, of original purpose undeviatingly pursued.

60. It has been objected, as inconsistent with divine benevolence that some animated beings are necessary to others as food. A moment's reflection will show, that this objection cannot be maintained consistently with obvious laws. If some sorts of animals did not prey on others, the common food must be vegetable. Suppose all animals and insects were left to increase in numbers, as we know they would do, and all were to find food from vegetable products, how long would it probably be, before all of them would perish for want of food? Supposing existence to be a benefit, and considering the numbers that escape destruction, it will be found that this provision, so complained of, is consistent with general laws, and consequently with the benevolence of the Deity. In the ocean, if the same law as to food did not prevail, its inhabitants would soon come to an end. It is known that one fish may produce millions of fish. If the increase were permitted according to this scale, and some fish were not consumed by others, it seems that the whole would perish for want of food. There is another remark worthy of notice; all the animals, except the dog and the cat, which are domesticated for man's use, live on vegetable food. If they required living animals for food, man could not supply their wants; or the inconveniences of keeping them would be too great to permit the use of them.

61. If we descend from very general views, to

some particulars, we shall see new proofs of this theory. The sagacity with which some animals are gifted is truly wonderful. The natural history of the spider, may be referred to for this. The migration of birds is another proof. Certain birds, and quadrupeds, have a kind of knowledge to which even man is a stranger. Pigeons, and some domestic animals, when carried many miles from their homes, in covered conveyances, have a power of discerning the way back. The common bee knows the straight line to its hive, at all times, however far it may have wandered, and however often it may have crossed its own path.

62. The senses of birds, and animals appear to have been given to them, for the spheres in which they are commanded to live, and move: and in which they are to wage war, fly from danger, or secure their food. Those who are curious in natural history, will find abundant means of gratification in examining the works of the creation; and the more minute the research is, the more will it serve to convince the mind, that GOD IS, and that all things are through and of HIM. We venture to assert, that this is a conviction from which the human mind cannot escape. And we may add, that this, thoughtfully pursued, leads inevitably to piety and reverence, and fits the mind to receive, as they should be received, the sublime and beautiful expressions concerning the power of the ALMIGHTY, which are of so frequent recurrence in parts of the sacred volume.

63. Let us examine two or three instances of these proofs, as found in the organization of animals. *Seeing* is necessary to all animals, because all of them are, in some way, connected with objects which are external to them. The law of vision depends on general laws, connected with light, and on the action to which rays of light are subjected, in passing through substances, which permit this passage. It might, therefore, seem to us, that there must be one sort of construction of the eye adapted to act with reference to one uniform and invariable

law of nature. The principle on which vision depends must be the same, in all eyes, that is, on having the image of the object seen, transferred through some medium to the sensitive nerve adapted to receive it. The general law, therefore, is this, the existence of the object seen must be in such a relation to the animal seeing it, that its image can be impressed, by the help of light, on the proper space in the interior of the eye. But that which excites our wonder is, the endless variety, among the different orders of being, by which the eye is adapted to its duty, and the means given to preserve it, in a fit state for use. The exceeding sensitiveness of the eye would expose it to irreparable injury, and it might soon be destroyed, if such means were not given. In the human form, in which only the hand appears, the injuries to the eye may be remedied by the use of the hand.

64. Among animals which have not that member, nature has provided other means to this end. Birds, generally, and many animals, and the horse among others, have a third eye-lid, the constant action of which may be easily observed, and so curiously adapted to use, that it can be passed over the outer surface of the eye in almost every instant, and, by its action, all offending substances are wiped away. On examination it is found, that this eye-lid moves on mechanical principles well understood, but in this instance marvellously applied.

65. The keenness of vision in birds of prey, which see at very great distances, and also at very short ones, requires another conformity to the general law. The eye of these animals is, therefore, so constructed, that it can by means of pliable scales on the outside of the ball of the eye, and by muscles drawn over them, so diminish, or enlarge the size of the eye, that it will perform its duty as to an object, however near, or distant it may be. This power of vision enables birds to see, from their airy elevation, far beyond the reach of the human eye, over a wide extent. They discern their food, and, with surprising sagacity, they submit themselves to

the gravitating power, and fall, unharmed, to the earth's surface, with a rapidity which would seem to be necessarily followed by destruction from the contact. This keenness of vision seems to enable birds that prey only on perishing animal substance, to know, whether the object seen is living or dead, though the position of the body may be the same in either case.

66. Another variation is seen in the *fixed* eye of the insect races ; and in the position of it. One or two instances will sufficiently illustrate this. In the common fly are seen two small round projections at the side of the head. These projections contain many thousands of lenses disposed in rows, each one of which is capable of transmitting an impression of outward objects. A German naturalist counted 6236 in the two eyes of a silk worm. Another naturalist counted 14000 in the eyes of a drone fly, 27000 in the eyes of a dragon fly. It has been proved by actual experiment with the help of glasses, that each one of these lenses was capable of receiving an independent and distinct impression. The inference seems necessarily to be, that the retina of these insects may receive, at the same time, some thousands of impressions without any confusion : which is far more wonderful than the single impression made on the retina of our own species, and on those of other animals, who have two eyes with a retina for each.

67. As we have no other purpose than to awaken curiosity and thought in relation to the natural world, we must leave this inexhaustible subject to the inquiring and well disposed. They may feel assured, that the thoughtless hours which they pass in early life, may be made instructive and happy, if they will examine the natural world, not as a mere show, but as proofs of that Power and Benevolence by which themselves, and the minutest insects, were alike gifted with existence.

CHAPTER XI.

Proofs that the Existence of Man is a necessary part of the Creation.

68: Doubtless this globe might have performed its annual circuit, and its diurnal revolutions if its surface had been composed of the known expanse of waters, and of barren waste on the land. It might have done the same, if the land had been made, as now it is, capable of producing vegetable beings; and showing only on every continent and on every isle, an enduring forest, and silence unbroken excepting by the roar of waters, the report of the electric fluid, the passing of the storms, and the crush of falling trees. It might have done the same if all animal life inferior to man, had existed as now it does, and the whole earth been subjected to the dominion, which brute force and instinct might have made for themselves. Had this been so, to what end would the mineral kingdom have been created? Why should the magnet have been formed? Why should the element of fire, whatever that may be, have been associated in the system? Should the waters have been made to flow to the ocean, and to return thence, through the atmosphere, and the earth, to renew their flow, only to slake the thirst of the beasts of the forest, or, descending in rains, to perpetuate useless vegetation? Why should the action of matter upon matter, and why should the wonderful results of that action, have been made inherent, and discoverable in matter? Why should metals have been made fusible and malleable, and adapted to any variety of form; why should the power of the screw, of the pulley, of the wedge, have been imparted to matter? Why should metals have been made fit to receive impressions and thereby to make known invisible thought, and transmit the action of the mind through successive ages? Why was matter made fit to be formed into means of conveyance over the pathless ocean;

and why were the products found upon and beneath the earth's surface, adapted to displace the forest, and to occupy its space with cultivated fields, with spacious and magnificent cities? If there were no such being as man, all these qualities of matter would have been given without use; and without the knowledge of their existence. If man had not been created, what being would have lived to admire and reverence the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Deity? It seems then to follow, from the attributes which we must ascribe to Him, that such a being as man necessarily belongs to this system. It may be inferred from like principles, that the worlds which we see from our own comparatively humble one, bear some description of intelligent minds, however varied they may be from our own, whose duty and whose employment it may be to know, to acknowledge, and to render homage to the ALMIGHTY SOVEREIGN OF THE UNIVERSE.

69. Reason, by which guide only we are attempting now to find our way, demonstrates, that man belongs to the system which he is made capable of perceiving. If we are convinced of this truth; if we see that all things animate and inanimate other than man, have their proper places of action, and exist therein pursuant to laws which are certain, defined, and which cannot be departed from; are there not laws for man also, in his sphere of action? As we know him to be blessed with understanding, is not that superior gift intended to enable him to search out these laws, and to find his own welfare in rendering his obedience to them?

In the examination of man's nature we shall find new proofs of the wisdom and goodness of the Creator; and clearly discern man's affinity to some superior order of being to any which he knows on earth.

CHAPTER XII.

Proofs drawn from Human Organization.

70. Man, as he is presented to the organ of sight, is distinguished from all other animals by his form. He is the only one who is erect, and capable of so sustaining and moving himself. All animals but man have a natural, permament covering on the skin. To all others an artificial covering is an incumbrance; to man it is indispensable; and he only is formed with the *hand* capable of providing it. Figure, varying color, and eloquent expression, belong only to the human face; though some few animals are supposed, like man, to shed tears in suffering, he only can smile, and laugh. Man can, and no other animal can invent artificial means, and use them; and he only can by such means, lengthen the power of his arm, and make himself felt and feared, by blows and wounds, sent to a far distance.

71. Man alone avails himself of the swiftness, the strength, and productiveness of other animals. Others destroy the living to make them useful, man cherishes the living to make them useful to him. Inventive power, the need of it, physical force and formation necessary to apply it, are not seen in any other living being as in man. He is the only animal who is gifted with ability to make the earth yield its increase, or to fashion natural substances to his own use, by changing or modifying their original forms. There is something of superiority and majesty in the form and natural being of man, which other animals instinctively acknowledge; and every one of the inferior grades shrinks before the searching of his eye. He is distinguished from all other animals in this also, that he is the only animal of the earth, who can pass as well on the ocean as on the land. But the eminent distinction of man over all is, the power of uttering articulate sounds, and of communicating thereby intelligible thought. By this power he makes known his wants, his suffer-

ings, his hopes, his fears, his happiness. By this he can instruct, warn, please, command, and terrify; by this, and in one effort, he can move assembled thousands to admire, believe, hate, honor, or pity; to rush on to acts of virtue or of crime; and even to self destruction.

72. Examined as to his interior frame and construction, he is found to be in whole, and every minute part, a necessary component of the material world, and designed to act on it, and to be acted upon by it; and in such variety of modes as could only be conceived by omniscience, and carried into effect by a POWER to which the human mind cannot imagine any limit.

Within the exterior surface of man, some few only of the many proofs of his origin, will be mentioned. His erect form must be so put together as to resist that tendency downwards, which operates on all particles of matter in lines at right angles to the surface of the earth. This invariable law is wonderfully shown in the case of the human frame, comparing the volume of which it is composed, with the base on which it securely rests, and moves. His head, therefore, must be sustained in the straight line of his frame; and yet if it were so sustained, and were immovable in its place, what a difference would it make in human welfare? The head, containing the supposed seat of thought, is provided with an ornamental covering of hair, and an arched covering of bone, capable of defending the brain from all serious injury in the common accidents of life. Heavy as the head is, it is placed so lightly and so firmly on the summit of the spine, and there adapted to move so easily, and effectively, that although it does move, by means of this pivot, and a ball and socket joint, forewards and backwards, and from side to side, millions and millions of times, and even through a long life, no one, in sound health, ever felt a sensation in the act of moving, in the places where this ability to move resides. That which is astonishing is, that through this very pivot of motion, the connexion from the brain is carried down through the whole extent of the spine or backbone. This marrow, which may not be improperly regarded as a continuation of the brain, sends forth nerves through the openings of the jointed and connected bones, which contain and protect it. We can see in other animals, how the spine may be divided into joints, since they are not erect. Yet, necessary as a straight solid support seems to be from the earth upwards, the human spine has its flexible divisions so as to enable man to throw himself into all the forms which his nature requires. At each part of the human frame where we can comprehend its form and its uses, it seems to us the most excellent, until we proceed to another, which claims the like pre-eminence for its purpose.

73. The connexion of the spine with the hips, and these with the lower limbs, and the feet with these, is more within the reach of observation, and every one may easily inform himself of the utility and fitness of these to their obvious design. The junction of the arms to the main bones of the upper part of the body, and the durable protection, which the heart and lungs have received, show how skilfully man is framed; while below the breast there are no bones, for reasons which every one must perceive, who attends to the positions into which he does, and must throw himself, almost every hour of his life. No one can remain ignorant of the beauty and utility of the human form in the action of the arms and hands, who will give them even the slightest observation; and every one who will notice the form of his own hand, its uses, and its admirable connexion with the wrist, and its facility of motion, must be convinced that such organization could only have sprung from a mind capable of designing and of executing designs. It would enlarge this volume into one on natural history, if minute anatomical descriptions were introduced: we will therefore only further add, as to the human arm and hand, this: let any one look around him and consider the objects within his view, and decide for himself, what the condition of mankind would have

been, if the human arm and hand had not been formed and given to man, as we see them to be. When this inquiry has been entered upon, let him follow it out, and see where it will lead him.

74. The bony frame of the human figure would be a motionless incumbrance if it were not for the muscles which cover it, and which fill up, and give the beauty of shape, which we find in it. These bands, and strings, are so strong, and so curiously placed, and so firmly united with the bones, that they move the whole, or any part of our machine of bones, yet so easily, that the sensation of motion, if felt at all, is always a pleasure in healthy persons, unless overdone, or too long continued. The mechanical operation of the muscles on the bones, we can comprehend; but that which we cannot comprehend, and which is utterly inconceivable is, the connexion between the will and the muscles, and the instantaneous and exact obedience which they render to that sovereign power.

75. That part of the human frame which has the common name of breast, and that of thorax in science, from the Latin thorax (*breast*), contains the seat of action on which human life directly depends. Here are the lungs, which by the avenue of the wind-pipe, receive about 48000 cubic inches of air every hour in successive respirations. In the lungs the air comes immediately in contact with the blood; and it is computed that the whole mass of blood, which may be 50 pounds, or five gallons, receives, fourteen times within the hour, the life-giving impulse of the air. It is supposed that the whole mass of blood passes through the heart once in every four minutes. From this fact some conception may be formed of the strength of the mechanical action of the heart, which must be sufficient to impel this mass through all the arteries and veins of the system, within that space of time.

76. There, also, is that indescribable power contained in the stomach, (an oblong globular sack of eight or ten inches in length, and five or six in depth, which is capable of contraction and expansion)

whereby the process is continually going on, to convert the foreign substances passed into it, into living, active, sensitive and perceptive being. In this small cavity of the breast, everything has its appropriate place, and its precise duty, and upon the harmonious action of each and every one, and unceasingly, that which we call life, depends; and that, which is the most admirable of all is, that the vital action of the whole system goes on independently of man's will ; and entirely beyond its control. All who have read *Paley* will remember his striking remark, that the action of the vital organs is not confided to man's care. His ignorance, or improvidence, if it were so, might soon, and easily, close his career.

77. We have no room to follow out the consequences of this mechanical action. But as there will be occasion to refer to human form and movement, in other places, for other purposes, we must notice the craving want of the stomach that daily returns upon it ; that it can and does receive with pleasure, and impunity, a given quantity of food in a given time; that the system is known to lose more than half of all it takes in as food, through its three hundred thousand millions of pores of the skin, in every twenty-four hours : that continued excess in quantity, is the parent of pain, suffering, disease, and death : that certain substances, are certain and immediate death; and that certain others, though received through habit, and from craving desire, will occasion a slow, though as certain death, involving the gradual destruction of the intellectual power, the moral sense, and of all that distinguishes men from brutes. This criminal indulgence places man far below the brutes, since they are incapable of such depravity.

CHAPTER XIII.

Proofs drawn from the Senses.

78. It is to the *senses* of man that we come with pleasure, in contemplating the power and goodness of the Creator. The eye is commonly selected as the most striking evidence of design, and is emphatically so, as a part of the human system. We cannot undertake to describe this delicate organ for any other purpose than the general one of rendering just homage to the Creator, and of warning all of the interest which they have in knowing its delicacy, and of preserving it in a sound condition; and because its action is open in some degree to common observation. It is first to be noticed, that the bones which project around the eye, seem to be intended to preserve it from exterior injury. The eyelids are given to close at every intimation of danger, and to guard the eye while we sleep. Between the eyelids, in the open eye, in the exterior front, the first thing we see is the *cornea.* This word is taken from the Latin cornu (*horn*), because this part of the eye resembles horn. This is a transparent substance through which light passes into the eye. The cornea is continued all around the globe of the eye; it is only in the front part that it is so called; the continuation around the eye is known by the name of *sclerotica*, from a Greek word which signifies hardness. As all the coats of the eye but this are soft, and might lose their form, this hardness seems necessary to preserve it.

79. Immediately behind the cornea is a distinct separate part called the *aqueous* humor, from the Latin aqua (*water*), which means, merely, a watery liquid. Immediately behind this humor is the *pupil*, (commonly called apple of the eye) which is a round dark spot which every one can see with the help of a mirror. The word pupil has no descriptive meaning. It is through this dark spot that the

light which comes in at the cornea, passes still further into the eye.

80. That colored circle which surrounds the pupil (or apple) and which is either black, hazle, grey, or blue, and from which the eye has its color, is called the *iris*, which word is the Latin for rainbow. The iris is supposed to have the power of compressing the pupil of the eye by means of minute muscles, or permitting its expansion by relaxing these muscles, so as to adapt the pupil to receive more or less light, as may be necessary; this action of the iris seems to go on mechanically, and without any operation of the will, as any one may know who goes from a lighted room into a dark one. In such case, one sees better in a few moments, which is occasioned by the spontaneous action of the iris in providing for the expansion of the pupil. The iris extends also, all around the globe of the eye, inside the sclerotica, but it loses its name after it leaves the front of the eye, and is called *ehoroides*, which name is from two Greek words which mean a membrane enclosing something.

81. Immediately behind the pupil lies the *crystalline* lens. A common burning glass or magnifying glass, is a lens, from the Latin word lens. Crystalline (nearly the same word in Latin, Greek, and English) means transparent or clear. This lens, in the human eye, is a remarkable substance; it is much easier to say what sort of substance it is not, than to say what it is. Its place is in the front centre of the *vitreous* humor, which is so named from the word vitrum (*glass*), because it resembles melted glass. This humor or liquid fills all the residue of the ball, until it comes in contact with the nerve, called the *optic* nerve, from a Greek word meaning vision.

82. This nerve is also called the *retina*, from rete (*a net*). The retina is the seat of vision; that is, it is the part of the eye on which the figure of the objects seen is pictured. The retina is the expansion of the nerve which comes from the brain in a round form about the size of a wheat straw, and

as soon as it enters the eye through the opening made for it in the back part of the eye, it expands into this minutely delicate net-work, and encloses the vitreous humor, precisely as a globular bottle with a solid neck to it, expands from the neck. To see an object there must be the cornea, the aqueous humor, the pupil, the crystalline lens, the vitreous humor, and the retina, and all of them must be in a condition to perform their several offices. All of them are of such indescribable delicacy, that it is astonishing they can be preserved for a single day: how much more so is it, that they are so generally preserved through all the vicissitudes of life, even to old age. This description of the eye is very general, and very simple. No attempt is made to describe the more minute parts, their nerves, blood-vessels, connexion of parts, general sympathy of the parts; even so far as is known by anatomists. By the most skilful of them, many parts of the eye are very imperfectly understood.

83. Thus far human knowledge goes, and no farther. By what law is it that the eye is so formed that it can see? What is seeing? How is it that the impression of a figure on the retina conveys a clear and distinct perception to the mind, and makes the object so perceived a subject of memory, and of thought? Who but that Being who framed and preserves the eye, can answer this?

84. The rapid, easy and unfelt motion of the eye, is also a matter of grateful wonder. In the strong and sound, the eye is kept in front, and in its proper place by soft substances, which yield the liquid matter necessary to its action; and the motion depends on muscles which turn the eye in every direction Different persons have different powers of vision; it may be thence inferred, that other senses differ. When disease overtakes us, and the waste of the body cannot be supplied, this is felt in the eye, as elsewhere, and the globe of the eye sinks within the socket.

85. The philosophical theory of vision, as now received in the world, is this: Every object seen, re-

flects or emits rays of light. These rays, passing through the several departments of the eye, make the figure of the object seen, to fall on the retina in an inverted form. In all representations of vision, the rays of light are drawn from the object to the retina. Color too, is said to depend on the manner in which rays of light act on the objects which appear colored to our eye. There is no doubt that light is necessary to see the figure, and the color, of objects. But some one may hereafter be bold enough to doubt, whether this theory of vision is satisfactory. May not the eye have a power of vision to which light is necessary to be sure, but of which light is not the cause ? When one is watching the coming on of the morning, or the gradual return of night, there is no gradual change in the coloring of objects. It is not satisfactory to common sense, that objects and persons well known to us, are not the same *even in color* in the night, and in the day time. We are certain of this, that when there is light from the sun, or light from artificial means, the eye can and does take impressions on the retina of external objects, and that they go thence into the mind. What is doubted is this, that rays of light are reflected from, or emitted by every object that is seen ; and that *their* rays must fall on the retina to make it seen.

86. It is said, by an eminent modern philosopher, who is still living, that particles of light pass by any fixed point at the rate of 500 millions of millions of times in a single second; and that it is by such movements of light, communicated to the eye, that vision is effected. That motion of light at the rate of 482 millions of millions of times produces the sensation of redness ; 542 millions of millions of times in a second produces the sensation of yellowness ; and that motion of light at the rate of 707 millions of millions of times in a second, produces that of violet.

If it be proved, or must be admitted, that the action of light does make color, is there not a picture of every object seen, on the retina ; and how can rays of light passing from that object, make that picture? May it not be that the eye has a power somewhat analogous to the reflection of a mirror; and that external objects pictured on the retina, are, in some incomprehensible manner, reflected to the mind?

CHAPTER XIV.

Further Proofs from the Senses.

87. The sense of hearing is even less understood than that of vision; the uses of the organs of this sense are more difficult to comprehend; and it is not easy to make known the little that is comprehended, by words, or even by the use of drawings. It will be sufficient for the present purpose, that is to prove the certainty of design, or of means used to an end, to advert to a quality of the common air which every one is familiar with, viz. that by exerting the human voice through a common trumpet, it can be sent to a far greater distance than when committed to the air without using such an instrument. The ear has some, but a very slight resemblance to a trumpet inverted. That part which is visible, seems to be intended in men, and animals, to collect sound, and conduct it inward, until it strikes on a thin membrane, called the *tympanum*, drawn across the outward end of the barrel or drum of the ear; *tympanum* is from a Latin word meaning drum. Between this membrane and an interior one in the hollow of the ear, there are four very small bones which seem to connect the two membranes. The use of these bones, in conducting sound is not known; one of them is connected by one end with the tympanum, and with the second at the other end, and this with the third, and that with the fourth and this with the inner membrane, drawn across another space, and within or behind this membrane, is a cavity deeply encompassed with the bone of the skull, containing a liquid, wherein

the auditory nerve, (from *audire*, to *hear*), proceeding from the brain, developes itself, much in the same way as does the optic nerve in the eye.

88. To have the perception of hearing *sound*, it must pass through the ear to this nerve, and through it the effect is made on the mind. When we consider what the variety, and the number, of sounds are, which must affect this organ, in the ordinary purposes of life, and its distinguishing power, and its nice adaptation to the end designed, we are left in no doubt as to the intelligence which its mere contrivance required. But however faithfully anatomical investigation may disclose the component parts of the ear, it does not, nor can any investigation which art or science has hitherto made, bring the least conception of the nature of hearing to our minds. How sound affects that organization, and how it communicates with the mind, is incomprehensible.

89. The commonly received theory of hearing is very unsatisfactory. Particles of air, it is said, being affected by some impulse given by the organs used in speaking, or any other sound-making agent, communicate that impulse to adjoining particles of air, and they to others, and so on, until those which are in contact with the tympanum affect it, and thus sound goes to the brain. That air is necessary to the conveyance of sound every where, above the surface of water ; and that water is necessary to the conveyance of sound made in water, and that sound glides along the smooth surface of water to a greater distance than it can on the surface of the ground, every body knows. But that sound is nothing but an agitation of the air it is difficult to believe. When one is speaking to a numerous assembly in a large apartment, he may make himself distinctly heard, and understood, even in the most rapid and minute articulation of which he is capable, by those persons who are most remote from him. But no effort of his lungs would affect, in the least degree, the lightest substance which floats in the air, at one half, or perhaps one quarter, of that dis-

tance. So one may make a violent agitation of all the air in a large apartment by swinging a door backwards and forwards, but he will make thereby no sound. Sound can be made to pass from one apartment to another, through a solid wall, and when the air on one side of it cannot receive any impulse from the air on the other. Sound passes through wood, metals, and other substances, with far greater rapidity than through air or water. And through some it cannot pass.

90. Is there then something in nature, hitherto unknown, which is *sound*; as there may be something, which is *vision*? That human ingenuity has gone no further as yet, in the philosophy of sound and vision, is no reproach to it. Looking back on its inventions and discoveries, it would be some reproach to it to assume, that it has attained its utmost limits on these subjects.

91. The other senses must be passed over with a few words. That of *feeling* seems to be diffused throughout the system. The sensation is always local, whether in the extremities, in the organs of sense, or in the brain itself. So also tasting and smelling are local. The connection between these and the mind is alike hidden from us. The only similarity between these three senses, and those of seeing and hearing is, that as to the three former, perception has a locality in the system, that is, feeling is every where, tasting is in the organs of taste, smelling is in the organs assigned to give that perception, but the organs of seeing and hearing give no organic sensation, and we only learn from experience that it is the eye that sees, and the ear that hears. The action of the eye, and of the ear, depends upon no volitions of our own. If they were *physically touched* by the objects of which they convey notice to the mind, as the other senses seem to be, would they not from their wonderful complication and delicacy of structure, soon wear out, and become unfit for their offices? Is there not something which may be called intellectual in the action of these two senses? But these are inquiries not

necessary to the present purposes, if they are deserving of any notice.

92. If the purpose in view, thus far, has been sufficiently accomplished, to make that purpose understood, it has been shown, that there is a created material universe, of which man constitutes a part. That he is curiously and wonderfully prepared and designed to act on this universe, and that it is, in like manner, prepared and designed to act on him. There is reason to believe, from what we know him to have been able to do in relation to this material system, that there is no part of it with which he cannot connect himself to some useful purpose. Surely this is true as to all things and beings on earth, to which he has access. It is even true as to the far distant luminaries of the firmament. He has made himself acquainted with the laws which govern them. He has made them, millions of miles from him as they are, minister to his necessities, his wants, and his pleasures. They make known to him the precise point on which he happens to be on the surface of his own little globe, the existence of which is perhaps unnoticed and unknown to the intelligent beings who may inhabit them. They have served him to enlarge his mind, to invent rules of science, and they have served him to elevate his conceptions, and to raise himself to that high station in the scale of being, mortal as he is, which permits him to know, and to adore, and to render his humble tribute to the infinite and awful MIND, of whom, and through whom, all things are ordained.

CHAPTER XV.

Proofs from Human Intellect.

93. We have endeavored to find man's place in the material world. We have next to consider him in his intellectual character. In this respect it will appear, that his material formation, and that of his

mind, have an intimate and necessary connexion. Whatever the mind may be, and in whatsoever manner it is connected with its material dwelling-place, it does not display its powers until it has been acted upon by the senses. This fact has led to the belief in the materiality of the mind, and has been the subject of many refined discussions. It is certain that the physical and mental action of one human being, is known to any other by and through the senses only. These truths force on us the necessity of considering the action of the senses in connexion with, and inseparably from, what is known of the qualities of the mind. This will be found to be at best a very limited knowledge.

94. The human mind has been the subject of many learned works. These have been given to the world at different periods. Each successive author has had the opportunity of studying the theories of his predecessors, and of adopting, modifying, disproving, or rejecting them, and of attempting to establish his own. It is not intended to compare different systems, if the ability to do this could be assumed, nor to pronounce which of them should be received, nor which of them should be rejected. All of them are far too learned, and refined, for elementary instruction. It is proposed, as sufficient for the present object, to invite those who are of competent years to do it, to examine their own intellectual acts as the simplest and easiest, and perhaps, the most satisfactory mode of instruction.

95. No one knows how his earliest steps in the acquirement of knowledge were taken; but he knows what the fact is with his juniors, and he infers truly, that his own course must have been similar. It is thus known to every one, that in earliest infancy the human being is, of all animals, the most helpless: that months elapse before there is any apparent sensation, but that which arises from the want of food, or a sense of suffering. The eye and the ear are, for a long time, insensible, and when age enough is obtained to put these organs

to use, they have every thing, apparently, to learn. The discrimination between different sounds, and the knowledge of figure, magnitude, color and distance of external objects, are very slowly obtained, and only by experiments often repeated. Less is known of the acquirements of the other senses, excepting, that the sense of feeling appears to be always on the alert, and that its disagreeable action is frequently manifested.

96. After some few years, all the senses appear to have undergone the discipline of *experience* to the effect of answering the common purposes of life. What the senses have attained to by experience, must depend on the sort of experience, or on the employment in which they have been engaged. The senses of a number of young persons who are equally gifted by nature in this respect, will acquire different habits, according to the accidental circumstances, in which they are placed. Children brought up in a city, those who have been only in a small village, those who have been at school, and those who have been employed in manual labor, will have their senses very differently disciplined. If each of these were brought together, and acted upon at the same time, by the same causes, each class would be differently affected, and the individuals of the same class would be affected in different degrees. The senses, therefore, may be said to be subjects of instruction from experience, from early infancy.

97. The only proposition which it is necessary to establish is, that the senses are subjects of discipline and of habit in every person, whatever his vocations in life may be. Another proposition which is self-evident is, that all knowledge of external objects, and substances, must be obtained through the senses. Those who are blind from birth, cannot have any knowledge of forms, nor of comparative distances, except the imperfect knowledge which the other senses give; and they must be entirely ignorant of color, and of all other acquirements to which the use of the eye is indispen-

sable. The deaf, from birth, must be entirely ignorant of all knowledge of sounds. The senses are, therefore, necessary avenues of knowledge to the mind.

98. It must be admitted, then, that the action of the senses is indispensable to the development of the mind. It does not follow from this well known fact, that the mind is not independent in itself, of material organization. One is apt to suppose that the mind is a perfect independent being, and is so from the commencement of life. It is quite as reasonable to suppose that the mind expands, and is progressive, in conformity to the action made on it, first through the senses, and then by its own operation.

99. It is not improbable that the soul, or mind, or spirit (meaning by these terms the same thing, that is, the immortal part of our being) is generally taken to be something perfect in its own nature, which takes up its residence in the human frame when life begins, and continues that residence, while life remains.

It is not inconsistent with some analogies in nature, that the *principle* of the soul is originally given to every human being, and that the action of life developes and makes it whatsoever it becomes. It is not more difficult to suppose that the Creator intended that the soul of man should take its character from the experience of life, than to suppose that it is given, at first, a separate, independent perfect being, and that it goes through no change from birth till death. On the contrary, it accords with our perceptions of moral accountability, that the immortal part of man should be adapted to its future state, in the scenes of this life. At the same time, it may be supposed that the righteous Judge of all the earth, exacts no accountability, but according to the means enjoyed of finding out duty, and according to the obedience, or disobedience, which follows a knowledge of it. If this supposition be admissible, it may reconcile some disputed points, and may support the proposition which is to be illustrated, viz. that the capacity to learn the law is given, and that neglect of it, refusal to follow it, or voluntary breach of it, are the omissions and acts for which we shall be held accountable. Whether this supposition be well or ill founded, and entitled to respect or not, still the truth as to the action of the senses on the mind, is to be sought out. From this source and from what is known of the operations of the mind on the materials which the senses transfer to it, must be rested the sum of all knowledge on this subject.

100. It is certain from observing those who are deprived of one, or more of the senses, that their agency is indispensable to the development of the faculties of the mind. It is also certain, that the senses have a kind of community among themselves. If the sense of smelling be entirely obstructed, that of tasting seems to be equally so. Sight and touch have a like community. The sense of hearing is connected with organs, with which that sense has no apparent physical connexion. It is connected with sight, and sight is often indispensable in deciding from what place sound proceeds. This is curiously exemplified in the art of ventriloquism. The deaf, are dumb, because they cannot imitate sounds. But the senses which remain, render some services which belong to those which are lost, or not given. The blind hear, and touch, better than those who see. The deaf and dumb touch and see, more perfectly than those who have all the senses. It is also certain that the senses are the subjects of discipline and of habit. No doubt the retina of every eye, which is perfect, has precisely the same picture made on it, which is made by the same object, on every other perfect eye. But the report made of that picture to the mind, depends on the discipline and habit of the eye, and on the habit of the mind in receiving, and using, that report.

101. Let us suppose that a military chief, a husbandman, a mathematician, the captain of a ship of war, and a physician, are examining, from the same point of vision, a numerous body of soldiery,

prepared for the exercise of their vocation; each of these individuals would have the same picture made on the retina, but each of them would have very different perceptions, and very different intellectual action from this picture. From this truth it follows, that the eye and mind are disciplined by habit. Suppose the same persons are equally perfect in the sense of hearing, and that all of them hear the same sound at the same time. Each of them would have the like quantity of the same sort of action, on the organ of hearing, but the ear of each would notice and report to the mind, according to the habit of that sense, and according to the use which the mind has been habituated to make of the report derived through that sense.

102. The senses of individuals vary, not only in consequence of habitual discipline, but also, in their natural and original formation. Some persons whose organs of vision are apparently perfect, and who see as far and as clearly as any do, cannot distinguish colors; or only very imperfectly. The same sounds are to some ears sweet and harmonious music, to others indifferent, and to others disagreeable. The sense of hearing is variously affected by the common tones of voice. The same tones are fascinating, indifferent, or disgusting, according to the ear on which they fall.

103. The inference to be drawn from such facts, seems to be this, that the connexion which is formed between the senses, and the mind, depends on two things, the original formation of the senses, as to perfection, or the falling short of it; and on the habits which have been formed in using them. The mind is, what its original faculties and powers, its own discipline and habits, in attending to the reports of the senses; and its power and habits in retaining and using these reports, have made it to be. This is all that is known on this very difficult subject; and it is very little. How impressions, from exterior substances are made on the senses; and how the mind takes cognizance of these impressions, is entirely hidden from all human search.

Although human beings are thus ignorant of these subjects, they have attained to some knowledge of the faculties and operations of the mind, which are next to be considered.

CHAPTER XVI.

Proofs drawn from the Human Intellect, continued.

104. It seems to be the most satisfactory way to learn all that can be known of the human mind, to examine one's own experience. Let us suppose that a person of competent age, and the common degree of intelligence and instruction, should turn his thoughts inwards, and ascertain for himself, what he can, of his own mind.

105. The first thing that will strike him as certain, is, that he exists; that he is conscious of that fact. No reasonable person can doubt that he is a human being. No one can doubt that he may act, or not act; that he can command the use of his muscles. No one doubts that he has perceptions of external objects; nor that he can recall and think of them, when they are not acting on him; nor that he is capable of feeling pain, and of having pleasing and grateful emotions. No one doubts that he can remember what he did a few hours ago, nor that he can think of what he will do a few hours hence; and resolve on the means of doing what he wants to do. Such things are the common, every day experience of all persons.

106. Suppose such a person seated in a room, and accidentally reminded of Eve's affectionate address to Adam in Milton,

> 'To whom thus Eve, with perfect beauty adorn'd—
> My author, and disposer, what thou bidd'st
> Unargued I obey: so God ordains:
> God is thy law, thou mine: to know no more
> Is woman's happiest knowledge, and her praise.
> With thee conversing, I forget all time;
> All seasons and their change, all please alike,' &c.

He recollects that he could repeat it; he attempts to do it, but his memory fails him. He remembers the place in which his volume of Milton is; he rises, and takes it down, resumes his place, and reads over the lines, closes his book, and finds that the lines have resumed their place in his memory, and that he can repeat them. This simple and every day occurrence is full of mysteries. What is that power of muscular motion which is so perfectly obedient to the will; the faculty of memory; the recurrence of former impressions; the connexion between thoughts recalled, or any thoughts, and the power of speech? and whence, and what, is that emotion of pleasure, found in the imaginary language of tenderness, and piety, which existed only in the mind of the poet? All this is incomprehensible, as to its causes and nature; but, it is so, and this is all that can be discerned.

107. Let such a person employ himself in calling to mind the events of his past life.

Suppose him to have arrived at the age when manhood begins. He can call to mind many events of the last year, and so can go back from year to year, till he comes to the earliest circumstances, and events, which he can remember. It is probable that such an exercise of the mind will bring to his view persons, and facts, which he has not thought of for many years; and that he will seem to see them again, with all the freshness of the first impressions. In this exercise of the mind, he cannot doubt that it was himself, and not another, who witnessed these things which he so recalls. He may be able to recollect, that in his school exercises he recited some piece of poetry, or prose, and with some effort may be able to recall it, and the very book from which he learned it, and that he can repeat the whole again. By this exercise of the mind he satisfies himself that he has one quality, or power of the mind, to which he gives (in common with all other persons) the name of *memory*. He may know also, that the memory can be charged with remembering, and with preserving what is committed to it; that by frequent calling on it to perform duties, and tasks, it will perform them more easily and effectively. There is, then, a faculty of the mind called memory, which is the subject of discipline and habit.

108. When he has thus made himself acquainted with memory, he will have attained to a certain degree of knowledge of this intellectual faculty. But what does it amount to? No more than this, viz. that he has such faculty, and can exercise it. But what it is in itself, he is no better informed than before he exercised its power. Where were those impressions stored up, which he has called to his view? How is it that he recalls them? And how is it that they do not come instantly, but often slowly, and after repeated efforts? And how is it that the memory serves him as to some things, and not as to others, which he cannot but know to have happened in relation to himself? How is it that some of his impressions are so very vivid, and clear, that by closing his eyes he seems to see the original objects again; while of others, he has only a very indistinct recollection, as though it were the fading away of a dream. All that one thus certainly knows is, that he has the faculty of memory, that it serves him for better or worse, probably from its original power, and from the discipline which he has bestowed upon it.

109. In such a process of recalling past events, one may find that his mind sometimes goes off from the proposed purpose, and engages itself in something which is incidental. Thus, if one should arrive at a point in retracing events, in which he recollects to have been one of a numerous audience, he may remember the impressions which some speaker made on him at the time, and also the subject spoken of. He may find that his mind, unbidden by him, engages itself upon the speaker, or the subject of the speech, and that the recollection of the one, or the other, or both, diverts him from following back the train of events in his own life, and that he has entirely forgotten himself, in this

new pursuit. After some time, his mind gives up this pursuit, and returns to that in which he was engaged: and he will be surprised to find, how far he has wandered from the employment with which he commenced. But this incident teaches him another quality of the mind, that is, that thoughts are associated with other thoughts, and that the presence of the one introduces the other. This quality, faculty, or power, is called association of ideas.

110. This faculty of the mind has the strongest influence on human life and happiness. It is on this faculty, that intellectual eminence is principally founded. It may be divided into parts, that of having acquired the information, or knowledge, or experience, which gives to the mind the power of forming such associations; and, secondly, the readiness with which the mind makes its associations. In all intellectual operations, this principle of association takes a most active part. An act is to be done, or an act done, is to be judged of. All similar acts, and all similar judgments, have relation to these. Those who have had experience are skilful, because of the facility with which these associations are formed in their minds. This faculty extends to all the vocations in life. Known truths, and inferences from these truths, are brought to bear on the subject to be acted upon. It is this faculty which has led to so many important discoveries in Natural Philosophy. It appears, eminently, in the mind of Sir Isaac Newton, and in that of the philosophic Lord Bacon. But it applies, alike, in all professional and mechanical employments. These associations are sometimes the fruit of laborious research, and continued labor; but repeated operations make them come uncalled for, no less in mental, than in muscular action. The principle is the same in the acts of a skilful surgeon, an extemporaneous orator, an adroit mechanic, a long practised musician, and a graceful rope-dancer. All the learning which has been devoted to intellectual operations, comes only to this result, that the mind

perceives, retains, and remembers. It applies what it has thus acquired to the acts in which it is engaged. This is common to all vocations, however varied the acts of human life may be, and however varied the knowledge with which these acts may be associated.

111. Another faculty of the mind will have been disclosed in making the proposed inquiry. The mind may, or may not be able to go back, without any deviation, in the straight line of one's experience, from manhood to infancy; and may refuse to go out of its way, or to permit anything to attract it from its direct course. This faculty of fixing the mind on the subject proposed, and excluding all things else, whatever be the subject pursued, is, in common phrase, minding what one is about; philosophers call it *attention*. It is very certain that those who mind, or attend to that which they undertake to do, are sure to do it sooner and better, than if the mind be often drawn off to other objects, and have to return to find where it was, and how employed when it deviated. If one have to go from one point to another on the earth, he may go in a certain space of time, or he may deviate to see every object that attracts him, and return to his path as often as he has left it, if he do not deviate so far, as to be unable to find it. It is a truth, for example, but not a self-evident one, that if one draw two triangles, having two angles of the one equal to two angles of the other, each to each; and one side equal to one side, viz. either of the sides adjacent to the equal angles, or the sides opposite to the equal angles in each; then shall the other sides be equal, each to each; and also the third angle of the one, to the third angle of the other. But to prove that such equality exists, a process of reasoning must be gone through. To make out that proof, one must remember or associate with the demonstration he is engaged in, the elementary truths which are laid up in his memory, and which are intended to be applied in such mensuration; and he must have a faculty in associating these

truths, as he goes on, with his demonstration; and he must mind what he is doing; that is, he must give his exclusive attention to his object; for, if his mind flies off to something else, the chain of demonstration will be broken, and he will probably, nay necessarily, begin again, and form every link anew.

112. Memory, association, and attention are all faculties of the mind, capable of discipline, education, and habits. Perhaps one could not hazard too much in saying, that the fruits of education are to be found in these three qualities, as to the ability of the mind. It is quite questionable whether these faculties are yet systematically and effectively disciplined, to their full extent. Nor is the best mode of disciplining them, probably, yet known. Memory is treated of very lightly in many schools; and whether cultivated in the best manner, in any, is very doubtful. Usually it is a painful effort to exercise the memory. Is there no way of making it pleasant, or, at least, tolerable?

113. Every one knows, that the power of minding what one is about, or attending to that which is doing, can be subjected to obedience. If a master should be moving among his pupils, with a whip in his hand, and should make its lash felt by every inattentive boy, he would certainly fix attention on the lesson to be learned. But with older persons, and even with such pupils, other motives may be applied, and with far better effects. No one doubts that a habit of attention may be acquired, and is acquired. It is one of those qualities which enables the mind to do its best. It is sometimes considered the fair rival of genius; and to be capable of supplying its place. A man of singular eminence for intellectual power, was lately asked, by one of his familiar friends, which of the faculties of his mind had secured to him his remarkable distinction; He answered, modestly, that if he had any pretension to be superior to men, in general, in anything, it was in the ability to take up a subject, and to fix his mind on it as long as he pleased, to the exclu-

sion of every thought not properly connected with the object in view.

114. Although these three faculties of the mind may be spoken of with certainty, as to their existence, their uses, and the cultivation of them, yet what they are in themselves, is entirely unknown. The operations of memory are known only by experience. Those of association, and attention, are known in like manner only. That facility which some men have of disclosing connexions between distinct ideas, and that power which is exerted at pleasure, of devoting the whole mind to a subject, disclose nothing of the mind, or its faculties, but this, that it is so ; and this is the limit of all inquiry.

115. Every person who has the power of remembering, and whose mind associates thoughts, and who can give his attention to his thoughts, must have exercised faculties of the mind, which are in use, before these faculties can be used. He must have had thousands of impressions made on his mind, through his senses. When the mind is attending to impressions made through the senses, it is exercising that faculty which is called perception. The act of the senses, by which the perception of the mind is obtained, is observation. The eye, for example, is engaged in comparing the merits of two pictures. The eye is *observing*. The impression made on the retina by one picture, and then by the other, enables it to *perceive* them. The mind in judging of them, associates what it remembers of impressions made by other pictures. The intensity, or singleness of its devotion to the act it is engaged in, marks the degree of attention.

116. When the mind remembers what it has perceived, it has ideas or images within it, of the things perceived. Any one who saw the eclipse of February 12, 1831, had a direct perception of that event. If he recalls that event by an act of his memory, he then has an idea or conception of it. The words idea, and conception, have the same meaning, when used in relation to a past impres-

sion. If one, who did not see that eclipse, should hear it described, or read a description of it, he would have, in his mind, an idea or conception of it. This idea or conception, is understood to mean the existence in the mind of some past event, or fact, or of something not present to the senses ; of this nature are all geographical and historical descriptions, whether real, or imaginary.

117. There is another class of ideas which the mind makes for itself, out of ideas of sensation, that is, out of ideas which come through the senses, which are called *ideas of reflection.* These are obtained by the power which the mind has to think, or reflect, upon the impressions which the senses have furnished it with. Every one has seen many different kinds of vegetable products, which grow on trees, bushes, and vines. He knows each one by itself, by some name. Collectively, he knows all these products under the name of fruit. The act of the mind in classing many, and giving a general name, makes an idea of reflection. A particular individual known to us, is a man. A number of such individuals, associated for a particular purpose, may be a mob, an army, a religious, or legislative assembly. A particular family is one ; many families constitute inhabitants of a city, a county, or a state. Generalization, is necessary in the arts and sciences, and in all intellectual operations. The respective members of the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral kingdoms, are classed and known by general terms. Without this power of classification, human knowledge would be exceedingly limited.

118. Abstraction is the separation of certain qualities from the subject in which they appear. This also is an idea of reflection. A rose, linen, paper, snow, are white. The quality is abstracted, and forms an idea of reflection, known under the name of whiteness. These ideas are unnumbered ; virtue, vice, right, wrong, loveliness, deformity, hardness, suffering, bravery, cowardice, truth, and falsehood, are of this description. It is said that ideas of ab-

straction, can be conceived of, separately, or abstractly, from any subject, or person. It is also said, that they cannot be so conceived of. Each one must settle this for himself, by attempting to conceive of vice and virtue independently of human beings; or of whiteness, or blackness, entirely separate from some physical substance. Thus, it is apparent that the mind has the power of classing and bringing many particulars under some general term; and also of abstracting from many particulars, some quality common to them all. Every person, without the aid of learned treatises, can master the theory of generalizing, and abstracting, by examining the materials of knowledge collected in his own mind. The word animal is one of the most general terms in use. Any one may follow this into many classes. Perhaps the most learned man that ever lived could not follow it into all classes in nature. Abstraction is a more simple operation. The abstraction is easily made. The difficulty lies in the application of it to particular subjects. Fusion, for example, is an abstract term. Certain substances can be melted or fused, that is, brought from a solid, into a liquid state. All substances cannot be fused. It is unknown whether certain substances can be or not. It is known that some substances cannot be melted, by the application of heat; but will either be dissipated, or reduced to ashes.

119. Imagination is another department of the mind which is considered, by some writers, as including that of conception. It appears to be that faculty by which the images in the mind are divided, reformed, combined, increased, or diminished; and also that, by which the realities perceived through the senses, are dealt with, by imaginary additions and changes. But, it will be found, in analyzing any and every product of the imagination, that it is made up of perceptions originally derived through the senses, and then managed according to this power of the mind. What a wonderful power is that, by which one may create in his head, an imaginary world; cover its surface with vegetation;

place on it varieties of animal life; endow its tenants with active powers, physical and intellectual, and furnish them with motives and passions, and engage them in connected and consecutive efforts. Beauty, deformity, virtue, vice, the kindest affections, the most generous and magnanimous feelings, the most malicious and diabolical propensities, may figure under the power of the imagination.

120. Among the imperishable products of this power, is Milton's Paradise Lost, as much read and admired now, (at the distance of one hundred and sixty-six years from its appearance,) as at any preceding time. Another production, of the same family, are the dramatic works of Shakspeare, some of which have the further recommendation of being historical, though, in many parts, more fit, in these days, for the closet, than any other use. And another instance is found, still of the same order, but for very different use, in the poem so well known under the name of Thompson's Seasons, now familiar to the reading world for about a century; and which is full of extraordinary beauty of description, and a high tone of moral and pious feeling, delightfully expressed.

121. But here, again, one is entirely ignorant of this power of the mind, and can only say that such an one there is, and such are its uses. It is to be noticed, that this faculty of imagination has its laws. However fanciful it may be, all its products are derived from ideas of sensation and reflection. These are limits which it cannot transcend. Dreaming seems to be the sporting of the imagination, with ideas of sensation and reflection; but in this sport, it apparently uses none other; and, philosophically, can use no other, however extravagant its operations may be. Insanity is, probably, a diseased action of the imagination; as when one imagines himself to be some person which he is not, or in circumstances or relations which are not real. Insanity is commonly said to be a *false* perception through the senses; or *false* conclusions, from *true* perceptions. If this account of mental alienation be a just

one, many persons are, in some degree insane, who are not thought to be so; and probably all persons are so, on this supposition, who are under the influence of any violent passion.

122. Every person who will attend to what his own mind does, in the daily action of his life, will know, that he is engaged in comparing one thing with another, and one motive with another. Some persons, who are actively employed, will find that they make many such comparisons in every hour. All persons, of all ages, make these comparisons in subjects of more or less importance. Philosophers, statesmen, professional men, and mechanics, are continually employed in this process; and so even are children, in their sports and amusements. The mind, then, has a power of making comparisons; and of judging, and the result which the mind comes to, is a judgment. Wherefore, it is said, that there is a faculty of the mind called judgment. But it rather seems proper to say, that the mind has a faculty of forming a judgment by comparison. Human life is a continued series of actions, and every action has some motive which arises from comparing or judging, though these judgments are formed so rapidly, as not to be noticed by the mind. Every one knows that these motives, so formed by comparison, determine him to act, or not to act. He also knows, that when a motive is sufficiently operative to move the mind to do, or to put the muscles of the material being into action, (when the motive has reference to them) an act of the mind, or body follows. This determination to do, or not to do an act, is an exercise of a faculty of the mind which is called the *will.*

123. The motive of the will, has been discussed by very able minds; and opposite, and irreconcileable opinions have been presented to the world, under the authority of great names. Some of these writers maintain that the will is determined by causes over which the mind has no control, and that every act done, or omitted, is from an absolute necessity. They say that every act, and

every thought, is an unavoidable consequence of preceding actions, or thoughts. That this must be so, because the Deity forsees every thing that occurs, and that nothing can happen but in pursuance of his will. On the other hand, it is said, that such a doctrine is directly opposed to the experience of every rational being. That no one doubts, for a moment, that all acts which are within his power, and which he is not restrained, by some consideration, from doing, may be done, or not, at his own pleasure. Can any one doubt that he can rise and walk, or sit still; that he can turn his face towards the East, the North, the West, or the South, or that he can speak, or be silent? If he receive the opposite doctrine, and give credit to that, disregarding the fallacy on which it must rest, he takes that to be true, which is contradicted by every act of his life. The very men who maintain this doctrine, act throughout all their lives, in direct opposition to it. Is it possible, that when one feels regret and remorse, at doing wrong, and satisfaction for doing right, he so feels, though he could not but do the acts from which these feelings arise? Such a doctrine makes of man a mere machine, denies him the influence of all motives; and annihilates, at a blow, all notions of accountability to ourselves, to society, and to the Creator. If this doctrine, so repugnant to common sense, be true, then it is a part of it, that men shall suffer and mourn, in consequence of acts which they were compelled to do; and with the perplexing conviction, that it was impossible to avoid doing the acts, the very *doing* of which, is the cause of their distress. Such things are subversive of all reverence for the Deity.

124. It may be proper to state more precisely the doctrine of "philosophical necessity," as it is called. It is this, according to one of the most distinguished writers on this subject: *Liberty and necessity are consistent. Men's actions proceed from the will, therefore, they proceed from liberty, because the will is free; yet, because all acts of the will proceed from some*

cause, and that from some other cause, and so on, in a continual chain, which ascends to the Great First Cause, all acts proceed from necessity. As God must see all the train of causes, all acts must be done according to his will, since no act can be done against his will.

125. To this doctrine common sense may offer these objections: How can actions be free, merely because they proceed from the will, when it is, at the same time, affirmed, that the will itself, is controlled by necessity? How can any human being know, whether there be, or be not, a train of causes, which begins in the will of the Almighty, and of which the last links are manifested in the acts, good, bad, or indifferent, of all sorts of human beings? Who can venture to say, that the Almighty does, or does not see, the train of causes, if there be one; unless he can also say, that he *knows* what the attributes of that Being are? Omniscience and Omnipotence are spoken of as attributes of the Deity. So far as human beings can comprehend the meaning of these words, when so used, they are properly used. But it may be doubted, whether the human mind can conceive of the application of them as Divine attributes. Who can take on himself to say that the Deity does, or does not, behold all things, that have been, are, and will be; and without succession, in order of time? Or, who can say that the Deity has, or has not, so ordered all things, that they must go on in a course which cannot be changed? Can any mortal pretend to know *how* the Deity exercises his power, or by what rules he acts, or whether there be any *rules* for him?

126. Some of the most learned and discerning men who have appeared in the world, have discussed the question of philosophical necessity. It is believed that all of them must have proceeded on the assumption, that the human mind has power to comprehend and to disclose, the manner in which the Almighty mind acts and governs. Or, they must have assumed that the Deity acts, and governs, as a human mind would, if it were Omniscient and Omnipotent. As to the first case, such power

is not given to any human beings. As to the second, it is a vain speculation to suppose a human mind qualified with such attributes; and a still more vain speculation to imagine, *how* a human mind would act, and govern, if it were so qualified. The discussions alluded to, have the merit and only merit, of having given employment to ingenious and acute intellects. It is not perceived that they have been, or can be, of any practical use. It seems to be more becoming to the short-lived occupants of this humble sphere, to follow the dictates of plain reason, and common sense. All who do this, must feel convinced that they may do, or forbear to do, in all cases, when there is no physical, moral, or religious restraint operating upon them. On this conviction moral accountability depends.

127. We consider man to be thus far a free agent, that he wills to do, or not to do; that his will is determined by the strongest motives acting upon it; that the nature and influence of motives depend upon his original mind, and upon the intelligence and discipline imparted to it; and through these, on the respect which he feels for commands and prohibitions, arising from the laws of nature, of society, and of his Creator. We believe, finally, that the mind of man is distinguishable, from the thinking power which other animals have (which may be in many respects, especially in some animals, very like that of the human mind) in this, that man can, and that no other animal can, form opinions of abstract truths. By this we mean, that man can comprehend the nature of a law, and its general application, and the consequences of obeying it, or disobeying it. That he can comprehend the abstract truths of science, morality, and religion, and that no other animal has this power. He can comprehend that he is required, under some penalties, to govern himself by these truths. We believe that in these respects man is, and was intended to be, exalted far above all other animated beings. And that this is the comprehensive mark put between

him and them, and raises him to the hope of another, and superior life.

128. The conclusion we come to is this: That the faculties of the mind are developed by the action of the senses; that the knowledge transferred to the mind through these, enables it to exercise its faculties, and to expand, enlarge, and perfect them, so far as human life permits; that among these are memory, association, attention, generalizing, abstraction, comparing and judging, or forming judgments; that judgments are motives, which put the will into action; that the will is formed, and qualified, by the sum of intelligence, and acquirements, which the mind arrives at; or that willing, and consequent action, may be right or wrong, virtuous, or vicious, or neither the one nor the other, but indifferent. If we are well founded in these propositions we have cleared the way to morals.

CHAPTER XVII.

Moral Accountability.

INTRODUCTION.

129. It may properly be expected, when any one takes on himself to set forth the grounds on which moral accountability is supposed to rest, that he should also show, what other persons have set forth, on the same subject. It seems proper to do this, that a fair comparison may be made among different, or conflicting opinions. Such display of opinions would, it is very certain, require volumes; and an extent of labor, far exceeding that intended, in preparing this volume. Nothing more will be attempted than a mere outline of the history of moral philosophy. In doing this, we assume that human reason, unassisted by revelation, can arrive at a respectable degree of knowledge, concerning duty to one's self, and to others.

130. How much any nation must be raised above

barbarism, before any inquiry begins as to religious and moral duty, it is not easy to decide. Few nations have been found so little removed from the lowest barbarism, as not to have *some* religious sentiments, however absurd or shocking. The aboriginals of this country, though called savage, and barbarous, had religious sentiments, and moral opinions. Some of the former, though rude, were better than some, which have appeared in civilized society ; and some of the latter were honorable to human nature, though qualified with excessive cruelty. As nations advance from barbarism, and approach refinement, *teachers* in religion and morals appear. A class of men are soon known, who, under some name, assume to be interpreters of the will of Deities, and to hold a place between these, and the multitude. It was so among the Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Medes, and Persians. How it was among the Jews is known from the Scriptures.

131. The most ancient philosopher and moralist, of whom there is any account, was *Zoroaster*. At what time he lived, is very uncertain : nor is it certain that there was such a person, although doctrines, said to be taught by him, still exist. Whether he was of the people called the Medes, or the Persians, is uncertain. He is considered by some writers to be the founder of the class called the *Magi*, another name for priests ; and also of the *Persees*, or worshippers of fire. Among the Chinese, a celebrated philosopher and moralist named *Confucius*, appeared, about 550 years before Christianity was revealed. His morality was of a high order, and his works have been deemed worthy of translation into more than one language of Europe, within the present century. From such examples, (of which there are several) it may be inferred, that religious and moral sentiments are natural to the human mind ; and that they necessarily take the form of *systems*, in certain stages of refinement.

132. The most remarkable among the Heathen philosophers and moralists, who lived within four

centuries next before the Christian era began, were Greeks and Romans. Morals, (independently of Christianity,) have some connexion with the opinions of these eminent men: All intellectual philosophy,* of the present day, is connected with their systems. It would be a labor out of place, to show what these systems were, and in what respects they differed from, or were opposed to each other. But, as many words are in common use among us, which are derived from Grecian Philosophy, it may be useful to show, why some of them came to be a part of our language.

133. *Socratic* is used to distinguish that sort of reasoning which consists, not in a series of arguments to prove a proposition, but by putting questions, which require an answer; or, which may be said to imply their own answer. It is called the Socratic method, and was that used by *Socrates*, an eminent philosopher and moralist, who was condemned, most unjustly, at Athens, to drink poison, in the year 400 B. C. He was the most rational teacher among all ancient philosophers of the existence of God, as well as the most profound and just of all ancient moralists.

134. *Peripatetic* is used to distinguish that school of philosophy which was founded by *Aristotle*. He was born at Stagyra, in Macedon, and died at the age of about sixty-one, 353 B. C. He was the pre-

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* The word *philosophy* is often used without an intelligible meaning. The sense in which it is used, in these pages, may be most easily understood by recurring to its origin. It is said in the tenth volume of the Encyclopædia Americana, page 595, that Pythagorus (who died 500 years B. C.) "refused the title of *sophos* (wise) as too assuming; and contented himself with the simple appellation of *philo-sophos*, (a friend, or lover of wisdom)." For general, or popular use, the word philosophy, may be understood to mean, the truths on which any science is founded, and the rational inferences which may be drawn therefrom, either for practical use, or to arrive at other truths. Thus, natural philosophy, means all that is certainly known of the material creation, and the practical use of this knowledge, whether in common pursuits, or in arriving at other truths. Moral philosophy, means all the truths which have been established concerning human motives, and conduct; and the using of these truths in obtaining the knowledge of truths yet to be known; as well as the practical application of them in human affairs.

ceptor of Alexander the Great. He instructed his followers while *walking about*, which movement is expressed by two Greek words out of which *peripatetic* is made. His systems of philosophy have been preserved, and he is often referred to by modern philosophers. He is sometimes spoken of as *the Stagyrite*, from the place of his birth. His eminence as a teacher concerning the nature of things, Political Government, and of the human mind, has made him less memorable as a moralist.

135. *Platonic*, is used to signify the philosophy of *Plato*,* who was first a pupil, and afterwards, to some extent, a competitor for fame with Aristotle. His opinions differed from those of his master, in some essential points. His works have been collected and translated, and commented upon, by a profoundly learned Divine, now living at Berlin, in Prussia;† and translated from the German into French, by a celebrated lecturer on Christianity at Paris;‡ so that the works of Plato are more likely to be known, familiarly, to the learned, than those of any other Grecian. *Academy*, a word in use in many languages, is indicative of the honor in which Plato's fame is held. His teachings, or conferences, were conducted at a gymnasium, or school, in or near Athens, which was kept by a person, it is said, named Academus. Whence, academia, academy. This place may have been among trees, as, sometimes, Plato's place of teaching is spoken of as being a grove. *Platonic love* is sometimes spoken of in this sense; Plato maintained that there might be a fervent and devoted affection, between persons of different sexes, of an entirely intellectual character, and resembling, in no respect, that affection which naturally arises between the sexes. Plato died at Athens 348 years B. C.

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* His original name was Aristocles. He was called Plato, from *Platus* (broad) on account of breadth of his chest and forehead. *Enc. Amer.* Art. Plato.

† Schleiermacher, who is as much respected for the observance of all professional and Christian duties, as for his distinguished learning.

‡ Cousin.

136. *Pyrrhonism* is used to signify scepticism; or doubting the credibility of truths, or opinions. This class of philosophers, or sceptics, opposed all systems of philosophy which had been maintained. They doubted the truth of every proposition. This sect was founded by *Pyrrho* of the city of Elis, where the Olympic games were celebrated. He died about 300 years B. C.

137. *Epicurean* is used to signify a high refinement in pleasures of the senses, and more especially those which have the least connexion with pleasures which are intellectual. But this is a great departure from the true meaning of the original Epicurean philosophy. Its object was to show that all things which man is made capable of using to promote his pleasure, may be used to that end, if it be done innocently, and in a manner consistent with one's duty to himself, and to others. The founder of this sect was *Epicurus*, who died at Athens 269 B. C.

138. *Stoic* is used to signify the absence of all sympathy for one's fellow men; and a disregard of all the pains, and pleasures of life. This word is derived from a sect founded at Athens by *Zeno*, a native of Cyprus. They held all the amiable virtues in contempt; and maintained that mortals must bear evils with sullen magnanimity, until they became intolerable; and whenever life was no longer worth preserving, the sufferer might put an end to it. This sort of philosophy was not uncommon among the Romans, as is known from the history of some of its eminent citizens. The name of this sect is derived from a Greek word which means a *portico*. Zeno is said to have taught in such a place, at Athens. He finished his own life at Athens 264 B. C.

139. *Cynic* is used to signify a person who is austere, churlish, and surly towards his fellow-men, and very ill at ease with himself. The word is derived from the Greek word for *dog*. The Cynics were a sect of philosophers of some celebrity. This sect sprung out of the Socratic school, and origi-

nally maintained elevated sentiments on the nature of virtue, which they considered to mean *self-denial.* But this theory degenerated into contempt of riches, and of every pleasure, and comfort of life. Diogenes was one of the most remarkable of this sect. He is said to have been visited by Alexander the Great, who found him living in a tub. Diogenes is said to have replied to the inquiry, what Alexander could do for him, "Nothing but to stand from between me and the sun."

140. The Greeks derived their philosophy, learning, and refinement, from the Egyptians. The Grecian mythology (religion) was entirely made up from that of Egypt. Romans visited Greece to obtain learning, science and arts; and made up their philosophy from that source. The greatest splendor of Rome may be said to have occurred within the century next preceding the commencement of the Christian era. Philosophy was then assiduously cultivated, and there were distinguished moralists at Rome, whatever may be then said of Roman morals. This was the period within which *Seneca* flourished in that city, though by birth a Spaniard. He is known by a much esteemed book called Seneca's Morals. In this time lived *Marcus Tullius Cicero*, from whom there are several works, familiarly known. One work (called Tully's Offices) on moral duties, is held in high respect by Christian moralists, and is often quoted. The last eminent moral teacher at Rome was a slave of a cruel master in Nero's time. He is known by the name of *Epictetus*, a native of a city in Phrygia, (Asia Minor). His works are preserved, and are greatly esteemed. They do not seem to have borrowed anything from Christianity, though he died about 150 years after its revelation.

141. It may be, that all moral systems should be considered with reference to the age in which they arose; that is, the state of society, the nature of the Government, and the effect which theories were intended to have. One could better understand, for example, the true meaning of the Gre-

cian systems, during the third century before the Christian era, if he had first informed himself of the political and social condition of Greece, during that period; and, especially, if he could know how contemporaneous moralists were related thereto, and to each other. It must also be taken into the account that the teaching was *oral*, and that (the art of printing being unknown) few, if any were influenced, who did not actually *hear*.

142. From the death of Epictetus, down to a period commencing about two centuries ago, we know of nothing in the history of moral philosophy, separated from Christianity, worth noticing, for the present purpose. From about the beginning of the seventeenth century (1610) to the present time, morality has been treated of, in connexion with Christian revelation. Works have appeared in England, Scotland, France, and Germany. These works are very numerous. We do not assume to make a critical comparison of them; nor to have such knowledge of them, as would be necessary, if we had the ability, to do it. These various writers, are not (so far as we are acquainted with them) reconcileable with each other. We think it useful to go so far as to select the opinions of a sufficient number of eminent writers, to sustain the principles on which moral accountability is maintained, in this volume. We quote the substance of opinions, not the words in which they are (in all cases) expressed.

143. Conscience is felt to act as the delegate of an invisible Ruler; it is the enlightening or directing principle of our conduct. A sense of right and wrong, or moral good and evil, belongs to human nature. (*Blair.*)

The light of nature not only shines upon the human mind, through the medium of a rational faculty, but by an internal instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle of the purity of man's first estate. (*Lord Bacon.*)

Sense of right and wrong is as natural to us, as natural affection. (*Lord Shaftsbury.*)

Every man may find the evidence of moral science in his own breast. The dictates of nature are the voice of God. (*Dr. Beattie.*)

Whatever conscience dictates, God commands. (*Dr. Price.*)

The mind contains in it, the general principles of morality, as native principles, by which it judges virtue to be fit, and vice unfit. (*Dr. Watts.*)

I call natural laws, those which nature dictates, in all ages, to all men, for the maintenance of that justice, which she has implanted in our breasts. (*Voltaire's Works, vol.* 34, *p.* 296.)

The secret sense of right and wrong, has the natural force and effect of a law. (*Dr. Shepherd.*)

The Divine Law, whether by the light of nature, or by revelation, is the measure of sin, and duty. (*Locke.*)

It is absurd to suppose that the *first* perceptions of right and wrong, can be derived from reason. Our moral faculties were set up within us, to be the supreme arbiters of our actions. (*Adam Smith.*)

144. There are men of true piety, and great learning, who go beyond the moralists before mentioned, and who maintain, that the will of God is, (in these days,) directly communicated to the human mind, independently of the moral sense; and that this communication constitutes a motive to action.* Of this opinion was Lord Chief Justice *Hale.* This opinion is not mentioned for the purpose of assenting or dissenting, for how is it to be proved, that it is, or is not, so?

One eminent moralist of modern times, has not been already mentioned, *Archdeacon Paley.* It has been objected to his theory of *utility*, (Book 2. Chap. 6.) that it places morality on the footing of mere social convenience. But, what objection is there to that, if social convenience implies a condition of society consistent with the will of Him, by whose order society itself, exists? The objection seems to rest on the term used, rather than on the meaning which it is intended thereby to convey. There is, however, one opinion of Dr. Paley, in which he differs from most of the heathen, as well as from all Christian moralists. He says in Book 2. Chap. 5. "Upon the whole, it seems to me, either that there exist no such instincts as compose what is called the moral sense; or that they are not now to be distinguished from prejudices and habits." "This celebrated question, therefore, becomes, in our system, a question of pure curiosity; and as such we dismiss it to the determination of those, who are more inquisitive than we are concerned to be, about the natural history and constitution of the human species."

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* See Essays on the Principles of Morality, by Jonathan Dymond, published in London, 1830. A work of an original thinker, and acute reasoner; but somewhat of an *ultra* moralist.

With the exception of this moralist, *all*, who have come within our knowledge, of whatsoever age, or nation, concur in the opinion, that there is, in the human mind, an original sense of right and wrong. On this opinion we rest the whole theory of moral accountability, so far as human reason, alone, can discern what moral accountability is.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Moral Accountability.

145. Distinguished as man is from all other animals by his physical and intellectual qualities, he is much more distinguished from them, by those which are called *moral*. He is the only animal who is capable of conceiving beforehand, whether an intended act, will, or will not conform, to some known law, or rule of right. It is certain, that he only, of all animals, is capable of forming abstract rules, and of applying them to actions done, or intended to be done. He only is capable of feeling a sense of compunction and remorse; and, beyond all question, the only one who can associate with transgression, the fear of punishment by an authority far higher

than any, known to him in this life. However inscrutable the nature of physical and intellectual qualities may be, the powers given to man, when properly cultivated, are sufficient to dispel all darkness, and mystery, concerning his *moral duties.*

146. As before intimated, all controversial discussion of theories and opinions, maintained by ethical writers, is intentionally avoided. The propositions which are thought to be sound, and maintainable on the authority of experience, and common sense are these : Man was placed on this earth, in an entirely different relation to his Creator, from that of all other animals. He only has the capacity to improve his condition, as to his physical wants and enjoyments ; he can, and no other animal can, ascend from a low condition, to an exalted one, by the disciplining of his intellectual power ; he can, and no other animal can, attain to a clear knowledge of the *motives which ought to govern his conduct ;* and he only knows, whether an act which he has done, or thinks of doing, may or may not be *a violation of a law, which he is required to obey.* These are unquestionable truths ; then, the inquiry which arises from them is this : Does the cultivation and improvement of man's faculties develope, and bring into action, his natural moral sense, just as the discipline of intellectual faculties, enables him to know what is true, and what is not true, when judged of by some scientific rule ? It is the affirmative of this question, which is to be maintained. If it be proved, that moral perception depends on the natural qualities of a human being, and on the course of education which may be applied to him, it is clear that the kind of education, *as to morals*, which one may have, is the most important thing that can happen to him, in this life. We have no doubt that this is so ; and that the manifold miseries which are seen in the world, are caused by the neglect of educating, and disciplining, *the natural moral sense.* The reasons, for this opinion, follow.

147. It may be admitted, that the rude and uncultivated mind of man is not furnished with rules of

right and wrong, so as to be capable of discerning between virtue and vice, or any thing, which is itself good or bad, unless in some very inferior degree. Yet, it is supposed to be true, that man has not been found any where, destitute of all perception, of right and wrong; though he has been found with very imperfect, and misguided perceptions in many instances, in different parts of the earth. We entertain no doubt, that what may be called the moral sense, does exist in the mind as a faculty, in all men to some extent, as a necessary consequence of their existence as men; and that this sense may be developed, and disciplined, in like manner as the other faculties of the mind may be; and that by suitable cultivation, this moral sense acquires a discriminating power, which may be called almost intuitive with respect to right and wrong. It seems quite reasonable to suppose, that there may be persons who have this sense so developed by long continued discipline, that they judge, infallibly, as soon as a proposition is presented to them, of its character, in relation to the most refined rules of fitness and propriety.

148. If we are right in this supposition, it must follow that fine moral sense is a clear perception, and ready application, of the laws which the Creator prescribed for human conduct, and, also, just perception and application of the conventional laws, which originate in social life. In proportion as the mind becomes well instructed in the meaning and use of the former description of laws, those which are of human institution are found to be right or wrong, just as they do, or do not conform, to those laws. We cannot resist the conviction, that if the Deity intended human beings should be happy, he must have intended that they should be so, by conforming to laws which he has prescribed; and this purpose would evidently be defeated, if those who are made to be the subjects of laws, were not made capable of comprehending them, and of making their own laws consistent with them.

149. In a multitude of instances the duty of obedience to laws, whether taken to be divine, natural,

or human, must depend upon an immediate perception of their application to that which is to be done, or avoided. To this it may be answered, that this is no more than the use of that intelligence, which discipline imparts to all the intellectual faculties. But if it be admitted, that a highly gifted and greatly experienced professional man, statesman, or military chief, may be said to have attained to a certain degree of facility in deciding on the course to be pursued, in the exigencies of his condition, so also may there be an acute discernment of moral fitness and propriety. And the rather in the latter case, than in the supposed one, because in these the thing to be decided, and the rules by which it is to be decided, may be entirely arbitrary; whereas those of moral fitness must be, in their own nature, incapable of error. But whether there be any such moral sense or not, in the original formation of man, it will sufficiently answer the present purpose to establish, that by a course of discipline, man may attain to a knowledge of all those rules, which are adapted to secure to him all the happiness of which he is capable; and to qualify him for the attainments which he is enabled to expect.

150. The word *morals*, is derived from the Latin words *mos*, *moris*, *moralis*, meaning, manners, or relating to manners, that is, conduct, implying motives, and actions. The word moral is often used in connexion with some other word, as moral agency, moral power, moral effect, moral courage. This use of the word, may not always convey a very definite meaning. We mean by moral philosophy, in this volume, that code of laws, of which the germs, or principles, are implanted in every rational mind, and which are to be manifested by the development and discipline of the faculties; and which are adapted to govern individuals, as such, and as members of society, throughout this life; and which, sanctioned by religious reverence, lead to the expectation of a happy future life.

151. We lay out of the inquiry here, as we have done in all preceding pages, the revealed law of the

Deity. The law of Morality is to be sought in the constitution of men and things. Do we believe that the material world proceeded from, and is governed by, the Deity? That it is governed by laws to which he has exacted an obedience, which cannot be departed from? Do we believe, that intellectual being proceeded from him, and that it is, in like manner, subjected to laws; that intellectuality, as it exists in man, allows to him the liberty of choosing, whether he will act in one manner or another? Do we believe, that this liberty of choosing, could have been given to man, unaccompanied with a capacity to learn the consequences of choosing well or ill? Do we believe, that man has availed himself, to some extent, of this capacity; and that he has learned, more or less perfectly, what these laws are, which were intended to govern his choice? Do we believe, that he has improved his condition, from age to age, by studying and applying these laws? Do we believe, that in all the term of life permitted to each individual, he is under the necessity of doing certain acts for himself, and relatively to those with whom he is associated by family ties, by social bonds, and by the using of those things which minister to his well being, consistently with the rights which others may have therein? Do we believe, that he ought to abstain from acts which are injurious to himself, and to others; and from acts which disturb the good order and harmony, of the political association of which he is necessarily a member?

152. If we so believe, then such belief must be followed by the conviction, that we must ascertain and conform to the rules which are adapted to accomplish these ends of our being. Morality, then lies in knowing, and in conforming, to these rules. In the proportion in which these rules are known to us, and observed by us, we shall conform to the will of the Creator, as discernible by us, in the nature of his creation; and in the proportion in which we are uninstructed in these laws, or are disobedient to them, when known to us, we shall fall short

of obtaining the good of which we are capable. Gross ignorance, and wilful disobedience, are the causes of suffering in body, and in mind.

153. Those who are instructed, are favored with a monitor under the name of *conscience*, which never fails to perform its duty. The character of this monitor, is derived from the state of improvement to which the human race attain. It is such, in each individual, as he makes it to be. In some individuals its influence is feeble, in some ever active and severe; in some misdirected, and leading to absurd consequences. This may be so, because of the narrow and misconceived rules, which conscience enforces. Conscience operates in every mind; it operates well or ill, usefully or mischievously, according to the character of the mind in which it resides; one may be strictly conscientious in things of imaginary importance, and even revolting to sound reason, and good sense.

154. Without adverting to revelation to prove that the spirit of man is immortal, we have assumed that it is so, in the preceding pages. But this all-important fact, cannot be left on assumption, merely. We have, then, to inquire whether the light of nature discloses to us *immortality.* We know not that the tenor of human life ought to be different from what it should be, whether the spirit of man is transferred to another life, or not. We discern nothing in revealed law, which ought to vary that conduct which will result in man's greatest earthly good, if he is not to live again. Whatever revelation may add to man's duties, it takes away no law, and impairs no law, which it would not be for his good, faithfully to observe, if life begins and ends in this frail being.

CHAPTER XIX.

On Immortality.—There is an Immortal Spirit in Man.

155. We propose to consider this subject of immortality, by the same light which has hitherto

guided us. We do not say that we expect to demonstrate the immortality of the soul; but we do expect to find truths, which will furnish inferences that it is immortal.

The proofs of this proposition, as derived from revealed religion, are not now to be considered. We shall go by the truths which the human mind is capable of perceiving, and by the inferences which can be drawn from these truths. We shall be met, perhaps, at the threshold with the objection, that nothing in the nature of proof can be drawn from this source, because, there is no truth within our knowledge, which proves the existence of an immortal spirit; nor any truths from which an inference can be reasonably drawn that there is such a spirit. If this be so, we admit that the argument must fail. It is also admitted, that with the exceptions which are found in the Scriptures, there is no satisfactory evidence, that the disembodied spirit has been seen by any mortal. We know not of any useful purpose, (with the exceptions above referred to) which would require that the spirit of man should be seen of the living. And we think it is irreconcileable with the qualities of our nature, so far as we can comprehend them, that spirit, whatever that may be, should be perceptible by mortals. There are many narrations which tend to show, that supernatural appearances have been witnessed. No credit is due to these. They are to be accounted for by recurring to truths, and to inferences from them. It is a truth that the mind may be affected by delusions. External objects may seem to the mind to exist, which do not exist. There are many well authenticated facts of this sort.

156. How this delusion, which has no being but in the mind, is produced, is not known to us. All accounts of apparitions, and supernatural occurrences, are undoubtedly to be referred to some mental error. We think it may be assumed, that it is contrary to the truths known to us, and to the inferences which must be drawn from them, that the immortal spirit can be perceived in a disem-

bodied state, by the human senses. What natural evidence, then, can we have that there is such spirit? We answer, that we are to take all the truths that bear on this inquiry, and make reasonable inferences from them. Among these truths we rank the following.

157. First. The universe is the work of one GOD. All its parts constitute a united, consentaneous whole. Every part acts, or may act, when motion is given to it, relatively to the whole. There are laws of analogy which pervade the whole; as well as general and particular laws, which act always in like circumstances, to the same ends. Among these analogies we may select as examples: The great principle of waste, supply, and renovation; the analogy of organic bodies; the resemblance which the vegetable creation bears to animated being, in the vessels, ramifications and circulations; and the analogy which exists between the circulation of fluids, in vegetable and animal being, and that of the waters of the earth. The principle of universal attraction, and the relation which every one of the globes, floating in the vast expanse around us, bears to all others. Every part of created being has some relation to, and connexion with, all other parts. It is not certainly known that all this is so; but so many truths are certainly known, as to present inferences so obvious, so satisfactory, and so conclusive, that the mind cannot refuse its assent to them.

158. Secondly: It must be admitted that all created being came from the universal Deity, whose attributes, so far as can be discerned, are forced upon the mind. From these truths we infer, that nothing which He has made was made in vain, or without design, or without some useful purpose. All that is known of man, comes within these general rules, always keeping in view, that man is a free agent, and that one is not to suppose, that the Deity intended he should necessarily commit the errors, follies, and crimes, which spring from the exercise of the liberty given to him. We are not to judge

of man from the ignorance and vice, which mark the course of certain individuals; nor from the benighted and low condition in which some nations are seen. But we are to judge of him by this undeniable truth: that he is made capable of improvement, and that the progress of improvement must, from obvious causes be slow; and that what is generally true of all the human race, under all the variety of circumstances in which they are seen, must be founded in the general law of man's nature, ordained by his Creator. These circumstances depend on the kind of government under which men live, the national habits, the degree of intelligence which they have attained to, and the influence which the knowing and the privileged, have exercised over the mass of men; and on the climate in which they happen to be placed; and perhaps, more than on everything else put together, on traditionary habit, everywhere the relentless enemy of improvement. To mankind, however thus diversified, the sentiment of immortality has been almost common. Some persons who do not believe in immortality, and even some who maintain it, allow no weight to the universality of this sentiment. They say it proves nothing; that it is natural to man to desire to live again; and that such desire establishes nothing as to the certainty of future life. To this we disagree. We go back to the truth, that the sentiment springs from the organization of the human mind. That it appears under all the aspects in which man appears. That it could not, and would not appear, if it did not spring from that power from which man himself originates. Why should the thought of immortality have entered the human mind naturally, if it have no foundation? Is there any thing else which men imagine of themselves which is known to be unfounded, or believed to be so? Since, then, the Creator has given this sentiment so commonly to the human mind, and since we cannot suppose that any sentiment is found there, and especially one so materially affecting existence, as this, without his authority, we think it is entitled to great respect in estimating the certainty of future life.

159. Thirdly. It is a truth known to every one that there is something in him which he calls mind. It is with this part of himself that he recalls the past, acts on the present, and regards the future. It is with this that he conceives of the Deity, and forms the sublime conception of his existence, attributes and presence. However depraved, and shocking the sentiment is sometimes seen to be in some nations of the earth, it is, nevertheless, an universal one, among mankind, that there is some intelligence, superior to themselves, which is to be worshipped. This is the natural offspring of the thinking part of our nature, and this is a truth. Is the inference fairly to be made from that truth, that this something may exist when the organization in which it appears, returns to dust? What sound reason is there for supposing that this is not a mere consequence of organization of material substance? We answer to this, that it cannot be conceived that matter, whatever matter may be, can have that power. How can we conceive that any arrangement of material particles should produce memory, imagination, reasoning, love, fear, conscience, religion? That matter should ever have this power, is irreconcileable with truths which press irresistibly on every observing mind. This thinking something, then, is not matter. Some persons who deny to man an immortal spirit, but who must admit that he thinks, say this: let it be that man thinks, and that matter cannot think, and that there is something in man which is distinguishable from matter, and that through that something he is immortal, have not other animals that same something in them? Do not animals think? And if immortality is to be affirmed of all animals that think, are not other animals, as well as man, immortal? To this we answer, that there is no truth, there is no inference from any truth, that leads to the conclusion that other animals think; or if they do, that the sort of thinking which

they are gifted with, is connected with immortality. We shall not shun, nor attempt to conceal the inference which the apparent intelligence of animals seems to furnish. We admit that this argument is plausible. We meet it by assuming, that the very best intelligence found in the animal creation, does not prove that they have any of that intellectuality which connects them with future life. We rely on this truth ; that no animal which has not the discipline of human intelligence is capable of any improvement. To each one of all the varied tribes, there is a prescribed, an unchangeable law, from age to age. By that law they are bound. The most intelligent of the animal creation, and the most teachable are the dog, the horse, and the elephant. They are man's pupils. Left to themselves they are incapable of change. They are the same now, which they were from the earliest knowledge of them. The skilful beaver, and the more skilful bee, are the same which they were when first known to man. It is not so with our race ; we are moving on in the long course of improvement. We are removing gradually the veil which is hung over the natural world ; we are casting stronger and stronger lights, on the moral and social nature of man ; we are gradually obtaining, by the light of reason, more clear and more grateful perceptions of the one only and true Sovereign of the universe. These are the qualities of man which distinguish him from the brute ; and these truths force on us the inference, that brutes are of the earth, and return to the earth ; that man is of another, and far more exalted being, and to that he is destined.

160. Fourthly. Such reasonings, it may be replied, are plausible, but not satisfactory. The brute returns to the dust, and does not man return to the dust ?. When that unknown something in him which we call life ceases, is he not decomposed and mingled with the natural world ? and how is this well known truth to be reconciled with the supposition, that something in him survives this ruin ?

Certainly that which came from the earth returns to it. But we have shown that there is something in man which cannot be of the earth. If this be so, it only remains to show, that this something may survive that which is earthly ruin. This cannot be directly proved, for as we have before remarked, no one has seen the disembodied spirit. But as this thinking something did exist, as the sentiment is universal that it may continue to exist, independently of the material frame; as this something has a progressive nature, as we have seen in the power which man has to improve; as it is not impossible that there should be a separate existence, what are the inferences which the mind is enabled to draw as to a future state of being? Let us first dispose of some objections which have been often urged against the proposition of future life. Among these are, that man belongs to a material system; and that it is irrational to suppose, that being seen to be such, there should be anything in his nature, which is separable from that system. This objection has been impliedly answered before.

161. No one will deny that there is a Creator, and that he is of superior immaterial intelligence, and that this intelligence acts on the material universe. No one will deny that this universe is one united whole; that material and intellectual man composes part of it. What truth or what inference from any truth forces on us the belief, that so much as is intellectual must be limited to this earth; and cannot exist elsewhere? Is existence elsewhere, so irreconcileable to reason, that reason must reject it? Why is it so? because one cannot see how it should be so. Let us see how many things and facts there are, within our daily observation, which are no less marvellous, than would be the fact, that the thinking something survives. Can any one account for the fact that his muscles obey his will? that the vegetable and animal substances which he receives as food, assimilate with and become part of himself? Can any one account for the action of his memory? For the connexion between the will

and the utterance of articulate sounds? Can any one account for the succession of vegetable and animal being? What is that in a seed which sends one part of it downwards into the earth in the form of roots, and another part of it upwards through the surface, into the air? How are all the transformations from one sort of animal being into another effected? How are the essences of flowers, and vegetables, made capable of a distinct and continued existence, when the organization from which they come, has been destroyed in the process?

162. It is not insisted, because no answer can be given to these questions, that, therefore, the human soul survives the ruin of the body; but this, that if it do, it is not more wonderful than that such things, which are within our observation, should occur. But then it may be said, that though all these things do occur, they belong to what we know to be the mere revolutionary succession of the natural world. All these things are confined within a limited sphere, viz. to this earth. This is true. But does it follow, that the thinking substance manifested through an earthly organization, necessarily belongs to the sphere of the earth? What is the limit of its action while so manifested? Does it not fly from world to world, search out the laws of the Creator, and come into his very presence in the admiration of his works, and in the feeling, which no man can escape from, of obedience to his will? Is it then limited to the earth? or does it belong to some proper sphere in the universe, of which the earthly being, is one, and perhaps the first of a succession, though far beyond the limited view which is permitted to us here?

163. It is not assumeed that it is, or can be demonstrated by the light of nature only, that man has an immortal spirit. But all the truths which human power can put together, and the necessary inferences from them, disclose to man a strong assurance that it is so; and on the other hand, it is certain, there is no truth, nor any inference from any truth, that presses upon him a conclusion, that this can-

not be so. If, then, there were nothing but the light of nature for our guide, the judgment of the rational mind would be, that there is no probability that earthly death is the end of life ; its judgment further is, that all which comes to that mind in the form of truth, and all the fair deductions therefrom, place the expectation of life near to certainty. We have one thing more to add : let us look through the created system ; let us consider man as he is, and may be, physically, intellectually, and morally; let us consider his term of years ; what he suffers and enjoys ; the restless action of his mind ; his abstract conception of death, its certainty as to him, and his apprehensions of what may follow it ; conception, certainty and apprehension, which are unknown to every animal but man. Let us consider, too, man's views of the Deity ; of his awful works, of his own state of being as connected with one of endless duration ; and, also, that so far as we can discern, nothing that is created is *annihilated*, though it may often change its state of being. Then, these things being so, how can we reconcile it with our conceptions of the Deity, that he intended for man, no more or better, than that he should come forth like a flower, eat like a brute, laugh and weep, through his brief moment, and disappear, and be lost, in the revolutions of the material world.

164. Man is left in no doubt on these subjects. All the natural hopes and aspirations of man, are assured to him by the Creator's own revelation of himself. Is this so ? How is he assured of it ? By the Christian religion. Certainly there is such religion in the world. There are very many who profess that religion. Its professors entertain very different opinions of its nature and obligations. Some creeds, and modes of worship, are apparently of human invention, and do no honor to a merciful and omniscient God. If it were of divine origin, would it not be better understood, and better applied to human wants and duties than it is seen to be ? How can it be, that such a God should have sent to the earth as a beneficent gift, such disclosure

of himself, and of human relation to himself, as are seen to be declared by men? Nor only declared, but maintained with the most intolerant spirit, and even with bloody and exterminating violence, wherever its votaries can use the arm of power? This religion then does not prove itself. Its assumed origin cannot be proved to human conception, in any other manner than that by which all other things are proved, that is, by reason. If reason tells us that there is such a religion, and what it is, it must be received and obeyed; otherwise it must be ranked with the exploded fables of the heathen world.

165. Let us proceed then to examine this serious subject by the light of reason. Let us keep in view, what the Deity has manifested himself to be, in his magnificent works; and what He has made or permitted man to be, and where He has placed man in the scale of being, and thence attempt to know, whether there be a revelation of God's will to man, and what it means.

CHAPTER XX.

Revealed Religion.

INTRODUCTION.

166. We have hitherto followed plain reason as the proper guide to a knowledge of the Creator's purposes. We know not of any other guide to a knowledge of Christian truth. If there be such a thing as a religion revealed to man, by the Deity, it must be known to man in one of two modes; first, by direct inspiration: secondly, by examining the evidence of its truth, and judging of it by the understanding. In these days, no one pretends to be inspired. Those who pretend to comprehend the nature of religion in any other way than that in which they understand any other matter, necessarily received, or rejected, upon evidence, must be deceivers, or deceived. Many men have been very

sincere Christians, who were gifted with extraordinary powers of mind, and who had attained to great eminence in all the departments of learning. Their natural powers, and the diligent cultivation of them, qualified such men the better to investigate Christian truth by the same rational means, which they applied to acquire the knowledge of truth, in natural and intellectual philosophy. At the head of such men, (independently of those who have officially devoted themselves to religious teaching, many of whom are of the highest order, as to intellectual power,) we may place *Sir Isaac Newton* and *John Locke.* There are many others who are entitled to eminent distinction. In some respects, *Lord Bacon* is their equal. But the two first have given, in the most decided manner, their testimony to the truth of revelation, after a long and searching examination, which no two other men, that ever lived, were more capable of making. It is well known that Locke, who was an original discriminating thinker, a man of business, and a polished man of the world, and who left but little to his followers to do in illustrating the qualities of the human mind, distinguished himself in proving the truth and reasonableness of revelation. He passed his long, busy, and happy life, in the observance of Christian precepts, and died, in the certainty of their divine origin. He found nothing mysterious, or incomprehensible, in Christianity. On the contrary, he regarded it, as a clear and simple exposition of those rules which enjoin duty to one's self, to one's fellow men, and to the Creator. He seems to have been aware that religion had been greatly misconceived of, and injuriously perverted. He, therefore, warns the pious against enthusiasm, and against mysterious delusions, which lead them away from the practical, and salutary uses, of Christian belief. Can it be doubted, that the calm, rational, and satisfying views of this eminent man, are worthy of respectful imitation?

167. We are sensible of the grave responsibility of introducing the subject of religion, among youth-

ful persons; the more so, because there are many denominations of Christians in this country. We consider this difference, to be the natural consequence of the freedom of opinion which reigns in this happy land. It is not to be expected that all minds should entertain the same belief. It is seen, that there are differences of opinion on all other subjects, whether serious, or insignificant. Unanimity is the less to be expected in a matter so serious as that, which prescribes the duty of the created, to the Creator. Each one knows, that in this responsibility, he must act for himself; and that he must take the final, and lasting consequences of conformity, or error. One is not sure that difference of opinion, in religious belief, has not a quickening, and beneficial effect. Suppose that there were a perfect accordance among all who profess Christianity, would not interest in religion be far less fervent than it now is known to be? The world has seen such an experiment, carried on for nearly a thousand years. From the beginning of the sixth, to the beginning of the sixteenth century, there was but one faith, and one Supreme Head, of the only church, known throughout Christendom.—What Christianity was, and what it was not, through this long lapse, history has not failed to disclose. It was in this time, that the darkness of ignorance, and barbarism, overshadowed society; and bound the mind, as well as the person, in chains. The first step in dispelling this darkness, was a difference in religious opinion. The character of society began, then, to change, and has been changing for the better, continually since. We assume not to judge, which of the various denominations, is right, or wrong. We know that *all Christians*, do, and must agree in one thing; that is, that among the fruits of Christianity, is proper moral conduct. With religion so far, and no farther, we presume to go. We disturb no one in his religious faith; nor shall we, in the attempt to describe religion, as the sanction of morals, express one sentiment that has any reference to sectarian faith or practice.

168. *Revealed Religion.* The word Religion is derived from the Latin language. It is said to be formed from *re* and *ligo*, *to bind anew*, and to have been used to express an oath or vow to the gods, which the Romans regarded as a sacred obligation. An eminent Roman derives this word from *religare*, to *reconsider*, in which sense it may mean, diligent study of whatever pertains to God. Others derive it from *religare*, *to bind fast*; in this sense it may mean the obligation which exists in the mind in relation to some superior power. The commonly received meaning of Religion, among Christians, is a belief in the revelation of God's will to man; by which, duty to ourselves, to our fellow-men, and to God, is made known. It implies obedience to that will, accountability, and rewards and punishments. The word Religion is also used as meaning the creeds and forms of worship, which prevail among all nations who are ignorant of the Christian dispensation. In this general sense, all human beings have some sort of religion, unless the miserable race who were found in Australia, in modern days, are an exception. In this comprehensive sense it includes Christianity, and all the varieties of Pagan and Mahometan worship. In no aspect does man appear more odious and revolting, than in religious belief and worship, where Christianity is unknown. Nor is it to be denied, that many things of human invention, have been associated with the religion which was declared by Jesus of Nazareth. The wars, the cruel persecutions, and the consequent sufferings which have occurred, in the name of Christianity, are suited to the irrational and barbarous nature of Paganism, and are wholly irreconcileable with the mild and peaceable spirit of the Gospel. Such events should be charged where they rightfully belong, that is, to human folly, error, and crime, and not to the teaching of revelation. Tears and blood have flowed so copiously, because man has assumed to judge for his fellow-men, how they should believe and worship; and because he has used the force of temporal power, to establish

this odious despotism. Regarded in its true and intended uses, revelation is the most gracious and important of all the gifts which have been bestowed on the human family. It lights the way through what would be, without it, a dark and incomprehensible region which human reason had attempted in vain to explore.

169. If revelation be entitled to be received as true, its importance cannot be overrated ; and no greater service can be rendered to youthful minds than to make it understood and believed by them. This we shall attempt to do, proceeding however under the guidance of great and illustrious men; and assuming no more than to present their views in the simplicity which the occasion calls for.

170. The Old Testament is held by all Christians to contain the history of a people, who were selected by the Deity to receive the revelation of his will. All who have read this volume as it should be read, know, that it sets forth in the most unquestionable manner, the existence, the presence, and the government of the Supreme Being, and the promise of a future life. No writings have come down to us from any one of the many nations who were contemporaneous with this people. And although the Old Testament is a connected history of the Jews through 1700 centuries, it nowhere appears from it, that any of the nations with whom the Jews were in some way connected, or engaged, had any writings of a prophetic or historical nature among them. This circumstance adds something to the proofs, that the Jews were a people chosen to receive, and to perpetuate, a revelation made to them, and to them only. The proofs which the Old Testament contains of its own authenticity, and purposes, are most conclusive, and most certainly so to all reasonable minds, when considered in connexion with events therein foretold, and now known to have occurred. The internal evidence of the authenticity of the Old Testament is found in the character of its writings. Many of these writings were made at a time when all other nations but the Jews, were in

a state of comparative ignorance, and barbarism. Yet the writings of the inspired historians and prophets of the Jews, are, for sublimity of thought, and beauty of expression, unrivalled among all the works which cultivated and refined genius has since been able to produce. When we desire to speak, as becomes us, of the attributes of the Deity, we borrow the language of Job. If we would set forth the overruling providence of the Almighty, we use the words of the prophets, who claimed to have inspiration from Him. In all Christian churches, when we would render just adoration to the Most High, we repeat the devotional poems of David. When we would speak of man as he is, and of the world as it is, we find the terms which we want in the wisdom of Solomon. But that which commands our assent to this sacred volume, is the prophetic declaration of events, then far hidden in futurity; and which we now know to have occurred, and to be in the course of fulfilment.

171. There are different interpretations of the prophetic writings, but the most respected writers agree, that many events which have occurred at different periods, correspond strictly with prophesy. These have been pointed out, and applied by different authors. We do not intend to enter into the prophesies if we could do it. This would be going far beyond our limits, and is unnecessary to the purpose. There is one however within general notice,—in the dispersion of the Jews, and in the preservation of their distinct national character throughout the world, while every nation which existed at the time of their dispersion, has long since disappeared. We need only to express a concurrence with those writers, who consider the appearance of the Messiah to have been distinctly and clearly foretold, and especially with *Paley*, who has given the authority of his name to this opinion. He appears to have been aware of the objections which had been raised to the prophetic authority, but he considers the three last verses of the 52d chapter and the whole of the 53d chapter of Isaiah,

as intended to disclose the advent of the Saviour. This prophesy was announced seven hundred years before the happening of the event. We find the same opinion maintained by an eminent scholar* who belonged to the gospel ministry in our own country, whose removal from his labors in the midst of usefulness and years, is still feelingly remembered. His words are,

172. 'It is certain that about eighteen hundred years ago, Jesus, this extraordinary person, appeared, whose birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension, completed a series of astonishing and, as we believe, miraculous events. This Jesus claimed the character of the long expected Messiah, the light and salvation of the world ; and under this character he is received by all who embrace his religion and acknowledge his divine authority.

'When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his son. The fitness of the moment appears, in the first place, from this undeniable fact, that there was, at that time, a general expectation throughout the world of the advent of some illustrious prophet and deliverer, who should change the aspect of human affairs. The rumor seems to have advanced from the east, and to have even reached the ears of the Roman emperor. We shall omit the scriptural proofs of this general expectation till we have produced some remarkable passages from three independent and unbiassed authors of that age. The first is from Josephus, the Jewish annalist of that tremendous war which ended in the destruction of his nation ; a man, all whose prejudices were against the Messiahship and religion of Jesus. He is speaking of the causes, which stimulated the Jews to revolt from the authority of the Romans. "But that which principally encouraged them to the war," says he, "was an ambiguous oracle, found also in our sacred writings, that about that time some one from Judea should obtain the empire of the world. This they understood to belong to themselves, and many of their wise men were mistaken in their judgment; for this oracle referred to the government of Vespasian, who was proclaimed emperor in Judea." This you observe is the explanation of Josephus, in compliment to his Imperial master. The second is from Suetonius, a Roman historian, who wrote, about the same time, the biography of the Emperors. His words are these: "There had been for a long time all over the east, a notion firmly believed, that it was in the books of the fates, that some one from Judea was destined, about that time, to obtain the empire of the world." The third passage is from Tacitus, an historian of veracity and universal credit. He had been relating the calamities of the Jews, which preceded the destruction of their city, and then observes, "that the mass of the people entertained a strong persuasion, that it was mentioned in the ancient writings of priests, that at that very time the east should prevail, and some one from Judea obtain the empire of the world. These ambiguities," says Tacitus like the rest, "predicted Vespasian and Titus; but the common people, according to the usual influence of human passions, having once appropriated to themselves this destined greatness, could not be brought to understand the true meaning by all their adversities." There are other passages in heathen authors, which I think it unnecessary to mention, which prove that this expectation was prevalent at this time in the oriental world, and especially in Judea. These surely are remarkable attestations; and the many instances of persons, who appeared in Judea about this time pretending to be the Messiah, and collecting vast numbers of deluded Jews around them, facts repeatedly mentioned by the historians of that day, are additional proofs of this general persuasion.'

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* The Rev. Joseph Stevens Buckminster. (Sermons.)

173. 'If we turn now to the New Testament, we shall find this state of things corroborated there by many incidental circumstances. The state of the public mind in Judea is indicated by the anxiety of Herod upon hearing of the birth of a remarkable

child in Bethlehem, and by the visit of the eastern Magi. Still more illustrative is the thronging of the multitude to John upon his first appearance, and the message of the Pharisees and priests to inquire, if he were the Christ.'

174. 'In a word, every thing in profane history and in the evangelical narrative proves, that the minds of the men of that age were wrought to a high pitch of expectation, that the great prophet and king would soon come into the world. But what was the source of this universal expectation at this moment? I answer, that I can discover or imagine nothing, except what these historians themselves assign as the authority, the oracles of the Jewish scriptures. This was the fulness of time for the advent of the Messiah, because it was the time predicted in prophesy. To the prophets, Christ and his apostles, repeatedly refer; and to me it appears, that if every other prediction of a Messiah in the Old Testament were allowed to be ambiguous, the single prophesy in the fifty third chapter of Isaiah would be sufficient to mark out the person we have acknowledged. It is too long to be quoted here, but it may safely be asserted that the description contained in it applies, in the most remarkable manner, to Jesus of Nazareth, and to no other person within our knowledge, who ever lived. It is the prophesy, which engaged the attention of the Ethiopian eunuch, and which Philip explained to him in the only manner in which it can be appropriated by any ingenuous man, who has read the history of Jesus of Nazareth.'

175. 'But you will inquire, perhaps, what prediction so accurately marks the time of the Messiah's advent, as to have excited this extraordinary expectation at this precise period. I must acknowledge, that some of those passages which are commonly alleged, particularly the mention of Shiloh, in Genesis, and the desire of all nations, in Haggai, do not appear to me sufficiently indubitable in any interpretation, which they have hitherto received. There is however a remarkable passage in Daniel

the celebrated prophesy of the seventy weeks, which, if there were no other, appears to me sufficient to have authorized the general expectation we have mentioned. In this celebrated prediction then, it clearly appears that in about five hundred years from the decree to rebuild Jerusalem, after the captivity, the Messiah should appear. From whatever date the reckoning is made, or whatever length is assigned to the years, the variations are not, upon any supposition, so great as to prevent our acknowledging that such a prophesy, wherever it was read, must have excited the expectations, which we are sure prevailed, of the appearance of the Messiah about the very time that Jesus lived.'

176. 'If you add to these considerations, that more than one intimation is given in the prophets, that the Messiah should come while the second temple was standing, that it was well understood that he should be born of the family of David, and of the tribe of Judah, you will instantly perceive that he must have appeared, if at all, before the destruction of Jerusalem. For who does not know, that since that unparalleled desolation, the Jews have been dispersed throughout the habitable globe; that they have not now the vestige of a temple; that their distinction of tribes is confounded, that their families and genealogies are utterly lost, and that it became and has remained, from the hour of this overthrow, utterly impossible to apply the distinctive marks of the Messiah to any future pretender? Christ, then, must have appeared at the period he did, or not at all; and in our controversy with the Jews this circumstance appears nearly decisive. It was the fulness of time, the consummation of prophecy, the closing period of the Jewish state.'

177. These are the opinions of two eminent men who devoted their lives to the investigation of the truth of Christianity, and to make that known to others, on the pledge of their sincerity, which they had found to be true. To these authorities, hundreds of others might be added, proceeding from

men of like eminence for ability to know, and for sincerity in declaring what they knew. If there be not weight enough in these illustrations to convince, it would be in vain to add others.

178. If it must be admitted that the coming of the Messiah was foretold, the proof that Jesus of Nazareth was *that person*, may be distributed under the following heads :

1. The state of the world, as to religion and morality, at the time he came, and the probability, that a new revelation would then be made.
2. The character of our Saviour, as made known in the New Testament, compared with prophesy.
3. The miracles which were wrought by him.
4. His death and resurrection from the dead.
5. The faith and practice which he taught.
6. The effect of revelation on human affairs.
7. The progressive diffusion of Christianity, and the probability, that it will become the only religion throughout the earth.

179. On the first point, the need of a new revelation to mankind, we present in the compendious and striking words of the writer last quoted, all that we think necessary to offer in the nature of proof.

'The testimony of Josephus, in numerous passages corroborates that of the apostle Paul to the depravity of the Jews : and he somewhere observes that never was there a time, from the beginning of the world, more fruitful in wickedness, than that in which he lived ; and that if the Romans had delayed to come against their city, it must have been swallowed up by an earthquake, or overwhelmed by a deluge. Surely if ever the extreme corruption of a national religion could demand the interposition of Jehovah, this was the fulness of time for the appearance of his Son.

180. 'The moral and religious condition of the heathen world, at the period of Christ's birth, is another proof that this was the most proper time for his appearance. In consequence of the progress of philosophy and other causes, the polytheism of ancient times had lost all its influence except with

the lowest of the people, and there was nothing left to supply its place in the minds of the great. The fear of the gods had vanished, and with it almost all sense of moral obligation. Power and wealth had introduced into the Roman nation the most effeminate and selfish corruption, and the early virtues of the commonwealth were no longer known. In Greece the worship of the gods was the mode, and their temples were the theatres of an inconceivable profligacy; and in truth the remains of their idolatrous superstition seemed to exist only for the more public encouragement of every species of infamy. The glowing description which Paul gives, in the first chapter of Romans, of the corruptions of that age, is confirmed by innumerable passages in Pagan writers. To say all in one word, they had united the more dissolute vices of a luxurious age, with the more sanguinary crimes of a ruder state of society.'

181. On the second point, the proof lies in comparing the Old and the New Testaments, together. This comparison has been made by learned men, and their opinions have been published. This comparison of the Old and New Testaments, we do not assume to be able to make; and if we could it would carry us away from our purpose.

182. 3d. On the miracles which were wrought by our Saviour. We are not of opinion, as many are, that assent to Christianity as a divine revelation, depends, at this day, merely on a belief in the miracles which are recorded, because we believe that, independently of miracles, there is abundant proof to establish its truth. But we think it may be proved that these miracles did occur, with as much certainty, as would be required in the administration of justice, to dispose of property, to punish crimes, and even to take away life.

183. We have heretofore shown, (Chap II.) what the rules of evidence are, as they operate on the human mind; and how the senses are used, and what demonstration is. If one see, hear, smell, taste, or feel for himself, and credit his own senses,

he has the highest evidence of which he is capable. If one use the proper means of demonstration, and use them rightly, he arrives at certainty. Knowledge, from such sources, is but a very small part of the sum of knowledge, on which human belief, and action, are founded. No one, now living, saw the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth, on the 22d of December 1620 ; yet no one doubts that such an event happened, because, those who saw it, put the fact in writing, which writing, or true copies of it, have been submitted to the senses, and the minds of those who now live ; and because the living are familiar with the natural, and necessary consequences of that historical event. So, there are very few persons, at any time living on the earth, who know, from any actual mensuration by them made, that the earth is distant from the sun 95 millions of miles. But this is so said, and so written, on the authority of men, who could, and who did actually measure ; and who are considered as stating the truth. On like evidence, history, geography, chemistry, and all science, and all truths, must be received, by all persons, who could not use their own senses, nor their own means of demonstration, in obtaining knowledge.

184. When that which one does not know, but which he is concerned to know, is offered to his perception, through the medium of speech, or writing, the only thing which is *intuitive*, is the fact, that one hears, or sees, the evidence presented. When the evidence is considered and understood, it may appear to the mind to be demonstrative ; that is, it may come in such form, and from such authority, as to be conclusive. Thus, the pupils of Pythagoras, in their conferences on philosophy, were silenced by the assertion, *he said so.* Some persons have such learning, and such habitual reverence for truth, in these days, that what they speak, or write, is received as absolutely certain. But, spoken or written evidence may amount only to probable, or presumptive, according to the matter in question, and according to the credibility of

him, who writes or speaks. From the nature of the evidence itself, or from the estimation in which he is held who discloses it, there may be doubt, uncertainty, or even discredit. It often happens, that matters of very serious import, are stated with all the solemnity which usually accompanies the declaration of truth, and yet turn out to be entirely false, either because the party, making the declaration, was deceived, or intended to deceive others. Evidence, depending on what is spoken, or written, is of daily occurrence in common affairs, and will deserve notice in another place.

185. It is on historical, or written (printed) evidence, that the truth of miracles must depend, as to all persons who did not live when they occurred. The worth of this evidence is to be ascertained, by taking it in connexion with all the facts, and all just inferences from facts, which properly bear on the subject. If there were rational credible beings who saw these miracles performed, and if they have truly recorded what they saw; if their word has come down to the present time, in such a manner, as to command assent; then there is that evidence, of the existence of miracles, which one has of all facts not witnessed by himself. To this it will be answered, that such evidence applies to facts which *could* exist; not to miracles, for they *could not* exist, for they are contrary to the laws of nature. It is, then, to be considered whether miracles could exist; and then to consider what the evidence of them before us, is.

186. What is a miracle? That which those who deny the recorded miracles say, is this: The material world is governed by certain established laws. Every thing that has been witnessed, conforms to these laws. All experience of them is so uniform and certain, that when one is told, that an event has happened which is inconsistent with these laws, he must ask this question, Is it most probable that such event did happen, or, that he who says it did, means to deceive, or was himself deceived? They

answer, that it is most probable in every case, that such event did not happen.

187. It is admitted that a miracle is an event, or fact, which could not have occurred, consistently with the laws of the material world, as known to men by experience. If one should see a human being rise into the air, as a bird does, and sustain himself there by the motion of his arms, and successfully resisting the known law of attraction, this would be a matter to be wondered at ; it would be a miracle, because it would be unlike anything known to have been done. Now, to know whether a miracle may or may not be, we make several propositions, admitting that whenever any person finds that he must give a negative answer to any one in the series, the argument must stop as to that person, and we leave him where we found him.

1. Is there a Supreme Being ? 2. Did the material universe proceed from him ? 3. Did he ordain the laws by which it is continued, in the order in which it appears to the human mind ? 4. Do human conceptions of the power of the Supreme Being, produce the conviction that he can terminate existing, and substitute new orders, of vegetable and animal life ? 5. Is it demonstrated, by geological and fossil remains, that he has, at some past time, made such changes ? 6. If our conceptions of the Deity compel us to believe that he can change the condition of this globe, and of all that live on it, at his pleasure, can it be denied that he may change, or suspend, his own laws, *in part*, for any purpose ? 7. Is man in his material, intellectual, and moral powers, a part of created being, and subject to the Divine will ? 8. May not the Deity make known his will, in any manner, suited to human powers of perception ? 9. Has not man the liberty of acting, or not acting, in conformity to that will, when declared ? 10. If he has not that liberty, is not the supposition of moral accountability, as applied to man, absurd ? 11. Is there satisfactory evidence that the state of the world, about eighteen hundred years ago, required a new revela-

tion? 12. Would the Deity have instantaneously illumined all minds, and thereby negatived human liberty of will, or have taken a course of showing his will, which would be convincing, in that mode of perception, by which the human mind is accustomed to arrive at truth? 13. Was the revelation of a new moral code, affecting the welfare of man in this life, and announcing to him the certainty of another, an occasion of sufficient dignity, to make that revelation known by means which arrest human attention, and thereby effect the design? 14. Can any mode be conceived of, more suitably adapted to that end, than to invest the Messenger, sent to the earth, with power to suspend, or change, or substitute, some other law for that which was universally known and confided in? 15. If this variation from common experience may be considered as the most suitable means to the end, could it be manifested, in any manner, so striking and convincing, as when addressed to the human senses in things of instantaneous operation, as restoring lost senses, and withered limbs, and dispelling or exterminating disease, and in showing that the dead may rise from the tomb?

188. Now, it is not insisted that these inquiries, and propositions must be answered affirmatively; we think it sufficient to insist that these things may be so. If an adequate and intelligible cause is demanded for every effect which is produced, how many things, of daily occurrence, would fall under the denomination of miracles? We say that it is sufficient to show, that the recorded miracles *might have happened.* No known truth, nor any inference from known truths, is opposed to the supposition, that affirmative answers may be given to every one of the propositions before stated. We add, that affirmative answers are consistent with conceptions of the Deity, with knowledge of the state of the world at the advent of the Saviour, and with the providence of the Deity, in relation to the human mind and character, as necessarily understood.

189. If miracles might occur, what is the evi-

dence that they did occur? It must be admitted that the New Testament, merely as a book of history, is as much entitled to credit as any other book of history, written eighteen hundred years ago. It stands on much stronger grounds, in this respect, than any other history. It is not the work of one man, but of many who write on the same subject, at different times, and places, and without any concert with each other. Yet all its parts, taken together, constitute an accordant whole. Assuming then that it was written by the persons who purport to be its authors, and about thirty years after the crucifixion, (and most of it probably very soon after that event) and by persons who knew the Saviour, or by persons who knew those who well knew him, the next inquiry is, whether the facts which it sets forth, are entitled to credit.

190. Those who deny the truth of revelation say, that these historians were deceivers, or that they were deceived themselves.

Were they deceivers? This question has been ably and repeatedly answered in this manner: It is inconceivable that any number of persons should plan, and carry into effect, any scheme of deception, without intending for themselves some sort of benefit. Such schemes must, from the very nature of man, intend to get riches or earthly power, or to gratify some evil propensity in making others suffer. It cannot be even pretended that the first professors of Christianity sought wealth. All of them are represented as poor and dependent. They did not seek to exercise any earthly power over others. They did not meddle with rulers or their subjects, politically. They sought neither the purse nor the sword. No one can imagine that they were under the dominion of malicious motives. They addressed themselves to the reason, not of any one man, or class of men, but to all classes. They proposed to them nothing but to promote their own welfare, by abstaining from folly, vice, and crime; to practice those virtues which adorn human life; and to entitle themselves to another and better one, when this life shall end. It is impossible to reconcile such teaching with any scheme founded on the hope of wealth or power, or the gratification of malice.

191. Were they deceived? It is not pretended that they were deceived in any respect, unless in the character and mission of the Saviour, or in relation to the miracles which are ascribed to him. Whether they were deceived in the character and mission depends on the general view of the whole subject, including the prophetic annunciation, the life of the Saviour, his teachings, his own declarations of what awaited himself, and those whom he had chosen to follow him, and the death upon the cross, and the effect which revelation has had upon the world. All this, it may be said, does not prove that miracles were wrought, and all this may be referred to possible natural causes. We are still without proof as to the fact, that these persons were not deceived as to those acts which are opposed to the known laws of nature. To this it has been answered, that there is not in the history of the world any account of miracles, except in the Jewish history, and in that of our Saviour, and as to those miracles which were wrought in his name. All others, of which there are thousands in different ages of the world, are well known to be frauds. The Christian miracles were wrought in open daylight, in the presence of many witnesses, and where all concert and contrivance were negatived; and where the common use of the human senses could be exercised, and where the witnesses were not, and could not have been prepared for the effect of deception. In most instances, if not all, the effect produced, was unlooked for. The proof then depends on this; whether these witnesses did see, or hear, that which they declare to have occurred. There is no known theory of evidence on which it can be asserted that they did not, but this: The laws of Nature, have so invariably operated, in a manner, so inconsistent with the supposed fact, that it must be taken that these witnesses were, in some way, deceived, rather than that they state the

truth. This is the last resort to which those, who deny the evidence of miracles, must come. It resolves itself merely into experience. Such reasoners cannot say, unless they deny the power of the Deity, that such things could not have been, but only that the probability is that they did not occur, because such things were never known to have occurred. When any event, contrary to uniform experience, is declared to have occurred, it is not to be taken on the dry question, whether that fact is, or is not contrary to experience; but all accompanying circumstances are to be taken into account. The question is not, whether one did or did not call a dead man from the grave, as in the case of Lazarus ; but all preceding and subsequent facts, are to be taken in connexion with that which is asserted. Among these facts, are the character, and purpose of the agent, the authority under which he acted, the prophetic declarations as to this purpose, the credit given to him by contemporaries, and the general prevalence of his doctrines at the present day.

192. It has already been shown how miracles might have occurred, consistently with human conceptions of the Deity. It is historically certain, that thousands who lived in our Saviour's time, and within the first century afterwards, found the demonstration that they did occur, so conclusive, that they devoted their lives to the faith and practice, connected with belief in these miracles, and did submit to every privation, to every suffering which earthly power and malice could inflict, and to the most distressing and cruel death. These, as we understand the arguments, are the grounds on which the evidence of miracles rests.

193. Did He, who was crucified, rise from the dead ? Whether this fact was so or not, depends on the evidence of those who declare it to have been so, and on facts connected with that event. It is objected to on the ground, that such an event is opposed to the laws of Nature, and to all experience. The same reasoning is resorted to in this

case as in that of miracles. It is not said that this event is impossible, but only that it is improbable. This objection has been refuted a thousand times. The question here, as before, is, not whether one who died by violence, could raise himself from the dead, but whether this *particular person*, taken in connexion with all that preceded and followed the resurrection, even down to the present day, did rise from the tomb ?

194. When the miracle of the resurrection is denied on the ground of experience, the objection should include, that men have no experience concerning the coming of a Heavenly Messenger, the character and purpose of his coming, and of its consequences. In this view we have no experience, because the connected history, and its consequences do, and necessarily must, stand alone. There is one circumstance only, in this history, to which we think it useful to advert. It has been regarded by candid and enlightened inquirers as conclusive. It is this :

That the disciples of the Saviour, were discouraged and dispersed by his condemnation and death. This event naturally terminated all their hopes, since he, on whom they reposed, had died between two common malefactors. Unless their full belief had been attained to before that event, something more was needed, and something which would remove the disbelief which the crucifixion must have occasioned. One of the disciples, it will be remembered, denied his master thrice in one night, as he had been told he would do, and only one of the whole number attended him to witness the last scene. Yet it is certain, that amidst all the terrors and denunciations which the enraged Jews could oppose to the further perseverance in belief of the real character of the Saviour, the remaining eleven of the disciples did reassemble after the time appointed for the resurrection, and did profess their belief, and did live accordingly ; and did go forth to teach the faith revealed by him who was known to have died on the cross, and did submit themselves to the well known consequences of the course which they voluntarily adopted. Certainly these things could not have been, unless these men had evidence which they could not resist, that Christ had risen from the dead. The Scriptures say they had that evidence by his personal presence, and that many others had it. And unless this was so, nothing but a course of delusion which cannot be reconciled with any experience which any one has had of human nature, will account for the firmness, constancy and perseverance of the disciples, of their associates, and of those who were taught by them. It is difficult to persuade one's self that these facts, should have been publicly stated in Jerusalem, and persevered in against the temporal power of that time, and against the malignant and cruel dispositions of individuals of that city, generally, and in a matter in which all who rejected revelation were most deeply interested, and yet, that nothing should have come down to us, in Jewish history, which has any tendency to discredit these facts.

CHAPTER XXI.

Of the Internal, and other Evidence, that Revelation is of Divine Origin.

195. Those who lived at the time when our Saviour was on earth, and who saw the recorded miracles, and knew of the resurrection; and those who believed through them, at that time, had precisely that evidence, which is now had by all who put faith in the historical account of events. They had also prospective evidence of the utility of Divine Revelation, as to human conduct and character. Those who live, in this day, have far stronger evidence than was had when the revelation was made, in this respect. It is now *proved*, what its adaptation is to human welfare, as comprising a code of moral and religious rules. It is now seen, notwith-

standing all the perversions and corruptions which its worldly professors have introduced; and the absurd misconstructions which ignorant, though zealous, ones, have maintained, what it was meant to be. With all the deductions and allowances which are to be made, for such reasons, and many others; and especially for the reason of its association with temporal power, it can be plainly seen what the work of revelation is, by comparing Christian society, with that which exists in countries, where the Mahometan and Pagan religions still prevail. From such comparison, it may be inferred what the state of the Christian world would be, and may be, if this religion were every where understood, and applied, in its true character.

196. It has been objected to revelation by Deistical writers, that it contains no moral precepts but those which were recognized by Heathen philosophers, existing, and teaching, before the Christian era began. This objection has been ably refuted. Those who maintain it, assume the historical account of the Messiah, and consider him to be a person of low origin, and without education. If this were so, how could he have acquired a knowledge of the precepts of Heathen philosophy? If he were such a person, how could he at an early age, have formed a system out of that philosophy, which, not only equals it in every thing which is merely moral, but far surpasses all the moral beauty which can be extracted from all of it together? The assertion that the moral teachings of the Heathens, and of Jesus of Nazareth, are alike, cannot be admitted to be true. The wise men among the Heathens, differed most essentially among themselves. Though many of their precepts were entitled, and still are, to high respect; yet, all the philosophy of all of them, may be resolved into a sullen submission to inevitable fate, when the evils of life could not be avoided; and into the opinion that it was lawful to take refuge in voluntary death, when these evils became intolerable. They referred the duty of submission to moral precepts, to no higher authority

than to what could be learned from their perceptions of nature's laws. Conformity to the will of a Superior Being, and accountability to him beyond the duration of this life, were not maintained, nor hardly glanced at, in any of these systems. Their doctrines, if they applied effectively to any person, did so to the enlightened few. They offered no efficient restraints to the indulgence of the passions of men: nor any compulsion beyond the power of the political law.

197. The Christian system addresses itself to every member of the human family. Its precepts can be understood by every one. It makes no distinctions among persons, whatever their earthly distinctions may be. It requires fidelity and truth in every one, whatsoever may be his station. Although it includes the duties prescribed by the political law of every people, it includes also the strict observance of duties which no political law can embrace. It enjoins the practice of these duties as best suited to this transitory life, and refers to that which is to come, to enforce obedience. Nothing is found in the moral code of Christianity which is inconsistent with the rational enjoyment of every good for which man is fitted; so far from this, it was undoubtedly intended to be adapted to the progressive improvement of social life. The precise character assumed in the beginning, which was then necessary to make the required impression and consequent change, is not suited to the present state of the world. The gracious and bountiful Author of the Universe could not have intended that human life should pass in privations, gloom, and penitence. Such a life belongs only to those who know, and feel, that they are voluntary and habitual sinners; and not to those who strive to live according to the Divine law, as disclosed to us in the created world, and in the revealed will. It is irreconcilable to reason, that the Deity intended that mortals should pass through this life in continued fear, if they know what is right, and do no intentional wrong. And as to those evils which are commonly called natural,

and inevitable, according to the system which he has ordained, he has given us the assurance that all these events are right, and has given us the power to trust that they are so, however incomprehensible they may be in the narrow limits to which our perceptions extend.

198. Surely no doubt should be entertained, that this life was intended to be a happy and a cheerful one : That all the faculties with which we are gifted should be cultivated and improved ; that all the means of rational and innocent pleasure should be cherished. Is the earth wrapped up in a gloomy mantle, or in a delightful verdure ? Does the vegetable world put forth its leaves, its blossoms, and its fruits, and its delightful fragrance, in sadness and mourning, or in joy and thanksgiving ? Does the returning sleep of exhausted nature, awaken emotions of distrust and despondency, or teach us a tranquillizing lesson of the change which is to happen in human being ? Does the storm of winter, and the snowy covering in which it clothes the earth, terrify us with the power of the Almighty, or awaken new thoughts of praise and adoration ? Is the animal world destined to pain and misery, or to pleasure and gladness ? which of its many tribes does not cling to life as a precious gift ? Why then should innocent, moral, Christian man, regard his GOD as a stern inexorable tyrant, and not as a gracious and beneficent SOVEREIGN over all who comprehend and do HIS WILL ?

199. Lastly. There is no reasonable doubt that the creed of the Christian, and his practice, when reasonably taught, and reasonably understood, will diffuse itself, in the appointed time, throughout the earth. However slowly that day may seem, to short sighted mortals to be coming, that day will come. Why has Christianity made so little progress in eighteen centuries ? This question can be satisfactorily answered only by recurrence to the history of the world during that long lapse of time. If we had space for such a purpose, it could be easily proved, that it is rather wonderful that Chris-

tianity has made so much, rather than that it has not made greater progress. When it shall come to be understood as a matter to be judged of by reason, there will be no cause of discouragement as to its universal diffusion.

It is an unquestionable truth, that the best means of disseminating Christian faith and practice, is to cultivate the human mind, and to impart to it comprehensive and philosophic knowledge. The wisest men have been the truest Christians. There are many different constructions of the nature and obligations of the Christian faith. All cannot be best. That which is so, will be known only as general intelligence is diffused; and as the intelligent are led to inquire, and to judge.

Even the contentions among Christians themselves, tend to this result. The true light of the gospel will eventually come out of these controversies. The people of the United States are singularly blessed that no regal or sacerdotal power, no political authority, presents any obstacle to free inquiry. The tongue, the pen, and the press, will bring about the true doctrine and practice of the Christian dispensation, whatever that may be found to be.

200. If there be any one who faithfully examines the book of Nature, and the book of revelation, to ascertain the truth, just as he would inquire into the reasons and probabilities on which he must found the expectation of any temporal benefit; if after having done this, he find no assurance, and still doubt, let him ask himself this question: Although these things are not proved to my mind, is it proved to me that these things cannot be so? If they MAY BE so, how earnestly does it concern me to live as though they were most clearly demonstrated!

201. We have thus attempted, with what success others must judge, to find a reasonable foundation for the moral code which governs, or should govern, throughout human life. We have attempted to show that there is a Supreme Ruler, who is discov-

erable in his works, and that he has created man as we see him to exist, and bound him by laws which he cannot break, without offending and suffering;—and that these laws founded in his own nature, as disclosed by reason, are confirmed by positive revelation. We assume, then, as the basis of moral law, THE WILL OF GOD. It remains to discern how this will applies to human condition.

202. We are aware that in attempting to define moral duty we have to meet and dispose of the question, how can it be reconciled with the goodness of the Deity that he has permitted *natural*, as well as moral evil? Is it certain that there *is* natural evil in the world? The operation of general laws of which we have at best a most imperfect knowledge, may seem to us causes of unnecessary suffering. If other animals than man could reason on this subject, and explain all that they find to be inconvenient and painful, it is probable that taking each class by itself, the whole creation might seem to be unwise, and ill ordered. It is more rational to suppose, that in the great system of the universe, governed, as it must be, by general laws, (incomprehensible, as they may be, by finite beings), all things are ordered in wisdom and benevolence. It is probable also, that if men were as enlightened as they might be, and may become, by their own exertions, no small part of what they take to be *natural* evil is, in truth, *moral* evil; for infirmities of body, and mind, are often referred to natural evil. Most of them may be of earthly making. How far these suggestions are well founded, we shall endeavor to show in future pages.

CHAPTER XXII.

Moral Duty.

203. We venture to hope, that the fair inferences to be drawn from the introductory matter which has been offered, are the following:

1. That man bears to the created universe, a well defined and necessary relation.

2. That his intellectual and moral nature, distinguishes him from all other animals.

3. That he has an immortal spirit, and is an accountable being.

204. Assuming that these are truths to all rational minds, we proceed to establish the principles of moral action.

1. Man belongs to a system which is undergoing an unceasing change and revolution; and in which nothing, which bears the stamp of animal, or vegetable life, is for a moment stationary.

2. That man's life is divided into two alternating portions, sleep and action. That when not reposing, his mind is ever active, and is so, whether he wills it to be so, or not; that it is active for good, or for evil; for profitable, or for vain purposes: That his bodily structure is active; some portions of it continually so, even without his will, and when he sleeps; and that absolute stillness, when repose is not called for, is unnatural to him. That he cannot remain in any one position without weariness, and the desire of change; that he is necessarily striving to keep what he has, or acquire something new. That he is pressed by wants and desires, which create relations between himself, and the things around him, and between himself, and other similarly constituted beings. Hence the law of his intellectual and material being is *action*, relating to himself, and to others, and to his Creator.

3. That man is capable of improvement by cultivating his mind, and disciplining his bodily powers; that there are no known limits to his capacity to

improve in those things which tend to his well-being.

4. That man is a free agent, and permitted to choose for good or for evil, according to his knowledge; and according to his firmness in conforming to knowledge.

205. If these propositions are denied by any one, no credit is sought with him. To those who admit them, it is intended further to show, that well being, here and hereafter, depends on actions done, and on the motives to actions: That proper actions, founded on proper motives, arise from knowledge of the laws of our being, and from obedience to them; that actions which are wrong in themselves, or which proceed from bad motives, are occasioned by ignorance, which man is capable of preventing, and from disobedience for which he is answerable. No opinion is expressed on the difficult question, whether wrong actions, arising from positive ignorance, are punishable. This, however, is certain, that in this life, all wrong actions, whether arising from ignorance, or wilful disobedience, are followed by suffering. Perhaps those who can enlighten others, and wilfully neglect to do it, may be the proper subjects of punishment. We hope to show that the whole of moral life, whether considered in relation to those who are well or ill informed, depends on two great principles. First: Striving to obtain or hold what is, or seems to be good. Second: Striving to be freed from, to avoid, or prevent, what is, or seems to be evil. To these two principles we shall attempt to bring *morality*, by which we understand nothing more or less, than the mode of acting in human life.

206. The duties enjoined on rational beings,—are,

1. Duties which one owes to himself, and to others.

2. Duties which arise from domestic relations.

3. Duties which arise in the communities of which each one is peculiarly a member.

4. Duties which arise from the political relations of society.

5. Duties which arise between individuals who are of different nations.

6. Duties which are to be performed to the Creator, in obeying his commands, and in rendering that adoration and thanksgiving, which are the reasonable tribute from the created, to the Creator.

In attempting to show what are the rules by which human beings are to be governed in these several relations, we shall take for our guides natural law, (or the law which enlightened reason approves), and revealed law. We shall use all the commentaries on these laws, known to us, which enlightened minds have given to the world, whenever these are applicable to the intended purpose; though without encumbering the pages by quotations or references. We suppose that there cannot be any new thoughts on moral action; and that every thought expressed in this book, and worthy of respect, may be found in some other book.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Human Duties.

INTRODUCTION.

207. From an early stage of youth, up to adult age, the law of nature, and of society is, that the time shall be spent, in preparation for performing the duties which begin, when youth ends. This applies to both sexes, and to all conditions in life. All young persons are, in this respect, *apprentices.*[*] There is a beautiful analogy between vegetable, and human life, in early stages. No enduring and valuable fruit tree, springs, at once, from the earth to maturity. It must go through a period of time, when it yields no fruit, and when it is an object of continual care, and attention. Its nature must be considered; the earth around it, must be kept in a

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[*] From the French word apprendre, to learn.

fit state to promote its growth; its useless shoots must be cut off; its diseases, whether generated in itself, or caused by some invading foe, must be met and overcome. It may be let alone, and live, an incumbrance to the land, producing nothing worth gathering; or it may be an object, on which the eye rests with pleasure, which its owner may be thankful for, and rationally proud to show. There is as much difference in the cares, anxieties, and duties, of raising a fruit tree, and bringing a human being to manhood, as the life of man is more precious, than that of a tree. Children are not competent judges of the kind of culture which is best suited to them. When they consider how deeply interested parents are, and must be, in their children, they ought to be assured, that what is required of them to obtain knowledge, must be intended for their benefit. There never was a person who was sorry and mortified that he had spent his time in diligent labor to learn his lessons, and perform the duties, which parents and instructors required. But, how many are met with, who are severely mortified, and painfully sorry, for the neglect of opportunities, in youth! The youthful period, is said by those who have passed it, to be the happy time of life. This is saying what might be, and ought to be, not what is. Are children as happy as they might be? Look into most of the families of the United States, without regard to poverty and riches; what are the hopes, fears, wishes and wants; and what the expressions by word, countenance, voice, and acts, which one there sees, among children? Observe their deportment towards each other, as an index to their thoughts. Notice what they say of each other, as an index to their feelings. See what tearful reluctance there is, in doing what is required to be done. See what ingenuity there is, to escape from labor. What numbers of them are sad, grieved, and ailing. How many of them are ignorant of the proper modes of treating the mere physical being, to keep it in that order, which is but dutiful homage, and just expression of gratitude, to the Creator.

208. When adult age is approaching, how many children are careful to hide their thoughts, and acts, from parents ; how many have already learned to dissemble, and to put one thing for another, when called to an account. And is not this the time of life, when a parent should know everything of children, which any mortal ought to know of any other ? Is not this the very time, when a son, or a daughter, should find in parents, the most sincere, affectionate, and confidential advisers ? And is it not, with very many, the time, when the parent's eye, ear, and voice, are shunned ? If these things be so, to any extent, whose fault is it ? Certainly, the fault of those who have the *ordering* of youthful condition. The head and the hands, are educated. *The heart*, (figuratively the seat of the affections and feelings on which human welfare essentially depends) *is not educated.* In other words, *moral education*, which should be the first object of solicitude, is too commonly, the very last.

209. *Adult age.* Every male who has entered on this period of life, may be, at the same time, a son, a brother, a husband, and a father. He may be engaged in some one of the various departments of labor, (intellectual, or physical, or both), into which human employment is divided. He may be a neighbor, a member of a social community ; a member, also, of divers associations ; he may be entrusted with some official duties ; and *must* be a member of the great social community of which every one is a member. Every female who is of adult age, may be, at the same time, a daughter, a sister, a wife, and a mother. She may be a neighbor, a member of several communities ; and, like every body else, must be a member of the great commonwealth of society. Men, who are engaged in business, whatever that may be, well know, that they govern themselves by rules, which they were instructed in, while they were passing through the youthful period. Every mechanic, manufacturer, navigator, farmer, and even laborer, acquires rules by which he governs himself in his vocation. These

rules are so entirely distinct, in each case, that no member of any one class, can do the work of any other. So the scientific members of society, govern themselves by rules, which are so distinct from each other, that no member of any one scientific class, however learned he may be in its pursuits, can trust himself to apply the rules of any other. Among females, the mistress of a family, the follower of some one of the vocations in which female industry appears, even a common cook, must have rules ; and no one among them can assume to do well, in a department of labor, wherein no rules of conduct have been acquired. If one wants to have a house, a ship, a mill, built, he must employ a person who knows the proper rules, and how to apply them. So, of scientific employments, as chemistry, medicine, mathematics, theology, war, law, and all others. Among female vocations, the principle is the same. Among all these varieties, who are they who command confidence, and have the greatest success ? Those who know the best rules, and who have the greatest facility in applying them to practical use. What is that science which runs through all these varieties of employments, and makes an harmonious whole out of all the parts, numerous and diversified as they may be ? Nor only so, what is that science which governs all the members of the great community, all members of its interior communities, and which enters into all domestic relations, and into the inmost secrecy of HOME ? *The science of* MORALS, *sanctioned by* CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

210. The rules of this science are called for, in every act of human life. If there be a call for a mechanic's art, his rule is ready. If there be a call for a physician's science, his rules are ready. But if one be called on to decide upon the nature, force, and bearing of the commonest *moral obligation*, where is his rule, when, of whom, and of what authority, did he learn it ? How often are persons seen in a state of doubt and perplexity, because they wish to do right, but have not, and cannot find, the rule of right ?

How often are seen mournful errors, because the rule was to be *created*, at the moment when a well known and familiar rule, would be the only one to be used? The truth extracted from the aforegoing truths is this: *There are moral rules;* the young should be instructed in them; they should be, like other rules, ready for the occasion; ready for all occasions. The *Author* of that prayer, which is almost the first thing learned in infancy, knew the human heart. He commands suppliants to pray, *Lead us not into temptation.* This supplication is to be understood, *Lead us so to learn* THY *law, that we can save ourselves from becoming the victims of temptation.* Will not every experienced person admit, that the sorrows and miseries which he has known, and his keenest self accusing, were occasioned by the absence of moral rules, when in the presence of temptation? Is it right to leave the young to pass to, and through, adult age, in the hope, that they will find their own moral rules, as they go on? It would be as reconcilable with common sense, to require of a skilful farmer who had never seen the ocean, to take the command of a ship, to a far distant port, in time of war.

211. *Decline and old age.* If there were proper moral instruction in youth; if the treasury of moral rules, then acquired, were carried into use throughout adult age, to the time of decline; would there be seen, sorrowful and dependent old age? If children were well trained, and life were continued to them, till they became old; and if their followers were trained in like manner, the presence of the old, would be no inconvenience to the young. Can any one fancy to himself a more interesting picture, than a cheerful, pious mind, in a dissolving earthly frame, bright with the beams shed on it by grateful remembrance of precious counsels, guardian care, and honorable example? To set forth, what is the true condition of the aged, in not a few instances, nor limited to any particular condition in society, would be a painful task. There are touching miseries to many, in this period of life. Why

is it so? It may arise, sometimes, from inevitable misfortunes. But, if there were sound moral instruction, in early youth, these misfortunes might have been avoided; and if not, there might be sympathies and consolations, which would take away their bitterness. There are miseries in youth, and miseries in adult age, from not having moral rules at command. But the keenest misery is when one feels, that the light of his earthly day is soon to go down, and forever; and when he looks back on a wretched waste of life; and forward, with doubt and dismay;—and when his most cheering hope is, that he shall live no more, and is soon to be forgotten where he has lived.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Duties which one owes to Himself.

212. *Life as a whole.* The whole of life must be taken together to acquire a knowledge of its duties. In this respect there is a strong analogy to the natural world. Every thing which appears to be made of matter, has a beginning, a duration, and an end. Life is a succession of parts; infancy, youth, manhood, maturity, decline, old age, and death. As with the vegetable kingdom, so is it with man. What he becomes, depends in part on his genealogy; as his infancy is, so will be his youth; as his youth is, so will be his manhood; as his manhood is, so will be his maturity; as maturity is, so will be decline; as decline is, so will be old age. If youth be passed in idleness, ignorance, folly and crime, how can one hold his way in the world, side by side with the intelligent, the worthy, and the virtuous? If manhood be passed in low pursuits, in rooting in the heart evil propensities; in wasting natural vigor, what awaits one in old age but poverty, pity, and contempt? If infancy be devoted to the reasonable expansion of the physical and intel-

lectual powers ; if knowledge of human duty be acquired, and be rightly used, will not manhood be worthy, maturity respectable, decline honored, and old age venerable ? Life then must be taken as one event, made up of many successive ones. On these unquestionable truths we found all that is worthy of any notice in the following pages.

213. *Purposes of Life.* Human life rightly understood, and rightly used, is a beneficent gift ;—it can be so understood and used. It is irreconcilable to reason that man was sent into this world only to suffer and to mourn ; it is from his own ignorance, folly, or error, that he does so. He is capable of informing himself ; the means of doing this, are within his power. If he were truly informed, he would not have to weep over his follies and errors. It is not pretended that every one can escape at once, from a benighted condition, and break into the region of reason, and good sense. But it is most clear, from what is well known to have happened in the world, that each generation may improve upon its preceding one ; and that each individual, in every successive period of time, may better know the true path, from perceiving how others have gone before him. There can be no miracle in this. It will, at best, be a slow progress : and the wisdom arrived at in one age, must command the respect of succeeding ones, and receive from them, the melioration which they can contribute. We understand nothing of what is called the perfectability of human nature ; but we understand this, that if human nature can be made to know wherein its greatest good consists, it may be presumed, that this good will be sought and obtained. Man was created on this principle, he acts on this principle, although he is seen, so frequently, to make the most deplorable and distressing mistakes. If it be not admitted that mankind will always strive to obtain whatsoever seems to them good, and strive to avoid whatsoever seems to them evil, then moral teaching is in vain. If this principle be admitted, the sole inquiry is, what is good, and what is evil.

214. *Infancy.* Every human being comes into the world with physical and intellectual qualities, propensities, and aptitudes, which distinguish him as much from all other beings, as he differs from them in figure and appearance. As society is a consequence of the Creator's will, as the proper divisions of labor are a necessary consequence of society, it is not irrational to suppose, that individuals are born with adaptation to labor in some departments, and not in others. In the early stages of life, these qualities are sometimes developed, whether they happen to be understood or not. But almost immediately after gaining some hold on life, all human beings become subject to the incidents which tend to strengthen original qualities, or to obscure or stop their progress; and even to suppress them, and engraft on the original stock those which are entirely different. It would be unjust to make infancy responsible for the evils and errors which arise in this manner; but, certainly, those who have the guidance of infancy are responsible, and will be held to be so. Children have a right to complain, and society has a right to complain, if duties to children be neglected; and if the belief spoken of, in preceding pages, be well founded, there is another, and inevitable accountability of a far more serious character.

215. *Youth.* This is the time when accountability begins, in all the relations which were placed in the divisions of duties. If it be asked at what age this is to be fixed, we answer, that the good sense of judicial law recognizes, that a child may be a witness in solemn judicial proceedings, when inquiries, addressed to him are so answered as to make it certain, that he understands the nature and the obligation of an Oath. This may be at the age of 10 or 12 years. But the perception of right and wrong, and the sense of duty, begin at an earlier age. There certainly are children of an early age, who have a very clear sense of moral propriety; and very many who can discern and reason on right and wrong, and arrive at a very sound judgment.

We shall presume that all into whose hands this volume may fall, will be fully capable of comprehending its purpose, and of judging of its fitness to be useful to them. Young persons think that they can see for themselves; and that they need not to be told what others have seen. But let this be reduced to common sense. Suppose a person to be under the necessity of going from the place in which he has lived, and which is familiar to him, to a far distant place. Let it be supposed that the road he must travel is crossed by many roads, and that he is frequently to find himself at points where several roads are seen, either one of which, so far as he can discern, may be the right one. Will it be of use to him to have been told, before he departs, which of these many roads to take? Will it help him onward to his destination, when he is bewildered and unable to decide for himself, to find some one who can assure him of the right course? Life is a journey. Every step taken in it, brings us to something new; something unexpected; and perhaps entirely different from that which was looked for. Those who have gone through it before us, have left us their instructions in what manner it is to be undertaken and accomplished. They tell of their own troubles and difficulties; they warn us how to avoid the like in our own journey. Which is wisest, to listen to them, and weigh the worth of their warning, or to push on heedlessly, and take the consequences?

216. *Health.* It may be supposed that most children of six or eight years of age, can form some opinion of the value of health. Most of them have suffered, more or less, by that time. They are now old enough to consider the purposes for which life has been given to them. They then feel that the purpose is to be pleased, and gratified; to want, and to have; and that restraint is disagreeable. But let them remember that life is a whole; that though all of them will not, yet some of them will attain to its longest duration, and that it is wholly uncertain to whom that lot will fall. Long life may

depend, and often does depend, on what children do, or omit, at an early age. Among the first gratifications which are looked for at this period, is the indulgence of the appetite for food. Here comes in a rigid law of the Creator. It cannot be broken without consequent suffering, nor repeatedly broken without impairing, and perhaps destroying, the material frame which has been shown to be so fearfully and wonderfully made. To require of that delicate machinery on which the action of life depends, a labor which it is not qualified to do, and which it cannot do ; to force it to do that which is offensive to it ; and to make this requisition habitually, is a sin against natural law. Its punishments are well known. The restless sleep, the heavy head, the many sensations of uneasiness, the positive pain, the disgusting remedies, are the punishments which follow. They are not all. Nature loses its charms ; companions their interest, duties become irksome ; the mind hates its labor, penalties are incurred. Parents, or teachers, are regarded with displeasure. These are the fruits of momentary gratification of this appetite. It is a law of Nature that food shall be grateful. It is required to supply the daily waste, to continue life. If there were not a craving want, food would be taken as a mere necessary duty. It is kindly made to be a pleasure, and, like every other pleasure, it is to be used and not abused. Thus, by ignorant or wilful pursuit of pleasure, a law is violated which brings with its just punishment, not only the loss of the like pleasure for a time to come, but also pain and suffering from indispensable remedies. When children are sick, they are subjects of tenderness and pity ; but, in most instances, they rather deserve to be punished; for they have broken a law wilfully, since they have disregarded their own experience. As to kinds of food, nature is not unreasonably nice about this. That which it complains of is quantity.*

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* However descending from the dignity of our subject it may be, we venture to speak against a kind of food which is one of the real causes of sickness, and of inflammatory diseases, impure skin, and corrupted blood,

217. *Cleanliness.* This is not a mere matter of decency. It is one of the positive commands arising from the constituted order of things. Be it remembered that every thing that lives, vegetable or animal, is wasting while life continues. And that all which is sent forth through the millions of openings, by the skin, has run its round and is lifeless, and that more than half of all the food taken comes forth in this manner. If perspiration sensible and insensible, be permitted to rest on the skin, and stop the way of that which is coming, nature is offended, and will show that she is so. Such neglect is one of the causes of disease. This fact was probably well known to eastern nations, since it was part of their religious duty to cleanse the skin. These nations were ignorant of the modern comfort of wearing a garment next the skin which can be frequently changed. The absence of this comfort was one of the causes of dreadful diseases, which are now unknown among Christian nations. There are classes of laborers and mechanics, whose health would be preserved, and their lives prolonged, if they knew how much depended on periodical cleansing. It may be said that there is a connexion be-

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and which is the unknown root of many an evil:—that is, the free use of gravies, fat and greasy substances, which belong rather to certain manufactories than to the human stomach. The state of the blood, which mainly depends on the kind of food, is believed to be the true cause of disease. The use of such food is the cause of that very common inconvenience called the heart-burn. If adults choose indulge in such food, they are old enough to bear the consequences, as they can ; but to children such food should be prohibited. It can be proved by the laws of nature, that such substances cannot be taken habitually with impunity. Even those whose bodily action occasions a waste which fits the stomach to take almost anything that offers, come at length to severe sufferings from this cause. The true way to test the worth of the gratification derived from food is, to ask the reasonable question, which will be seen to apply to so many other cases, In what way shall I obtain the greatest good ?—Will it be by giving way to my present inclination, or resisting it? Shall I have a momentary pleasure and a lasting pain ? Shall I not esteem myself enough for my forbearance, to compensate me abundantly for the loss of this seeming good ? But there is a still more imposing question. Am I not commanded in the law of the Deity, to do good and not evil to myself ? and if I know that what I am desirous of doing, is evil, do I not break his law in taking that evil on myself ?

tween cleanliness and moral feeling. Perhaps it may be going too far to say, that those who habitually disregard cleanliness and prefer to be dirty, have no moral perception ; but it may be truly said, that those who are morally sensitive, are the more so from respecting this virtue. There is a close affinity between moral depravity, and physical degradation. The vicious poor, are always shockingly filthy. The depraved rich are visited by worse penalties. They may have clean garments ; but what can wash away the impurities which vice has made part of themselves. There are few such cases in this country ; but many in some other countries. History abounds with them. That of Henry VIII. of England is well known to many. It is not for one's self only, that the virtue of cleanliness commends itself. Every one comes within the observation of others. However uncleanly one may be himself, he is not the less offended at the like neglect in those whom he observes. Now it is every one's duty to himself to recommend himself to others, so far as he innocently and reasonably can, and to obtain their respect. Clean and costly garments may fall very short of doing this, if it be seen that they are a covering for the neglect of this important law. If there be a lovely object to the human eye, it is a clean, clear-faced, healthy, innocent, neatly clad, happy child. There are few children who may not, if they will, be neatly dressed, for this does not depend on that of which the dress is made. There are fewer who may not have a clean skin and healthy look, if they are properly fed, and sleep in pure air : There are none who may not have a clean skin, for we speak to those who are old enough to judge for themselves. And let it be added, for their inducement, that in obeying the command to be clean, they are performing a moral duty ; in neglecting it, they are inflicting an evil on themselves in two ways. 1. In diminishing their own comfort : 2. In losing the esteem of others.*

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* We again venture to speak of a subject at the risk of being thought to notice trifles. We not only think the matter now to be noticed *not a*

218. *Air.* Among the generally unknown causes of loss of health is the respiration of impure air. In a former section some notice has been taken of the qualities of air. The number of cubic inches which must visit the lungs in a measured time to continue the blood in a healthy action, has been already shown. The congregation of many persons in one apartment, especially when artificial light, in great quantity, is permitted, is a cause of more maladies than is commonly supposed. Three causes, in such case, combine to destroy the fitness of the air for respiration. The animal heat of the assembly, the lights, and the breathing of the same air again and again. There must be such assemblies. The remedy is proper ventilation. The smoke of lamps has frequently occasioned death. No lamp is properly trimmed if it emit any thing more than a pure bright flame. It is a common practice to keep sleeping apartments shut up. If there be several persons in a small room which has been shut up for several hours, it would be shocking to know, how often they must breathe again and again the same air, and how unfit it is to be breathed after it has once visited the lungs. Add to this the impurity of the

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trifle, but one of serious importance. The Americans are remarkable for neglecting the *teeth*. Paley says that 'God did not make the teeth to ache.' It is the most unpardonable neglect that makes them ache. The teeth were given to us for many highly necessary purposes. They are indispensable in preparing food for the stomach ; equally so in speech. They may be highly ornamental, or otherwise. They suffer as much as the skin by neglect ; and they make known their complaints, when neglected, in a manner which cannot be disregarded. Notwithstanding these things are so, probably not one child in some hundreds, in the United States, knows that there is such a thing as a *brush* for the teeth. Whatsoever the Creator has given, he has required of us to use according to his laws, and, consequently, to preserve what he has given to be used. This is not the less true of the teeth, than it is of the eyes, the muscles, or the digestive power. Males and females are frequently met with, whose intelligent and pleasing expression of countenance prepossesses us in their favor, but the minute they go to speak, and laugh, the charm vanishes, and a sensation of disappointment is felt at the disclosure which they make. This is the consequence of ignorance or neglect, for which parents are directly chargeable. Ignorance is not an excuse for the violation of any plain law of nature. Voluntary neglect aggravates the wrong. If a child has once learned the comfort of cleanliness in this respect, he will duly value it, and never give it up.

air, which is continually in contact with the furniture prepared and constantly used for sleeping, in an unaired apartment. It is not mere nicety, or fastidious delicacy, which requires that the pure air should be admitted where the human lungs are in action, but it is a law as old as the creation of man, and cannot be disregarded. A skilful observer might select among many, from the appearance of the countenance, those who have just left an apartment in which they have been respiring for hours, a spoiled atmosphere. No doubt that this cause long continued, so affects the whole mass of blood as to bring on many diseases. If pure air be peculiarly necessary to any class of persons, it is so to children. It is believed that a more useful suggestion could not be made on the subject of health, to the whole community, than to invite them to respect this law of nature, that there cannot be perfect health where the air is impure; and that this applies, especially, to apartments appropriated to sleep. Visiting friends are often put into sleeping apartments, which have not been opened for days and weeks: this is far enough from kind treatment, however innocently it be done.*

219. *Exercise.* This is almost too common a subject to be noticed. Youth of the male sex, usually have exercise enough, from the sports, and promptings to action, which belong to their years. Females are great sufferers from neglect of muscular action. This is the true cause, why American women, are so defective in form, and so feeble, in constitution, as they are said to be by those, who compare them with females of some other nations. A slow walk of a mile or two, does not deserve the name of exercise. Action should be varied, and every muscle brought to its proper use. Females are required to sit too long at their studies. Of

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* One of the most common, and most annoying discomforts in our country is, the bad state of the sleeping apartments in which travellers are obliged *to attempt* to repose. This is occasioned, not so much by the sort of bed which is used, as by the ignorance, that pure air is essential to comfort and to health.

what consequence is it to store a young lady's mind with classical learning, if her physical frame must be sacrificed to this learning? A weak, round shouldered, puny, complaining *invalid*, (which some women seem to like to be thought) makes a very poor head of a family, wife, or mother. The kinds of exercise which young females should take, must be known from those persons, who can speak professionally. But so much as this any one may assume to say: *Action* is as certainly demanded by natural law, for the whole system, as oxygen is required by the blood. The utility of action is apparent from recurring to the truths, already stated, on the mechanism, and economy of the human frame. Exercise aids the blood in performing its circuit; it enables the skin to perform its functions; it promotes the secretions necessary to healthy digestion; it makes food necessary and grateful; it promotes cheerfulness; it cures restlessness; it makes sedentary occupation agreeable; it makes, and preserves, *beauty;* and, finally, it is *commanded* by a LAW GIVER, who cannot be disobeyed with impunity.

220. *Personal Decoration.* This is a subject which engrosses a large share of female thought and time; and no small part of their means of expenditure. There are not a few females who would be shocked at knowing, how many *immoralities* they are guilty of, on the single subject of DRESS. The human figure, is in itself, beautiful. But it is capable of being adorned, and made still more beautiful, because the sentiment of delicacy, which arises in every cultivated mind, demands that some drapery should be thrown over it. If our race were always in a temperature of 98 degrees, (which is the common temperature of healthy blood) so that external covering would be useless, still it would be duty, and pleasure, to be dressed. *Physically*, dress is indispensable to exclude cold, and preserve the healthy temperature of the body. *Rationally*, dress should be such as to permit, and conform to, the naturally graceful action of the human frame. *Tastefully*, it

should be such as conforms to the feeling which one has, in looking on the light fleecy clouds, that veil the moon in her brightness. *Fashionably*, it *must be* such, as to violate all laws of physics, reason, and taste. According to *fashion*, the person must be indecently exposed ; it must be laced and *girdled*, at several points, so closely, as to prevent the circulation of the blood, and impede, consequently, the action of the heart and lungs ; and of the limbs. The blood, driven from its natural channels, takes refuge where it can. It throbs in the head, swells the eye balls, stagnates in the extremities ; and being denied its necessary access to the lungs, to be reinvigorated by the air, it becomes impure, and unfit for its natural purposes ; it discolors the skin, and generates disease.

221. Is it conceivable that the laws of the Creator should be thus contemned by *rational* beings ! By such beings they are not. It is *ignorance* that does this complicated mischief. No young female would knowingly destroy her health ; lay the foundation for lasting maladies ; and disqualify herself to perform the dignified, and interesting, duties which await her. But, what is to be said of *mothers*, who look on these follies with complacency ; and even give the example to their children ? For them there is no excuse but *ignorance*, the prolific parent of human trouble.

For what purpose did the Creator form the human foot, and concentrate therein blood-vessels, and nerves, which hold an intimate connexion with the great action of life ? was it to be *reformed* by painful efforts, so as to make it almost useless ; and the seat of continual anguish, whenever it is employed for motion ? * Surely not. The power of rapid, easy, pleasurable locomotion, is one of the kindest gifts of the Creator. Observe those who have wholly, or even partially lost, the power of moving, at will, from place to place. What a mournful privation do they experience. The fashions of the present day as to *dress*, have no redeeming quality, not even this, that dress is a *covering*.

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* The experiment of trying to make a *small* foot, by wearing a *tight* shoe, has never failed to make an ugly, and a painful one. What a light vanity is this! What sensible female ever supposed, that the size of her foot, was to affect her well being in the opinion of herself or of any sensible person ?

First; female dress, of this day, has no pretensions to grace and beauty. If it be asked, whether there be a *standard* of beauty for female decoration, it may be confidently answered; *there is;* one, that taste and genius, have made imperishable. The form of woman was never so beautifully adorned, as in the best days of Greece. The enduring marble of artists will tell, through ages to come, in what drapery woman renders due homage to nature and to taste.

Secondly; It is neither convenient nor comfortable. If one knew nothing, from experience, of the distresses arising from *tight ligatures* around the region of the heart, the extremities, and elsewhere, it would be regarded as a cruel punishment, to bind up a female, as most of them are now made up, daily; and, especially, when they desire to please the eye, the most.

222. Be it remembered, as a stain on the *morality* of the present day, that the law of *fashion* has attempted to repeal the laws of nature. That the natural beauty of the human figure is deformed, and disgraced, so that it cannot be known, (through the absurd drapery which it has assumed,) to be human. This may be put into the account of folly. But, be it also remembered, as a reproach to this age, that the tyranny of fashion has *disfigured the female frame;* has disqualified it to perform the duties for which it was created; has made it, wilfully, the seat of pain, suffering, disease, and of premature death, which deserves hardly a less harsh name, than intentional self-destruction.

It is said, that all the females who disregard the law of nature, and obey that of fashion, from between the ages of twelve and twenty, are more or less deformed; and that half of all the young females of the present day come within this description. *Mothers* are bound, by every principle of duty, to be *wiser* on this subject. The most common indication of growing deformity, is the unnatural projection of one or other of the shoulder-blades, and, in general, of the right one.

CHAPTER XXV.

Duties to One's-self.

223. *Time.* Every person connects himself in his usual thoughts of himself, with all the lapse of time in which he can remember, and with all the lapse of time through which he expects to live. This he calls his life. He does not live in time that is past, nor in time that is to come. He actually lives only in the present moment. Yet, he feels that he lives in the past, and will live in the time to come, because the past, the present, and the future, are so connected, that he cannot separate them. Man seems to rise and stand upon the surface of a rapid stream. It is incessantly passing from under his feet; he stands not on that which is to come, nor on that which came, and is gone. But his consciousness extends while his standing continues to all that will come, and to all that is past. His effort is to keep his standing, and to avoid as long as he can, the accidents and changes, which will sink him below the surface. It is, then, a law prescribed to us, from which no one can free himself, that he shall suffer in the passing moment for the wrongs done in time gone by, and for the evils of which he dreads the approach. As this is certainly so, how little does he regard the operation of inflexible law, who provides for himself a load of self-reproach, for any gratification which he can procure, by error or by crime.

224. Let us lay out of the case those errors and crimes which have been alluded to, and consider negligencies and follies. We have shown that man

was meant for action. His actions were intended to enable him to secure good to himself. Good to himself depends on the performance of his duties to himself. Duty to himself requires that he should improve his faculties, and should avail himself of all the opportunities given to him for that purpose. The hours, then, which are permitted to slide by without any improvement, are lost. In so losing them he breaks the law of the Creator. Apply this to the vocations in which one is to cultivate his mind in any business, mechanical, scientific, or learned. When one sees himself surpassed by others, and left far in the rear; when he is called on to measure himself against another; and when he sees that comparisons are made between him and others, greatly to his disadvantage, he may feel, and most men do feel, that they are thus depreciated, because the precious time which was allotted to improvement has been passed in trifling amusements, or in idle pursuits. To some minds the suffering from such causes is extremely acute. They have no one to blame but themselves. The bitter remembrance which they have of the past, as connected with the present, and the future, is the punishment for breaking a positive law. They may console themselves, perhaps, with the firm resolution that they will repair the wrong done in the past time, by diligence in the time to come; but they find that time brings with it its own demands. They are fortunate indeed, if they can do, in one space, that which belongs to it, and that also that which belonged to another, and in another season of life.

225. One cannot innocently say his time is his own, and that he may dispose of it as he pleases. His time is his life. It is given to him in trust. Like other trustees he will be held to an account, in which there is no possibility of concealment, and where nothing will depend on proof. It may be supposed that it will be said to him: There was confided to your use a term of time. You knew, or could know, the laws prescribed to you, in perform-

ing your trust. Are you come from that trust to render an account of it, burthened with reproach from your own conscience, and with marks of guilt, which you cannot hide? or, are you come, without any advancement in the knowledge of your duties, and with no other account than that your days rolled by in childish pursuits, or idle amusement, *no wiser* when you were severed from the world, than when you left the cradle of infancy? or, are you come with the exalted acquirements which you might have, and with that innocence and purity which you would have, if you had read the laws of the created world; and those which have been revealed, and placed before your eyes? Where have you read in these laws, that no duties to yourself, and to your associates, nor to the *Lawgiver*, were enjoined upon you? Have you not been told by every breath you drew, by every movement of your frame, by every thought of your immortal mind, by every just pleasure, that you have had, by every pang that you have suffered, and by all that you have been made capable of perceiving, and learning, that there were laws prescribed to you in your trust, and that an account of your stewardship would be exacted, from a judge who cannot be deceived?

226. *Self-love.* It is an invariable law of Nature that every human being shall do those acts which he thinks will secure good to him, and that he shall avoid those acts which will occasion evil to him. Why then should not every one do any and every act in his power, by which his own will may be gratified, and avoid doing any and every act which is disagreeable to him? The only answer that can be given to this question is this, that man is a free agent, entrusted with the power, and charged with the duty, of ascertaining for himself, what is good and what is evil; and that this power and duty extend to those with whom he dwells in society, and also to his Creator.

227. Children always conform to the natural impulse of self-love, until they learn from the disci-

pline which is applied to them, that they cannot have their own will without subjecting themselves to a suffering, the dread of which controls the natural impulse. They learn, after a time, that the greater good lies in giving up what they will to do, and doing what is required of them, rather than to meet the certain consequences. The whole science of morals will be found in the principles contained in the truth above stated.

228. Self-love is just as strong throughout life as it is in childhood. It is that quality of our nature to which all excellence may be referred; but it is also that to which all unworthiness may be referred. As the dread of punishment, or an unwillingness to displease those whose kindness a child desires, will restrain him, or put him into action; so in more advanced life, the dread of suffering a certain or probable evil, and the certainty of losing the good will of others, will restrain, or impel to act. With those whose minds have been properly disciplined, and who have learned to comprehend their relation to the Creator, there is a far higher motive, which is founded in a submission to the Creator's laws. As one goes on in life, he may or may not acquire more and more clear and just perceptions, of what will be the greatest good to himself, and how he can obtain it. It is a self-evident proposition, that if a person could certainly know what it would be best for him to do, or not to do, in relation to all things and persons, and under all circumstances, he would best obey the impulse of self-love, and most exactly conform to the laws prescribed for his good, if he should act according to this knowledge.

229. It cannot be too often impressed upon the youthful mind, that *life is to be taken as a whole.* For, if this extended view be not taken, it must frequently happen, that it will seem right, in certain circumstances, and when the view is limited to these circumstances, that certain acts may be done, or avoided as the greatest good. Yet, if the consequences could be foreseen, they would disclose, that this seeming good would turn out to be a positive

evil. It often seems good to the young to avoid the performance of labors which are assigned to them, and to spend, in amusement, the time which should be devoted to fit them for duties, which will be incident to future condition. This misapprehension of good, is to be lamented ; but with some, this is not all. Their own self-love prompts them to engage in a course of folly, so that not only do they fail to obtain that which is real good, but they find, under the mask of pleasure, that which proves to them to be the most grievous suffering.

230. The same truth runs, in an endless variety of forms, into manhood, and through all the stages of life. Men are impelled by self-love not only to provide for the craving wants of their nature, but to seek pleasure, riches, power, distinction, and luxuries. These propensities are given for wise and beneficent purposes. It is the misapplication of them, as seen in the world, which constitutes human misery. He is called brave and honorable who defends himself, even at the risk of life, against those who would do to him that injustice, and wrong, which would make the gift of life of no value. But the brave, who invade the rights of others, and subject them, by violence, to losses and to sufferings, without cause, misapply this principle of action. To get riches by honest industry or the reasonable exercise of one's talents, is a commendable use of self-love. To get riches, by unfair and dishonest means, to hoard them up, and to brood over them in secret, is a pitiful misuse of this commendable impulse. To have power, over one's fellow-men, and to use it faithfully, and for their benefit, is a relation which one may honestly and commendably desire, as a reasonable exercise of self-love. To seek such power by deceitful representations, and to obtain it by violence and fraud, and to use it for purposes of supposed self-benefit, and to the injury and oppression of others, is another form of self-love. But there are few, if any cases, in the history of mankind, in which self-love has appeared, in the latter form, without,

eventually, overwhelming the agent with disappointment and sorrow. It is true, that for a time, such an one may seem to flourish in his schemes, and command the applauses of those who look up to him in his, apparently, fortunate elevation. But in the very nature of things, if his heart could be sounded, there is no one whom he looks down upon, who is not more at ease than himself. His day of humiliation may be at hand, in the course of events which he cannot control; and, if not, he learns, when it is too late to correct his error, that he has misapplied the impulse of self-love. This misapplication is to be seen in many cases of daily occurrence, and in things of little, as well as in those of comparatively great importance. The principle is every where the same.

231. It may be answered, perhaps, that all this is incident to human nature. There is no help, it is said, for these evils. Every boy who has learned Latin, repeats the maxim, *humanum est errare*, (it is human to err.) A more mischievous maxim was never invented. If men understood, as most certainly they may do, that they need not err, and that it is best for them they should not, they would rather adopt as a maxim that none but the wilfully ignorant, and the wilfully foolish, *err*. Such a state of things is yet afar off. It may seem to be foolish indeed, to assert that any society should ever come to be so well informed as to make a proper use of self-love. Let us not despair. Society may improve very slowly; yet, if every one does even the little that he can, in showing, by precept and example, what things a rational and accountable being should desire, and what he should avoid and reject, certainly, the time may come when self-love will never be so misapplied, as to be necessarily followed by penitence and sorrow.

232. Will it be denied, that there is a certain best course of action for every human being, in every possible condition in which he may find himself? Or, that no small proportion of human suffering arises from not having discerned that it was best,

in past circumstances, to have acted differently, or not to have acted at all? Or, that whether one did or did not act, in the supposed case, that his motive was to secure to himself the greatest good of which that case was supposed to allow? If these things cannot be denied, then the great end of life is so to regulate self-love as that it may secure the greatest good. Let us suppose that every person in society knew what it would be best for him to do or not to do, so that his physical, intellectual, and moral condition, should be as good as he could make it. His self-love would never be directed to any end which would impair his bodily powers, or keep his mind in ignorance, or misinformed, or make him a subject of reproach, or contempt, in his own view, or in that of others. This, it will be said, is an impossible state of things. So it was said that it would be impossible to root out the use of *ardent spirits*. This great change is not wholly accomplished, but does any one doubt that great advance has been made towards its entire abolition? Let us go on, then, in the work of improvement. Let every one try to show the proper uses of self-love. The day may come when every one will admit, that all the sufferings which may visit the human family, are of their own making, those only excepted which arise from the general laws of the Creator. As to those, they may be greatly mitigated by intelligent moral agency. When these come, they can and will be endured with piety and resignation, if the sufferer can console himself with the certainty, that he has done no wrong thing, nor neglected any proper one, to which the cause of his sufferings may be referred.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Duties to One's-self, continued.

(LABOR, HABIT.)

233. *Labor.* It is commonly considered that labor is the *curse* declared to mankind, as a consequence of the transgression of the *first man.* It is foreign to our purpose to enter into any discussion, as to the true meaning of this historical, or allegorical account; the Christian revelation may not be dependent on a literal understanding of it. However this may be regarded, under the influence of further reasonable research, we must take man as he is; and so considering him, labor is not an *evil*, but a *pleasure.* Is it a curse to man, as he now is, to be enabled *by labor*, to comprehend the existence of the Deity, and the beauty and utility of his works? to adorn the earth and bring its productive power into action? to apply the material substances of the earth to reasonable use, convenience, and ornament? to expand and improve the human mind? to cultivate and strengthen the moral power? Certainly these are the effects of labor, and labor so applied constitutes man's highest happiness.

234. There are two kinds of labor: 1. Mere bodily labor; 2. Labor of the mind. These two are sometimes necessarily combined. The mind, and the body, demand some sort of employment. No one whose mind is free from natural defect can prevent its action. It will think of something, good or evil, profitable or foolish. Every one who attends to the operations of his own mind must be convinced that this is so. The body and limbs cannot be kept in any one position for any considerable space of time, unless they have been in action, and demand repose. If it were painful to us to direct the action of the mind to useful labor; and if it were distressing or inconvenient to us to exercise our muscles, for purposes which we believe to be proper, then it might be that labor is a curse. But many, nay

all, who require of the mind to perform its duties to any useful purpose, and especially those who have disciplined the mind to an accustomed service, find that the absence of employment is an affliction. This cannot be otherwise, unless man's relation to the universe has been entirely misunderstood.

235. As to bodily action, it is seen that children in their sports go through a series of exertions, often exceedingly violent too, from mere pleasure. Men frequently exercise the body much more severely in matters of amusement, than they have any occasion to do in necessary labor. This action seems to be a dictate of nature. In many cases of indisposition, bodily motion is the prescribed remedy, and is commonly a successful one. There are sound reasons why this should be so. We have noticed in a former section, the universal action of the material system to which man belongs; and the continual waste and demand for supply. Excepting only in the involuntary movements in man's structure which are not confided to his care, he is required to aid nature in her operations. If he would put himself in the best condition to receive, and derive pleasure from his daily food, he must keep himself in action. Those who have the least pleasure in using, what was given to be used, as the means of pleasure to the senses, are those who keep the body inactive. This is true of those who labor with the mind only; more strikingly true of those whom affluence excuses from labor, of body and mind. They seek happiness in indolence, and in luxury. They find it not, because they violate a law of nature. No product of the vineyard, the field, or the sea, however aided by inventive art, will furnish a welcome repast to one who sits in listless idleness, on a downy cushion, from breakfast time, till dinner. The day laborer who sits down to his coarse meal, has a pleasure to which the luxurious idler is a stranger. The one receives a rational benefit from the kind and just bounty of nature; the other seeks it where nature has decreed that it shall not be found.

236. The labor of muscular action is not only in itself a pleasure, but it is the means prescribed to us for the acquirement of subsistence ; for the gradual improvement of society ; for applying natural and artificial products to our comforts, to our convenience, and to reasonable luxuries. Nor only so: this is the ground work of all the beautiful and imitative arts ; of the discovery and application of the chemical power of matter ; of the wonderful contrivances by which man securely moves on the face of the ocean ; by which he cultivates his acquaintance with the stars, and raises his thoughts to the Author of all being. Let us not then regard labor as a curse, but a blessing, and rank it among the many causes for thankfulness. It is obvious that muscular action would have been given to us in vain, if it were not directed by intelligence. There must then, be labor of the mind. This is no where said to be a curse. If there be anything for which men should be specially thankful, certainly it is that they are blessed with the power of mental exertion. This labor is, in itself, a source of happiness ; and in its fruits, has made, out of savage men, a rational and improving social being. The most restless and comfortless of all creatures is he, who has no occupation for his mind. If one would invent the most miserable condition for a human being, other than mere physical suffering of the most excruciating kind that can be without extinguishing life, it would be, to deprive him of all employment of body and of mind.

237. Can there be a doubt, that in man's present condition, the ability to labor is his exalted privilege ? And is he not accountable for this privilege? Is not reason given to direct him in the use of it ? It is well known to those who have compared the condition of mankind in different ages, how much the labor of body and mind, has been able to accomplish. Even within the last half century the most surprising changes for the better, have taken place, from the right use of this productive power. On this depends the condition of the human family.

From the joint labors of all who wish well to their fellow men, there will be obtained, eventually, the knowledge of the best manner of using the products of the earth; the best mode of ruling men in their social relations, the just homage due to the Creator, and the true purpose for which human life has been given.

238. To some descriptions of persons labor is irksome. They are obliged, in their vocations, to use certain muscles, and those only. They repeat the same act throughout the day. Their labor becomes tedious, because it requires little or no action of the mind. To this numerous class we venture to offer a relief, which is within the easy reach of many of them. It is well known that the nature of habit is such that the hands will do, what they have been accustomed to do, without any obvious attention, and the mind is left to do what it will. The mind might be employed, while the hands are busy, in pursuing some connected train of thought. Muscular action, so far from being an interruption to the action of the mind, may be made to assist it. Persons who think intently are often seen to have some habitual movement. The relief suggested is, that sedentary laborers should provide themselves with subjects for reflection, and exact of their minds to attend to these subjects. By such simple means the memory may be strengthened, the stock of knowledge may be greatly increased, and the mind surprisingly invigorated. One might begin this exercise by attempting to remember, with the utmost precision, every act done during the preceding day; and so go back from day to day. Better still would it be, if the purpose were to see wherein one had not done as well as he might, and as he may wish he had done. This exercise may be applied also, to the contemplation of subjects suggested by reading; and this contemplation will raise questions, which will lead to the examination of books. There may be hundreds of poets, philosophers, and moralists at the work benches in this country, who have no thought of themselves, that they are such.

It is in the power of any person who can read and understand the English language, to strengthen his memory, give himself an interesting employment, and furnish himself with a rich fund of the truest philosophy, in this manner. He may commit to memory six lines, each successive day, of Pope's Essay on Man ; and on each day repeat all he had learned on preceding days. On the 218th day he would be able to repeat the whole essay. This might be done without losing one moment of time, and without making the slightest error in one's work. When accomplished, it would be an intellectual treasure for which any man might be thankful, and of which he might be justly proud. The first efforts may be discouraging, but perseverance will insure success. Every one who is accustomed to thinking can attest, that most new subjects, are, at first, confused and undefined ; but they gradually disclose themselves, and fall into shape and order, just as material substances, used on the work bench, and the anvil, take that form, smoothness, and polish, by successive operations, which the workman requires.

239. *Habit.* This quality of our nature has engaged the attention of many philosophic minds. It has been considered an *ultimate fact*, as it is called, that is, one of those qualities, which, like respiration, digestion, and many others, are found to exist; and beyond which fact no investigation can be made. Its laws, rather than its nature, have been the subject of remark. It may be, that habit is to be referred to the law of action, which appears to pervade all material and intellectual being. Life is divided into two principal parts, alternate sleeping and waking. Each successive day is a sort of new existence, in which many of the acts of the preceding day must be repeated, because nature demands the repetition of them. Also, almost every one is engaged in some vocation, on which he relies, to supply his wants, and gratify his wishes ; and most persons have in view certain pleasures, which are innocent, or otherwise. Habit arises from this demand for action, and from the manner in which this

demand is supplied. Action relates to ourselves, to other persons, and to things around us which minister to our wants ; supplying its demands, associates us with these persons and things. The want, whatever it may be, arises, and forthwith all things connected with satisfying it, force themselves into notice ; and these become a part of our very existence. It is a well known fact, that the appetite for food, will associate itself, with a particular hour of the day, and with persons, places, and objects of gratification ; so that one becomes hungry rather according to the hour, than the natural want.

240. It may perhaps be an ultimate fact, behind which one cannot go, that those acts are most easily and well done, which are oftenest done. One who uses a flail, an axe, a scythe, a sword, or a pen, can use either the better, the oftener it is used, until he arrives at a point of excellence at which his power of improvement stops. This may, perhaps, be accounted for by supposing, that, the first effort which the mind makes to direct muscular action, is the most difficult one. After repeated efforts the mind seems to understand, better and better, how to direct, and the muscles how to obey, till, at length, a very slight effort of the mind seems to be all that is required, and even an effort so inconsiderable and rapid, as not to be the subject of notice. On this truth seems to depend the astonishing facility of action, to which (among many other instances) jugglers and musicians attain. This is called *habit*, which word is derived from a Latin word which signifies custom or use. There are customs, or habits, of the mind, as well as of the muscles. Persons who accustom themselves to extemporaneous speaking, acquire a surprising ease and readiness in the complicated action of conceiving, uttering and expressing by sounds, by looks, and gestures, whatsoever they would impress upon an audience. The mind has its own habits also, in the quiet of contemplation, and in exercising its various powers. It has its own associations too,

with external objects, of which many curious instances are stated in philosophical works.

241. The moral deduction to be made from these general principles is this; that there is a continual craving to do some act, to obtain some object; or a continually recurring necessity to do some act to prevent an evil, or inconvenience. The frequency of this call to do something, whether it be for eventual good or evil, leads to the practice, custom or habit of doing; and in some cases, the impulse to act becomes so powerful that reason, self-respect, the laws of society, and even those of the Lawgiver of the Universe, (if these are heeded,) present no sufficient barrier to the impulse. It is to this all-important truth, in the nature of man, that the attention of the young is earnestly invited. The capacity to create habits, is the consequence of the power given to us to promote our own welfare individually, socially, and as accountable beings. This capacity was designed to fasten us down to that course of action which will accomplish these ends of our existence. Like everything else, with which men are entrusted, it may be rightly and profitably used; or may be misused, and perverted to certain ruin. Habit is the kindest friend, or cruelest foe to human welfare. When it assumes the latter character, it comes ever in the most delusive and seductive forms. It soon substitutes its own irresistible will, for that of its victim; and triumphantly points to the gulf to which it bears him. The fly, caught in the spider's web, is a faint illustration of the power of habit. The fly knows, from the first moment, his destiny, and struggles to escape. The gambler, the drunkard, the felon, when and how do they learn, that they have been caught in the web of HABIT!

CHAPTER XXVII.

DUTIES.

Actions which are wrong as to One's-self, and which may be so as to others.

(SELFISHNESS, INTEMPERANCE, TOBACCO.)

242. *Selfishness.* It is obviously a part of the Creator's design, in placing man as he is seen to be placed, relatively to the parts of the created system, and relatively to society, of which he is necessarily a member, that he should have wants, which he must supply. There are also desires, and aspirations, which arise from, and which are modified by, the peculiar condition of each individual. It is commendable, in every one, to provide for the satisfaction of his wants, and for the gratification of desires and aspirations, provided, all these be such as are proper, both as to himself, and all other persons, with whom he is associated. To desire property, conveniencies, and even luxuries is reasonable. To desire to be esteemed for virtues, talents, and for efforts to promote the common welfare, is reasonable. But to desire whatsoever one can have, and to get it, hold it, and use it, for one's own exclusive benefit, and to let it be seen, that one has no other motive, is to care for one's self only ; this is *selfishness*, and is a striking defect in moral character. Now, it is an unquestionable principle in human nature, (that is, the fact is so, and one cannot go behind the fact, and know why it is so,) that mankind respect all those motives and acts, which have for their object, the promotion of the common good ; or individual good, in particular cases. It is on this principle that mankind esteem those who disregard labor, property, and personal safety, when the motive is benefit to others. And on this principle mankind hold those in contempt, who show no sympathy for their fellow men, and who crave all, and hold and use all they can get, for their own exclusive gratification. Selfish men betray

their dispositions, by the manner of craving, and of using. Blinded by this over-ruling passion, they are incapable of seeing objects as other men see them. That which seems to them to be proper to be done, does not seem so, to others. The selfish are liable to descend to divers acts of contrivance and littleness, to accomplish their purposes. The excuses which charity finds for selfish persons, and the only ones that can be found, are, that they were either so constituted originally, and have had no moral instruction in early life, tending to correct their natural propensities ; or, that these propensities have arisen out of the circumstances in which they have been placed ; and show that the purposes of life have been misunderstood. The evil which such persons encounter is, that they lose, or fail to acquire, the esteem and respect of their fellow men, which is, in itself, no small evil.

243. Selfishness is not limited to any individuals or classes. It is seen among occupants of thrones, and among the inhabitants of the smallest villages. Neither is it limited to particular objects of desire. It may spend itself on money ; on anything that money will buy ; on distinctions which are grounded on talents, on office, or on the covetousness of admiration. It readily mingles itself with all wants and desires, which find a place in the human heart. Malice, jealousy, revenge, avarice, fraud, envy, slander, have their root in selfishness. All these, and many other impulses, or passions, which belong to human nature, are perversions of some good principle, imparted by the Creator. All vices are perversions of the principles of motive and action, in which the virtues are founded. Thus, it may be inferred how important it is, to fix the rules of right motives, and right conduct, in early life, that they may be ready for use, whenever occasion calls for them. When any one assumes to declare the conduct of another to be selfish, charity demands that he should remember, how indistinct the partition line is between selfishness, and that conduct, which the good sense of mankind approves. He should,

at least, desire to know *motives*, whatever the act may seem to be, before he ventures to condemn, or to approve.

244. *Intemperance.* Temperance consists in observing the law of moderation, in the performance of all those acts, which one should do, to promote his own welfare, or that of others. *Intemperance* is doing *excessively*, those acts which it is lawful, and right to do, to some extent. To show what Temperance is, would be to enumerate all the actions which one may properly do. It is, therefore, more to the purpose in view, to show what *intemperance* is.

245. This word has attained a meaning more limited than its proper one. It is applied, commonly, to persons who take, habitually, ardent spirits ; but it is equally applicable to all transgressions of the law of moderation. All acts which may be lawfully done, for one's own good, when carried to excess, are acts of intemperance ; and all such acts are sooner or later, followed by some sort of suffering, according to their nature and degree. Excessive labor of body or mind, are as much acts of intemperance, as to make one's self dull, and stupid, by taking food ; or irrational and giddy by taking spirit. But there is a wide difference in the degree of immorality in the kinds of excess. An intemperance in study, which brings untimely death, in some instances, is not condemned as an immoral transgression, (though it certainly is such), for the motive which leads to this intemperance, is an honorable one. The loss of health and character, from abusing the privilege of taking nourishment, is universally condemned, because the motive, and the acts done in obedience to its impulse, are irrational, and disgraceful.

246. There are two kinds of intemperance against which the young should be warned. The one is drinking, not for nourishment, but for pleasure ; the other is, using tobacco. It has been demonstrated in former pages, that nature requires a certain quantity of proper food, to maintain a healthy and happy condition of body, and mind ; also, that ex-

cess, of any kind, will be followed by suffering. This is just as certain, as that a full vessel must throw off just as much as is added to its contents. It is very natural that young persons should assemble for the sake of society; being assembled, they must have some employment for the muscles of the body, and the craving of the mind. We have shown that such propensities spring from natural constitution, and that they must be satisfied. There must be a community of purpose in the meeting. That may be found in any muscular action in which all can join, and which has some definite object, as athletic games; or, it may be found in some intellectual employment, which is common to all present. Unhappily, the common bond in such meetings is *to drink*, for in this all can join. Connected by this common attraction, the mind is called into action; but for what purposes? Those who frequent places of public entertainment can answer this question. Some who are sent to public seminaries can also answer it; and some can answer it, who know that they are maintained *there*, by pinching economy *at home*. Some others could answer it, who never had a serious thought why seminaries were established, nor for what uses they were intended.

247. We refer again to the demonstration heretofore made, that the law of nature, which cannot be broken with impunity, inexorably admits so much, and no more. Let us then look in upon a gay company of young persons, around a table, and half concealed by tobacco smoke. What sort of air are they breathing; what sort of substances are they casting into their physical system, already bursting with excess; what sort of thoughts have they in their minds; and what sort of words are flowing from their lips? We *could*, but will not answer these questions for them. Let us pass by this revel, and go to the next day's morning. We might then propound some other questions. Are not their heads heavy, hot and throbbing? Are not their eyes thick and burning? Are not their

tongues white, and parched? Do not the nerves tremble? Is not the mind confused? In what condition are they to perform duties to themselves, to those they serve, to instructers, to affectionate parents? *Is not this dear bought pleasure?* How long can nature bear to be *pleased* in this manner? This matter does not stop here. The same scene is repeated again and again. *Soon, habit asserts its awful dominion;* and then the scene *must* be repeated. The craving cannot be resisted. From social drinking, the step is an easy one to solitary drinking. *There is no resting place for habit; everything, in this system of being, must keep on, or end.*

248. It is believed that the sort of criminal excesses alluded to, are not from the promptings of nature. They are entirely artificial in the beginning. It seems irrational that any one should like to take more of any thing than nature requires; and more so that one should naturally desire to take burning liquids, to the degree of intoxication, or perhaps to take them at all. It is believed there is no such natural propensity; but that such liquids, when first taken, afford less pleasure than pure water. The taste for these articles is created by association, by imitation, by fellowship; and above all, because there is a kind of tradition that it is *manly* to drink. Songs in praise of the juice of the grape, have some effect in the delusion of drinking. There is a fascination in combined poetry and melody. Such combinations are well known to have the most powerful influence in national associations. They inspire a feeling which bears men on to victory, or death. The songs of Bacchus do the same. They conquer the strength of those who sing, and of those who listen to them, and sometimes lay their admirers, not in the bed of honor, but of contempt. We have nothing to say against poetry and music; far otherwise. This world was made for human happiness. Poetry and music are means to that end. It is the abuse of them, as inducements to drinking, that deserves condemnation.

249. If one could get the ear of a misguided

youth, he would not do much by reasoning with him. He might do something by getting him to reason for himself. It would be necessary to bring to his view some facts, from which he could reason. He must be made to know what a wonderful contrivance the digestive power is, and by WHOM it was contrived. That its purpose is to take the inanimate substances, which nature provides for it, and convert them into living, sensitive being, and, possibly, into thinking power, and immortal spirit. He must be reminded how easily every human contrivance may be deranged, and the more so, and irreparably, in proportion to the minuteness and delicacy of construction. But as one might fail to make a thoughtless boy comprehend the nature of the principle of life, which resides in his own bosom, because he cannot see it, some illustration must be made. Unhappily there is none which can be effective to this end. The nearest that occurs, is this. Let us suppose, then, that one knows the use, and the value, of the human eye in its physical, intellectual and moral relations; that he knows he must take care of it, and frequently bathe it in cold water, as well to cleanse it, as to refresh and brace it, so that it may still be an eye to him, when decline and old age shall come. Let us further suppose that instead of so using, and so preserving this delicate organ, he should, when he first rises in the morning, let fall into it a drop of burning spirit; and at eleven o'clock another, and so on, at the proper hours, until he sleeps again: How long would the power of vision remain to him, and how soon will this organ of delight, become a source of insufferable pain? It must be much the same with the digestive organs, as to the abuse of them.

250. If one could, in some such way, bring home to the perception of an erring youth, the grievous wrong which he is inflicting on himself, he might be prepared to reason on his own case, and might be asked some such questions as these: Is it of any consequence to you to be free from suffering and sorrow? As you must inevitably keep company

with yourself, as long as you live, is it of consequence to you to make of yourself, a pleasant and agreeable companion, and not one who will be continually complaining, and upbraiding ? Is health of any value to you ? can you use your limbs, and the faculties of your mind, as you would like to do, without it ? Can you have health, if your habit is to throw into that delicate part of your system, whereon the action of life depends, substances, which excite it to an unnatural exertion, or deprive it of all power of exertion ? Does not every part of your system sympathize with the injustice, which you do to your digestive organs ? Will not your brain, and consequently, your mind, suffer by this violence ? Do you expect to attain middle age, and old age ? Will not the seeds you are now sowing come up in that space of time ? Will they come up in the form of enfeebled muscles, chronic aches, self-reproaching thoughts ; the loss of the capacity to enjoy the bounties and beauties of creation ? Will they grow up to overshadow your moral sense, and shut out the delights of intellectual power ? Was life given to you for the few years in which you can sing, drink, and 'enjoy yourself,' or, that you may enjoy life *in every stage of it*, as a rational being, and by rendering your homage to nature in obeying her laws, and your gratitude to Him, who ordained these laws, for your happiness ? Do you not look forward yourself, to be at some time a parent ? Have your own parents ever so conducted themselves towards you, that you have a right to punish and afflict them ? Are you willing that your parents should see you, and know you, as you know yourself ? If you should be a parent, are you willing that your children should be told with whom, and in what manner, you 'enjoy yourself ?' Would you tell them *how* you spent your youthful days and nights, and recommend to them to take yourself as an example ?

251. *Tobacco.* It is not to be supposed that the Deity has made anything in vain. The proper uses of all things that exist are far from being known.

Additions are often made to our stock of knowledge in these respects. There may be proper uses for tobacco. There are some persons so employed in life, that they may, perhaps, use it with impunity. They are persons who labor hard, with the body, and who have little call for mental action. Such persons are sometimes engaged in solitary tedious duty. The continual craving for action in the material system, that is, for something to do, is, in some degree, supplied by this vegetable. Such persons balance its evils, by physical action, which invigorates the action of the stomach. Of this description are soldiers and sailors. It is probable then in the lonely midnight watch, tobacco may be a soothing friend. Yet it may well be doubted, whether the sum of human happiness may not have been greatly diminished by the use of it. Even to soldiers and sailors, it has become necessary under that friend *and* foe of the human family, habit. For, every one knows, who has subjected himself to this habit, how painful and disgusting were the first steps towards it. It may be set down as an established and unquestionable law of nature, that tobacco is pernicious to every one, who is not habitually in strong bodily action. It is consequently pernicious to all who rely on the labor of the mind, and with whom bodily action is a secondary concern. Tobacco is considered by medical men as a poison. They demonstrate, that taken in powder it does two evils, first it finds its way to the brain, and disturbs its action, and sometimes palsies the nerves of that seat of reason. Second, it finds its way to the stomach, disorders the digestive power, and sends from that centre of action, through the system, the infirmities which it engenders there. Taken in smoke, it visits not only the brain and the stomach, but the lungs. We have seen what the lungs were made for; certainly not to receive and transmit tobacco smoke. The weakness of digestion, the enfeebled limbs, and overcast intellect, which sedentary men, and students, complain of, are obtained from the delights of the cigar; although it is said, that one who has smoked long enough to make his lungs as black as his shoe, cannot tell with his eyes shut, whether his cigar is lighted or not. The remaining mode of using tobacco is, probably, that from which there is the most of evil. It lies in this. It is found that those operations of nature on which the most is made to depend, are provided for by correspondent delicacy and adaptation, to the effect to be produced. The continuance of life, therefore, as the first object, is provided for by a process which begins with the first reception of food into the mouth. There are organs there, fitted to yield a liquid by the excitement of food, which is indispensable to digestion. Every one knows what is meant by having his mouth water. This use of tobacco calls forth, and misapplies this liquid. So does smoking. Both create an unnatural thirst. By the third mode of using tobacco, its evil consequences are more directly communicated to the stomach. Here is the seat of strength and power, if rationally used; here, also, is the seat, *from abuse*, of feebleness, trembling, faintness, palsy, apoplexy, and death. Those who put an end to themselves by rum and tobacco, are of some use in the world. They are like crosses set up in catholic countries by the way side, to show that a murder was committed on that spot. But those who put themselves to death by their own follies, show, not only that a murder has been committed, but *who* it was, *how* done, and *by whom.*

252. All consumers of tobacco know two things. 1. That they came to the use of it through painful struggles. 2. That they cannot break the chain of habit, without struggles still more painful. How does it happen, then, that tobacco is so commonly used? Its use, and that of opium, which is the same thing in a more hateful form, began with savages, Turks, and Asiatics, to fill that aching void, which belongs to all idle and uncultivated minds. It has found its way, unhappily, to those who need no relief from such cause; but who might if they

would, fill up every moment, innocently, and profitably. It has become so general, from ignorance and thoughtlessness. A still more efficient cause is, the propensity to imitation, and the natural anticipation of approaching stages in life. A boy wants to be a man. He likes to do those things which men do. Men use tobacco, therefore boys must use it ; and boys soon find themselves entrapped in a habit, and act, as all other persons do who are so entrapped.

253. Is there any remedy for this evil ? Perhaps, there is none but this, *not to begin.* And why should one *begin ?* Suppose all who use it were asked, if you had never begun, would you, knowing what you do, have had a pleasanter life without it, than you have had with it ? One cannot know what the general answer would be ; but every one must know this, that, from some persons the answer would be : "Tobacco has been to me the most distressing evil ; I bitterly lament that I ever began this truly afflictive practice ; but it has become a part of my existence ; no operation of my will can disengage me from it." Some might answer doubtingly, and others would not ascribe to this weed the evils which they have suffered from it. Why should a young person take upon himself a want voluntarily, which may lead to painful consequences, and the gratification of which is not only, not called for by nature, but which is most expressly condemned by this high authority ? Some reasons have been given why it is so condemned. There are many others. Those already spoken of, and many others that might be, regard the direct injury to the consumer of tobacco. Others relate to those with whom the consumer associates. It may be considered as unquestionably true, that every person who uses tobacco, is, in some way, troublesome, or disgusting, to every person in whose presence he uses it. This is a breach of social law. No one has a right to follow a pleasure, which is a grievous displeasure to those who must witness it. If one has been so unfortunate, in early life, as to fall into the use of

tobacco, as it is entirely a solitary pleasure, he should use it in solitude, and not where he will poison the atmosphere which others must breathe, or do those acts which violate the decencies of civilized life. An eminent statesman, who had returned from the court of France, was asked, whether gentlemen smoked in France; "*Gentlemen*," said he, "*smoke nowhere*."*

CHAPTER XXVIII.

DUTIES.

Actions which are wrong as to One's-self, and which may be so as to others.—Continued.

254. *Gaming*, divested of its delusions and fascinations, is a contract to this effect: A says to B, I have 1000 dollars. I owe nothing. I have no wife, no children, for whose benefit I ought to expend this money. I am under no moral obligation, which requires that I should expend the whole, or any part of it. I am under no necessity to keep this money to supply my own wants, present or future. I propose to you, to put another 1000 dollars against this sum, and draw lots which of us shall have both sums. B replies, I am willing to take this risk; but drawing lots is soon done. When it is over, the winner will feel a mingled emotion of pleasure and pain; the loser will feel clear disappointment and chagrin. We can prolong the interest, and increase the pleasure of expectation, by going, not for the whole; but by units and tens. Let us put winning or losing, not on lots, but on the chance distribution of cards which, when turned up, and compared, shall decide who loses, and who wins. This will engage us for some hours, and all night, and all the next day, if so much time be necessary, to accom-

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* Governeur Morris.

plish our object. Now it is very plain, that the purpose here is to get money, on a contingency, but with the risk of losing, by the same. This is *gaming*, in whatsoever form the means of carrying it on may appear. It is a complicated violation of all law. 1. It is action; but it is wrong, and perverted action. 2. It is disposing of time, but it is among the very worst modes of disposing of it. 3. It is an impulse of the commendable desire of obtaining property; but this is a mode condemned by every sense of duty. 4. It is so condemned because all notions of order demand, that acquirements shall be attempted, and pursued, by means which make one satisfied with himself, and which occasion no suffering, or sorrow, to others. 5. It is untrue, that any human being ever has $1000 or any sum, which he has a right to dispose of in gaming. 6. A passion for gaming extinguishes, or converts into a withering curse, every fine feeling of the human heart. Time, health, property; the profane use of the tongue; character, self-respect, and peace of mind, are the sacrifices made at the gaming table. Unnoticed by the miserable victim, the shackles of habit are put on, which no earthly power can unrivet. When the gambler's last shilling is gone, he starts, as from a dream, into a full sense of the complicated misery, and ruin, in which he has involved himself. He must then devote himself to infamy; and submit himself to the power of a gravitation, which will bring him, inevitably, to the bottom of its abyss. The evils of gaming may be judged of by the number of suicidal deaths which it occasions, especially, in the great cities of Europe. All gaming for property leads, in proportion to its character, to such results.

255. *Avarice.* This is an all absorbing passion. It puts all other passions to death. The avaricious man stands, a living monument, at their tomb, to tell what lies buried there. Those who have fallen under the dominion of this degrading passion are justly considered deranged, for they are insensible, not only to all the natural sympathies of the human

heart, but regardless of all natural promptings of human nature, as to themselves. The object of the avaricious is, to get, and to hold, that which they do not *use*, forgetful that all which comes from the earth returns to it, or, at least, cannot be carried from it. Death, to the avaricious, is terrible. It separates them from the only God, they ever knew, or cared to know. The word avarice, is derived from the Latin word *aveo*, to desire; but by long usage, it is limited to mean, the desire of money. Money, is in itself, without value, except for the *use* which can be made of it. The word *miser* is derived from the same word in Latin, which means miserable. It fitly expresses the estimation in which the world holds the insane love of money. It is just as reasonable to desire money, as to desire those things which money will buy; or to desire ability to do those things which can be done only with money. The perversion lies, in the false estimate of its value. Avarice is only an extravagant illustration of selfishness. It is a kind of retributive justice, that the money which comes from the coffers of a deceased miser, is usually found to make up for its long rest by the rapidity with which it circulates and loses, all connexion with its former owner. And why? a miser finds no time to educate heirs in a manner which prepares them to possess, and to use; nor has he room in his head for such a thought; nor in his heart for any feeling, that does not begin, and end, in himself, as existing in, and for, one grossly immoral purpose.

256. *Profaneness.* Excepting the high crimes, which are punishable by the public laws, there is no one more shocking than profaneness, nor any crime which there is so little inducement to commit. Profane swearing is of two kinds. 1. That in which the Deity is called on to do the will of a sinning mortal. 2. That in which the Deity is called on to witness the truth of such a being's thoughtless, or false declarations. This common practice can be accounted for only on two grounds; 1. Pitiable ignorance; 2. Abominable wickedness. On the

first ground, surely the profane swearer must be ignorant of the meaning of the terms which he uses. It is impossible to believe, that he can realize, *who* speaks, to WHOM, and of *what.* If he did understand his own words, he would be struck with horror. When one hears such expressions, he can hardly restrain himself from saying, 'You contemptible worm of this little earth! Do *you* call upon the *Universal* GOD to execute the sentence of *your* wrath, and of *your* folly? Do *you* call on HIM to witness your disgraceful assertions, and your low-born thoughts? Ought *you* not rather to tremble lest HIS awful justice should instantaneously wither *your* prostituted tongue!'

Surely, if there be any escape for the profane, from that condemnation which they imprecate on others, it must be, that mercy will be extended to them in compassion for their ignorance. If they are not ignorant, but do knowingly and wilfully so misuse the gift of an immortal mind, and that unquestionable proof of Divine power and goodness, *the ability to speak*, they cannot be subjects of moral instruction. They should be left, like the consumers of rum, and tobacco, to shock, and to warn others.

257. To those who aspire to the dignity of being regarded as rational persons, and to be sensible of the capacity of improving, and exalting their condition, there is something to be said. Swearing, is, by some persons, held to be a genteel, and manly accomplishment. To swear with a good grace, is a proof that one is a gentleman! But all persons who are really gentlemen, consider this practice to be a decisive proof of a low and vulgar mind. We lay aside now, the breach of divine law, and that accountability which we have endeavored to show to be inevitable. We consider this only on the principle of pure self-interest, which every one must admit to be the proper governing principle. Does not one who is habitually profane, necessarily entertain a low opinion of himself? Would any respectable merchant, or mechanic, or farmer, receive into his service, a youth whom he knew to be a

profane swearer? Could any one who is known to be such, find admission into any school, academy, seminary, or college? Would any respectable parent admit such a one to be a companion of his children, or a visitant in his family? Would not every reasoning person say, that a youth who is so ignorant as not to know, that swearing is a violation of natural and divine law, must be ignorant enough not to know, that there are many other laws for the proper government of society, and consequently that he is an unsafe person to be trusted? If the profanity be the consequence of voluntary wickedness, then surely all reflecting persons would say, that he who is wicked in this respect, is indeed wicked; but then he will be wicked in others, also. For, as there is one chain which runs through all the virtues, and binds them in a sympathetic union; so also is there a chain which unites all the vices. He who swears may be justly suspected of drinking; he who swears and drinks, may be justly suspected of gaming; he who swears, and drinks, and games, must keep very bad company, by day, and by night. He who keeps such company from such motives, must squander his own property, or steal that of somebody else to expend. He who robs another, will commit forgery; and he who is so desperate as to commit these two latter crimes, will not hesitate long, to put a human being out of the way of his pressing wants, if he is tempted to do it. It is probable, that habitual lying, and swearing, are the first steps in that mournful series of crimes, and the first beginnings in the course of deplorable wretchedness, which deform and disgrace human society. Will any one maintain that these are necessary evils; and that God has so made man, that they cannot be prevented? Surely, these are evils wholly of human origin; and where they begin, there lies the power to extirpate them.

258. *Envy.* It is to be kept in view, that the main object is to show, that this is a good sort of existence, if man knew how to use it; and that he is the author of his own afflictions. This is remark-

ably illustrated in the matter of *envy.* It is probable that a large proportion of mankind, in all classes, suffer from the dominion of this passion. It can be shown, that it is peculiarly the passion which man has made for himself, out of emulation, which latter is the Creator's work. In this instance, man has been exceedingly ingenious, and successful, in making himself miserable. He has done worse, he has provided for himself, in creating envy, a fountain which sends forth, not one water, but many, and each one foul and poisonous. He who has submitted himself to envy, has bound himself to think, to feel, and to act, as envy prompts. It would be most shocking to know, what agency this monster has had in human affairs. If any one should read history, and watch the movements of his fellow men, merely to learn the operation of this principle of action, he would see, probably, the most operative cause of the misery which men inflict upon themselves, and on each other. If one has not time to read history, and watch his fellow men, he may, perhaps, learn much of what he would find in these authorities, by *reading his own heart.*

259. The word envy comes from two Latin words, *in* and *video*, and signifies looking *against.* It arises from perceiving in other persons, qualities which one's own self-love leads him to wish to have ; as beauty, strength, grace, learning, eloquence, power, &c. It extends to riches, to office, to distinction ; to the respect and esteem in which one is held by his fellow men, and even to birth and ancestry. It makes one *sorry* that he has not these good things; and makes him *angry*, that others have them. One easily persuades himself that great injustice is done to him, in that *he* has them not. The next step is to *hate* him who has them. Then comes the desire, to deprive the supposed fortunate possessor of the benefit of them. But, to admit that one has these malignant promptings, is contrary to another principle of self-love, and, therefore, no man tells another of his own envy ; and he tries to wrap it up from his own view. As he cannot, and dare not openly

manifest that he is envious, he must obey the suggestions of malice in the dark. He, therefore, intrigues, insinuates, and becomes adroit, in putting one thing for another; he secretly, and by covert means, undermines the object of his hatred. He whispers his doubts, suspicions, opinions, and belief. If the tenure of the hated object is too strong to be shaken, then the bad use which he makes of his advantages, are sought out. The base accompaniments of his fine qualities are brought forth, and placed in the strongest lights. 'She is beautiful; *but* she is vain, haughty, and silly. He is rich, *but* he got his wealth by frauds, and hoards it like a miser. He is able, eloquent, and popular; *but* he is selfish, and insincere, and would put a yoke on every neck in the republic, if he could. He is making a great flourish in the world, *but* it is all false and hollow; he came from nothing, and will go back to nothing.' It may be easily inferred, that one who has surrendered himself to the dominion of envy, not only deprives himself of the profitable use of what he has, or might have, but makes himself wretched in contemplating what he must know he cannot have; he is so wrought upon, that whatsoever seeds of crime he may have in his heart, are sure to start into luxuriant growth.

260. Can any rational being doubt, that this sort of suffering, and crime, are entirely of man's making? Can it be doubted that he can prevent them? These are violations of natural law, and Divine law; and no law comes from this source which cannot be understood and obeyed. Let us take an example, and seek out the unreasonableness and immorality of envy; and to do this effectually we must take a strong case, and in some degree, a fanciful one. Let us suppose that in a seminary of females there is one who is very beautiful; her parents are very rich, and are highly respectable; and that this young lady is distinguished by her genius, and her diligence, and good conduct, and is obviously in the receipt of the preceptor's unqualified approbation. Let us further suppose, that there are some of her

school fellows who *envy* her. Their countenances show what they feel. Every mark of favor manifested to this fortunate person, is a blow on every envious heart. Discontent, distress, and malignity, take up their abodes in these hearts, and enter into thriving partnership. But, the beauty, the genius, the diligence, the wealth, the parentage, the applause, are not among the dividends which these partners make; these remain where they were; and what dividends do they make! Let us suppose that the envious could do what they would;—that is, annihilate the envied qualities, and make the possessor too low, and contemptible, to be more thought of; and let us suppose too, that the successful adventurers succeed to what is now the first eminence; is there no one below to pull them down?—They are soon down, and by like means; and thus the demolition would descend, until the seminary became too low a place for even envy to find something to live on.

261. Is not this a fair example of what we continually see in all grades, and classes, of social life? and is not this passion of envy, earthborn, mischievous, and odious? What is the remedy? Common sense, and plain reason, point out the remedy. Generally speaking, every member in society is just as much in his own place, as he is in his own skin. No one can be in another's place. Every one has his place originally assigned to him, and his natural condition in it, by means, over which he had no control, and in making which he had no agency. What he will make out of himself, and of the circumstances in which he finds himself, must depend, (after the irresponsible state of infancy is passed) on his own thoughts, motives, and acts. He will find his greatest good, not in repining at the good of others (which he can never make to be his own, and which he cannot destroy without expecting retributive justice as to himself), but in making his own condition as good as he can, consistently with self-respect, and peace of mind. That which is given to others, and all that they can

lawfully acquire, is righteously their own. All that is given to one's-self, and all that he so acquires is, in like manner, his own. If he would have no injustice done to him, by those who are below him, he must do no injustice to those who are above him. We entertain no doubt that the day will come when youth will be so instructed, and men so self-disciplined, as to know, that the laws of nature, and the laws of society, when conformable to these, permit to every person a proper place; enjoin duties in that place; and insure happiness from the performance of those duties. When that day comes, envy will die.

262. *Emulation.* This has been sometimes classed with envy; but they have nothing in common. One would feel like a culprit in being known to be envious, but would rightly take praise to himself in being emulous. This motive to action was given to man for the best possible purposes; and upon the application of it, with justifiable views, and to commendable ends, the advancement of human welfare mainly depends. We understand it to mean, the desire to obtain excellence, in laudable pursuits. An envious man may be supposed to say, 'Your eminence distresses me; I cannot bear to see you sitting up there; and though I have not the shadow of hope that I can ascend to your place, if you were out of it, nevertheless, I must pull you down, if I can; and then we shall stand on the same level.' An emulous man may be supposed to say, 'I admit that you are where you should be. You have raised yourself by fair and just means. I have no desire to disturb you, nor to impede your further progress. You have done me no injustice; on the contrary, you have rendered me the important service of showing me how one may honorably rise. I shall follow your example, and endeavor to place myself by your side. If I can get there, we shall have a fair, good-tempered rivalry, and we may animate, and quicken each other's efforts. If you are able to keep always in advance of me, you will make me diligent, and enable me to excel oth-

ers, if I cannot equal you.' There seems to be nothing immoral in this. In this view emulation is presented in its true and amiable character. Like all other things intrusted for good purposes, it may be perverted. It frequently excites very unworthy feelings, whence it has been often confounded with envy. Emulation is the principle on which instructers rest the inducement to be diligent in schools; and it is there that the perversion alluded to, is often noticed. When children are required to get and recite the same lesson, there must be a best, and a worst, among them. Excellence may depend on natural talent, or on industry, or on both. It deserves great consideration, in what manner, the stimulus of emulation should be applied. It must be applied in some manner, no doubt. If human beings were not naturally led to compare themselves with each other, and to obey the proper suggestions which arise from that comparison, life would be very still and stupid. But, what use should be made of the principle of emulation in schools, wherein the strongest desire, and the utmost effort to do well, may, (in some instances), fail of reward, and of self-satisfaction, requires more consideration than this matter has, hitherto, had.

CHAPTER XXIX.

DUTIES.

Wrongs, to One's-self and others, arising from the perversion of some good principle of action.

263. *Anger.* This word is derived from a Latin word, which means to choke, or strangle. In several other languages its root is found, and in all it has the signification of strangling, choking, constraining, or narrowing. In common understanding of its meaning, which is the true one, it is a violent passion of the mind, arising from some real

or supposed injury; and its natural tendency is to do two things, first to take satisfaction for the injury; second, to make the offender suffer. This passion does not appear to be wrong in itself. Like many other excitements, which are common to our nature, it was given to us for useful purposes; and is only wrong, when its dominion is injuriously submitted to, and unjustifiably obeyed. There is a principle of general operation among all animated beings, which reconciles the existence of anger with the wisdom and benevolence of the Deity. All animals are entrusted by nature, with the preservation of their own rights, and the promotion of their own welfare. But all animals are liable to have their rights infringed, and their welfare disturbed by others. If there were no sensibility to wrongs, the cunning and the strong would make all others obedient to their will. Anger is justifiable in self-defence, and in exacting justice, and in making an offender suffer, within the limits of reason. It is only in the misdirection, and irrational use of anger, that men make this principle of their nature a cause of affliction to themselves. Certainly the indulgence of an irritable angry temperament, is one of the sorest troubles experienced in human life.

264. Anger has its seat in the mind. It is a passion which literally means an excitement of the human system, by the action of some external cause perceived by the mind. It is that passion which has the most immediate, and the closest connexion, with the material system. Every one who has experienced a violent fit of anger, knows, that the natural action of the heart is quickened, and that his blood courses through his veins with a feverish rapidity; he feels that his face reddens with this action of his blood; that his eyes are full and distended; that he has a sense of choking in the throat: these emotions will gradually subside, as the fit goes off, and the blood will resume its accustomed flow. So far, this may be only a temporary physical evil. This, however, is not all the evil. Such an excitement can never occur without af-

fecting other parts of the system. The interior organs of the system, which minister to the digestive process, partake in the evil effects of this violent action of the blood. These also are choked, and constrained, in their natural and necessary action. Physicians and naturalists tell us, that the frequent action of anger generates stones in the gall bladder, makes the liver schirrous, (become hard) and deranging the indispensable flow of the bile, brings on jaundice and other diseases. (Such afflictions arise from various other causes also.) It is well known that there are instances of sudden death from violent anger. This is accounted for by the sudden rushing of the blood through delicate vessels, which are not strong enough to hold it. They give way, the human machine is ruined, and death follows. It is said that the theories, as to long life, are contradictory. By some, it is referred to temperance. But some persons have lived long, who were not remarkable for this virtue. It is rational to suppose that a naturally good constitution will endure long, if the rules of temperance be respected, and if the system is never subjected to violent passions. It is probable that those persons live longest, who are not only temperate in quantity, and quality, but who are also good natured, and cheerful.

265. Supposing the foregoing suggestions, as to the nature of anger, to be well founded, they are to be applied, by persons who are entrusted with their own rights and welfare, and whose great purpose is to obtain the greatest good from life, *as a whole.* It is admitted, that all persons may, and perhaps must be, sometimes angry, until all persons attain to a much higher state of moral perfection than has hitherto been known. But it seems to be of great importance to one's-self to learn, in what way he can govern the propensity to anger, so as to make it what it was meant to be ; that is, means to his safety and welfare, and not, as too often it is, a cause of suffering and humiliation.

266. The causes of anger are supposed to be

these; first, by the law of nature, and of society, every one has rights in what he regards as his own property; second, one has a right to hold unimpaired, whatsoever he can justly acquire in reputation, and character; third, he has a right to have his feelings respected by others, if he do no wrong to their feelings; fourth, he has a right to have the like rights respected in those with whom he is necessarily connected, by family and social ties; fifth, he has a right to be treated with justice, and according to established laws, by those who are entrusted with power; sixth, he has a right to have those who are bound with him, in a common subjection to such laws, treated with justice. Whenever any one is offended by the violation of any of these rights, he may be justifiably angry. But in what manner, and to what end, he shall express his anger, so as to do himself the greatest justifiable good, is the thing to be known.

267. Every one who has had a violent fit of anger upon him, knows, that it was to himself, (independently of the cause, and object of his anger), a painful and even a very distressing sensation. No one ever looked back upon such a state of things, as to himself, with satisfaction; but generally with regret, and sometimes with remorse. He feels humbled, and grieved, in his own estimation of himself. He may too well remember that he used expressions, and did acts, which he is grieved to have resting in the memory of others, or in his own. It is probable, also, that no one ever saw another in a violent passion, without feeling that this angry person was degrading himself, and acting more like a brute, than a rational being. Whatever be the cause of such anger in another, cool spectators always regard the angry person, as under a temporary loss of reason, and in danger of doing some serious mischief, and are prompted to restrain him. Every one feels, in such a case, that the least that can happen to one so acted upon, nd so acting, is, that he is preparing for himself hours of self reproach, and of bitterness. If no one likes to remem-

ber that he was violently angry himself, and if he is offended in seeing others so, it must be admitted, that violent anger is contrary to natural law, as it most certainly is to Divine law. It is an abuse of the trust confided to us to promote our own welfare.

268. As to the cause and object of anger, there are certain cases in which sudden and violent anger is justifiable. The law of society permits the expression of it by violence, even to the destruction of human life. Thus, he who in violation of all law, human and divine, is attempting to take the life of a fellow being, may be justifiably slain by him who is in such peril. The same law justifies the like act in attempts to commit some grievous crime in relation to persons, or property. This justification occurs only when the offence is in the course of being perpetrated. These are extreme and rare cases, and more properly to be considered in another place. In most cases in life, where anger is felt, the causes are of far inferior grade to those which the law of the land notices. It is to those of common occurrence to which our attention is now directed

269. The cause of anger is some real or supposed wrong done, which prompts us to obtain reparation, and to punish the offender. It is consistent with reason for any one, who is under the influence of anger, to be prepared to ask, and answer, the question, whether the wrong is real, or only supposed; and whether he is himself free from the first imputation of having occasioned, by his own error, that which he regards as a wrong. If the offence be real, other questions arise, of this nature: What real good shall I secure to myself, by attempting to get a reparation; and in what respect shall I advance my own welfare by attempting to punish the offender? May I not, in either of these attempts, involve myself, by words, or acts, in some wrong; and give my adversary the advantage of finding me an offender, in trying to vindicate myself? If I could succeed in my attempt, what will it come to? Shall I not make the wrong done to me more noto-

rious, and subject myself to the pity, and compassion of others ? Is it not better to be silent, and quiet, and leave the offender to time, and his own conscience, than to engage myself in a controversy, which is sure to be vexatious, and in which I shall run the risk of doing wrong, and in which I shall not be likely to get any good ? If I succeed in humbling my adversary, I shall surely make him my enemy forever ; for, in the nature of man, he is slow to forgive the wounds inflicted on his own self-love. When this matter is over, and time has dissipated the mists which now prevent a clear view of it, and when other feelings and sentiments have arisen, shall I like myself the better for having been silent and quiet, than if I shall have attempted to command justice, and to inflict punishment ? It is probable, that young and ardent minds, and those who are looking back by the light of experience, will answer such questions very differently. But the experienced can tell the young, with sorrowful truth, that among the most painful sufferings of life, are to be numbered, those which have arisen from sudden impulses of anger, expressed in words, or acts. The experienced can also tell, with like truth, that in the common occurrences of life, angry words and acts, have seldom, if ever, accomplished the purpose for which they were intended ; they have neither obtained justice, nor punished the offender ; but, on the contrary, they have often converted the injured party into an offender himself, and involved him in bitter recriminations, keeping up an irreconcileable aversion, and even enmity, through life. We have, so far, supposed there to be a real, and justifiable cause of anger. But the case is very much stronger against the indulgence of angry feelings, when the cause is only imaginary. It is in many cases imaginary, especially among young persons. They take up sudden impressions concerning the supposed conduct, and words of their associates, and acquaintances, when no such conduct or words, have occurred ; or, if any did, none with intention to wound, or offend. If there be one case in which one feels himself peculiarly humbled, it is when he has manifested anger towards one, who has committed no offence, or who is entirely unconscious of having done so.

270. It sometimes happens, that an offended person can restrain himself from expressions, and words, when he has been seriously offended. But he cherishes a malicious sort of feeling against the offender, broods over the wrong done, and permits his imagination to inflame the sense of wrong, until he makes himself too unhappy under this excitement, not to express it in some mode, which will occasion pain or affliction to the offender. If there be any one who has fallen into such a condition, he may be asked, whether he knows of anything, in the nature of regret, or remorse for his own follies, and sins, which is so exceedingly burthensome, as to carry about with him the feeling of aversion, ill-will, and malice, towards one who has offended? What, then, is to be done? angry words and acts are forbidden by the law of nature, by self-respect and by convenience; the memory of an unavenged wrong is intolerable. Is there no remedy? We think there is one, in every person's power. If the individual with whom one is at variance, can, by calm expostulation, or by mutual friends, be brought to a just perception of the case, that is the remedy. If that fail, there is another remedy. Will you pass your life, in humiliating bondage to such a one? Forget that there is such a person in the world. Never let him engage your thoughts for a moment. You do him no wrong by that. You do yourself a just and great good; you cut a moral cancer out of your own heart.

271. Among the sources of affliction in human life, is the uncalled for interference of third persons, in the angry collisions of others. It may sometimes be an unavoidable duty to take a part in an angry quarrel. When this duty is to be performed, it concerns every one who is mindful of the trust confided to him of taking care of himself, not to en-

gage in the controversy in such a manner, as to become a principal party in it. As a general rule, it is the safe course to let angry persons settle their own concerns as they can. Certainly, no one who claims to be regarded as having a discreet sense of his own welfare, plunges himself into a quarrel. Yet this is a very common thing. It is often seen in schools. Parties and divisions grow up, extend and become more and more bitter, from the most trifling causes ; and are often carried out into manhood, and show their evil consequences through life. This is so, because impressions made in that season, are very vivid, and durable. It is a duty, sometimes, to take a part in controversies. It must be remembered, when one engages in such quarrel, that he is dealing with persons who are under a sort of derangement, and who are most exceedingly sensitive, and perhaps mutually vindictive. Those who interpose are bound by the law of self-regard, to interfere with calmness, and sound discretion, and so to conduct themselves, in word and deed, as to do no evil to themselves, while they attempt to do all the good possible, to the angry parties. On the whole, mismanaged anger, is a prolific source of suffering. Yet when calmly looked back upon, in a great majority of cases, the cause was some insignificant trifle, magnified into serious importance, by angry words, and pitiful acts. Such is the propensity of persons to busy themselves in the quarrels of others, that there is little reason to hope, that a preventive can be successfully offered to any but to those, who have studied out, and who reverence, the will of the Deity, as disclosed in the nature of things, and in his own positive law.

272. *Self-respect.* Every one has some sort of opinion, more or less distinct, of all persons with whom he is acquainted. This opinion may embrace intellect, disposition, virtues, vices, personal appearance, deportment, condition in life. So also every one has some opinion of himself on the same, and on many other subjects, best known to himself.

When one examines his own opinion of himself, he seems to do it as though he were another person. He uses the eyes of others. He turns aside as it were, by the way, to see himself pass by. The judgment which one forms of himself, is often much more unsound than that which he forms of others. The eye cannot see itself; so neither can any one see himself. He must use a mirror. There are many of these. History, books, daily example, every person he comes in contact with, his own experience, are mirrors. If he sees himself in these, and thereby corrects his own errors and follies, and gives himself reasonable and just credit for his attainments, he may come, at length, to be entitled to entertain a respect for himself. There is a certain best thing to be done, and a certain best manner of doing it, in all possible circumstances in which one may find himself. Nothing is entitled to be considered *best* which does not conform to natural law, the law of God, the positive law of the land, the conventional laws of society, (so far as they are founded in reason and good sense), and to the decencies of life. To that best thing, and to that best manner, no one, perhaps, ever perfectly attains; but it cannot be doubted that there is some such standard. He who comes the nearest to it, is he who is best entitled to entertain a respect for himself. This respect, it is apparent, comprehends many motives, and most of human actions. There are some men, who seem to have had this standard in view throughout their lives. It is probable that *George Washington* stood high in this class, perhaps as high as any man that ever lived. His countrymen do not know as much of his private life as it might be good for them to know; but as to his public life, he seems always to have done the best thing, in the right time, and in the best manner; he was entitled to have, and it must be supposed that he had, in fact, the high reward of self-respect. As self-respect, well founded, and in all things consistent with reason, relatively to one's-self and all others, is the safest guide that one can have through life, (since it is only another name for enlightened conscience) so, it may easily be perverted, and become a reproach, and even ridiculous.

273. *Pride.* There is a kind of pride which is often mistaken for *self-respect.* We hear of honorable, and of laudable pride. We take pride to be that self-esteem, in which a man holds himself. It may be founded in his estimation of the qualities of his mind, in his attainments, in his possessions, in his strength, his beauty, his parentage and descent. It may also be founded in a consciousness of virtue, and of having faithfully done one's duty in all the relations of life. It seems to arise necessarily, from comparing one's self with other persons. If this be the right meaning of pride, it is very clear, that it is not always a sentiment which entitles one to respect himself. A man would be thought to be very unwise, who should openly declare that he valued himself, in comparison with other men, on account of his wealth, his beauty, or his family connexion ; equally unwise, if he should declare his opinion of himself to be, that he was superior to other men in the gift of natural intellect, in the cultivation of it, or in the practice of the various virtues. The common sense of mankind, founded in natural reason, does not approve of that self-gratulation which rests on the accident of birth, of inheritance, nor even on the acquisition of fortune by one's own industry ; nor does it approve of that feeling, when founded on qualities which belong to the mind, nor even in the practice of the virtues, unless, when manifested in a becoming manner. There must be, in the very nature of things, some persons in every community, large or small, who are superior to others in these sources of self-esteem. In every city, town and village in this nation, there are some persons who are in possession of some of these causes of self-esteem, in some comparative degree, and other persons who have the fewest of them. Those, who so use their advantages as to entitle themselves to the esteem of others, and who are acknowledged to be respecta-

ble for that use, may well be entitled to respect themselves from such causes. Those who use them in such a manner as to announce the feeling of superiority over others, and habitually to offend the watchful feeling of self-love, are properly called *the proud*. It is believed, that these views conform to natural law, and to the necessary constitution of human society.

274. *Vanity*. A still greater mistake is made in substituting vanity for self-respect. The word vanity, is made out of two Latin words which signify *exceeding emptiness*. It is commonly understood to mean a strong desire to be noticed, considered, and esteemed by others, but on account of things rarely worthy of a rational mind. Vain persons covet praise. They thrust themselves, and all on which they value themselves, upon the notice of others. They delight in recounting their achievements, and sometimes make the sad blunder of speaking to those who know they are mistaken. They touch adroitly on their own excellencies, and provoke others to descant upon them. They have such delightful visions of self-complacency, that it seems cruel to disturb them. Such persons are always tools in the hands of the *knowing ones*, and most extensive use is made of them, in the political machinery of this country. In general, the display of this poor passion, is made by persons of very light and frivolous minds. It is seen at all ages, but strikingly in youth. To see a young person strutting, or mincing along, in a new garment, or in some personal ornament, and watching to see if he is noticed, and by whom, excites a feeling of pity and contempt. The same feeling arises when young persons are seen who say, in their movements, as intelligibly as though they spoke in plain English, ‘ Do they not think me very handsome ; elegantly dressed ; a fine figure ; exceedingly graceful ? ’ In some instances, lookers on do think so, and smile contemptuously at the same time. But in general, lookers on see no such thing as the vain imagine ; they do see that which it would be shocking to those vota-

ries of vanity to know, *is* seen. They do see 'talents wasted, time misspent; foolish hopes, and vain desires.' They do see that the purposes of life are misunderstood, or perverted. Is there any remedy for these follies? None, probably, unless one could bring home to the minds of the vain, that they violate the strongest precept laid down in the code of natural law for the government of persons, individually, and socially. That precept commands them, so to conduct themselves in all things, as to entitle themselves to self-respect, and consequently to the respect of others. If the vain could conceive how small a portion they make of created being; how insignificant a part they make of civilized society; how many there are, in that society, whose pretensions, if asserted, would be transcendently superior to their own, they might, perhaps, dismiss their little vanities, and devote themselves to gratifications worthy of their intended nature.

275. *Family pride.* It is said to be no uncommon thing, in Europe, to see a worthless member of society, and, perhaps, odious for his vices or follies, proud of a long line of ancestors, to many of whom he may be a disgrace. A sentiment of veneration for worthy predecessors, is a very natural one. The world may be willing to tolerate this sentiment. They do this, however, only, when an individual shows a proper regard for progenitors, by his own personal worth. If there be anything, truly ridiculous, in this country, it is the manifestation of family pride in one, whose progenitors would be ashamed to know (if they could know it) that they had left such a descendant. So far as the just respect which is felt for the virtues of those from whom one claims descent, may operate as motives to virtuous conduct, there may be something in family pride; but it seems to have no force beyond this. Such pride is a fleeting treasure in this land. The vicissitudes in family relations are so sudden and revolutionary, that most individuals are liable to be thrown upon their own merits, in the course of life. In such reverses, one's ancestry are feeble

aids. There are abundant proofs, that substantial merits need no aid from ancestral honor.

276. *Speaking of others.* It may be asked, whether one is to be entirely silent at all times, and on all occasions, as to the character and conduct of others? Certainly not. There are many occasions for speaking of others, and for speaking the *truth* of them, whatever that may be. All the members of any community are interested in knowing the true character of each other. The knowledge that this character may be known, is one of the most salutary correctives of erroneous conduct, and one of the strongest inducements to pursue that which is commendable. It is probably the case, that the members of every community are pretty well understood by all who have an interest in knowing them. We know not of any law, which holds it to be immoral *to speak the truth of any one, from good motives, and for justifiable ends.* It is all important that this principle should prevail in our country, where so much depends on public opinion. Surely one's arms are not to be folded, and his lips closed, when he sees one bent on mischief, public, or private. It may be one of the highest moral duties, to declare what men are, and what they are aiming at, in many supposable cases. There can be no surer guide, than the *motive*, and the *end.* Inquiries are sometimes made, in matters of greater or less interest concerning others, confidentially, and where the inquirer needs to be truly informed. The party inquired of, has a right to be silent, if he thinks he has good reason to be so; but if he answer, he is bound to state the truth. If he choose to speak, and wilfully conceal the truth, so that the inquirer is deceived, he subjects himself to the imputation of an intentional deceiver.

277. There may be also, and there frequently are, confidential discussions of character, especially concerning public men, and where, perhaps, there is no particular end in view. This does not seem to be wrong; such intercourse is not founded in malicious, nor unworthy motives. It is even, some-

times, instructive and philosophical. This, perhaps, is the extreme limit. In all other imaginable cases, it is, probably, most consistent with one's own self-respect, and all truly respectable motives, to let other persons alone, and leave to them the care of their own characters.

278. *Slander.* This is a two-fold crime. 1. It is a breach of natural law, of divine law, and of the implied law of society, in relation to the party spoken of. 2. It is a breach of the same law, in relation to the party speaking. It has been commonly treated of in the first relation. It is now to be noticed in the second; and if it be shown why it is a breach in this, the other will take care of itself. We beg leave to ask a slanderer a few questions: Do you desire to be esteemed in society for your intelligence, your sense of justice, your knowledge of the decencies of life, and for the observance of them? If you happen to be ill-tempered, petulant, and disagreeable to your family connexions, and associates; if you make hasty and troublesome judgments, which you have to rescind or reform; if you happen to be ridiculous in your deportment, and remarkable for silly vanities; are you willing to have these things set forth in any, and every company, by any one who knows of them? Suppose there to be only some slight foundation for some one, or more of these things, which, if you could have an opportunity to explain, would be entirely cleared up; are you willing to have that slight foundation made the basis of a structure of reproach, which if true and real, ought to expel you from decent society? Suppose there to be no foundation at all, for any such accusation of yourself, and yet somehow, and unaccountably, it is afloat, and circulating; should you not think great injustice to be done to you? This is just what you do to others. You take away their good name, if they deserve to have one; you magnify their little faults and errors, and make them ridiculous or odious; you try them on indictments, for serious offences, on which they have no opportunity to de-

fend themselves, and of which they are ignorant. Where did you get your information ? What credit were they entitled to, from whom you had it ? Did you understand them as they meant to be understood ? Where, and how, did your informants learn what they communicated ? Were they thoughtless, or malicious slanderers, like yourself? How much have you added to their slanders by way of recommending and making yourself agreeable ? Have you broken any law by this conduct ? We take the liberty to answer for you.

279. You have broken every law which an honest and honorable man, and a rational individual should respect. 1. You have made every person whom you have spoken to, fear you, and shun you. You have shown that you know not what the value of a good name is, and have forfeited your own, if you ever had any. You have shown, that you are a stranger to self-respect; that you have, probably, every one of the faults, follies, and errors, which you impute to others ; and desire to bring them down to your own level. Thus you have broken that law which commands you to do no evil to yourself. 2. You have violated that principle of natural law, which commands you to do no injustice to your fellow-men. You know not what opinions you may entertain of the party you have slandered, if circumstances, (as they may,) should bring you into connexion with him. You may find him to be, on a better knowledge of him, an amiable and worthy person. You may find all that you have said, and helped to circulate, utterly groundless. If he be one whom you occasionally meet, and even ask to partake of your hospitality, how can you meet him, and manifest towards him, every sentiment of respect and esteem, when you have so spoken of him ? One of two things must be true, either you *act a lie*, when you meet him in such a manner, or you *spoke a lie*, when you represented him as you did, to others. 3. You have broken the law of God. To this law, perhaps, you are a stranger, and know not what wrong you have done. If

so, the kindest thing that any one can do you, is, to urge you to find out what it is, and to learn there, the sentence of the slanderer.

CHAPTER XXX.

DUTIES.

Actions between One's-self, and others, which are common causes of dissension.

280. There are very serious questions arising out of promises, out of alleged violations of justice, of truth, and of divers forms of obligation, which are noticed, and settled, by judicial tribunals, according to the law of the land. There are many questions, of like nature, which are referable to no tribunal but that of conscience, and that of public opinion, so far as that may be found to apply ; and it is the latter only, which are now to be considered.

They are of daily occurrence, among all classes; and are often causes of mutual reproach, and lasting bitterness. This arises from the different views, which the interested parties take, of the same transaction. Both may believe themselves aggrieved ; and both may sincerely think each other, offenders. This is a very common evil, and is founded entirely in defect of moral education. It cannot be pretended, that such evils are inseparable from human life. If men better understood, than they commonly do, that the *causes* might be avoided, and that when these evils have arisen, they might be very differently disposed of, from what they usually are, surely, human condition would be greatly improved. Common differences or dissensions are believed to arise, from supposed, or real disregard of truth ; or of sincerity ; or of the obligation of gratitude ; or of justice ; or of promises ; or of what is called, (in the language of the world) the law of honor. And, sometimes, from particular relations of parties.

281. *Truth and Falsehood.* These two subjects relate to two parties; 1, that one who speaks truth or falsehood; 2, that one to whom it is spoken. This matter is to be considered only in relation to the first party, and as to him, in two views. 1. Whether there be any, and what law, which requires that the truth should be spoken; and 2. What good or evil one may do to himself by disregarding the truth.

1. One reason why truth should be spoken is, that the knowledge which any one person can have from the use of his own senses, is, in many things which it most materially concerns him to know, very limited. He must, therefore, often depend, for his knowledge, on what others say to him; and when the thing spoken of, is exclusively known to the party speaking, the other must rely entirely on what he says. If it be considered how great a part of the most serious concerns in life depend on declarations made by one person to another, if these could not be relied on, the affairs of mankind would be greatly embarrassed; and confidence, would be destroyed. As this matter of speaking the truth is one which concerns all persons, so all persons agree in holding liars in contempt. Even the very lowest persons consider themselves to be disgraced, when charged with the guilt of lying. They can endure charges which would subject them to public punishment, with more composure than they can endure this. A lie is always understood to be resorted to, to secure some advantage, or prevent some evil, to the person who resorts to it; or to occasion some disadvantage, or injury, to the person to whom, or of whom, the lie is told; sometimes both these purposes concur. The object in view is always an immoral one, and the means used are always regarded as disgraceful. It is obvious, that wilful falsehood is forbidden by natural law, which is intended to regulate our social relations; and is expressly forbidden by Divine law, which condemns

all acts of fraud and deceit, and commands one to do to others, as he would have them do to him.

282. 2. It is a rare occurrence that any one who descends to falsehood, succeeds in the object which he may have in view. He is commonly detected; and if not, is suspected, which may operate quite as much to his disadvantage. If he should escape detection, and suspicion, he lives in constant fear of both. He has a very troublesome secret to keep. If he should be able to do this, still he cannot hide it from himself that he is a liar; and such a person, by natural justice, is compelled to pass that sentence upon himself, which he knows that others would pass upon him, if they were as well informed as he is. A liar is, therefore, obliged to feel like a guilty person, and an habitual liar very soon comes to look like one. If there be no higher motive than one's own interest and welfare, in speaking the truth, and avoiding falsehood, this is a very sufficient one. If a man is known to be a person unworthy of confidence when he speaks, he has not the benefit of being credited even when he speaks the truth. He voluntarily deprives himself of the advantages of social life. His assertions secure to him no credit; his promises are contemned; he makes himself to be alone in the very bosom of society, for every one shuns him. In the administration of justice in courts, a person is not regarded as a witness, whose common reputation is, that he is not believed when he speaks. The objection to him is not that he might not tell the truth in the matter which is on trial, but that such a person ought not to be received as a witness, because he cannot be credited in anything that he says. When such a person has been called, and examined as a witness, it is usual to examine other witnesses to prove his character; and if it be proved that he is unworthy of credit, what he has sworn to is disregarded, though he may have declared the truth. This is the common fate of all such unfortunate persons in society, as well as in courts. Independently of the criminality, lying is very poor policy. If the object

be to obtain a supposed good; it rarely is obtained by such means; and if it be, the price so paid, must always be greater than the good is worth. If the object be to conceal a wrong done, it is rarely successful; and if not, it leaves the offender without excuse for his error, and adds another wrong. If the object be to charge an innocent person with a wrongful act, or to deprive one of his good name, or of some lawful possession, or subject him to some evil which he ought not to endure, the offence is of that cast which the law of the land holds to be *malicious*, and it deals with such offence accordingly. In short, it is very difficult to violate any law of natural justice, or divine prohibition, without encountering an adequate punishment; and it may be assumed, that the punishment which follows lying, is as certain, and just, as in any instance of criminality. If every tenant of every prison, and if every person who is in the custody of a goading conscience, were asked this question, *what was your first step from innocence, and purity?* he would probably answer, *telling a lie.*

283. Every one, of common experience, knows, how frequently the question arises, whether one did, or did not say, such a thing, or did, or did not do, such an act; and that affirmation on the one side, and denial on the other, often grow into an aggravated contention. No one can doubt, that such troubles arise from a disregard of the moral duty of speaking with due regard to truth; and from carelessness in remembering what was said, or done; or, from what is much worse, a resolution to deny what one does remember, because it seems to be inconvenient, or disadvantageous to remember. As every one is a free agent, and may speak, or not, the original wrong lies, in having spoken that, which should not have been spoken.

284. *Sincerity and Insincerity.* These are other names for truth and falsehood. They are not commonly applied to the most serious concerns of human life; but, to what are called the 'imperfect obligations.' Such obligations, it is well known,

are not enforced by the law of the land, but are binding as duties arising, as well from natural law, (reasonably expounded,) as from divine law. Sincerity is a duty to one's-self, because it is demanded by self-respect. As every one has an individual separate physical being, so every one has a *separate circle* within which he exists, and into which, no one has a right to intrude. His thoughts, motives, opinions, and policy, are his own. What he will, or will not do, (so that no wrong be done to others, and no act of duty be withheld from them) is for him to decide upon. Within this circle, he makes up his judgments on all persons and things. In his outward deportment, he must frequently act in a manner, not consistent with these judgments. As an example ; one has made up, from repeated observations of a certain individual, a very clear, but very unfavorable judgment of his qualities ; but, there is no occasion to disclose what the judgment is. The observer is obliged, or finds it convenient, to meet this individual, and to deal with him, and perhaps to interchange courtesies with him. It is undoubtedly proper to manifest the respect, in such case, which the decencies of life require ; and to show the common proofs of good will. There is no insincerity in this. Though no one can possibly avoid forming judgments of others, nor avoid liking or disliking them, even including very near friends and relatives, yet there may be a positive violation of duty in publishing these judgments, or in disclosing these feelings. The divine law, 'judge not that ye be not judged,' does not, it is believed, interdict these judgments, because they cannot but be made ; but, it forbids the wanton, unnecessary, and injurious publication, or manifestation of them. Those who are keen observers of their fellow-men, see in their faces, in their manners, in their modes of speaking, in their tones of voice, in the sentiments which they express, &c., causes for respect, esteem, confidence, and approbation, or, they may see causes for disrespect, suspicion, strong disapprobation, and disgust. But all these things belong to the *individual circle.* It is not insincere to keep them there. On the contrary, society would be intolerable if they were not kept there ; it is very hazardous to the observer to let them out, unnecessarily. He may be mistaken, both as to the favorable and unfavorable judgments, which he forms. Further observation, new circumstances, unexpected changes, may essentially correct his judgment ; therefore, a prudent man will keep his judgments to himself. They are his own peculiar property ; they were obtained for his own use ; and, no person is adapted to get through the world, who has not sagacity enough to make them. Suppose one to have occasion to meet, and to act with, or against one, who is disagreeable and repulsive to him, what is the proper rule of conduct ? perhaps the fault is in the judgment formed, and not in the person of whom it is formed. The first safe measure is to take counsel of one's own conscience. But, suppose the impression just, and irradicable, as it sometimes well may be, the best way seems to be, to avoid the disclosure of it, unnecessarily. One can always resort to the forms of decorum which society has properly established. This course is also consistent with a regard for one's-self. For why should one put himself into a state of irritation and hostility, wherein he can gain nothing, and may lose much ? Perhaps this sensitive being is quite as disagreeable to other persons, as this particular object is to him ; and yet may have no suspicion that he is so. He might not like to be assured of this ; nor be able, perhaps, to change the relation for the better, if he were..

285. *Gratitude and Ingratitude.* If a destitute young person should attract the notice of a wealthy man, and should be by him supported, educated and established in the world, so as to be able to live, to become independent, and respectable, every one would say, that this is a case for the feeling, and the expression, of fervent gratitude. Let us suppose, that the patron of this young man, frequently reminds him of his former condition, and by what

means he finds himself where he is. Suppose the patron exacts a frequent acknowledgement of his bounty, and takes to himself unqualified praise for his goodness. Let us suppose, that the obliged party finds his condition very irksome ; and almost wishes that he had never been the subject of such burthensome favor ; and is, at length, provoked to say so ; *Is he ungrateful ?* It would seem, then, that gratitude had two sides to it, as well as two parties. He who has conferred a favor, has not done all which it concerns him to do ; and he who receives a favor may have a difficult task to perform. A bargain is an exchange of one thing for another, and the parties are even. The conferring of favors, whether asked for or not, seems to stand on very different grounds. Many elements make up that compound from which gratitude is said to arise. The parties may understand the nature of the favor very differently at the time when it is conferred ; and more differently, afterwards. He who confers, has a retentive memory ; he who receives, a fading one ; time engraves the favor deeper and deeper, in the former ; and wears it out, more and more, in the latter ;—in the former, it often preserves the freshness of a new occurrence ; in the latter, the sense of favor often goes, and the weight of obligation alone remains. It may be that the complaints made against ungrateful persons are not always well founded ; and that the expectations of those who confer favors are as little so. Some poet has written,

> He that's ungrateful has an only fault,
> All other crimes may pass for virtues in him.

The meaning of this couplet must be, that the members of society are under no obligations to confer favors ; and that if they do confer them, the party obliged is a monster, if he do not, *what ?* we know not what is intended, nor that there is any rule by which gratitude is to be measured. We think that every member of society is to do what of good he can, and to whomsoever stands in need of it. He is not to stop to measure, and calculate, how he is to be paid for it. He may not be paid by the party benefited directly, but by some other, and in some unexpected way. Whosoever confers favors, opens an account with the changes, and chances, and accidents of life. His credit side will look well in the close. If he confer a favor, he does it because he thinks he can, and ought to. He has the *pleasure* of doing it. If he wishes to avoid the affliction of ingratitude, he can easily do it, by not letting the party obliged, know, unnecessarily, whence the benefit comes.

286. Such modes of doing favors are rare. Whether one ought to be grateful, or not, depends entirely on the act done, and the motive for doing it. Whatever the act may be, if the agent was moved to do it, by the expectation of a superior, or equivalent benefit to himself, he is entitled to no gratitude, whether he obtains that benefit or not. He may rather be regarded as immoral, in claiming gratitude. When one has really conferred important favors, from entirely disinterested motives, he is entitled to gratitude. He may find the obliged party willing to manifest this feeling, or not. If not, the obliging party will best consult his own interest in making no claim. One who is so immoral as to ask, receive, forget, or deny favors, is not likely to be brought to a sense of justice, by being reminded of them. We must look at human nature as it really is, and is long likely to be. Every one who is compelled to ask a favor, inflicts a wound on his own self-love, and on his natural desire to be independent of his fellow-men. He is glad to get the favor, and humbled that he had to ask for it. He is very apt to transfer his feeling of uneasiness with himself, to the person by whom he has been obliged. It requires some magnanimity to be properly grateful ; and if ingratitude means, a sense of uneasiness under the weight of favors, it does not seem to be that crime which diminishes all crimes to insignificance, and even converts them, by comparison, into virtues. As favors, are acts

which one is at liberty to do, or not, however beneficial they may be; the agent may put an end to all sense of obligation by his own misconduct in demanding an humiliating acknowledgment of them. This is much the same thing as to demand of a chained slave, to clank his chains to delight the ear of him who put them on.

287. There are few pleasures in this life more self-satisfying, than that of doing good to others, from noble and disinterested motives. That man is to be regarded as favored by nature or education, or both, who justly estimates that pleasure. Such a quality likens one to HIM, who is the fountain of all good. He who seeks gratification from such acts, will not fail of his purpose, even if he should find the object of his bounty as thoughtless, thankless, and ungrateful, as so many of the human family are, towards that Power on whom all that live, depend.

It is not to be wondered at, that so many embarrassments arise, in attempting to find exact values, where the means of measuring, are so imperfect; and where even such measures, are used by interested parties. It is obvious that better knowledge of *moral duty*, is the only remedy for such evils.

288. *Promises.* A most prolific mother of trouble, and vexation in the world, is the making of promises. Every one who has something to do in the present moment, may judge whether it be best to do it, or not. He who promises, takes on himself to do something in a *future* time. Where, and what will he be, and what will be his condition, at a future time? A promise is not only a solemn engagement to do an act, at a future time, but it is an engagement, that all things shall be so, that he can do it. This is undertaking a great deal. How much needless suffering is there, from this thoughtless, and almost wanton undertaking! All moralists agree in this, that every promise is to be performed in that sense in which the promiser understood it, and in which he authorized him, to whom the promise was made, to understand it. A promiser

voluntarily puts on fetters; he agrees to wear them until a certain day. It behoves him to weigh well, before he puts them on, whether he can *then* take them off. Young persons are very ready to make promises. The kind feelings, and the sincerity, and the inexperience of early age, prompt them to promise. They know not, at that time of life, with what facility, present scenes disappear, and new ones take their places. Nor is it much otherwise, when other stages of life have come on. The evil of promising is, that when the day of performance arrives, either the inclination to perform is annihilated, or the ability to perform, if it ever existed, has been lost. The promiser must excuse, and exonerate himself as he can, or take the consequences. He runs the risk of losing his own self-respect, and of destroying his peace of mind. He runs still other risks; he may draw on himself future and ruinous evil, in attempting to escape from a present and inconsiderable one.

289. There are promises, of less serious cast, into which many persons enter, from unpardonable weakness. They are solicited to make promises; or some desire to be agreeable, or amiable to others, leads them to enter into engagements, which they find it disagreeable, or inconvenient to comply with. It would help such persons very much to know, that there is a monosyllable in the English language, very easily written, and more easily spoken, which would relieve them from all but a momentary inconvenience. When one who solicits has, in answer, a firm and decided NO, the burthen is on him, and the other party is entirely relieved. In some cases, this answer may be, and undoubtedly is, improperly given; but in a great majority of cases, it is the proper one. Suppose one asks you to solicit of another a favor for him. Either you ought to do this on the principle of benevolence and duty, or not. Of this you are the judge; the proposition is made to you, and you are to decide on it. It happens, that in your opinion, there is an objection to your making the promise; and it is weighty

enough, if you had the firmness to do what you know you ought to do, to call forth a decisive no. Which is best for you, to say *no* at once; or to make a shuffling and evasive answer, leaving the applicant in doubt; or a promise, which you do not mean to perform? One thing may decide this; the applicant will never tell that you refused him, if he had no right to your services, or you were justified in refusing them. Those who apply for favors never tell by whom they have been refused. It is immoral to promise any thing which you know you cannot perform; far more so, to make a promise, which at the very time of making it, you mean not to perform.

290. The making of heedless promises, is not only a wrong done to one's-self, and to others, at the moment when they are made; but they lead to strife, and lasting ill will, from the different understanding which the parties have of them, when performance is called for. How often is heard in the world; "Did you not *promise* me, *this?*" "No; I made no *promise;* I only said I *would* promise, *if,*" &c. Both parties may be very certain they are right; though neither may be. Nevertheless, they insist on their own views, and the necessary consequence is, some sort of warfare. Promising cannot be called a light matter, in any case. In courts of *equity* it is held so serious, that the delinquent party is made to do that, which he promised to do. A promise is, in no respect different from an obligation to do an act instantly, excepting that the time in which it is to be done, is future. As no one knows, what intervening time may bring about, prudence to one's-self, and justice to the other party demand, that all promises should be made with such qualifications as will lead neither party into difficulty. The most important, as well as the most insignificant acts in life, may fall under the head of promises. The making of promises, and the neglect or omission of performance, is a good index to worth, or worthlessness, of character.

291. *Justice and Injustice.* Justice, is from the

Latin, *jus* (right), and is a very comprehensive term, and stands opposed, physically, morally, intellectually, and even religiously, to every motive and act which is wrong. In a more limited, and common acceptation it means, that conduct, and the motives to that conduct, which are right, or wrong, in the transactions of men. It, therefore, comprises all those acts which are cognizable in the administration of civil government, as well as in the common intercourse of men, with which that administration has no concern. In this still more limited sense, (common intercourse), it is now to be noticed; that is, in *moral* relations, as distinguished from those which are called *legal.*

Every observer of what is going on in daily affairs, even in domestic life, and among children, must know, how frequently questions arise on the point, whether an act done, or intended, be just, or unjust. One frequently finds, that his common sense of right and wrong, is pleased or offended, because the scene, which he is witnessing, strikes him as right or wrong, or as being just or unjust. It seems to be expedient, then, to define the common application of these terms, since none are of more frequent occurrence.

Justice is said, by a Roman moralist, to be "the mistress and queen of all the other virtues." The Roman (or civil) Law, (which is the foundation of the administration of justice throughout the continent of Europe) defines Justice to be, "a constant and prevailing will or disposition to render to every man his due." Injustice is co-extensive. From these definitions it is apparent, that all acts which occur among men, of whatsoever degree of importance, may deserve the character of just or unjust. Not only classes of men, learned or unlearned, but every individual of every class, has some perception, that there are rules of conduct, which he knows, (however loose and undefined they may be) under the terms of justice and injustice. Even children, in their sports, are constantly heard to say, that an act done, is fair or unfair, which is only another name for the same things. It is obvious that the meaning given to *just* and *unjust*, must depend entirely on the persons using these terms, and the subjects to which they are applied. Thus, it is said, that a legislative assembly has made an unjust law ; that a court of justice has pronounced an unjust judgment ; that a lady has treated a gentleman unjustly; that the chief of banditti has made an unjust division of the spoil. All such sayings show, that throughout the whole range of society there is a common-sense admission, that there is, for every case, some rule of right. It is, then, unaccountable, it may be said, that if every one refers to a rule of conduct, that there should be so much error of conduct, and so much contention as to the application of the rule. This is believed to arise entirely from the indistinctness of the rule of right, among a great majority of those who assume to know it ; and from ignorance of the true rule ; or from intentional breach of it, if known. In most cases where contentions arise, there are two things to be done by parties, who are, commonly, in a very unfit condition to do either of them ; the one is to make the rule for the occasion, and the other is, to apply it. This sort of law making is usually conducted by the opponents, with very little respect for each other's capacity to legislate ; and with much less inclination to accept, and apply the law, respectively, to the subject of controversy.

292. It cannot be admitted, that mankind are condemned to such ignorance of their own means of social welfare ; and to a hopeless incapacity to improve their condition. Should we hear of, and experience in daily intercourse, controversies, disputes, and angry differences, if the "queen of all the virtues" were known among men, by means of early moral culture ? There is no risk in asserting, that all such evils are entirely of man's own making. He might be instructed, so as to know, how worthless the matters commonly are, on which such contentions arise, when taken as items in the great account of human life. Certainly, there must be

found out some mode of educating the *heart*, as well as the *head*; and of making its spontaneous flowings, the responses to every question, *Is this just? Is this unjust?* And why should the *heart* be so instructed? Because the power so to instruct, has been given to man:—because so to instruct, and to act in obedience to instruction, conforms to the unchangeable law of nature; because such conformity, leads to earthly welfare; and because that law, and that welfare, are consistent with rational conceptions of the Deity.

293. *The Law of Honor.* We have read some severe remarks on Dr. *Paley's* notice of this law. (Mor. Phi. Book 1. Chap. 2.) He is considered therein, as stating "the rules of life to be, the law of honor, the law of the land, and the scriptures." He must be understood to mean, what *are* the rules of life, not what they *should be*, because in the same short chapter, he condemns the operation of the law of honor. This law may be a very good rule of life, or a very bad one, according to the meaning which is given to it. The words, *a man of Honor*, may mean a gambler, duellist, and a contemner of many virtues. It may also mean, one who is conscientiously regardful of truth and justice. This is an instance, and a striking one, of the use of words, without a defined meaning, in consequence of the neglect of moral instruction in early life. No one who has been so instructed, and who carries the effect of such instruction into manhood, has any need of "the law of honor" as a rule of life. He will have far superior rules, and may prove himself to be *honorable* in the faithful observance of them. To show how absurd it is to regard "the law of honor" as a rule of life, without regard to morals, founded in the laws of nature, and the law of religion, as the sanction of morals, it is only necessary to observe how various the law of honor is among different classes of persons; and how different and contradictory it is, according to the subjects to which it is applied, as a rule. As there are many in the world, who have no other law, it may not be

unprofitable to examine it, and attempt to know its value.

294. The word *honor*, is said to be derived from the Hebrew word *hon*, signifying substance or wealth; "which being the primitive source of esteem among men, came at length to be put for the measure or standard of esteem, namely, what is good." Whatever may be thought of this derivation, the same word is found, in several languages, though varied in each one. It was adopted into the English from the Latin, in which it is *honos*. It is supposed to mean the high estimation in which one is held; and also the estimation in which one may hold himself. *Honesty* is from the Latin *honestus*, and that from *honos*. Honesty is usually applied to dealings among men in matters of property. Thus, one is said to be honest who affirms nothing, and who conceals nothing, for the purpose of misleading or deceiving any one with whom he deals in order to benefit himself. One who declares an article to be of a value which he knows it is not; or who contracts a debt knowing that he cannot pay it, is said to be *dishonest*. Uprightness, and honesty, are often confounded. An honest man may be silent, when no affirmation is asked of him, and when the party with whom he is dealing, undertakes to judge for himself. An upright man, does not limit himself to external acts, or merely to the use of the senses; he refers himself to principle, and will neither do wrong himself, nor be in any way, even negatively, instrumental in permitting wrong or injury, to another. Whatever number of honest men there may be, in the world, the number of the *upright*, is much more limited. Honor, integrity, honesty, uprightness, and probity, are all founded in the universally admitted principle, that mankind ought to conduct themselves in such a manner, as to do no wrong to themselves or to others. But, the "law of honor" has a very different meaning. It is referred to no standard of right and wrong, but that which individuals, and classes of individuals, set up for themselves. Such

persons esteem themselves for doing certain acts, which no law of nature, society, or of religion enjoins, and which every one of these laws may prohibit. They esteem themselves for not doing certain acts, which every one of these laws may enjoin. A thoughtless being who is entirely ignorant of every principle of moral rectitude, and who habitually disregards, the principles of action, on which the welfare of society depends, and on which his own depends, makes up, or adopts, a code of laws, (he knows not by whose authority originated), and on these he founds his self-esteem, and claims respect from his fellow-men, because he does, or pretends, to observe them. He is ready, at the risk of his life, to revenge the slightest imputation, that he does not observe these laws. If any one impeaches his veracity, his honesty, his courage ; or objects to his words or deportment, whether that which is said be true or false, an indelible stain is fixed on him, which nothing but the blood of the offender can wash out. But, then this blood must be got at, by the law of honor, which is a violation of every other law known to man. This sensitive guardian of *that* for which he esteems himself, has certain privileges which no other men pretend to be right. He may be profane, a vain boaster, a dishonest debtor, a deceitful friend, a worthless son, a burthensome brother, a cruel husband, a heartless parent ; and the consumer of his substance at the tavern, and the gaming table, because the law of honor prohibits none of these wrongs. But, if his fellow gambler should dare to intimate that he played false, or suggested an untruth, as to any occurrence in the game, his honor is stained, and he cannot endure existence without satisfaction. Thus, *men of honor*, set up for themselves certain rules of life, as various as their own particular classifications. In some parts of our own extensive country, there are laws of honor which are only *heard* of in other parts. They have this in common with other laws, that they constitute a *rule* ; of this rule there may be violations ; violation demands punishment. The offender is put on trial; his judge is the offended party; and the trial, the sentence, and the judgment, come in one and the same act, the blow of the assassin, if not of the murderer. The sensibility of a whole nation is, sometimes, shocked by the outrages of *men of honor.* Can any one doubt that these are the necessary consequences of defective moral education; or rather, of having *no* moral education? The root of this evil may be found in ignorance of the true purposes of life. Men come into society, with the absurd notion, that their own welfare depends on a set of rules to which reason, and common sense, are irreconcilably opposed. If they think of moral law at all, they think this phantom of honor *is* IT.

295. Is there, then, no such thing as honor? Certainly, there is, and, in its true sense, it is the brightest ornament of human life. The universal acceptation of this meaning, excepting among "men of honor," is well known to imply the highest estimation in which any one man can be held by his fellow men. He is a man of honor, who is true, and just to himself; who is true and just to his fellowmen; and who *knows*, and who is *obedient* to the laws of his Creator. In this sense GEORGE WASHINGTON was a man of honor. The world's "men of honor" may admit, that *Benedict Arnold* was of their number. If they decline this, real men of honor may be allowed to suppose, that he was as worthy, and well principled, as any of their fraternity.

296. It sometimes happens, that "men of honor" find themselves in places of important trust, in the elective form of government, under which Americans live. They are, perhaps, members of legislative assemblies, and meet there men of the same school. A "man of honor" in the fervency of debate, makes some remark, which some "man of honor" takes to be an intended reproach to himself. He demands, whether the "Honorable member" intends to have his remark understood to be a *personal* application to himself? The Honorable member may have had no such intention. But being so interroga-

ted, the "law of honor," which is the only law he ever had occasion to think of, forbids him frankly to answer, that he had no such intention ; because, this would imply, that he is deficient in courage, and is unwilling to be *shot at.* He must, therefore, reply, that the inquirer must judge for himself, of the application of the remark. This must be understood to be, an application of the remark *to* the inquirer ; who, thereupon, sends his "friend," to arrange with the "friend" of his foe, a "meeting." They meet, and some accident prevents the destruction of the one, or the other, or of both, but the matter of "honor" is thereby adjusted, and both are "honorable" men : That is, both of them have manifested a willingness to be shot, which is enacting a complicated LIE ; and without settling anything which may be supposed to have been in controversy. What a reproach is it to the *morals* of any country, that a man cannot say, that he intended no reproach to another ; or that he is sorry to have been *unjust*, if he has been so ! *

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* Washington was a man of ardent temper. He gave offence to a gentleman ; and in the interval, which would have been consumed for the arrangement of a challenge, the offended person received a request from Washington, that an interview might be had, at an appointed hour and place. The offended party attended accordingly, *properly armed.* Washington appeared *unarmed.* "I came," said he, to acknowledge that "I did wrong, and to ask your pardon for my offence." Further to show that Washington was a man of honor, in the proper sense of that phrase, we extract from Ramsay's life of Washington, p. 237, (Chap. XIII.) the following ;—"He had religion without austerity ; dignity without pride ; modesty without diffidence ; courage without rashness ; politeness without affectation ; affability without familiarity. He was punctual in all his engagements ; upright and honest, in his dealings ; temperate in his enjoyments ; liberal and hospitable ; systematical, and methodical in all his arrangements. He was the friend of morality and religion ; a steady attendant on public worship ; he encouraged, and strengthened the hands of the clergy. In all public acts, he made the most respectful mention of Providence ; he carried the spirit of *piety* with him, in his private life, and public administration."

Let "men of honor" compare themselves with this model !

CHAPTER XXXI.

DUTIES.

Actions which promote One's own good, whether affecting other persons, or not.

PRUDENCE ; IMITATION.

297. It has been shown, in former pages, that the system of being to which man belongs, is incessantly acting. It seems to be a general law, that all sorts of being must act, and be acted upon, in their respective relations. So man, as part of that system, must be active and passive, throughout his life. Although there are some few animals that seem to act with reference to the future, as the bee, the ant, the beaver, the distinguishing quality of the human race is, to prepare for the future, or to *foresee.*

In every stage of life, from year to year, and from day to day, all reasonable beings are doing acts, preparatory to some expected state of things. If one were entirely severed from his fellow-men, he would not be exempt from the duty of providing for the future ; but, dwelling in society, most of every one's actions have some reference to others, as well as to himself. Every considerate person conducts himself, in his affairs of business, pleasure, and all other employments, under the feeling, that he is to continue to act, and to be acted upon, as a member of society. Some persons consider themselves to be far-sighted in discerning the contingencies of the future, and are wise in preparing for them ; while others are indifferent, or careless, taxing themselves with no thoughts beyond the current events.

298. It is self-evident, that such a being as man is shown to be, will essentially promote his own welfare by having rules of life for the government of himself, whether with regard to present, or expected circumstances ; and whether circumstances

be limited to himself only, or have reference also to others. The ancient moralists held thoughtfulness, and provision for the future to be virtues. They regarded *prudence* as the highest proof of wisdom. Plato calls this, the leading virtue ; and a Roman, whose verses are familiarly known at this day, has sung, that he who has prudence needs no other guide.

299. *Prudence*, is from the Latin word *prudentia*, which is supposed to be derived from *pro-videntia*, meaning foresight. It implies knowledge of present facts, and sound judgment of what must, or can be made to follow, from present facts. If one fully understands his present condition, and can discern in what manner he shall act, so as to secure to himself the *greatest good* in expected circumstances, he will act *prudently*. This virtue, prudence, is thus seen to have a very comprehensive meaning. One acts prudently in availing himself of the means of acquiring a good education ; in acquiring a good name ; in providing for means of supplying his wants ; in taking care of his health ; in keeping his conscience in such order as never to feel reluctant to commune with it. This virtue, contemplates human life *as a whole*, and respects all its known, contingent, and even possible events. It must have been so considered when called the *leading* virtue ; that virtue, which gives character to all other virtues. In common acceptation, prudence has a very limited meaning, and is dishonored thereby. A prudent man is commonly understood to be one, who is careful of his property, and who lives snugly within his means ; so that to be called, significantly prudent, is to be spoken of, reproachfully. A prudent man should rather be esteemed as eminently wise, and one should be called *imprudent* who permits the love of money to tarnish his fame. A person is sometimes called prudent, who forbears to speak of others. In this sense, prudence is restored to its proper place ; for it is not easy to see, how one can do himself any real good, in discoursing on the faults, follies and failings of others. The per-

son spoken of, may not be injured; the party speaking, always is.

300. The ancient philosophers comprised their wisdom in short maxims. To have made a wise maxim, was to acquire renown. Thus, in discoursing on prudence, one of them shows his wisdom in uttering these precepts, "*Begin nothing of which you have not well considered the end.*" "*Take care of irrevocable deeds.*" Crito, one of the *seven* wise men of Greece, declared, that the highest human wisdom was that sagacity, which discerned in the present, that which the future would disclose.

301. *Imitation.* It is doubtful, whether this principle of action, has received all the consideration, and respect, to which it is entitled. It is supposed to be applicable to physical, intellectual, and moral being. In the first sense, it is supposed to apply to all animals. The word, imitation, is derived from the Latin, *imito.* A word is found in the Greek, which is compounded of two words, one of which signifies to *mimic;* and the other signifies, *alike;* and so compounded, they are said to mean, *to do*, or *to make alike.* There is something, like education, among the animals who are inferior to man. A bird may be naturally disposed to fly, when it is fit to leave the nest; but it may depend on *imitation*, to carry the disposition into effect. The young of animals have an instinctive direction to the objects proper for them to pursue; but they pursue these objects the more promptly, it may be presumed, on the principle of imitation. It seems reasonable to suppose, that the natural instinct is not so strong, and directory, of itself, as to put every animal inferior to man, in the proper pursuit, independently of this principle. However this may be, it is quite certain, that among human beings, this principle has so powerful an influence, that the character of society is determined by it. Man was characterized, by an eminent Greek philosopher, as the '*imitative*' animal.

302. The very first teachings addressed to the infant mind, are invitations to imitate. The first responses to these invitations, are attempts to do

what the teacher proposes. If a child were left alone, from an early age, until advanced towards manhood, he would be destitute of language.* This is proved by certain accounts of persons, who happened to be so placed, if these accounts are credible. It is also supposed, that the dumb are not defective in the organs of speech, but in the power of imitation. The acquirement of language is undoubtedly dependent on this faculty, as is clearly proved by those who attempt to learn, and to speak, another language, after attaining an adult age. It is probable, that the loss of a language, learned in one country, by going to another, in which it is not spoken, is not to be referred to the absence of habit, and the defect of memory only, but to the ceasing to imitate those who speak that language. Whether this be, right or wrong, is not very material to the main object, which is to show, the nature and consequences of imitation, in a moral view.

303. It has been proved that every person has a natural propensity to action. In what manner, and to what end, he shall act, is suggested by nature. Seeing, as he necessarily does, other persons like himself, acting in pursuance of these natural suggestions, he obeys the impulse to act, by doing or attempting to do, as they do. The operation of this principle is seen in every relation, from the cradle to the grave. It appears in matters of business, and amusement, in things serious, and in things trifling; in armies, in schools, in work-shops, in legislative assemblies, in domestic life; in short, in virtue and in vice, and in all that pertains to good or ill, in which man is an agent. This principle of action is frequently *involuntary*. It is a common observation, that a person who yawns, (or, as it is commonly called, *gapes*) will occasion a similar action in those who see and hear him. It is well known, that disagreeable muscular contortions, more particularly of the face, are frequently taken by one child from another, especially in schools; so, also, are disagreeable tones of voice, and peculiarities of articulation. One may,

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* See note at the end of the volume, on Casper Hauser.

sometimes, pronounce with certainty that a person who is heard to speak, for the first time, was educated at a certain college ; or that he has been brought up in a certain part of the country. One may pronounce, also, with certainty, that entire strangers to him, belong to a fraternity, who entertain peculiar sentiments, on certain subjects ; they acquire a distinguishing mode of speaking ; especially when the dominant sentiment is of a serious character. There are abundant opportunities, open to every intelligent observer, in this country, to prove that these things are so. All this is the consequence of imitation, though the persons who prove that it is so, may be, and probably are, entirely ignorant of it.

304. There are instances of physical imitation which depend on some mental delusion. These, also, are *involuntary.* As when one of a number is so powerfully acted upon by the imagination, as to fall into some muscular convulsion, and others present, are affected in like manner. It is well authenticated, that females in the Royal Infirmary at Edinburgh, who were affected by *hysteric* fits, occasioned the same infirmity in others. It is well known too, that in the poor-house at Haerlem, in Holland, some years ago, a girl, under some impression of terror, fell into a convulsive disease, which extended, on the mere principle of imitation, to nearly all the boys and girls in the house. The celebrated Dr. Boerhaave put a stop to it, by preparing certain irons, and having them made red hot in the presence of the children. He pronounced, with great solemnity, that every child who manifested any symptom of the disease, must be burnt to the bone, with one of these irons. There was no occasion to use them ; and the disease was no more known. In the year 1803, a species of St. Vitus's dance became epidemic, in one of the United States, on the same principle. About the year 1784, a commission was instituted at Paris, to test a new sort of philosophy, then introduced, under the name of *animal magnetism.* It was traced to imitative sym-

pathy, and exploded; and has not been known, (we believe) within the present century. There are many well authenticated instances of involuntary imitation, extending through parishes, villages, and districts of country. They have been uniformly traced to some imaginary terror. There was an instance in the island of Anglesey, in 1796; and many in Scotland, towards the close of the last century. In general, this sort of imitative malady occurred among persons who had not received the benefit of any education; it occurs *only* to such unfortunate persons. It was never known to have happened among the instructed, and well informed. Such occurrences are now properly ranked among judicial astrology, trials by combat, and the delusions of witchcraft. They are marks standing forth in time gone-by, to show how reason, and good sense, have raised mankind above them.

305. Manners, and fashions, are to be referred entirely to the principle of imitation; in some instances, it is involuntary, but most frequently, intended, and sometimes with diligent effort. All persons, in small, closely connected communities, have manners, opinions, and modes, peculiar to themselves. Every village, school, factory, college, and town, has its own manners, and fashions. Wherever there is a collection of persons, in habitual intercourse, there must be imitation. If the qualities which are respectable in human society are derived from this principle, of which there can be no doubt, so, also, are the follies and vices of society. If a child had never heard any one swear profanely, it is incredible that he should *invent* profanity. If one had never seen others take spirituous liquors, it is not to be supposed that he would do it. If one had never heard of others' wasting time, health, and character, in places of low and infamous resort, it cannot be admitted, that the inclination to do such things, would naturally spring up in an uncontaminated mind. Thus it seems to us, that the sins, and follies, and depravities of the world, are rightly chargeable on those who are *imitated*,

rather than on those who are imitators. This should be so, because the *experienced* have attained to a certain maturity of age, and have arrived at some knowledge of the evil consequences of their deeds, and ought rather to warn the pure to shun their paths, than invite them to enter upon the like course.

306. This notice of the principle of imitation has been thought expedient, as introductory to further notice of it, in its good and evil effects, in domestic life, and in the congregations of the young, and otherwise. The effect of imitation is very striking in families. Taking each individual of a family connexion by himself, great differences may be discerned between him, and all others. Taking the whole together, traits are found to be common to all ; looks, muscular motion, expressions under strong excitement, and marked peculiarities, run through whole families. Though such things may be accounted for by laws belonging to physical being, in some measure, yet the most important part of them, viz. *the moral part*, depends on the imitation. What can be more natural than that this should be so ? From the earliest age, after the senses are brought into use, all children are pushed onward by the impulse to act. They do as they see their seniors, and each other, do ; they speak as others speak ; they copy all that comes within their notice, good and bad ; they adopt the opinions, feelings, and thoughts of others, and modify these according to their own sphere of action. They must so conduct themselves, or do nothing, for they cannot have a stock of motives growing up spontaneously, in their own minds. This providential order to imitate, is like all others which come from the same authority ; most useful, wise, and benevolent ; and like all others, liable to mournful perversion. If these views are right, it follows, that those who constitute a family, are under great responsibilities. The affection of parents for children, the dependence of the latter on the former, their daily and increasing intercourse, place chil-

dren where they must be imitators. As parents are, (in their view,) superior to all other earthly beings, they are the proper persons to look up to, and to be copied ; and, in general, (right or wrong,) the attachment of fathers and mothers is, undoubtedly, increased, by seeing themselves *repeated* in their offspring.

307. The inferences to be drawn from these positions are very obvious. If a parent would possess his child of a natural, comely and graceful bodily action, he must, at least, not show, by his own action, that such things are of no consequence. If a parent would teach his child that he is to eat, to live ; and that he is not to live, to eat, he must demonstrate, by his own mode of life, what the true purpose of eating is. If he would teach his child that the digestive organs are given to perform a very necessary, and sober sort of *business*, at proper times, and in a proper manner, he must not show, by his manner of using his own, that he regards them as a mere place of deposit, for whatsoever it may give him pleasure to pass into them. If a parent thinks that patience, and tranquillity, under disappointments ; gentleness of voice, and kindness of manner ; truth and fair dealing ; early rising and industry ; cheerfulness and thankfulness; and doing as one would have others do to him, are qualities which he would like to see in his children, he must not show, by the tenor of his own life, that he thinks them of no value. It is very easy to see, from observing the children of a family, what sort of parents they have, and what is the common course of conduct, within their walls, although one never saw the interior, nor the parents. There are exceptions which prove the rule. Sometimes, children perceive and are shocked, at errors and follies in their parents. Thus one is not to suppose, that because a mother is a silly, gossiping female, intermeddling with her neighbor's concerns, and is fruitful in malicious or pitiful commentaries, that her children will all be of the same cast. On the contrary, the children, from seeing such an

evil example before them, may go to the extreme of prudence, and propriety, in managing the tongue. So, also, if a child have an intemperate parent, he may not become so himself, but may acquire a horror of the use of ardent spirits.

308. It is almost too obvious, that the principle of imitation is a tyrannical one, in places of education, to require any remark upon it. It is very natural that instructers, who stand in a high relation to pupils, should be objects of imitation. If they happen to have bad, as well as good qualities, it is to be expected that they will be imitated, in both. If the personal deportment, if the tones of voice, if the expressions of countenance, if the sentiments which are occasionally expressed, are of a dignified and estimable order, there will be some pupils who will be diligent imitators ; and those who cannot, or will not imitate, cannot withhold respect.

309. The qualities which are strongly contrasted with such as have been mentioned, will certainly find imitators ; or they will engender feelings and opinions, which disqualify the youthful heart, and mind, for moral improvement. In all schools and colleges, there are, as there are in adult society, some individuals, who are *the* objects of imitation. How these persons act, and in what manner they act, are very interesting inquiries. Curiosity is insatiable on such points. Whatsoever such prototypes do, is fit to be done by others, *as they think.*

310. In almost every school, college, community, or association, there are some persons who are looked up to. These persons determine, (by what rule cannot be stated, certainly not by that of common sense,) what shall be done, and how it shall be done. These persons, from impudent assumption, or by pretension founded on accidental circumstances, or from some humiliating concession, are admitted to know what the *fashion* is ; and such persons are, consequently, to be imitated. No matter how absurd, or ridiculous, their course of conduct may be ; nor what violence they do to the laws of nature, or good sense, they, nevertheless,

establish *the law*, and no one may dare to depart from it, without subjecting himself to the charge of vulgarity ; or what is worse, to that of being *unfashionable.* With imitators, the question is not, what is becoming, proper, and really useful ; but, how does such a one, and such a one, do, in the proposed case. Now, it is most certain, that all persons who have this exaltation, whether assumed or conceded, are under a grave moral responsibility. They are bound, by the solemn laws of morality, so to conduct themselves, as to set no example of a degrading, and ruinous character to their imitators. Such persons are invested with an honorable *trust.* If they are important enough to make laws for others, they should make good ones ; they should make good ones for the highest and the strongest reasons : their laws are like those made in a republic ; they are for the government, not only of those who are to obey them, but, *for those who make them.*

CHAPTER XXXII.

DUTIES.

Same subject continued.

CIVILITY ; POLITENESS ; CHARITY.

311. As men must have intercourse with each other, there must be modes of having it. As intercourse implies acts, there may be good or bad modes of acting. As men are necessarily social, and imitative, good and bad modes may be common to many. As classes in society are distinguished from each other, and as men covet distinction, *modes of acting*, is one way, in which they try to get it. If *elements* be considered, there are more things common to all classes, than are usually thought of. All civilized beings, eat, sleep, live in some building ; all are clad, all speak, and are spoken to ; all of them interchange property, labor, and services, or money

as the representative of these ; all have associates, friends, kindred ; all are pleased and displeased ; and all have about the same degree of self-love, however variously manifested. All of them must act, and be acted upon, in these relations. That in which they are distinguished from each other lies in the *materials* of action and in the *manner* of it. There are some things which are precisely the same as to all these beings. They were all born, and they must all die. In the eye of their Creator, they are all equal, except so far as they have rendered themselves unworthy. They are all members of the same society, however differently they may be therein placed. They are all necessary to each other, for all of them must be counted in making up society. The inquiry is, in what manner these members of society, should conduct themselves towards each other, so that each one may secure to himself the greatest good, consistently with the rights of others. It will be said by some persons, perhaps, that if one do no wrong to another as to property, person, or character ; if he pay his debts ; perform his promises, and do not intermeddle in affairs wherein he has no concern ; he is a good sort of man ; and no more should be required of him.

These things are a part, and only a part, of moral duty. The *manner* of doing, is as much a moral duty as *to do*. No small part of the convenience, comfort, and pleasure of life, depends on the *manner*. One may pay a debt, or perform a promise, fully, but may do it in a mode that will leave an impression (never to be removed) that he is little better than a brute. Modes of acting, or manners are, therefore, proper subjects to be treated of, among moral duties ; because one's welfare is inseparably connected with these.

312. *Civility*. The well-being of society would be greatly promoted, if the nature and use of this Christian virtue were more generally known. We take this to be, in personal intercourse, the observance of the command, Do to others as you would

that others should do to you. The most rapid glance at any community, shows this : That some of its members are brought into contact in matters of business, necessarily ; others meet, incidentally, who have no particular connexion ; others meet for social purposes, in various forms ; and that there is a large proportion who know, of each other, very little beyond the fact, that they are of the same country ; and perhaps, not even that. There must be a *best rule* of deportment for all these classes ; and no one will deny, that if this rule were defined, and faithfully applied, there would be much more of every day comfort, and complacency in the world, than there is well known to be. Civility is the manifestation of kind feelings, and of a desire to do all things which should be done under the influence of such feelings, and in a becoming and agreeable manner.

313. If every person understood the true foundation of society, the common origin of all its members, their natural and necessary sympathies, their community of interests, their necessary action upon, and with each other, it might be supposed, that all who are reasonable, would be civil. They would be so, because they would promote their own good, because they would be doing what it is proper to do, to promote the good of others ; and because they would know, that in so doing, they would conform to the design of their creation. We do not include under the term *civility*, the great duties of justice, acts of munificence, important personal services. These arise out of some special relation, which an individual bears to one or more other individuals. It seems to be limited to the manner in which the common, or accidental intercourse of the members of society, in general, should be carried on. This matter may be better understood by some examples. Thus, if one comes into the presence of another, as a beggar, servant, laborer, mechanic, trader, merchant, farmer, lawyer, physician, clergyman, or public officer; or if it be a female, or child of either sex ; there may be very various

modes of receiving these different persons. Yet, certainly, by every one of the laws, which we are endeavoring to illustrate, these several persons are entitled to civility. Even the beggar, perhaps one should rather say the beggar in particular, if not deformed by voluntary transgression, should be received with civility. That is, gentleness, kindness, decorum are to be observed relatively to each one. Why ? because no man can afford to be deemed insensible to the calls of reasonable humanity ; nor a stranger to the decencies of life ; nor ignorant of what is due from him, nor to him, in any of his proper relations.

314. We may find many illustrations, and fill ever so many pages with them. Let us take one which will concern the greatest number. In this country a stage-coach, and a steamboat, bring many persons into a small space, who may be utterly ignorant of each others existence, until they meet. They have a common object, that is, to be transported in the same vehicle, from the point of departure, to that of destination. Circumstances compel them to be very close to each other, and each one has the power of being very disagreeable to each one of the others, in a variety of well known modes. Let us suppose that each one consults merely his own interest, including in that, his own self-respect, the reasonable good will which each man desires from all others, and the ever present principle of doing as he would be done by. He shows that he is sensible of the presence of his fellow-men ; that he thinks them of sufficient consequence to wish to have their good opinion ; that he is attentive to their comfort, or convenience ; that he is disposed to learn something from them, or communicate something ; or to join with them in disposing of the time in which one has nothing to do, but to be carried. Take the other side of the picture ;—he puts himself in the best place ; takes out his cigar, lights it from a pocket apparatus, and goes to smoking, without asking who likes, or dislikes tobacco smoke; he sees no one, speaks to no one, and endeavors to

hear no one ; if spoken to, he answers in a coarse monosyllable, and in a tone which prevents all further attempt at intercourse with him. If he make his presence known at all, beyond his sullen sitting there, it is by some selfish exclamation ; or contemptuous ejaculation, on what is passing within his notice. Which of these two persons is *civil* ; which of them is making the most of human life ; which of them is attracting good will ; which of them ought to like himself the best ; which of them will have the most to look back upon, with pleasure ? Which of them is a rational, sensible, well-disposed human being, and which of them is a selfish brute ?

315. There is one other consideration which operates on all men, who have had much experience in the world. Men and things change, and take new and unexpected relations. Persons who have been long, and even intimately connected, suddenly, or gradually, sever ; persons who have known little of each other, and that little uninteresting or unfavorable, are brought in contact, by some unexpected turn of affairs. Sometimes one needs favors, or at least good will, from those, whom he never thought to be of the least importance to him. In such, and in a multitude of other circumstances, one may find the advantages of having been acquainted with the virtue of civility. There are other cases, in which one is called on by duty to do things disagreeable to himself, and exceedingly so to others. But there is no good sense in performing such duty morosely, and with inhumanity. As the laws now are, one may be authorized and required to put another to death. There is no reason why even such an act as that should *not* be done *civilly*.

316. *Politeness.* This word is derived from the Latin *polio*, to polish. The quality of politeness is one to which few persons attain, if the following definition of it (from a respectable writer) be a just one. " Politeness requires peculiar properties of the head and heart, natural and artificial ; much

goodness and gentleness of character, an even current of feelings, quickness and refined delicacy of sentiment, a command of temper, a general insight into men and manners, and a thorough acquaintance with the forms of society." This is a quality, nevertheless, which most persons consider themselves as having in a high degree. This may be supposed to arise from a misapplication of terms. It may be useful to consider politeness as it may be, and as, too generally, it is. If real politeness be that manner, which a high degree of intellectual and moral education, and familiar intercourse in society, composed of persons who have been so educated, would necessarily create, it is, probably, a rare quality in the world. But one often sees an approximation towards it; and many pretensions to it. In its true meaning it is said to be, such conduct as is, at the same time, consistent with a refined sense of duty to one's-self, and to all other persons; and the like sense of what is due from others to one's-self. It scrupulously avoids all offence to the feelings of others; and is ever ready to prefer the convenience, comfort, and welfare of others, to one's own. It is ready to acknowledge all just merit, and is reluctant to admit that the errors and mistakes of others are perceived. It is kind, gentle, unobtrusive, delicate; and, consequently, wounds no one's self-love by bringing good qualities into comparison with inferior ones. It forbids every act which implies disrespect for others; and all deportment which may be offensive to the senses, and even to the most refined delicacy of others. Real politeness, or *refinement*, approaches very near to the true spirit of Christianity. If all those who have had the advantage of a refined, and highly polished education, were sincerely to do and to feel towards all others, as they would have all others do and feel towards them, they would justly be called *polite*. It is not surprizing that so estimable a quality in human character, should have called into being many counterfeits, and many pitiful imitations. The ordinary politeness of the world is made up of counterfeits and imitations. If one could describe such sort of politeness as it deserves to be described, it would appear, at the same time, ludicrous and contemptible. Whosoever has sagacity enough to discern how many false and hollow pretensions pass under the name of politeness, will be prompt to admit, that the remedy for these perversions is the teaching of the true principles of morality.

317. *Charity.* There are many meanings of this word. It is used to signify the act of giving alms; to describe acts done for the relief of the indigent and the suffering; and institutions of a public character, wherein the sick, the insane, and the poor, are taken care of; and also institutions for education of the young of both sexes. These beneficent objects are effected, sometimes by the appropriation of money from the public treasury, but more commonly by donations of individuals by will, or by voluntary subscriptions. It is not in either of the aforegoing meanings that charity is now to be treated of; but as a moral sentiment, active in the heart of each individual, as a rule of life. A sentiment to be developed and cherished, for the good of him who feels it, and for the good of those for whom it is felt. As it can be demonstrated that every member of society will greatly promote his own welfare, and may conduct himself uprightly, and justly towards others, by applying this rule of life, (charity,) in a great proportion of all the acts he does, it may be useful to search out the true principle of charity in aid of such demonstration. This is the more necessary to be done, because there is no injunction in the whole code of Christianity more sternly insisted upon, than the duty of being charitable.

318. The word charity, is from the Latin *charitas;* and this from *caritas;* originally meaning dear, or scarce, from *carus;* and also meaning precious. But it has long been used in the sense before mentioned; and in the sense now intended, it was used by one of the earliest Christians.

[*] 1 Epis. to Corin. ch. xiii.

Let it be remembered, here, how each individual is constituted. He comes into the world with senses, and with intellectual and moral qualities, which are to be developed in the action of life. Suppose him to have attained to manhood, his senses, his mind, and his moral qualities have undergone some discipline or education, according to the circumstances in which he has been placed. He has been necessarily using his own senses and his own mind, for he cannot use those of another. He has seen, heard, thought, and acted, according to his own peculiar condition. He may have imitated others; he may have been influenced, and even governed by others, but it must have been through his own senses, and his own mind. Then, consider how very various, and even contrasted, the condition of the people may be who inhabit the same city, town, or village. How few of them see the same objects in the same light; and how small a number see the same objects at all. This one, for example, is a farmer; his life has been devoted to his pursuits. All his active powers have been, at times, devoted thereto; at other times, to the duties of neighborhood, citizenship, and religion, according to his peculiar views. This one is a merchant; he has devoted his active powers, to mercantile pursuits. He has also duties of a similar nature with the farmer, but he is not of the same party in political opinions, in religious belief, nor in his views of mankind. A third person is called on to judge of these two persons. But his vocations have been those of a student in some profession, and he may differ from both the others in every one of the theories, and principles, which they hold to be settled; and each of these, consequently, differ from him. Yet, each of these assume to pronounce, of the other two, that they are wrong. Then extend the same sort of comparison through all the grades of life; and consider how each individual is made up, by the use of his senses, and mind, in the circuit in which he has been acting, and judge whether it be reasonable, for any one person, to pronounce an authoritative judgment upon all others, as to intellectual and moral conduct. When any one is proved to have violated some universally acknowledged moral principle, or to have offended against some law of the land, there is no possibility of doubting as to the judgment which is to be formed.

319. It is not in such things that one is to be blamed for the want of charity; but it is in thinking, and speaking reproachfully, of the conduct, motives, and manners of others, who show themselves to their fellow men, in the qualities which have been acquired in their special condition. In so thinking and speaking reproach is implied, as to one's intelligence; as to one's respect for moral duties; as to the soundness of one's religious faith, and practice; or as to one's intregrity, and fair dealing. All this proceeds on the supposition, that he who condemns has himself the intelligence, and the capacity to judge; and that he has all the facts on which a judgment can be formed. But, what are his own intelligence and capacity to judge; and what has he been doing with his own senses and mind in his own sphere of action, all his life time, so that he can pronounce on the precise degree of error into which another has fallen? What would be his condition if others pronounced, with like audacity, on his intelligence, motives, conduct, and capacity? That which is still more to the purpose is this: He can make no judgment, just or unjust, without *facts;* and where and of whom did he get these? Did he use his *own* senses, and his *own* mind, on the subject of his judgment; or did he get his knowledge of facts from those who did, themselves, observe; or only from those who have heard, through *one knows not how many traditions*, that which is taken to be true.

320. Stop any one who is pronouncing one of these off-hand judgments on his neighbor, with the question, "*Where did you get your facts?*" and what would the answer probably be? "I heard so, but I forget who told me; *every body says so.*" Now, advert to what is every one's experience, nay to what is done

by almost every body. Some fragment of a story is told, it is adorned by the malice of the narrator; or it is only adorned for the purpose of being *news*. It is passed from memory to memory, and from tongue to tongue, with all the falacies and errors which belong to memory, and to the use of words; and thus, those who pronounce on the reputation of others, arrive at *facts*. Should not one hesitate, out of respect to himself, if he have no respect for the person spoken of, before he pledges his own reputation for the truth of what he asserts? Ought he not first to ask himself, am I rightly informed? Did I see and understand truly? Did my informant, and his informant, and so on, *know* that what is said, is true? Did they hear truly, did they remember truly, are they understood as they intended to be? If I am not sure in all this, can I take on myself, as a moral, rational being, to give my own assurance, that these things are true?

321. But, admit that the facts are known, and that the person of whom they are affirmed is such an one as the facts imply; is he not such an one from the circumstances in which he has been placed; and from the use of his senses, and mind, in his own sphere of action? No doubt he may differ from you; and you may say that had you been in his place, you could not have done so. This may be true; but then no one can be in another's place. Each one must think and act according to his own perceptions. For example, you see that one is very rich, and very mean; or very selfish. You are indignant. You reproach him with meanness or selfishness. Why? Because, if you were rich, as you know him to be, you could not be so mean, nor so selfish. You would live hospitably; you would give to the poor; you would use your money so as to command respect and esteem, and purchase for yourself a good name. Perhaps you would; you think you would. But suppose you had been in that man's sphere of action, and had acquired notions of the value of money just as he did, you would act as he does, and be like him, a subject of

reproach to all who reason as you do. You may rather pity this man, that he is not as well informed as you are in the use of money. Or, he may deserve your compassion for having perverted a rational principle of action, by long continued practice, which has become inveterate habit. But this same person dares to judge of you. He dislikes your manners, your political or religious principles; he holds you in contempt for your ignorance of the value of money. Were you right, and this person also, right, in your respective judgments?—The moral law says that both of you are wrong. It says, that both of you have violated the law of charity. By the same law, perhaps, both of you are wrong, not from intention, but from ignorance. Him of whom you judged may be wrong in his value of money; most unfortunately wrong for himself, and for others; but he knows it not. Neither do you know, how much you err in those things whereof you are judged. What then is your duty? Is it not to be charitable to the faults and failings of others, that others may have charity for you?

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Same subject continued.

GENTLENESS; TRIFLES; PEACE OF MIND; HAPPINESS.

322. *Gentleness.* This is an element in civility, politeness, and charity, so truly important that it deserves a special notice. It is manifested in numberless modes, when one is active, and when one is passive. It is a most precious quality among those who must pass their time in each other's society. Gentleness is exhibited in moderation of speaking, and in the tones of voice. There is an indescribable charm in a gentle sweet-toned voice, especially in the female sex. So, a loud, boisterous, and rap-

id tone, always indicates a vulgar mind, and an undisciplined heart. There are persons in society, who have received a good education, who are of good intentions, and who are of unimpeachable morals, who are positively disagreeable, and who do not pass for half their worth, merely from their peculiar tones of voice. This wonderful gift of speech, has some unknown connexion with the intellectual and moral powers. No well disciplined moral being, can have a really disagreeable voice. The cultivation of the mind, and the softening of the heart to human sympathies, must produce a gentleness in the expression of the sentiments which flow from the heart. The connexion between a pleasing voice, and a good heart, is well worth a philosophical inquiry. Young persons can easily institute such inquiry by critical examination of themselves, and their associates.

323. Gentleness is also manifested in personal deportment. There is a collected, calm, respectful demeanor, which is grateful to every member of the human family ; and the strict observance of which, in each one, would be an easy and sure mode of promoting every one's welfare. There is hardly any act, however insignificant in daily life, to which gentleness cannot impart its charm. One cause of disagreeableness in society, (whether it be known or unknown as the cause) is the disregard of the truly christian virtue of gentleness. This may be verified by looking into family circles. The members of these are dependent for daily comfort on this virtue. Yet it is often seen to be an article, which is to be brought out only for the use of company ; or, like a best garment, only to be exhibited abroad. If civility, politeness, and gentleness are good qualities for use, among any persons, they must be especially so with those who must dwell together, and who are bound by ties of nature, and of social law, which cannot be severed. Can any reason be given why persons, so connected, should use harsh expressions, set up contradictory opinions, and in the most insignificant matters? The

absence of gentleness among children, and especially members of the same family, is a reproach to the moral education of the country. If any one will take the trouble to consider what this quality is, and then to examine, critically, where and when it appears, he will be surprised to find how rare a virtue it is. Those who are so placed in society as to see a great number of persons, and under various circumstances, often acquire a discriminating tact as to character, from one's personal appearance, manner of deportment, and tones of voice. All persons who are met with, for the first time, are submitted to the scrutiny of the eye, and of the ear, which may be called the organs of the two *intellectual* senses. Let any one examine into the cause of his being pleased or displeased, at such interview, and he will certainly find that the first impression arose, from the presence, or absence, of gentleness. It may be taken as an unquestionable truth, that a person of sound mind, disciplined heart, and good education, is always *unaffectedly gentle ;* and that whatsoever respect he may think himself entitled to, he never fails to manifest the respect due to all others.

324. *Trifles.* There are a great many trifles in this life, when considered as a whole. It is a common failing to magnify them into serious matters. It would be perhaps, descending, rather too much, to particularize them. They may relate to dress, food, visitings, insignificant purchases, management of children, treatment of, and remarks upon domestics ; and a multitude of little matters on which difference of opinion arises. Now, it is not of the least possible consequence, in the long run, whether the matter be disposed of in one way or another, if no moral duty be broken. Tomorrow, or soon, it will be so thought of. Yet a sudden observation, in an ungentle voice, will produce an irritating reply, and this a severe rejoinder, and presently, the affair

'Resembles ocean, into tempest wrought,
To waft a feather, or to drown a fly.'

This ungentleness has a mournful effect on the character of children, when exhibited in parents. It is wholly useless, and worse than useless in asserting authority. It can only be classed among those sad mistakes which tend to make this a miserable world. How can any two rational beings, who must live in familiar intercourse, while they do live, so misapprehend the purposes of life, as habitually to torment each other on insignificant trifles! If any one should be unhappily betrayed into an unbecoming expression, silence best becomes those who hear it. If the case is of importance enough to need authorities, some may easily be found by all who can read.*

325. *Peace of mind.* Many persons pass much of their time in a state of inquietude, and constant irritation, although they are in health, and have the means of satisfying the common wants of life, and even abundantly. As to the present—they have some unreasonable desire, which cannot be satisfied; or which cannot be, without causing a suffering more intolerable than the unsatisfied desire. As to the past—they dwell on the memory of some good which they think might have been obtained; or on some wrong or blunder, by which some good was lost. As to the future—they dread some possible evil, and the more because of the uncertainty of its nature, and of the time and manner of its coming, and which may never come. There are many persons who are habitually discontented. They find every thing goes wrong. The weather is bad; their food is not as they would have it; no one does any thing in the right time, or right manner; or that is done which should not be, or that is omitted, which should be done. Such persons are always groaning, sighing, or grumbling. They dislike every body, and every body dislikes them; and particularly, their abundant *advice* is disliked, and their manner of giving it. There are great differences in

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* Ecclesiastes x, 12, 13. Proverbs iv. 24.—xii. 18.—xiv. 29.—xv. 1.—xvi. 32.—xviii. 19.—xxi. 19, 23. Romans xii. 10, 18, 21.—xvi. 13. —xv. 1.

the temperament, and natural dispositions of persons. It is incredible, that the worst tempered persons would not make a better whole of life, by suppressing their natural propensities, and acquiring a control over themselves ; and teaching themselves to look out for what may be pleasant and agreeable, (passing by that which seems ill to them,) instead of doing exactly the reverse.

326. There are other persons, who are of unquiet mind for more serious causes. They have recollections which distress or torment them. They are transgressors, perhaps, criminally so. They have been able to conceal this, but they live in the fear of disclosure ; at any rate, the fact cannot be hidden from themselves. They forgot, when they sinned, that there is one being in whose society they must ever be, and which will sometimes announce its presence, even when they would hide themselves in sleep. These are frightful instances of the agency of this companion which every man has in his own bosom. There are hours in every one's life, when he must compare the condition in which he is, with that in which he thinks he might have been. To some persons, these are hours of pain and sorrow. It is believed that such cause of suffering is purely of human origin ; and that prevention must be found where the error began. It is the law of the Deity, that there shall be such suffering, when the guilty mortal makes it necessary to apply that law.

327. There are cases in life, in which, it is said, there must be anxiety, and inquietude, from the very condition in which men are placed. Persons who sustain public offices ; persons who are placed in important trusts ; persons whose vocations are perilous ; those who are pricked by the thorn of political ambition. It is probable, that such persons do experience many painful and distressing emotions ; and that they sometimes pay dearly for their distinction. But it is demonstrable that even such persons, might have tranquillity, if they had a right frame of mind. There are persons who substitute an aching solicitude, for the reasonable discretion

and care, which is all that is required in the performance of duty. There are others who greatly overvalue the distinctions to which they attain, or aspire; and very few of them realize, that they must take success, especially in popular governments, with the accompaniments of having their worthy acts misunderstood, and reproached; and their mistaken ones magnified, and distorted, to suit the occasions of adversaries.

328. The remedy for this sort of suffering is within every one's power. Those who are poor, and in humble life, if not in extreme poverty, may possess peace of mind; and it is of easier acquisition by these, than by those who are involved in the duties of office, and the responsibility of trust, and the embarrassment of wealth. Certainly, without this treasure, no earthly grandeur, no promise of posthumous glory, is worth having, or seeking for. If the laws of nature, and the teaching of revelation were properly known, respected, and obeyed, the common causes of inquietude would hardly be known. For example, what is more common than complaints of the weather?—It is too hot, or cold, wet or dry. It is not nature that mistakes about the weather, but ourselves. The movements of the winds, and the waters, and the temperament of both, proceed on some great and universal laws, far beyond human perception. That which is exacted of us is, to believe that it is so; and to adapt ourselves to necessary condition, by experience and ingenuity. What sort of effect would it produce in the earth, if such things were regulated by human perception of what is best? When one has occasion to put to use, a board, or stick of timber, which has been in contact with the ground for a certain length of time, he disturbs, and puts to flight, families, communities, and whole nations of living beings. Man may be much in the same relation, as to general laws, (not meant for him to comprehend,) in which these insects are, on the removal of their covering.

329. As to all causes of inquietude arising from the operation of nature's laws, in which human

agency has no concern, they must be right, although they occasion inconvenience to individuals. As to the acts and omissions of others which affect us, some questions are to be asked and answered, before one can rightly judge of these ;—viz. what is the real cause of our complaint ? did not the first fault arise from some act, or omission of our own ? Do we judge reasonably of the supposed wrong ? Do we make charitable allowance for the misapprehension, which may affect the party complained of ? When the inquietude arises from our own wayward and peevish disposition, from our own misconduct, negligence, or breach of laws, which we could know if we would, the remedy lies in becoming wiser and better ; and more reasonable in learning how we may make of life, that which it was intended to be, when we use it as we should. Let any reasonable being look back on his own life, and calmly consider the causes of his own contentions, ill-will, and sufferings, in body and mind ; how many of these can he fairly lay to the blame of the Creator's laws, of Nature's laws, or those of society, whether positive or implied ? If to these he can charge but very few, who but himself is there, to take the residue ?

330. We have been trying to show what peace of mind is not. We have to show what it is, or rather in what it is founded. It comes from sober conviction, that the Creator has made his own laws, for his own universe ; that he requires conformity to these laws, that he permits, and enjoins, the use of what is good and right ; that he punishes all that is wrong and disobedient. He has trusted every mortal with his own welfare, but has associated him with others, who live in the same trust, each one for his own, but yet for mutual welfare. All are to contribute their common efforts to the common good. Those who have the means, are to aid others in acquiring a knowledge of the laws which are common to all. If these laws were understood and applied, how abundantly would peace of mind increase in the world. The school-boy would get his lessons and

obey his preceptor; laboring classes would labor diligently, live temperately, and find a greater pleasure in their frugal food, than the luxurious in their festivals; for the former live as nature orders, the latter as fashion dictates. The opulent and luxurious would learn, that the incidents of their fortune, do not exempt them from the laws of nature. That if they have affluence beyond their reasonable and commendable wants, they are blessed with the means of acquiring an honorable name; they would learn that no wealth will exempt any man from earning, by physical motion, an appetite for his pleasures; that if he is tired of being rich and happy, *he must work* to accomplish some reasonable purpose. His distinction is, that he may choose the means in which he will expend, *to be busy*, while others can only work in some prescribed mode, *to live.*

331. The middle classes, and all who are not dependantly poor, have as many, and as valuable sources of enjoyment as those have, whom they think to be better off than themselves. They can love and be loved. They can be respected and esteemed. They can have the consciousness of behaving well, where their lot has been cast. They have a far keener zest for natural and reasonable pleasure, than those who misuse the bounties of accidental condition. They can have peace of mind, when it is denied to those, whom they deem to be more fortunate. If these natural laws, which seem to be so plain and obvious, were understood and respected, the laborers *in mind* in all their varied employments, would do diligently in the best manner, that which they have undertaken. Men in public trust, would do justly that which they have assumed to do.

Suppose it were all so, and yet that disappointments and troubles should come, this would not destroy peace of mind. If every one felt that no act, nor omission of his own, is the cause of suffering, and that he has acted faithfully and justly, to the best of his ability, in the circumstances in which he was placed, he would be entitled to have *peace of mind.*

332. *Happiness.* There is no word in our language more commonly used; nor any one less defined, or less understood. It is sometimes taken to mean pleasurable sensations derived through the senses; sometimes it means a peculiar state of mind. It may be said that a pirate, who has been brought to the most perfect penitence, and who is sensible that he has forfeited his life to the demands of justice, and that he is about to be transferred from the perplexities and sufferings of this state of being, to endless felicity, is *happy* that he is going to be *hanged.* Perhaps it is easier to tell what happiness is not, than what it is. The most perfect *health* is not happiness, unless one has something to do. Health, and *riches*, do not make one happy. These accidents of being, rather excite cravings for enjoyment. They are means, not ends. A rich man can ride but one horse, sit but in one coach, eat but one dinner, wear but one suit of garments, live but in one house, at a time. Persons in moderate circumstances can do as much.

333. Health, riches, *power* and *distinction* do not make happiness. Distinction is troublesome; it has more pains than pleasures, It is jealous, envious, and distrustful. Power does not make one happy. It demands the most busy watchfulness to keep it. If lost, its absence is often followed by painful suffering; and the possession of it, is always accompanied with the fear of losing it. Riches are sometimes regarded as means of enabling one to live in elegant luxury, and even in voluptuous enjoyment. This is no way to be happy. The appetites soon become satiated. The stomach wears out. The senses are palled. Diseases come. The body may be racked on a velvet couch, as well as on a straw bed. Is there, then, any such thing as happiness? There must be such a thing, or the laws of nature, which provide for physical, intellectual, and moral being, are false and deceitful; and the gift of revelation is a fable. If there be such a thing as hap-

piness, it will be found in that knowledge of, and obedience to, the laws of nature, which make health. It will be found in obeying the propensity to action, to some prospective and useful end : that is, in pursuing reasonably, some one of the many vocations in society, which tend to secure one's own self-respect, and peace of mind ; and which tend also, to the common good. But, there may be disappointments, ill luck, and causes of mortification and sorrow. These, we apprehend, do not seriously disturb any well regulated mind, when there is a consciousness, that no reasonable foresight, or prudence, would have discerned, and prevented the cause. Finally, one may feel assured, that if he so live as to be healthy ; so use his time as to be reasonably busy, to some good purpose ; and so conduct himself as to be justly entitled to his own approbation ; and if he live in the habitual assurance, that there is an omnipresent, omniscient, and merciful Judge of moral, accountable, and immortal man, he will certainly be happy. Are such things impossible, or impracticable ? Who has made a serious effort to obtain such happiness, and has been unsuccessful ?

CHAPTER XXXIV.

DUTIES.

Acts which ought to be done, as well for One's-self as others, because they are pleasant and useful.

RECREATIONS AND AMUSEMENTS.

334. We have had occasion to show repeatedly, in preceding pages, that this state of being is one of alternate action, and repose. There must be serious action, and there must be amusements. It was intended that mortals should be pleased, and happy, if they deserve to be so. Those who maintain that life is to be an uninterrupted scene of labor,

and gravity, are entirely mistaken. There is nothing in the natural world, nor in man's peculiar constitution, nor relations, which gives the least countenance to such an opinion. Amusement, like everything else, in which free agency is concerned, may be innocent, and grateful ; or improper, pernicious, and introductory of the worst of evils. Young persons must have the former, or they will seek out the latter. It is the duty, and the interest of parents, to lead children to take pleasure in such things as can be approved of ; and to divert children from such as must be injurious to them, and afflictive to those who are deeply interested in them.

There may be persons, and classes of persons, who may not assent to the opinions here expressed, on the subject of recreations and amusements. To all such persons the utmost respect is due, because they are very sincere and decided, in their views. Yet, on a matter so important as the making of good citizens, and good moral agents out of children, one should not hesitate to speak frankly and sincerely. If wrong, persons better able to judge, will take care that no evil visit them, in consequence of such error.

335. Amusements are physical, or mental. It may be more proper to say that there may be, first: amusements which are intellectual ; and second : such as consist of some bodily motion, in which the mind is, more or less, interested. If there be such distinctions, athletic sports may be of the second sort. The simple use of the eye, of the ear, and of the imagination, may be of the first sort. It is believed, that all amusements must have some contemplated end, or result, whether that be defined and certain, or contingent. It is believed to be so, because everything in this world seems to be moving on, to some purpose. One who is acting without knowing for what, is neither laboring, not amusing himself, but is trving to get rid of himself, and of time. The most captivating sports are those which are contingent : that is, sports or occupations, wherein the result may be highly favorable, or otherwise. No

one engages in them without expecting to come out on the successful side. Hence hunting, fishing, winning or losing sports, horse racing, and gaming, are of this order. The hope of success is a very high excitement. But, the mortification and distress of failure, ever far exceed the pleasures of success. The object now in view is merely to find a principle, and by no means to approve of some things which have been named; that principle we take to be, *action to some end, or purpose.*

336. Every one admits that the mind, and moral faculties, are to be developed, and strengthened, and made to do the best, by exercise. This is equally true of physical power. Every action, which it can be proper to do at all, ought to be done in the best way; otherwise the end of being is not answered. In the vegetable, and animal departments, all proper care, and cultivation, tend to use, and beauty. Is there any reason why the physical powers of man, should not have care, and cultivation, to the same ends? Those who prefer a stooping, lounging, awkward, graceless figure and motion, may be on one side of the question; those who think that it was intended that man should be an upright, easy, frank, comely, and convenient being to himself, and pleasant to all within whose observation he may come, will be on the other. As we most decidedly agree with the latter class, we shall try to show in what ways we think their object may be effected.

337. There are many persons who think it is unlawful to bear arms. It is very much to be desired that all the world were of their opinion. But since that opinion is not likely soon to become the general one, we may borrow, from the profession of arms, an illustration much to the purpose. The object of disciplining men with arms, is to make them, individually, and collectively, as powerful, and effective, as possible. There has been but one opinion among military men, from earliest ages to the present, that soldiers must be straight, easy and graceful. The first thing to be done with a recruit,

is to break him of his ungainly habits of body, and limbs ; and to bring him into an upright position. The next is to give him the free use of all his muscles. The last is to make his movements easy, and graceful, so that one part of himself, shall not be a burthen to another. A man can protect himself, and be most effective against others, in proportion to his excellence in these qualities. Warriors must be supposed to have discovered, and to have practised the best modes of making out of man, the best machine for disabling and putting his fellow men to death. In the use of arms, not only the musket, but the sword, the lance and pike, are to be handled. The person must be capable of carrying a heavy burthen, and moving over a long space, in a short time. The drilling which a soldier gets, qualifies him to effect all these objects, in the best manner. It may be concluded, therefore, that military discipline,(if it were not for the purposes for which it is given) is consistent with the principles of nature, in giving the bones a proper position, and in giving the muscles their proper use, and power. If strength, facility and beauty of motion, are good qualities for soldiers, in the use of human muscles for their purposes ; they are good qualities of every person *who moves* for any and every purpose, for which motion is lawful.

338. Although the frame of man is so made as to permit him to assume an endless variety of positions, and to apply his strength in all of them, he does, or should, return always, to an upright position. No essential deviation from this position, can possibly be a natural one, but for a temporary purpose. This is proved by the framing of the human bones. This framing shows, that when one walks, it was intended that he should be perpendicular ; if he walk in an inclined position, he has not only to move himself, but to resist the power of gravitation, at the same time. The muscles, in such case, have a strained and unnatural duty to perform. It seems to have been intended, by the same sort of proof, that human beings should walk with the lower

limbs, that is, from the hips downward, and not with an unmeaning and ungraceful action of the whole person, as is often seen to be done.

339. As to the best modes of acquiring strength, ease, and grace, there may be very different opinions. There are many persons who think the discipline of *dancing*, a proper mode ; and others who think this highly improper. We would not run against any opinions, whether they be well, or ill-founded. But as to dancing, just like every thing else, it may be misused and perverted ; or be made to be an innocent, healthy, and commendable accomplishment. There is no mode so much within the reach of the community, in general, as this. Properly taught, it brings out the power of the muscles, and gives them their natural action ; all natural motion is graceful. The motion of birds is exceedingly beautiful ; that of animals is generally so ; that of young children is always so, until they acquire something unnatural ; the flowing of waters is graceful, and the action of the winds is so, as is proved by the waving of the trees, of the grain-fields, the floating of the flag, &c. The most graceful object in nature is tranquilly ascending smoke. Why should not man conform to this general law of nature ? Dancing well, is one mode of conforming. Possibly, it is considered frivolous and corrupting. Nothing is frivolous in this system of being, which is innocent, pleasing, and adapted to promote healthy action. Persons who are capable of being corrupted by dancing, will certainly find some much more effective mode to become so, if this be denied to them. Dancing among the very young, is usually conducted under the eye of discreet seniors ; and well-educated adults need no supervision in dancing, but that of good sense, and their own self-respect. But suppose dancing could in any case be perverted, so may every thing else be. If we are to do nothing till it is impossible to err in doing it, what will there be for any one to do ?

340. As to dancing, this may be said of it : 1. Dancing satisfies the demand of nature for action.

2. It is action for both mind and body. 3. It is action, which begins, goes on, and ends, with the attainment of an object. 4. It brings the human figure into its proper position, and developes the power and uses of the muscles. 5. It is a social, and not a solitary pleasure. 6. It is an innocent and refining pleasure, because it brings both sexes to be acquainted with each other, and improves the manners of both. 7. It is accompanied by music, which is one of the most elevating and grateful pleasures known to man. 8. Dancing is a dictate of nature. It has been made solemn among savage warriors; a mode of exalted worship among the pious; one manner of showing social gratification, among dignitaries. It has found its proper place at last, in being a social, rational, elegant amusement; which delights those who engage in it, and those who are spectators.

341. *Drawing.* This is an employment which deserves a higher rank than mere amusements can claim. As an amusement only, it has much to recommend it. It disciplines the eye, because no one can delineate well, who does not use the sense of seeing with nice discrimination. It requires accurate comparing of different objects, and of different parts of the same object. Nature, everywhere, respects proportion and grace; and no one who has successfully attempted to represent her works on his canvass, can look on them without sentiments of devotional reverence. A skilful delineator would behold the sun-setting, which often occurs in summer, and in autumn, in this favored clime, with emotions unknown to him whose eye is fixed on the dust of the earth, and whose immortal spirit never rose above its surface. What is the glorious decline of day to him, who never raised his thoughts to the *Being*, who appointed its place to the luminary, that warms, sustains, and cheers the life of man. Apart from the sentiment which copying Nature, (whether in her own beautiful simplicity, or adorned, as she may be, by human taste,) may inspire, there are numberless uses of the power of delineation, which

makes it well worth the acquisition. It is that skill which rescues from Time, some of his accumulating spoils, and which bestows on the very senses of those who may dwell in coming ages, perception of realities, which past ages have borne away.

If it be objected that these are fanciful views; so be it, with all who think so; and let us turn to what is certainly useful. In what way can inventive genius, present its products to the senses of the mechanic, (who must be relied on to make them real,) without the art of delineation? Without this aid, art and science would have been, where the communication of thought would have been, without the art of printing. In a much inferior view, and merely as convenient, agreeable, and amusing, the art of drawing is innocent, and proper *action*, and less liable than any which can be mentioned, to lead to any perverted use.

342. *Music.* It is one of the most convincing proofs of the benevolence of the Deity, that he has so formed the human ear, as to make it capable of finding a rational, and elevated pleasure, from the action of sound. There might have been organs of speech, and ears to hear, without imparting to the ear, the power of knowing and delighting in music. It must have been intended that this gracious gift should be used, and (most probably) as one mode of praise, and thanksgiving, as well as for innocent pleasure. Christians, in general, understand this gift to be properly applied in worship; and it may be, and often is found to be, one of the most impressive and affecting parts of it. It may be that this page will fall under the eye of some one, who knows, what may be felt from hearing sacred music in St. Peter's Cathedral in Rome; or St. Paul's church in London; or from hearing the grand organ at Haerlem in Holland. Music may be perverted, and may be the vehicle of defiling thoughts; it may be seductive, and help onward to folly, and crime. If, however, one were to strike out of use, *all* from which partial evil may arise, or which may be perverted, he must give up all the pleasures of life. Music is

action; it is action to some end; the end may be innocent, and delightful. The enjoyment has the double advantage of being solitary and social. Music may be made to produce a sense of high moral feeling; and it may be made to produce a feeling of very opposite character. The same rules must be applied to this subject, as to all others; that every thing was created, and for some good and wise purpose; and that every thing must act, and will act, to some useful end, if human ignorance, or error, do not interfere. It is therefore contended, that the power to make music is to be cultivated, and its benefits to be thankfully enjoyed. That music was intended for man, may be seen in this: Let one consider what a variety of sounds, are continually made on, or near the earth's surface, and within human hearing; what a large proportion of them are pleasant sounds, either in fact, or from association with useful ends. Then consider the sounds made by the wind in passing through trees, and in the flowing of water; next, those made by insects, quadrupeds, and the feathered tribes. Whenever one meets a painful natural sound, it is from an association of it, with pain, or terror. Many of these natural sounds are directly, or from association, exceedingly interesting and pleasing; the music of birds is so, in a high degree, from both these causes. Was not this music introduced as a part of the system, quite as much because man belongs to it, as that birds do? It cannot be known, what pleasure the mocking bird, for example, takes in his own astonishingly varied notes. But a human being who attends to this, and many other songsters, if he have any ear to hear, any sensibility to be touched, and any thoughtfulness as to the *why*, and *wherefore*, of all things, feels, that these musicians were made for him, as well as for themselves. He feels too that they do not pin him to the earth, but send his thoughts upwards. For such, and many other reasons, which naturally suggest themselves, it must be, that pleasurable sound is a beneficent gift, and was meant, as all others were, to be used, cultivated, and applied to promote human happiness.

343. It is consistent, that man, as he is so superior to all other animals, should be alike superior in the making and enjoying of musical sounds. He undoubtedly is so. His voice (it would be more proper to say woman's voice) includes all the sweet sounds which can be made, by all other animals. He has by cultivating this power, by applying the atmosphere through the human lungs, and by delicacy of touch, and by bringing substances in contact with each other, and, by sending the wind through that wonderful work of his own hands, the organ, found the means of rendering just tribute to the Most High, and of softening and purifying his own heart. No doubt music was given to mortals for their *amusement* ; and that it is their duty to take it so, and be thankful for it. Whether thankful, or not, they have so taken it. Music is as old as man is. It is seen wherever man is seen. The wilderness of the savage, echoes with it, and so does the splendid palace of the king. It goes with the solitary laborer ; it is the friend and comforter of the oppressed, and sorrowful, when they can find none other. It is the poor man's friend, the rich man's luxury ; it is the lens of the imagination, through which are seen one's native home, one's early days. The philosophical value of music is, its conformity to the system of which it is found to be a part ; that is, making music is doing something, which has a beginning, progression, and end, to a pleasing and useful purpose. Why is history interesting ? Because it carries the reader along, and awakens curiosity, and proposes to him a solution, when he comes to the end. When the products of imagination, (which to be of any value must conform to the same rule) are aided by harmony, they are captivating. There were, before the art of printing made them less valuable, persons, whose business for life it was, to *sing history* ; such were the minstrels, and troubadours, of former days.

344. So much has been said on the subject of

music, because it may be an employment which will do two things, first, furnish children something to do; and secondly, to make the something done, morally useful and pleasing to themselves, and to parents, friends, and associates. And, finally, because proper poetry, sweetly sung, never yet made any mortal less worthy; but has touched, stayed, and, perhaps reformed, many a backsliding heart. The American people have few amusements. Some, which they have, they would be better without. They take amusement by violence, and often go far for it, and buy it dear. Amusement should be one of the inmates of every family. A kind friend who is ever ready to take care that one does not abuse the trust of existence by idleness, nor obey the impulse to be busy, in doing that which should not be done. As such a friend, we venture to give music a cordial recommendation.

345. *Games at cards*, are a very common amusement. They may be innocent, but there is nothing to recommend them. They give no action to the body; they are a very humble occupation for an intelligent mind. Whether the chances in distributing fifty-two pieces of spotted paste-board, fifty successive times, in three or four hours, shall possess some of the engaged with fortunate pieces, and others with unfortunate ones, can hardly be said to be doing anything, to any useful end. When the sport is over, the thing proved, or arrived at is, that in this use of four hours of a short life, A. counted so much, and B. so much. This, however, is not the end usually proposed in playing cards. The cards are only the machinery, which, with more or less skill, submits to the laws of chance, the result of emptying one man's pocket and filling another's. The most *immoral* gaming that is known in the world is carried on by means of *lotteries*. It is truly astonishing that it should ever have occurred, in any Christian country, that Legislators should have made it *lawful*. It would be some compensation for the complicated and manifold evils, which lotteries have occasioned, if all the American gov-

ernments should concur in abolishing them, under the severest penalties.

The means of gaming, and especially with cards, (as they are the ready and most common implements in use) are regarded by all persons who feel an interest in the young, with a sort of abhorrence. Why ? Because they know how easily habit steals over one, when associated with captivating occupation in early life. They are mindful of the wise maxim, RESIST BEGINNING. The young, have no need of cards for amusement. They may have many amusing occupations which are innocent and improving. There may be persons in an advanced time of life, who are beyond the seduction of gaming, to whom the interest of a game of cards, may be an innocent and welcome amusement. Undoubtedly, friends who are met for social purposes, and who have nothing better to do with their time, hands, and minds, may play cards, in a manner to give no offence to themselves, or others. But it is pleasing to know, that the state of improvement is such, that in most social meetings, there are higher entertainments than that which cards afford, and which are justly in higher esteem. We allude, among other things, to *conversation*, of which something is to be said in a future page.

346. *Chequers, or Drafts*, are an innocent, but unprofitable amusement. They take time which might be much better spent. *Chess* is a game generally known throughout the world. It is probably the most engrossing of any, in which property is not depending on the result. It is a game for the mind only, and keeps the body long inactive. It has all the philosophical recommendations of interest. It is a trial of masterly skill against an adversary, in which a series of causes and effects are involved, leading to the result of victory. It is said to strengthen the mind. It certainly does so, as to chess playing ; but it remains to be proved that it does so, as to any other intellectual effort. There are many cases in life, where the playing of this game, is a grateful relief. It is a pleasant resort in

advanced life; but as a love of it is easily acquired, and as it is a time-stealer, the young can do better, at something else.

347. *Chess* is said to be the favorite game of the Turks, and Chinese. This seems to be as it should be. These nations are destitute of intellectual pleasures, and it is fortunate for them that there is such a game, to supply the demand for action. If one could clearly see how this demand affects different nations, and the same, in different stages, it would furnish a key to the necessary condition of nations. For example; if the climate, the religion, the neighborhood, and the degree of cultivation of any people be known, it might, perhaps, be deduced, (like a sum in the rule of proportion) how a nation, so circumstanced, must act. Act in some way, it certainly will. Thus, possibly, some ingenious person, might account for the habits of Pagan oriental nations; and show that the narrative tact, and their amusing products of fancy, arise, naturally, out of their condition. And so, also, of the superstitious, and terrific cast of fancy's works, among other people. If there be anything in such suggestions, it affords this inference, that the sum of moral duty includes the direction, and government, of the desire for amusement, no less than for the serious occupations of life.

348. There might be games, one would think, adapted to amuse children, and to be at the same time, innocent, and useful ones. Whatever they are, they must be consistent with the principle which requires a beginning, an interesting succession of circumstances, and a result worth attaining. This is proved by what every one may have observed in the estimate which children make of toys, and playthings. The charm soon vanishes, because, as soon as curiosity is satisfied, and it is known what the pleasure which the thing can impart, is, there is an end of it. Nothing is more natural than that a child should break its rattle. The noise it makes has become familiar, but what it is that rattles, must be known. Children must be busy. To require of

them to be still, is to require what nature has forbidden. To place a child on a hard bench, and tell him to sit still there, two or three hours, without any employment for his hands, or mind, is as great a violation of natural law, as to require of him to stand on his head, for the same length of time. There is an obvious want in the means of amusing children ; and we apprehend that it arises from disregarding the principles on which the construction of physical, and intellectual being rests. If there were an extensive workshop, provided with every variety of tools, with a proper superintendent, to which boys might resort on some proper arrangement ; and where they could make articles for themselves, there can be little doubt that it would be diligently frequented. The reason is, that their little efforts, would be to some end ; and by natural means.* On the other hand, the gymnastic machinery is fallen into disrepute. These exercises are uninteresting repetitions to no end, except with those who realize that bodily motion must be had, to secure health. In such case, they endure the labor for the end in view. Nothing can be more uninteresting than gymnastic solitary exercise. No one would submit to this penance, who has not some object in view, as health, or grace, or strength, to be of use elsewhere, than in the gymnasium. The only charm in such exercise, among those who have no such objects, must be emulation. But the amusements of the young must be of a nature, to secure action to an innocent and useful end ; and health will take care of itself. Perhaps there may be some persons who can follow out this matter, and invent rational amusements. They would deserve to be regarded as benefactors, and would, probably, find a substantial reward. We cannot but remark, that there is one game, which is not known among us, and which is one of the most interesting, and healthful that can be played ; that of *tennis.*

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* There is such an establishment at the Theological Institution, at Andover, (Mass.) ; it has afforded all the interest and utility which is naturally to be expected.

There are many things to recommend it, and among others, it is one sufficiently interesting to be played for itself, without adding to it, the zest, of winning or losing anything but the game. We incline to think that it is the game, of all others, which deserves the patronage of colleges, and seminaries; and is best adapted to develope the physical force.

349. *Conversation.* The principal amusement of the American people (except eating and drinking), is the interchange of thoughts by speech, or conversation, which word is made out of the Latin words *con* and *versor*, and means literally, *to be turned to* or *with.* The principle of this amusement is found in the law of association of thought. To show this: What connexion can there be between a change of weather at Boston, in the month of January, and the crystalized appearance of granite on the highest of the Alpine mountains? A visiter remarks, that the thermometer had changed 48 degrees in 24 hours; and that some snow had fallen. Then the association of thoughts leads to the difference of snow fall in this, and more northern latitudes; level fall of snow at Quebec, Archangel; causes of different forms of flakes; principle of crystalization; wonderful effects of this natural principle of action; salt, ice, granite; primary and secondary formations of rock; crystalization of granite; mountains; &c. &c. From such a simple illustration, it is apparent, that one thought brings up another. Sometimes a conversation seems to take a very erratic course, and the end seems to have no connexion with the beginning; but if it were carefully traced back, the chain would be discovered. It is with conversation, much as it is with the action of the mind when one is alone, and is meditating on things done, or to be done; and on persons, characters, and events. Now, the use to be made of these suggestions is this; that conversation is a matter which is subjected to control, and to rules. Intelligent persons can always make a conversation. The only difficult step is the first; that ought not to be so considered. Persons who are skilled in the art of

talking, can always give it a direction. The purposes of conversation are, to put one's-self in the way of learning something ; to impart something that others want to hear ; to form opinions on interesting subjects ; to settle the merits or demerits of public action ; to recount amusing, or extraordinary facts, &c. &c. Every human being knows something, which he is willing to tell, and which any other, that he is in company with, wishes to know ; or which, if known to him, would be amusing or useful. To be a skilful conversationist, one's eyes and ears should be busy ; nothing should escape his observation. His memory should be a good one, and he should have a good-natured willingness to please, and to be pleased. It follows, that all matter of offence in conversation should be avoided. The self-love of others is to be respected. Therefore, no one is tolerated who makes himself the subject of his own commendation, nor who disregards the feelings of those whom he addresses. There is as much demand for politeness, and civility, in conversation, as in any other department of social intercourse. One who rudely interrupts another, does much the same thing as though he should, when walking with another, impertinently thrust himself before his companion, and stop his progress. But then, *one's companion should not take up the whole path.* Conversation often turns on a question of fact, and one or other of the parties maintains vehemently, that the fact was, or was not; and gets warm in maintaining his position. He relies on his own memory, or on that of some one who *told him so*, and may find himself at fault. He may have done *himself* a serious wrong in being so positive. Now whether the fact was so or not, may be of very little importance. So, *opinions* are, sometimes, vehemently maintained, when they are in themselves of little weight. Conversation, among civil, well informed, and especially among polite persons, is carried on for the sole purpose of giving a general pleasure, and one *in common*, to all who are engaged in it ; and never for the gratification of any individual's pride, vanity, or ostentation. These, it is acknowledged, are only intimations. The importance of conversation better deserves a volume, (if one were capable of making it), than a short section. But if there be any weight in what has been intimated, those who take an interest in the matter, will be able to improve upon it. It may be added, that, in general, it is supposed that persons do not want to talk, unless on particular calls to do so. On the contrary, it is believed, that all persons like conversation, when properly invited to engage in it. Under favorable circumstances, and among persons who know how to train a conversation, there are few, if any amusements, more grateful, to the human mind.

350. *Reading*, is another of the standard amusements of persons of all ages. How truly astonishing would it be to an Egyptian, Grecian, or Roman, if he could be told, that a speech delivered in a legislative assembly in one evening, is read by thousands, before ten o'clock next morning, who are scattered throughout a circle of an hundred miles in diameter. The influence of the press on the character of a country is not to be measured, or calculated. It is strikingly true of this admirable invention, as it is of so many other things in natural and moral agency, that, *well used*, it is an inestimable blessing; ill used, the corrupting demon of social life. The press resembles natural and moral agents, in another respect; it is, what they who use it, choose to make of it. In a wise, discreet, and virtuous community, the press must conform to this character. In a turbulent, ignorant, and low community, the press will conform itself to the demand. It is commonly said, that the press makes the character of the people who read. *Is it not equally true, that the people make the character of the press?* They probably have a reciprocal influence. As the people become wise and intelligent, the press must become so. It may be that the press itself has aided them, in forming a chastened demand.

351. Happily, attention to the proper wants of

the young, has required of the press, its action for their benefit; not as to books of study only, but books of amusement. It is delightful to hear children, in their conversations, quote their authorities, from books so attractively prepared for them, as to have rivetted attention, and to have loaded memory. They are books sent forth by beneficent, and intelligent minds. Their narrations are exceedingly interesting, while they lead to sincere and respectful assent to the virtues, and moral beauties, which they teach. They are *lessons* for parents, while they are amusement of the best order for children. But children cannot devote all their playful hours to reading. It is not desirable that they should. They are liable to sit in postures, while intent upon their books, which are unfriendly to form, and to health. However commendable this sort of occupation may be, still we venture to maintain that, *there is a space to be filled in finding amusements for children*, which comprise such physical action, and such mental interest, as will expand and strengthen the frame, while they keep the heart pure, and amiable. There is rarely a known want in this land, which no one is ingenious enough to supply. This want may be carried further. It is very possible, that the gathering of great numbers, on public days, might be made interesting by manly, and amusing sports. They might, it is believed, be such, as would interest, and command the approbation of those who could not engage in them, and even of the most venerable.

The splendor of Grecian renown undoubtedly had its root, in the celebration of the Olympic games, which occurred once in four years throughout more than eight centuries. The finest qualities of the physical and intellectual being of man, here found their wreaths of laurel amidst the applause of gathered thousands from all the cities of Greece. Here manly strength and grace, female elegance, poetry, music, piety, patriotism, skill, emulation, enduring and glorious honor, conspired to do some act, to some prospective end, in which all were interested.

These celebrations served as *eras* in computing time. Whence, one reads in the history of this eminent people, that an event happened in such a year of such an Olympiad. The games of the Greeks are not offered for imitation, in these days. But, man's nature now, is the same that it was in Greece. The principle of action is the same, though manifestations of it in Greece, may not suit American propensities. Yet, that there must be amusements is as certain, as that there are Americans. The matter to be known is, by what means amusement may be, at the same time, most attractive, most innocent, and most useful.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Domestic Duties.

INTRODUCTION.

352. There are some persons who see, in the order of succession, inherent in animal and vegetable creation, that the system is irreconcileable to Divine power and benevolence. They complain of the principle of decay ; of the yellow leaf of autumn ; of the dreariness of winter. They complain more of the uncertainty, and, (sometimes) sudden termination of human life ; that the young and the serviceable die ; that death, at any age, is a mournful and afflictive event. They say that the world is ‘ a vale of tears ;’ that ‘ man is born to trouble, as the sparks fly upward ;’ that our ‘ days are few, and full of trouble.’ This is not what the Deity has said ; it is not what nature says. This is the language of ignorant, erring, ungrateful man. There is no one thing which declares the wisdom, and the goodness of God, more convincingly, than the provision for the commencement, the duration, and the end of life. Whatsoever there may seem to be of evil in it, is either of man's own creating ; or it is because he does not, or will not exercise his reason. If it

were left to man to regulate this matter, what would he please to do? Would he make every thing that comes into being, as vegetable, continue in it, and for how long a time? What would become of the succession of blossoms and fruits? Would he make his own race immortal on the earth? What would he do with the pleasures, and duties of youth, manhood, decline, and old age? Would he continue all in life, who come into it indefinitely? How would, or could, any being come into life, if the Creator's order were deranged? If it were possible to suppose that all to whom life is given, were to remain on earth and continue to multiply, what would life come to be? It better becomes audacious mortals, to be assured, that all is right. It is their proper duty to exercise the beneficent gift of reason, to learn that it is so; that *death* proceeds no less from the goodness of God, than *birth*; that man abuses and perverts the beautiful order of succession, as he does every thing else, when ignorant, and disobedient. If he used his faculties as he is commanded to do, he would know, that from this order arise, all the relations which call forth the highest moral perfection to which he can aspire; all excitements to virtue; all the promptings to self-satisfying action; all the delights which are worthy of a mind destined to immortality.

353. *Marriage.* The history of the human race does not make known any people, among whom marriage was unknown. It does make known that this natural union of the sexes has been misunderstood, or odiously perverted, among many people. It has been rightly understood by no people who were not Christians. It has been most reproachfully misunderstood or perverted among them. It has been, sometimes, a mere cover for obtaining wealth, or distinction, and, in such cases, has been *punished*, as all perversions of good gifts commonly are, and ought to be. What can be a more gross perversion of parental duty, than to sell a child to one whom she cannot love, respect, nor esteem, merely because he is rich! Marriage is the ordi-

nance of the Creator. It began when man began. It is ordered to perpetuate the succession of the human family. It is ordered for the whole duration of adult age. It is man's peculiar privilege in this : it connects him with generations which are gone ; with that which is passing away ; and with those which are to come. The memory, and the ashes of the dead are precious to him, and no other animal has that sentiment. He alone, contemplates that his own memory will be held in honor ; and that the place of his earthly quiet will be sacred. He only is enabled to conceive, that moral and physical wrong, will bear his own stamp, in the character, and in the frame, of those that follow him ; he only knows that a *good name* may be an honorable inheritance. These are the sentiments which spring from the beneficent gift of marriage. However much one may misunderstand, or abuse this gift, nature, ever faithful to her trust, forces these sentiments on the heart. The bitterest agony that a worthless father, or mother can endure, is the consciousness, that their own vice, and folly will be visited on their offspring. In this sense, there is nothing more true than that the sins of the father shall be visited on the children. Marriage is held to be, in all Christian countries, a *contract*. The very term, contract, implies an understanding of the nature of the subject on which the contract is made, and that the parties are capable of performing it ; and also, that they will respectively perform the obligations which the contract clearly indicates. It is that contract which is so solemn and serious, that all others, when compared with it, sink into insignificance. It is for this reason, that those who are called to minister in holy things, are empowered, by the laws of the land, and the usages of Christians, to declare in the presence of witnesses, that this contract is made ; and to ask the blessing of Heaven on its purposes. The laws of the land, those of nature, and the Divine law, disclose the sentiments, the feelings, and the awful sense of duty with which this undertaking should be regarded.

Yet, it is frequently entered into, from motives highly reprehensible; and sometimes with shocking thoughtlessness. It is from such causes, that we see, that this sacred union, which should be the true source of the highest human happiness, becomes that inexhaustible fountain, from which both parties are daily and hourly compelled to drink, and from the same cup, the bitterest waters. One hardly knows in what language to speak to the young, on this all-important subject. Can one speak to them in any language which they will heed? Gliding easily into gross errors, they believe every thing to be what fancy whispers it to be; they entangle themselves in a web of their own creating; and when they find their freedom bound in cords, which nothing but the scythe of death can cut, they cry out, 'What a miserable world is this!' 'What malignant power invented this detestable state of being!'

354. If one could penetrate the ear of enamored youth, what good would come from such suggestions as these? Have you considered what that measure is which you are about to take? Do you know that there is a Lawgiver above you, who is just and inexorable? That he has trusted you with the responsibility of your own welfare? That he has submitted to your perusal the volume from which that responsibility is to be drawn? Do you know what will come of that engagement which you are about to make? Are you about to tie yourself in bonds, absolutely indissoluble while you live, to a mortal who has feelings, wishes, wants, hopes, and fears, which must become your's, and a part of your very self; or which you must resist, control, or war with? Do you know that pain, suffering, and sorrow, originating in either, must be borne by both? Do you realize that whatsoever of error, folly, or crime, may be chargeable to either of you, or to any who may spring from your contract, will be your common burthen, and shame; and that from these you can relieve yourself no where but in the grave? Or, do you know, that

this attractive being will be your kind friend ; your counsellor ; the welcome soother of your cares and anxieties ; the generous and charitable judge of your infirmities ; the inspirer of honorable ambition ; your fellow laborer in joint interests ; the ornament of your life ; the gracious, considerate, faithful, gentle companion who will make your own virtuous home, the place to which you refer all earthly happiness ? Who that is '*in love*' has leisure, or inclination to think of such *trifles* as these ?

355. There is no reason why the passion of love should be wrapped up in mystery, nor any, why the mind should be stained in considering its nature. It would prevent much, and complicated misery in the world, if all young persons understood it truly. There are in every human being, germs, each one of which may be made to come forth, and may be so cultivated, as to produce the most odious vices, or the most serene and heavenly virtues. Or, to take another illustration, every propensity of the heart is like a drop of water, which rises on the very summit of the highest land ; it may flow to the East, and find itself, (with all that joins it on the way,) in one sea, or West, and find itself in another, as distant and different, as East and West. The propensity to love, is one of the best in our nature ; but, it may run into the worst of afflictions. It seems to be a principle of nature, that the ruin of the highest and best, is the deepest and worst of ruins. The human mind in its greatest natural force, and best and purest cultivation, brings its possessor into an affinity with angels. The same mind, gradually depraved and debased, and driven to raving and malicious madness, is a horrible example of what is fancied to be diabolical. So is it with love. In its true use, it is, what is thought to be the happiness of heaven ; in its perversions, who can find words to tell what it is ? Ask the physician whose vocation it is, not to heal the wounds which nature makes, but to find remedies for the punishments which she inflicts. Look into the public hospitals, and mad-houses. Nay, look within the curtains,

whose outside emblems of grandeur and dignity tell for whose use they were intended, and see, who and what inhabit there !

356. There is in every human heart a fund of kindness, tenderness, and affection, which makes itself known to be there in due time. It demands to be applied. This is the trying and perilous moment in youthful life. There is some one, somewhere, who will take that fund, and give its full equivalent. The external senses, and the heart, are in search of that one. Happy will it be for the searcher, if he will take reason as a monitor to keep the senses, and the heart in order. But reason is commonly regarded, not as a kind and faithful friend whose duty it is to whisper, 'begin nothing, of which you have not well considered the end,' but as a withered scowling matron, who, being utterly dead to the impulses of youth, denies that there ought to be any youthful impulse. If there has been no preparation for this eventful period, if the mind has not been enriched with the teachings of rational prudence ; if the eye has not been taught to distinguish between the real and the seeming ; if the ear has not learned to discriminate the meaning of sounds ; *if life as a whole*, *if the consequences of irrevocable deeds* be not thought of, there is peril ; and the pure drop from the fountain may flow into any sea, but that of happiness. Surely, when one is subjected to the force of any passion, there is peril. He is like one descending an inclined plane of ice on the Alps ; the further he goes, the faster he goes, and the nearer is he to the abyss below. Such an one cannot (as an amiable and eminent statesman of our country said on another occasion) drop so much fire into a barrel of gunpowder, as will inflame an ounce or two ounces, at his pleasure, *and no more.* He should know that one spark, however small, will inflame the whole. We pray leave to remind the amiable and virtuous young, of one very curious principle of our nature, which comes into effective action at this sensitive moment. The imagination asserts its dangerous empire ; it throws a

misty medium before the eyes; it steals away the common prudence of the ear; it disorders the natural sensibility of the touch. It takes its seduced subject into lonely contemplations; and there it dresses out the common qualities of the beloved object, with unreal, and unnatural beauty. One begins then, to hear of angels, divinities, and loveliness that are not, and never were of this earth. Who, and what, is the object of this adoration? No one, and nothing that really exists, but a fascinating creature of the brain. That creature is what is married. The realities of married life soon show, under what a sad delusion the parties have acted. The disappointment is proportioned to the extravagance of fancy.

357. In whatever variety of modes, the purposes of life may have been mistaken, or perverted, it is probable that they have been so, in no one thing so much as in marriage. There are fewer marriages than there might be, and ought to be, to say nothing of the motives on which some are contracted. This may be referred, it is believed, to the mistaken estimate which is made of riches, and modes of living. The sacrifice which is made to fashionable opinion, is a very costly one. It would be unjustifiable to attempt to maintain, that the elegant products of art, are not to be esteemed and used, and the production of them encouraged; and equally so to decry, the luxurious products of the land, or the sea. All are proper in their respective places. All are to be consumed by those who can buy them, and who desire to reward directly, or indirectly (provided always that they duly reverence nature in the use) the labor that brings them forth. But such things are unduly valued. They are made to be the first objects in life, when in fact they hardly deserve to be called secondary. The married must have a place to live in; it must be convenient and comfortable; they must have garments and food; and they must have the means of supplying certain necessary and pleasurable wants. There must be ease, and independence, within their walls. Inde-

pendence does not mean *wealth*; but that magnanimity which produces cheerful, thankful satisfaction, for having, and having the right to have, *a home*, in which one finds full exercise for all the kind affections of the heart, with the means of gratifying them. All beyond these things are sought, and obtained, and used, for whom? To conform to opinions which have very small claim to be rational, but which have a powerful influence in the world. There must be a certain state of things, because, 'every body does so.' There must be one or more apartments furnished in the proper style, to be opened and used some two or three times in a year, to please persons with whom one has slight connexion. It may be erroneous to say to *please* such persons, for it is far from being certain that this effect is produced; it is to please one's-self, in doing what fashion dictates, whether that be convenient or inconvenient, wise or foolish.

358. Will it be doubted that a young, well-educated, industrious couple, who are sincerely and affectionately attached, on a sober examination, and conviction of each other's worth, and suitableness to each other, may be happy, with means far short of the fashionable standard? Presuming that such a couple are wise enough to take life for the real and substantial good that it can produce, and as a whole, it would do them great injustice to suppose that they could not find that good in a small, simple, cheerful, tranquil mansion. It would be doing the friends of such a couple the like injustice to suppose, that they could not visit them, and be satisfied to see them happy, through such means. It may be added, that such a state of things conforms to the laws of nature. If such a couple desire a more enlarged state of things, they will *earn* it by frugality, and industry. What one has earned is sweet to him; and he who sees something before him which he may strive for, and attain to, is impelled, by the same laws, to honorable exertion. But he who has no more to aspire to, must, like 'Macedonia's madman,' weep that there is no more. These are very

homely but very healthy truths ; yet, there is not the shadow of hope that they will change the thoughts of one *belle* or *beau*, in the whole United States. So far, therefore, as depends on these unpretending efforts to improve the world, it will continue to be, in the opinion of very many, 'a detestable state of being.'

In whatsoever circumstances, and with whatever motives marriages occur, the parties *are married ;* and the question which they have to propose, and solve is, in what way they can secure to themselves the greatest good during their union.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Domestic Duties, continued.

359. *Husband.* It must be assumed, that the parties to a marriage act, according to their own will and pleasure, in entering into it ; and that they expect to promote their own welfare by such measure. They were, or might have been informed, of each others suitableness. Both knew, or might have known, that new circumstances, and unexpected events, might change or destroy qualities, and bring dormant, or newly acquired ones, into operation. Both agreed, each with the other, to bear, and forbear, and to make the best of the matter, however it might prove to be. Each one solemnly promised, that the contract should be kept, if it reasonably could be, although the other might fail to perform. Let us suppose, that there were no mistakes in the beginning, as to the qualities, and conduct of the wife ; and that she is, in all respects, and under all circumstances, such an one as has been before suggested. Can the exercise of power over a dependant female, in a manner which not only deprives her of the benefits promised in connubial life, but which makes her a daily, and hourly sufferer, be reconciled with the law that commands one to pro-

mote his own good, and to perform duties voluntarily assumed? How can any one who calls himself a man, and who claims to be considered and treated as such, by other men, habitually prove himself not to be a man, but a brute, towards a defenceless, unoffending woman? If one could look into all the families of the United States, how many *voluntary* scenes of misery would be disclosed! We assume now, that the woman is in no fault; and that she strives continually, to accommodate herself to her condition; and to bear in silence; and to do her best to console assuage, and make of home what it should be. Might not one, in such case, say to the husband, are not you, your own cruel enemy? Do you not make to yourself the misery which you complain of, as being incident to this state of being? If you have troubles, and vindictive feelings towards any who have wronged, or oppressed you, abroad, have you any sense of right and justice, or any conformity to the law which commands you to do as you would be done by, in making your innocent wife the victim of your morose and angry feelings? Did you not solemnly promise her, that if she would devote her life to you, you would support, cherish, and faithfully reward her affection? Do you avail yourself of the secrecy of domestic life, and of the certainty, that prudence and regard for you, and for your offspring, will keep all *causes* of complaint within your own walls, to play the tyrant towards one whose tongue must be silent, until she charges you as a criminal in a court of justice? Has she done you any wrong? Has she upbraided you that your social hours are spent away from her; and that your earnings are not brought home to be used for the common comfort, but dissipated in follies? When you have come into her presence, from she knows not what company, with an unsteady step, a giddy and throbbing head, and a bewildered brain, has she not sought to hide your, and her own shame? Has she reproached you for these breaches of your solemn promises, in any way, but with tears?—Tears, not shed for herself, but for you, and for your children!

Are these, and similar scenes, *natural*, or *moral*, evil? Did the Deity, or his order of providence, command them, or are they wilful, wicked breaches of plain obvious duty? Surely, it is not right for such husbands to say that this is a bad world; and that man is *born* to trouble? It would rather conform to the principles of inflexible justice, that such husbands should find, in this world, the thorough contempt of all good men; and, somewhere, such punishment as such voluntary breach of one of the most important of all laws, ought to meet with.

360. *Wife.* It must depend in this case, as in that of a husband, whether a contract shall be made. As it is the proper course for the other sex to propose, and for this to accept or reject, a female should have opportunity to know the character and temper of a suitor, before she consents to make him master of her welfare for life.

If this serious negotiation were treated with the sincerity and frankness, which it so much better deserves than any other that can be named, the proper knowledge would be had. The true state of the case is this: A man proposes to a woman to surrender herself and her expectations of happiness to him, as long as she lives. The decorum enjoined upon her sex, has shut her out from the inquiries, and knowledge, on which, if she have any pretension to prudence, and good sense, her answer must depend. It may be very unfortunate for both parties, whether her answer be yes, or no, under such circumstances. It would better conform to reason, for the female to reply, that she cannot answer; and that it will be wiser for both of them to consider the matter, and to take time to form a candid and just opinion. Any sensible man would feel a respect for such a woman; and if the final answer did not accord with his wishes, still the female has done him no wrong. As the fashion of the day is understood to be, a proposition is made, often unexpectedly and without consideration; a 'refusal' follows; and the applicant considers himself aggrieved, and is ever afterwards disposed to feel, that if it were not a lady, he would demand satisfaction. This want of frankness, and good sense, and the ridiculous sort of mystery, and perversity, (which have no better origin, in many instances, than the learning derived from novels), are among the causes which have brought the sacred institution of marriage into disrepute. This is the occasion in which, above all others, a young female may rejoice in having rational and sensible parents, who understand what are the true purposes of human life. She can, and she ought, *through them* (or through those who hold the next place, if parents cannot be advised with) to know, all that it concerns her to know, of temper, of principles, of health, of habits, of capacity, of education, and of manners; in short, of all qualities, on which her happiness may depend. Parents who have not the intelligence, and the will, to learn all that should be known, on these points, do not deserve to be parents. On them it depends, whether their child may have the greatest good, or the most harassing evils, that the female heart can know.

361. Those who are wives and mothers, have taken on themselves a very serious responsibility. That kind Providence, which never sleeps, and never errs, has enabled unperverted woman, to feel her connubial, and maternal duties; and if she have good sense enough to know how that feeling should be directed, and used, she will not err. Her condition is often a trying one; but happily, in general, in this country, though pains-taking and busy, it is not an unhappy one, and generally far otherwise. When it is a trying one, her task is to find out, how she can do herself, and those connected with her, the greatest good. It may depend on many circumstances how she is to effect that object, of which she must judge. It is easy to show how she will not effect it. No husband who errs, is ever corrected by the sharp and upbraiding tongue of a wife. *She may make him hate her, without making him*

any better. She is the last person in the world, from whom he will endure, unretorted, the language of reproach. She bound herself, by her original contract, to hold and bind him, by gentleness, kindness, and forbearance. These are her means. They are the only ones which she can ever use, with any hope of victory. This may be proved by a short illustration. A couple had lived long in happy alliance. The husband, misled by evil associates, yet fully sensible of domestic duties, spent his afternoons at a gaming table. It was his custom to return to his family at a certain hour in the evening, and to find his wife at the table, awaiting his coming. Divided between the duty which he owed to her, and the habit of gaming, the time of his return, grew later and later ; he always found her at the tea table, clad in smiles, and welcoming his return. The hour was more and more prolonged into night, till it became midnight ; but she was still at the table, ready to receive him. No word of complaint escaped her. Subdued, at length, he burst into tears, declared his follies, and renounced them. The next day, and always after, he joined his family circle at the accustomed hour. Let us suppose, that this wife, had addressed to her husband that reproach which came, at last, through her kindness and good sense, from his own heart, what would have been her condition, his own, and that of their children ?

There is one in the world, who feels for him who is sad, a keener pang than he feels for himself ; there is one, to whom reflected joy, is better than that which comes direct ; there is one who rejoices in another's honor, more than in any which is one's own ; there is one on whom another's transcendent excellence, sheds no beam but that of delight ; there is one who hides another's infirmities, more faithfully than one's own ; there is one who loses all sense of *self*, in the sentiment of kindness, tenderness, and devotion to another. That one is WOMAN whom the Christian religion has given to the lord of the earth, to be his *companion.*

362. *Children.* The place which children may hold in society, depends essentially, on the character and conduct of the mother. In this busy nations a husband is commonly too much occupied in his own concerns, to devote his thoughts, and time, to any systematic course of discipline. The sum of duty, comprising manners, cleanliness, associates, time out of school, amusements, morals, religious impressions, example, precept, temper, gentleness, depends mainly, on the mother. She commonly feels the weight of her responsibility, and is willing faithfully to acquit herself of it. But, she deserves every possible encouragement from her husband. The husband, too often thwarts her purposes, by interposing his own contradictory views. If he think he can do any good, by his better knowledge, the medium of influence is *through* the mother. If he can kindly convince her of some better mode, he will best promote the common welfare by that course; and can do no greater mischief than by laying down rules that imply, the insignificance of her judgment. It should be remembered, that the prominent blessing of the Christian dispensation as to human life, is, that it has made woman the joint and equal partner in domestic interests. If parents desire to make their children feel contempt for the authority of both of them, the readiest way to do it, is to dispute in their presence. Which of them is a child to obey? The bringing up of children is a fearful responsibility. So great is it, that many parents feel, that if they were not involved in it, and could have foreknown what it is, they never would have assumed it. But this distrust and dissatisfaction is, in part, from their own errors. Have they ever seriously thought how this duty should be performed? What books have they read? With whom have they conversed? What have they learned as to the best means of promoting the true interests of their offspring? If they have done nothing to inform themselves, how can they be instructers to others? Not only are parents bound to know what is right, but they are bound to know

how to use knowledge in a right manner. One rule to-day, and a discordant one to-morrow ; harshness and severity at one time, and the most weak and injurious indulgence at another, are poor qualities for instructers. There must be, in these matters, as in everything else, a best way. It may be found somewhere in, or extracted from, these principles. Children have as good a right to be happy as their seniors. Their happiness consists, in having, and doing, what will make them intellectually capable ; morally correct and amiable ; and physically pure, and strong. These ends will be obtained by a systematic regularity, mildly, and kindly, but certainly, enforced. Love, respect, and obedience, are its consequences. A child will soon learn, what it can have, and do, and what it cannot; and it will soon know that it cannot ask again, for what has been, on due consideration, refused. The excellence of society has its root in infancy ; and that excellence is confided to the care of mothers. Its seeds are planted in the cradle.

363. *Parental blindness.* If parents did not naturally love their children as they are seen to do, they would not have sufficient motives to perform their duties to them. This natural sentiment is seen to be strikingly perverted. Parents are often blind to defects and to faults, and imagine excellencies which no one perceives but themselves. When numbers of children are assembled, and are consequently objects of comparison, it is amusing to notice the watchful and self approving eye of mothers. But every mother may be assured that her children are very much like the children of others ; and that it will rarely be safe to take any mother's self-gratulation as evidence of truth, touching the beauty, talents, or virtues of her own offspring. The desire to do the most, and best, for children, often leads mothers into a course of slavery, anxiety, and exhaustion. It undermines their physical strength; it narrows the intellectual circle in which they move ; and that circle becomes so contracted, at length, that it excludes all but children, unless the

husband can find a place in it. This is, undoubtedly, a mistake. This world was made to live in. Children must learn *that truth*, at some time. The sooner they learn it the better. They have to learn also, that they must depend on themselves; and take care of themselves. If a child find that its parents always *think* for it, and that it need not have any thoughts of its own, it will not have any. If parents would do justice to children, they must take care of their own health, and of their own minds, and keep the run of the world; and keep in view, that they can best fit their own children for social duties, by availing themselves of all reasonable opportunities to know how those duties are generally understood, and performed; or disregarded, or unknown. Children should be pushed forward, and made to try their strength with their equals, and not kept in seclusion. They need, as their seniors do, objects, with which to compare themselves. The mother's duty is to see, that these objects are proper ones. She needs to see those objects herself, to enable her to make her own comparisons, and thereby to repress errors, and advance the commendable qualities.

364. *Brothers and Sisters.* These relations make a very great mistake, as to the real good of life, in not cultivating a cordial and affectionate friendship with each other. In early life, they are apt to be in each other's way; and to have irreconcilable wants; thus, they very soon fall into alienations. They cannot, however, shake off the laws of nature. They must have an interest in each other, whether they will, or not; and it will essentially promote their mutual welfare, to have a kind and gracious one. The common causes of their differences are exceedingly insignificant, and often are contemptible. They will see the day when they will so think of them. The time presses hard upon them, when they will need counsel, support, and some one to care for them in a manner, which none but brothers and sisters, can do. When all has gone on well, from the cradle upwards, among such

relatives, they become to each other, not only the most useful friends, but the most agreeable companions. They are the natural confidants, when it would be folly to trust any one whose sympathy, and solicitude may change. Brothers and sisters who are thus bound together by affection, sometimes hazard the connexion, by volunteering friendly, but very unwelcome commentaries, and advice. This is a very delicate matter. Giving unasked advice, on any occasion, requires very great discretion. If one sees that his brother is blundering, there are many modes of so approaching him, as to lead him to find that he needs advice, and of putting him in search of it. If there be a right understanding, he will go where he is sure of having the best and sincerest. To assume a dictatorial authority over a brother, is to inflict a wound on self-love which cannot be forgiven. We have already noticed the value of civility, and politeness, between such near connexions. And we add, that sincerity and truth are no where more profitable and necessary. 'Familiarity breeds contempt,' is a true old saying, and is very apt to find an application of its truth, in the intercourse of brothers and sisters. If it do so, it must be because they are very ignorant of the precious privilege which the laws of nature have given them. Though they do dwell together, in the closest intimacy, each one has his, and her, own 'individual circle,' into which no one should come uninvited. Within that, is the very marrow of self-love, which is never touched, offensively, without exciting enmity.

The kindness and confidence of brothers, like other feelings given for the best purposes, may be a source of serious affliction. It is no uncommon occurrence, especially in mercantile life, for one brother so to involve himself with another's affairs, by merely *promising*, as to make the same ruin inevitable to both. It is a difficult matter to settle, where the limit of fraternal duty lies, in many cases. It is as much the duty of a brother to pronounce a decisive NO to a brother, on some occasions, as to make that answer to a stranger. No duty to a brother can absolve any one from his duty to himself.

365. *Domestics.* From the earliest ages down to the present day, there have been different classes in society. This necessarily arises from the very order of society. The well established, and very proper right of inheritance, and the ability which some members of society have to acquire, and which others have not; the difference of education, and other obvious causes, necessarily produce these distinctions. Who among the various classes, is the most contented and happy, is quite another matter. There must be some to serve, and some to be served. They are mutually dependant. We refer, at present, to domestics, by which we mean those who constitute a part of a family for wages, or otherwise. Great complaints are heard, sometimes, of these persons, and sometimes great complaints from them. This connexion is regarded as one of the miseries of life. It is not necessarily so, and is usually, the fault of those who command, rather than of those who serve.

Servants, masters, and mistresses, have the same sort of bones, muscles, heads, and hearts; the same self-love, and the same sensibilities. All rational and well instructed persons, consider that servants are entitled to be esteemed and respected, according to their merits. That they have, as well as every body above them has, a right to be happy. They are entitled to be spared when sick; advised and relieved when in trouble; and to be made as comfortable as the circumstances of the parties permit. If they are persons of religious impressions, their accommodation is to be consulted. They are to be counselled as to saving the fruits of their labors. The commands given to them should be plain, clear, uniform, and not contradictory, and capricious. They are not to be commanded with virulence, and reproach, but gently, and rather by request. Children who are permitted to be insolent to the dependant, are permitted to do unchristian, and highly reprehensible acts. Servants, in common with all who wear the human form, are entitled to civility. We know not, in this changing world, whose turn it may be, in a very few generations, if not in the passing one, to be masters or servants. To fret and be ill-tempered about one's servants, ill becomes the dignity of any one. If they are troublesome, unworthy or ungrateful, the remedy is to dismiss them, and find others. It may be assumed that all persons who are served, may be well served if they choose to be so ; when they are not, it is their own fault. If there were no just cause of complaint against masters and mistresses, there would be much less against servants. If all persons understood and practised on these truths, the good qualities of servants would be more common, and thus, one more cause of human misery would be diminished.

366. *Families.* If the Christian dispensation be a precious gift in any respect pertaining to earthly being, it is so in family relation. What virtue that profits and adorns, is more excellent elsewhere than *in this ;* what vice that enfeebles and debases, is more odious than *in this !* Here, may be, helpless innocence nurtured and invigorated ; insatiable curiosity, and restless excitement to action, usefully and successfully trained ; and honest pride of parental love, faithfully and well directed : Here may be, the grateful assurance of having contributed to the common stock of society, worthy members ; inexpressible delight which fills the heart, and moistens the eye, in beholding the honor which the world renders to well directed parental care ; that kind sympathy and ministering skill and tenderness, which take from affliction its sting ; and that calm and dignified submission to the will of Providence which despoils even death of its terrors. But, perverted as it may be, and often is, family connexion may be an inexhaustible fountain of misery. Let us avoid the humiliation of showing what families may be when ignorance of, and diso-

bedience to the laws of the Creator, are the only known guides in life. Rather, let every family member lay his hand upon his heart and ask, am I temperate; am I busy to useful ends; am I just and true; am I gentle and charitable; am I kind and forbearing; do I, as I would that others should do to me; do I consider life as a whole, and do I understand its purposes, so that I can minister to the good of those on whom I must depend for good to myself, and for relief and sympathy when sorrow overtakes me?

367. *Disappointments and Sorrows of Parents.* It is not to be wondered at, that parents, who have, as they think, done all that parents should do, to make their children worthy, are afflicted, when their labor and exertion do not produce the intended effect. Their reasonable hopes are disappointed; their best feelings are tortured. An idle, ungrateful, dissolute son, is such a complicated cause of suffering, as may, if any thing may, lead one to murmur at the order of Providence. It may be admitted, that such a parent is very likely to break out with complaints against the world. This suffering, however keen and biting it may be, is not a natural, but a moral evil. There is a moral wrong somewhere *at the root.* Is it in the parent himself? Has he rightly understood the trust confided to him, in the true relation of a parent? Has he been austere, and uncompromising? Has he thrown his child off from him, by severity? Has he considered the nature of the human heart? Has he given *to that* of his son, the support of good principles, and sound reason, to aid him to stand up against the temptations that assail youth? Temptations which he ought to know to be inevitable. Has he watched the beginning of error, and drawn his child off from the descending plane? But, perhaps the downward course has been long begun upon, and such progress made in art and deceit, that the child has been able to elude parental inquiry. This can hardly happen with a watchful parent, while his child is under his own

roof. Perhaps the downward course has been begun upon, when a child is at a distant school, college, or in a place of business, preparing for manhood. If a parent has placed a child where he cannot superintend him, or with those who do not undertake to do this, or with those who do not superintend, though they undertake to do so, the parent is not excused, because others are in fault. A child who is sent away from home, is, as the world now is, always sent into some hazard. The hazard is, when least, that the preceptor, guardian, and master, may be deceived. The seductions may be such as to plunge a boy into ruin, even before those who see him daily, and who mean to do their duty, have the least intimation of it. There must be error, then, somewhere. *It is believed to be in society itself.* If those who can order what society shall be, permit the means of moral ruin to grow up, and flourish among them, they may mourn, and call it a bad world, if they please, but they ought not to charge Providence with their sufferings.

368. In all large cities, towns, and even in villages, there are some persons, who live and thrive in whole, or in part, by aiding young persons to ruin themselves, and to make life itself a burthen to parents. These persons are well skilled in the arts of seduction. They cannot go, and put their hands into a father's, or a master's pocket, and take thence what they covet. *But they know how to put other hands there.* They know what appetites to awaken, what desires to create ; and how to cultivate them, and make them deep rooted, and firm, so that no wind of conscience, can blow them over. They know what the fruits will be to them. Those who have been, by such means, withdrawn from the paths of innocence and virtue, and who have succeeded in stifling the cries of conscience, strive to add to their degraded number. They place temptations before the unsuspecting, and lead them on ; and thus one plausible young villian is enough to seduce, and poison a whole generation.

369. This mournful course of seduction, profli-

gacy, and crime, is called by some persons, the natural evils of society. Such persons are poorly instructed. They are as clearly mere moral evils, as murder is a crime These are to be charged upon the parents themselves. Who are they who vote, and legislate in a free country ? Do not they make the laws, which send the accused to prison, and felons to the gallows ? Cannot these persons declare, by their laws, that their children shall not be seduced, and physically, intellectually and morally ruined before their eyes ? Are not social communities instituted to declare and to enforce, obedience to the laws of nature, and of the Deity ? Have they not the *power* to do, what this high Authority commands to be done ? This power does exist, and is exercised on many subjects of insignificant character, compared with these. Suppose the legislative authority should declare it to be an infamous crime, to receive a minor into certain places ; and to take his money, or give him credit, for horses and carriages on the Sabbath, what social right would be thereby violated ? Has any member of society a *right*, by any law divine, natural, or human, to help an ignorant, or perverse child, to ruin himself, for the reason that one can get a living by such means ? If these contemners of parental hope and right, were to rob a parent, even to his last shilling, this could be endured. They would have taken that which came from the earth ; and something of like value, can, by industry, be drawn from the earth again. But who can purify a corrupted heart ; restore to sanity, a perverted and bewildered mind ; or, cleanse the body from the leprosy of vice ! It cannot be doubted, that every civil community, has the power, and the right, to take all such measures as will best secure the ends, and purposes, for which it was instituted. If, then, the trustees of this power, pervert and abuse it ; if they ignorantly, or wilfully neglect, or refuse to take the good which is allowed to them, they ought, at least, not to add impiety to their transgressions, and charge the Creator, with their own follies and sins.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Misfortune, Sickness, and Death.

370. We have, at length, found, if they are to be found, the causes of natural evil. There can be, it is said, no ignorant or voluntary immorality, in misfortunes, sickness, or death. It is as easy,

> 'To vindicate the ways of God to man,'

on these subjects as on any others. What are misfortunes? They are said to be the happening of some unexpected event, which could not be foreseen nor prevented. How many of those events which do happen, could be foreseen or prevented? Let it be supposed that the inhabitants of a closely settled town, are engaged in rendering their due homage to the Creator. A single spark emitted from a chimney, or the taking fire in the soot of a chimney, or the using of light combustibles for a lawful and commendable purpose, begins a conflagration, which reduces that town to ashes. The most complicated suffering and distress, accompany, and follow in the train of this evil. Fire will undoubtedly consume. This is a law of nature. That law has shown its application in this case. Is this, therefore, a natural evil? Most clearly it is a moral evil. It may be one, however, so entirely free from all intentional wrong, as to command the most sincere sympathy, and charity. Yet it is a moral evil. Fire was given to serve; not to tyrannize, and ruin. It can be commanded. The very giving it an opportunity to tyrannize, and destroy, is a moral evil. There might have been, by human agency, such a course of conduct as would have prevented the original cause of the evil. Care and foresight are required of the several members of society for their own good, and for the good of others. But would not such extreme caution, make life a slavery? Certainly not. Life was given for action, and for use, and to preserve all things necessary for use. Is it best to observe this law, or to have one's town made a desolate ruin ?

371. A ship is struck by lightning at sea, and set on fire. The ship's company do every thing that courage, strength, and intelligence can do, to extinguish the fire, and save the ship. They find it impossible ; they then obey another law, which commands to do the greatest good to themselves which is possible. They escape from their burning ship in their boats. They are overwhelmed by the sea, or starved to death. No human exertion could prevent this mournful catastrophe. Is not this a *natural* evil ? This is the operation of a general law, which happened to occasion loss of property, and of life. Suppose the ship to have been where she should be ; and that all wise precautions had been taken to prevent the injurious action of the electric fluid on her ; still the destruction is not a natural evil, unless one be prepared to say, that the Deity erred, in providing in his creation, for the action of this fluid. Surely this fluid never acts but for purposes consistent with infinite wisdom, and divine benevolence. It may be a far more efficient agent in the material world, than human research has yet been able to disclose. The ship owner, and the navigators, may have been unfortunate, that the ship, and its company, were at that spot, at that time. But no one will contend that the electric fluid must not act, because it sometimes destroys property, and life.

372. A child falls, and its limbs are thereby broken ; its spine is deranged, and it becomes a hump-backed cripple for life. This is very far from being a natural evil. Some one was greatly to blame in permitting a child to be in such a situation, that such an accident could happen to it. But because this, and similar sorrowful misfortunes may happen, are we to suspend the laws of gravitation ? Let one imagine, if he can, what would be the effect of such suspension. Our duty is to know what these general laws are, and to provide, as in most cases we may, against their injurious effect. It is

not an uncommon occurrence in this country, that the passengers in a stage coach, are terrified, maimed, or killed. It has become almost fashionable to scatter the limbs, take off the skins, and take away the lives of passengers in steam-boats. Such things are not only not natural evils ; they are moral evils that are clearly *crimes.* Suppose the immediate agents in such scenes, whose duty it is *to take care*, were indicted, when death happens, ought they not to be convicted ? Suppose proprietors of public coaches and steam-boats, were sued for damages, in cases where death does not happen, ought they not to be held to pay them ? The ground on which such evils are crimes, is this :—reasonable precaution, and care, would certainly prevent these evils. The neglect of such precaution and care, whereby persons, who are lawfully following their vocations, are deprived of life, or otherwise seriously injured, ought to be regarded as *malicious intent.**

373. Sickness and disease are commonly regarded as natural evils. Some persons die from original feebleness of constitution. This may, perhaps, arise from some moral wrong, if it were traced back to its origin. It probably did so arise. The power of connecting cause and effect, does not permit such matters, in the present state of information, to be clearly understood. It is well known that many inherited evils flow from immorality. It is much more rational to suppose, that this is frequently so, from some error, or short-sightedness, which further progress in science may prevent, than that the Deity errs in the formation of man, since no such mistakes are discerned elsewhere in his works.

374. If all cases of sickness could be examined and compared, it would surprise one to find, how large a proportion of them arise from ignorance, in-

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* It was the pleasure of the great Frederick of Prussia, to make his soldiers wear great cocked hats on parade ; these were often blown off by the wind. He ordered that hats should not be blown off ; but the *wind* did not regard this order. He then ordered, that every soldier who lost his hat, should immediately receive forty lashes in front of his regiment. After that order, the wind lost its power, and no hat was blown off.

discretion, folly, and crime. It might be useful to show what these are; but this would require, not one, but many volumes. The following very common occurrence, may be taken as an example. An accomplished well educated female, knows how to clothe herself to meet the severity of our winter climate. She conforms to her knowledge, and keeps herself well. She is bidden to a fashionable party. She throws off her warm garments, dresses herself in thin apparel, so far as this extends, leaving parts of her person, not only without dress, but *indecently* naked. She proceeds to a crowded apartment, and soon breathes an atmosphere fit only for vermin. She engages in the dance, and under the joint effects of artificial, and animal heat, and her own action, the veins, arteries, and minutest vessels of her frame, are expanded, to the utmost. In this state, and without any protection but a shawl, she goes forth into the cold midnight air. Her lungs must breathe this air; and her whole system undergoes a violent contraction. She returns shivering to her apartment. The next day she has 'a cold;' the next week a cough; the lungs cannot endure the shock they have received; they yield to natural law, and become the seat of disease. This is the common case of consumption, and in a 'little month' this blooming, happy child of fashion, is gone from the earth. Is this a natural or a moral evil? The world says it is a natural evil; and bereaved parents call on their friends for tears of sympathy.

375. There is a kind of bodily pain and suffering, which is universally considered to be natural evil. This arises from rheumatism, gout, fevers, wens, cancers, and the formation of substances in the cavities of the body, &c. In such, and similar cases, there may be remedies, and there certainly may be alleviations, which would essentially diminish afflictions. It is said that such evils cannot be foreseen nor prevented, but are inevitable, and prove the misery to which human nature is sometimes subjected. It is assuming a great deal to say, that the causes of such evils will never be so far under-

stood, as that they can be prevented. If we contrast the science of physics, at this day, with what it was in former times, such assertions are not rational. What has become of leprosy, of many horrible cutaneous diseases, of the small pox? What have the discoveries, and inventions in chemistry, and of the action of matter upon matter, already made known? How much have art and science accomplished? Is all done, that ever can bedone ? Comparative tabular records demonstrate, that human life is more enduring, at this day, than it has been, in any modern age of the world. As science, morality, and virtue diffuse their beneficial influence, this will, undoubtedly, become more and more so, unless nature be capable of fraud and deceit. It is at least probable, that most of the diseases alluded to, if not all of them, arise from some moral wrong ; that is, from some ignorance, or disregard of rules prescribed to our order of being. Where there is not some physical, and incurable defect, as old as the subject in which it appears, disease must be generated by some neglect, or abuse, known, or unknown to the sufferer. A cancer may arise from diseased circulation of the blood. That may be caused by making bad blood from unsuitable food ; or from local injury, perhaps, by which proper circulation is impeded. It is incredible, if this be so, that there can be no prevention. A cancer resembles vegetable production. Will not science, at some time, detect the seed, and be able to extract it? That agonizing disease ‘ the stone,’ is, undoubtedly, a concretion of substances, which being brought to act on each other, obey the laws of nature, and form a body in a place in which human nerves are necessarily acted upon. Will not science find out how these substances acquire their qualities, and how to keep them apart, or neutralize them? But a much more interesting question is, whether it will not, at some time be demonstrated, that such evils spring from some violation of the laws of nature.

376. There is a very numerous class of persons, who suffer severely from what are considered to be natural evils. The employments of these persons require them to *sit* while they work. They are of both sexes. It includes students as well as those who labor with the hands. They *bend* over their work, and continue, a long time together, in an unnatural position. The action of the vital organs is impeded. Their powers are gradually impaired. By some sort of consequent illness, the lives of such persons are shortened. Long before their departure, life becomes almost worthless to themselves, and themselves a burthen to others. Until it be proved that it is impracticable, by very simple contrivances, to bring one's work *up* to the eyes, instead of taking the eyes *down* to one's work; and until it can be shown, that occasional counteracting motion, in an upright and natural position, cannot be had, such kinds of evils are not to be charged upon nature.

377. There is one evil which falls as heavily, and is as distressing, as any that can be named, and which is regarded as one in which religious resignation, and the balm of time, afford the only consolation and relief. It is the loss of amiable and virtuous children. When no parental ignorance nor error, occasions this affliction, and when art and science are baffled, it is not proved, nor to be assumed, that the system of being is wrong. It is true that the affections, implanted in the human heart, for the wisest and kindest of purposes, receive an insupportable wound. The great object of parental life seems to be defeated. The staff and comfort of old age, are broken, and destroyed. Yet, what has happened? Death is to come to everything that lives. It may come sooner or later. If every one knew the moment in which he is to die, he would live under the sentence of death, however long he might live. In itself, death is no evil. Yet, there could be no living if there were no dying. These truths furnish no consolation to a bereaved parent. There must be a certain number

of deaths; but when, and how they shall occur, (when ignorance and folly do not increase the number,) is in wiser government, than human sensibility can suggest.

378. The deportment of the living, when distressing bereavements happen, and the manner in which the dead shall be disposed of, is to be governed by reason. A departure from what reason suggests, is a cause of common suffering. The remains of the dead belong to the earth. A very touching, long continued sympathy from the world, in general, is not to be expected on such occasions; if it exist at all it is slight, and transient. Nor is this to be complained of; if all must mourn when one mourns, it would be truly a mournful world. By a natural, but irrational association, feeling and sensibility are still imagined to reside in the dead. There is no longer anything in them, and they should be respectfully, but tranquilly, consigned to the bosom from which they came. But, vanity, and a mistaken estimate of duty and propriety, make of what should be a simple and natural accordance with the order of nature, and the will of its author, either an absurd ostentation, or a grievous and unnecessary affliction to the living, or both together. It is not a religious duty to assemble a mourning family, and its immediate connexions, and in the solemnity of prayer, to harrow up their souls, as is sometimes done. If life is a blessing, if the gift of children is of the Deity, it would better become us, when a glad mother has first beheld the new subject of her cares, and affections, then to address the Benefactor whom we reverence, in the language of gratitude and praise. Why should sobbing, and heart-broken relatives follow the deceased to the grave? Is not this adding something, unnecessarily, to the griefs of life? There are always near and dear friends who can perform these duties. But, we apprehend that widows, and female children derive no consolation from this ceremony, which is to be measured against the agony which it occasions. Is it not irrational to

regard death as is commonly done? Are not the fine feelings of our nature called into service to make of death, that which it is not? The innocent, the virtuous, and the pious, have no fear to die. Why, then, should it be dressed up in terrors, shrouded in mysteries, and made to be frightful, any more than other events, in the common order of the natural world? It is to the wicked and impious only, that death should be terrible.*

379. The following remarks may be well worth the attention of considerate persons.

'Mourning Apparel. A sensible writer in the Connecticut Observer states the following objections to the foolish fashion, which has so long prevailed in relation to mourning apparel:

'1. As a general practice it is no real expression of grief for the loss of our friends, nor is it so considered. It is adopted by all classes; by the covetous heir, whose heart beats with joy at any event which puts him in possession of his idol, as well as by those who are affected with the purest emotions of genuine sorrow. An English writer has remarked that "the very time that a man shall mourn, and the very time that he shall half mourn, and the very time he shall cease to mourn, are fixed for him by the world, whatever may be the duration of his own sorrow!"

'2. It is no mark of respect for departed relatives. The dark habiliments are assumed, whether the deceased was virtuous or vicious, honest or fraudulent, sober or intemperate; whether he was a man or a fool, a Christian or an infidel, a blessing or a curse to society.

'3. It imparts no consolation to the bosom of sorrow. It alleviates not the wo which flows from a bereaved heart. It offers no balm to its wounds. It equally fails to assuage excessive grief, and to excite that which is proper.

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* In one of the accounts of *George Washington's* last moments, the scene is represented thus: Every thing that professional skill could do having failed to relieve Washington, his attendants remained silent spectators at his bedside. Perceiving that they were painfully affected at his situation, and could not suppress their tears, he said, with a complacent smile, '*I am dying, gentlemen; but, thank God! I am not afraid to die.*'

'4. As a memento of departed worth it is superfluous. The heart of true friendship needs it not; the object of its affection is engraven there too deeply to be effaced. The mock mourner is unaffected by its sable hue.

'5. It conveys no moral or religious instruction to the mind. It excites no mourning for sin; no submission to God; no parting with the world; no desires for heaven. Neither the solemn realities of the scene of death, nor the affecting and admonitory truths of the word of God, can be enforced by it.

'Our objections to the custom are founded principally on its positive evils:

'1. It is extravagant, and absorbs a large amount of funds which might be appropriated to far more useful purposes.

'2. It presents strong temptation to pride and dishonesty, and has often robbed the widow and fatherless of their bread, and the creditor of his due.

'3. It is a violation of the command, "Be ye not conformed to this world."

'4. It diverts the attention from the voice of the Almighty in his instructive Providence. It occupies the mind, as well as the hands in that solemn period, which is so peculiarly favorable for the soul to retire within itself and contemplate its character and destiny.'

If such changes should be made as the good sense of these remarks calls for, those who make the law of *fashion*, and who can decide as to what shall be *imitated*, must begin.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Civil Society.

DUTIES.

380. Why should one man have a better house, more land, better garments, and better food than another? Why should one man have things convenient, comfortable, or even luxurious, *without labor*, while another must work all the day to obtain things of the first necessity? Why should not any one take and use whatsoever he sees; why should one pay money to make roads which he never passes over; and to maintain schools to which he sends no child; or to support paupers, who are entirely unknown to him? Why should a few men assemble, debate, and make laws, which other men are to judge of, and apply; and still other men execute, or carry into effect? Can it be right that one, or three or four men, should have power to deprive hundreds, in the course of a few years, of their natural liberty, and even to condemn some of them to death? Is it not much more agreeable to natural justice, that every one who thinks himself injured, should be his own judge of right and wrong, and inflict such punishment as he thinks proper, on the transgressor?

381. Writers on natural law, would answer such questions by saying, that all men are, by nature, free to do as they dare, or please to do; and that each one is independent of all others, and governed by no law but fear, or force. This, such writers call, *the state of nature.* That men, being in such state, found from experience, or anticipated, that it would be better for them to make a *contract*, or *social compact*, each one with all the others, to enter into a *state of society*, and give up some of these natural rights, and to become civilized. If this theory is sound, when did the people of Massachusetts, for example, leave the state of nature, and

enter into that of society? Was it when the Pilgrims landed? Were the Pilgrims in a state of nature? They were not when they left their native land, and they were undoubtedly civilized, while they were on the ocean, and after they found the shore. The contract must be sought further back. Was it made by those from whom the Pilgrims may have been descended, that is, by the Normans, the Saxons, the Danes, or the Britons, by each of whom England was (in whole or in part) successively possessed? Suppose one could arrive at a time when any barbarous people entertained an opinion, that it was best for them to change from their natural condition to a social one, *how* did they effect their object? What was the *form*, and *substance*, of the contract? It is difficult to suppose that authors so eminent, intended to be literally understood. It is more respectful to them to believe, that they intended only an illustrative fiction, which having been literally understood has led to some confusion.

382. It is not easy to comprehend what is intended by a state of nature as distinguished from a state of society. There cannot be a congregation of human beings, called a nation, a people, a tribe, or horde, however rude and barbarous they may be, who have not some sort of chiefs, rulers, and judges. The rudest horde have some sense of right and wrong as social beings; it has some rules, habits and customs, as between its members, and as between the whole horde, and similar congregations of persons. *As a whole*, the members must have some sense of the necessity of union to defend themselves from injury, and to obtain redress for wrongs. If the native Indians of our own country be taken for an illustration, every one will admit, that when our ancestors came over, these natives were in a state of nature, if there ever was such a state. But every one knows, that they had their rulers, their laws, their customs, their own sense of right and wrong, and of justice, and of property. If an Indian of one tribe, slew an Indian of another, justice demanded that the offender, or some one of his tribe

should die. There must be blood for blood. If the cornfield of one tribe was plundered by another, reparation must be made, or war ensued. The natives had their rules of making war, and of establishing peace. There were rules as to captives. It is not perceived why such a state of things does not make *society*. Hence it is inferred that society is natural to man, and that no human being ever did contract to pass from a state of nature, into a state of society, any more than he contracted for his share of the running waters to slake his thirst, or for his share of the atmosphere to keep his lungs in motion. He cannot prevent being in society, whether he *contract* to be so, or not. The difference between the rudest horde, and the most polished nation, is, that the one has made no perceptible improvement on original condition, while the other has made all the improvement which contrasts its present condition, with its original one. This change may have been gradually made, during many successive ages, and through numberless generations ; millions may have appeared, and disappeared, while the change has been going on. Thus it seems that man, can make out of society, as he can make out of himself, whatsoever will, wisdom, means, and opportunities permit.

383. In every condition in which man has been seen, he has been found to have the like wants, desires, and passions, which are seen in the most refined nations. The means of gratifying these natural propensities are very different, in different stages of improvement. The love of ornament, and of personal decoration, which are observed in an Indian princess, is precisely the same passion which is disclosed in the dress of a *belle* in a Parisian saloon. The leading passions of the Indian Teecumseh, and of the French Napoleon, were the same. The one wanted as much empire over civilized nations as the highest improvement of the military art could give him ; the other wanted as much empire over the inhabitants of the forest, as the scalping knife, and tomahawk, could give him.

384. As society improves, new objects of desire, and new means of gratification arise, and new rights accrue. Rights imply the possibility of wrongs. Rights and wrongs suggest remedies. Remedies imply rules or laws, and means of enforcing them. What is the difference *in principle* between the rudest, and the most refined society? The difference of mode in applying the principle, may be very great; and may be very unlike among nations pretending to equal refinement; but no difference is discerned in the *principle*, from the rudest to the most polished.

385. It has often been said, and by persons entitled to great respect, that society was instituted *merely to protect property.* If God placed mankind upon the earth merely to acquire, and to use property, this saying may be true; otherwise it is not. It is believed that they were placed here for the purpose of acquiring, and using property; and, also, for many other purposes, without the accomplishment of which, property would be of no value. They were placed here, in social connexion, to cultivate physical, intellectual, and moral power, for purposes which have no connexion with money, nor with any thing that money can buy. Social rules or laws, and the administration of them, or, in other words, *civil governments*, are not framed for the sole purpose of taking care of property, but for the melioration and improvement of social welfare. To these latter objects they have not been directed, in any proportion, to the good that might be done. Among the improvements which society will attain to, will be legislation, not to punish crimes, but to prevent them; not to relieve pauperism, but to root it out of society; not to provide a house of correction for the intemperate, but to make drunkenness impracticable. As to *property*, its true design is supposed to be this: The Deity made man, and all the elements of property for his use. Man must use these elements. Originally, he might take and appropriate any of them, to his own use, provided he did not prevent others from doing the like, who had the like necessity that he had. When any one had taken and appro-

priated anything to his own use, and especially if he has modified it, by his own labor, for his own use, it became his own, to the exclusion of all right, or pretension of right, in any other person. Thus an Indian has a property in his bow and arrow, in his war club, in his deer skin, in his wigwam, which is as perfect a right as the inhabitant of a city has to his domicil, and the furniture therein. There are Indian laws and customs, which regulate the acquiring, the use, and the exchange of property; and there are laws and customs, in civilized and polished nations, to the same ends. The inventions and improvements which are seen in polished society, make no change in the principle of property. In either case it is man, savage or civilized, as the case may be, using elements of property, made more or less suitable for use, by human ingenuity and industry. In either case, it is using property, within the protection of some acknowledged rule of right, however rude or perfect that rule may be. When any country has made a certain progress in improvement, everything within it, whether natural or artificial, has an owner. There are some things which cannot be owned by any one person, as a navigable river, an arm of the sea. The right of property in these, is in the people collectively, or in its civil rulers for them, or in the nation. The ocean, in like manner, cannot be owned by one nation. It belongs equally to all nations, and all have a right to move on it, just as the inhabitants of a country have a right to move on a river, or on an arm of the sea. Hence, it is plain, that there is no state of nature for man; unless one could go back to the first family that ever existed, and before they had begun to be any better than brutes; a case inconsistent with historical accounts.

386. If the aforegoing views be admitted, they show, that society is man's natural state; that society implies laws, and rulers; and the ministration of laws by some sort of authority. It tends, not at all, to impair the force of these truths, that mankind are known to have been as miserable as

history shows them to have been, in their social connexion. This fact proves, that there must be government, while it proves, also, that there may be very bad government. Why has this been so? Many causes have combined to keep man in ignorance of the laws intended for his welfare, or to make him a rebel against these laws when known. Among these causes may be enumerated, the propensity which mankind have shown to engage in war To attack, or defend, requires unity of action; this requires the direction of physical force (comprised in a great number of individuals) by the superior skill of one, or a few. When one man has conducted many, through perilous adventures; or has enabled them to defend themselves successfully, against imminent peril, he is held to be a superior being. His will becomes the law; his adherents find their passions gratified under his guidance. They are armed, united, combined. They have unity of action. They have superior knowledge, and bring knowledge to operate on fear, or ignorance. Thus, a few armed, intelligent, and united men, can keep great numbers in awe. Hence one reads of oppression, tyranny, cruelty. From such simple elements kingdoms, and empires, have grown up; and kings and emperors, who must, like all other earthly beings, obey the law of natural succession, have left to their descendants, the dominion which they had acquired. Another cause of human misery is the *perversion of religion.* There have always been men, throughout the world, (it was so among the Indians of this country) who by their superior skill, or learning, have assumed to stand between the gods and men, and who could promise, and assure, not only good or evil in this life, but in a life to come. This is seen, not only in Egyptian, Babylonian, Grecian, and Roman history, but in the history of Christian nations, as strikingly as in any. At this very hour, out of the 800,000,000 of beings who dwell on the earth, what proportion of them are blindly submissive to the tyranny of some sort of Priesthood! Military chieftains, and the ministers of the gods, have united their powers for their own common good. They have needed civil rulers to aid them in their purposes, and these have needed, military power, and priestcraft, to aid them. Hence privileged orders, and noble, and princely families, are seen in the world. There are not a few who think, that such an order of things is best adapted to human welfare ; that mankind are incapable of any better order. The number of those who entertain an entirely different opinion, is increasing. They think that such causes of inequality, and misery, are founded in ignorance, and that ignorance can be dispelled ; and that this beneficent work is going on successfully.

387. The young, who are soon to become *citizens*, are earnestly invited to consider, by what course of events it is, that they are blessed with an unexampled portion of rational civil liberty. They do not, as a great part of those who dwell on the earth do, derive their social, political, and religious condition from the joint acts of successful military chiefs, cunning priests, and dependant and subservient judges. Far otherwise. Their fathers dared to be free. They threw off, in a manly and glorious struggle, all the shackles, which the customs, and habits of ages, had imposed. They acknowledged no superior to themselves, but the DEITY. They had to form anew, the natural elements of social life, into a rational government. They were not passing from "a state of nature" into a "state of society." They had the light of experience, the collected wisdom of ages, the light of their own minds ; the consciousness that they were acting, not for themselves only, but for successive millions. They knew that they should soon pass away ; that their fame might be held in grateful remembrance ; but, above all, that they were *trustees*, who must soon render an account of their trust before their Creator. It is proved, that they lacked neither integrity, nor wisdom. The prosperity of the country, which they rescued from unjust dominion, shows, what they intended, and what they effected.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Civil Society. Its form, in the United States.

388. The theory of human society as established in the United States, is this: All men are born free and equal.* All men have the right to improve their physical, intellectual, and moral powers. All persons have the right to acquire, to use, and to enjoy. All persons have a right to dispose, in any manner which they think best, of whatsoever they lawfully possess. Every one may choose for himself his own religious opinions, and may worship God in whatsoever manner his conscience may dictate. Lawful industry is permitted to every member of society, in any business or calling, which he thinks himself qualified for, and in which he can benefit himself. There are no restrictive rules in this behalf, which the good sense of the whole community has not approved. Every citizen may pass throughout the whole extent of this great country in perfect protection, and security, (so far as human laws are concerned) and every one who is a citizen in one state, is a citizen in most respects in every other. He may dwell, and follow his vocations, in whatsoever part of the country he chooses, and may depart for a time, or entirely, at his own will. He may have a home, and all the benefits of home, wheresoever he chooses, according to his ability, and his own qualities. He is, everywhere, entitled to protection, in his life, in his person, in the members of his family, in his calling, in his property, and in his good name. He is free to decide for himself, for whom he will vote for all public offices. If he is wronged, he has a right to justice in a peaceable manner, freely, completely, promptly, and without delay. If accused, he has the right to meet his accuser face to face, in an open court of justice; and he cannot be deprived of his life, his liberty, his prop-

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* See note on Slavery, at the end of the volume.

erty, or benefits of citizenship, by any judicial sentence, unless an impartial jury shall have first inquired, and on their solemn oath pronounced, that he is justly charged. Notwithstanding the great number of judges who are in office in the twenty-four state sovereignties, and in that of the nation, instances of partiality, or unworthiness, in the administration of justice, even in the moments of high party excitement, are hardly known. Justice may be said never to loosen the bandage over her eyes, so that she can see, and distinguish the suitors, who appear in her temple. Every one whose industry, or whose accidental fortune, has possessed him of property, may order, to whom it shall go at his decease, after doing justice to all fair claims on him. *There can be no better political condition for man, than that of an American citizen.*

389. But under what circumstances and provisos is it held ? 1.—That he shall do to others, as he would that others should do to him. 2. That he shall so use his own, as not to injure others, nor anything that belongs to others. 3. That he shall obey the laws of the land ; shall render his reasonable personal service, when lawfully required ; pay his proportion of all public charges, and taxes ; and perform all the proper duties of a citizen. Suppose that the public laws are found to operate inconveniently on a particular citizen, and to restrain him from doing acts which he desires to do, why should he obey them ? Because the system of rules and laws, which have been made to regulate the common welfare, was made by himself. He answers that he did not make the laws. It may be true, that he did not act *personally*, in the making of the laws ; but he did, or might have acted personally, with others, in electing those by whom the laws were made ; and the elected had the right, and it was their duty, to make laws according to the form of Government to which he must be held to have assented, and which must continue in force until the power, (that of the whole people) by which it was created, sees fit to change it. But he does not like the laws.

Then he must try to have legislators chosen, who can change the laws by exercising the like authority by which they were made. It turns out that this cannot be done, because a majority of those who are sent to make the laws, do not find that they require change or amendment. The complainant is, then, in a minority of the whole number, and he must submit, because the will of the majority, legally expressed, must be the supreme rule in legislation, or society would have as many contradictory rules, as there may be different opinions, and would soon fall into incurable confusion. What is to be done, if the legislative power should make an intolerable law; and if after one, or more elections of new lawmakers, the law is neither repealed, nor amended? The presumption would be, that the law was not such as supposed by those who think it intolerable, and that from some cause, the dissatisfied were mistaken in their opinion, as to the want of power to make such law, or as to its utility, when made; yet, they determine to resist the execution of the law, and actually do so. In such case, those to whom the powers of preserving the government *itself*, no less than the powers of administering it justly, are given, must see that the law is executed; and must pursue those measures to that end, which the lawful modes of action require.

390. Doubtless there may be laws which are unjust, intolerable, and even tyrannical; for popular assemblies are made up of men. Aware of this, the wisdom of our patriots provided, that when a law is denied to be such as the legislative authority could make, that point must be settled by judges of proper judicial tribunals, on argument, and solemn deliberation. If these judges find the law to have been within the legislative authority, it remains in force, and must be obeyed; if not, they declare it is not a law, and it is void and of no effect. This is a provision peculiar to the American Governments, and is a truly excellent one. But suppose the dissatisfied will not resort to the opinion of the judges, but choose to judge for themselves, and resolve to

resist the law, *violence must follow.* If the dissatisfied cannot prevail, by force of arms, against the force of the Government, but are vanquished, they must be treated and punished as rebels. If they can succeed, it is revolution, and some other form of Government must arise. The patriots of this country, sixty years ago, resisted the whole power of Great Britian, because they thought the laws imposed upon them, were unjust and tyrannical. War ensued. It might have turned out to be rebellion, or revolution. It was GOD's will, and their own will, that it should be revolution. The highest trust ever confided to mortals, thereby, devolved on the American people; that of *doing as they please for their own good.*

391. The wisdom of our Fathers led them to propose *written constitutions*, which the whole people deliberately considered, and adopted. These constitutions provide, that laws shall be made by persons elected by the People to make them; that they shall be applied to the transactions of men, in their various civil duties; that when any breach of law is alleged, it shall be tried, or ascertained, whether there be a breach or not, by, or in the presence of, judges; that when any sentence or judgment is to be carried into effect, this shall be done by the Executive Power, which is charged with the duty of taking care that all laws are executed. The same constitutions provide, that the powers of one branch, shall never be exercised by any other branch.

392. One would think, that this beautiful theory, might easily be carried into effect. How plain it is, that nothing more is necessary, than for the people to choose from among their number, the most wise and faithful to legislate; and the most capable, and upright, for the executive power; and that this would ensure the appointment of the most learned and upright judges. Unhappily this does not always so prove to be, in practice. All the evils which are seen in the political action of this country, arise from ignorance, and dishonesty.

One would suppose that such causes of evil might be prevented.

393. There is a popular saying in the United States, which is borrowed from the constitutional maxim in England, that the King, or Sovereign, *can do no wrong*, whatsoever he may do. It is truly said here, that the people are sovereign ; and then it is said to follow, that *the people can do no wrong*. The people are many individuals. One person may do wrong, so also may many. Many are more likely to do wrong than one ; for they are subject to strong, and sudden impulses. They act without the responsibility which attaches to one. If many take an erroneous impulse, they encourage each other in the common error. One man alone, thinks of consequences ; a combined number do not. Their object is to carry their point ; and consequences may take care of themselves. History abounds in examples. But, as the people of any country cannot intend to do any wrong *to themselves ;* as our whole country, and all its institutions, belong to the people, and as they must all suffer from their own erroneous acts if any body suffer, how can they do wrong ? It is believed, that the whole people of this country, or those of any one of its many sovereignties, or of the subdivisions of these, never intend to do any wrong. They may, nevertheless, err. This arises from the want of true and just information in the matter on which they act ; and that may arise from the personal interest, which certain persons among them have, to mislead them. It is incredible that any number of citizens should not desire to do right, in any affairs which materially concern them; equally incredible, that they should not do so, in fact, if their own honesty, and good sense, had their true and just influence among them. But there are, and there ever have been, in all communities, certain individuals who suppose, that their own good is to be found in having certain acts done, which are inconsistent with the good of the whole community. Certainly there may be among these individuals, many who from various

causes are deceived themselves, and who think that the objects which they pursue, are proper to be pursued ; or they may think the objects proper, and that *any means* to obtain them, are proper ; or, they may well know, that both the objects and the means, are improper. The institutions of this country, are peculiarly adapted to give such individuals opportunities to act. It is believed, that all these errors, and wrongs, may be referred to the two common causes,—ignorance of what is right, and wilful departure from right, when known. As to the first, there is no excuse, unless ignorance of what can, and ought to be known, be an excuse ; for the latter, there is no excuse, because there is an intentional perversion of proper principles of action.

394. It is not blamable to desire to have power in popular governments, that it may be usefully applied ; it may be one's duty, under proper circumstances, to entertain this desire. For power must be exercised by some members of the community, for the common good. The error seems to lie, in seeking power for selfish purposes, and in striving to obtain it, by base means. Such persons, by modes well understood by them, direct, wherever they can, the thoughts, and the actions of their respective circles, and unite with their fellow laborers of other districts, to produce the desired result. They control the press, they discourse on the public good, they inspire distrust, jealousy, and ill will, towards opponents. Those who mean right, and take proper measures to effect their object, must also use the press, and discuss the motives, and the measures, of their adversaries. The result is a very natural one, which is, that the majority is sometimes misled, or deceived. There is, undoubtedly, a gross immorality somewhere, in these transactions. It is unjust to say that the evil done, is a mere consequence of social connexion, and inseparable from it. On the contrary, it is as clear and certain a violation of moral law, as it would be for one citizen to deprive another of reputation, or

property, by fraud. There is retributive justice even in this kind of wrong. It may be slow in coming, but it is pretty sure to come. The community find out, at last, who are wise and honest, and who have only *pretended* to be so. They learn that the latter have practised upon the maxim, '*All is right in politics*;' a maxim fit only for the moral perceptions of Constantinople and Pekin. The public, at length, reject, with the decision which becomes them, the maxim, and those who maintain it.

395. If two persons engage in any unlawful transaction, each of them puts it in the power of the other, to disclose their common secret; and either of them may, in some cases, make a merit of doing so. The danger that this will be done, increases in proportion to the numbers who are concerned. This well known principle may be applied as truly in political life, as in ordinary criminalities. Suppose any unprincipled party should, at any time, happen to get the power of government into their hands; and suppose they should misuse this power; and should attempt to fortify themselves in the possession of it, by dishonorable and fraudulent means: In such case, there must be a great number of persons in the secret; there must be some presses under their control; many things must be said and done, which it would be ruinous to their purposes to have disclosed. But, as the motive to the union, was, in this, as in all other wrong doing, self-interest in each; the same motive may, and commonly does, introduce disunion. If their purposes are detected, or suspected, they endeavour to cast the blame on each other. Some of their number will court the approbation of an opposing party, by making known opinions, and facts, which will disgrace and overthrow their late associates. The war which arises among such bands of friends, has elements of hate, and vengeance, which never mingle in natural, and honorable hostility. It is of little importance what becomes of such politicians, provided they cease to be public agents. It is of immeasurable importance

to a self-governing community, not to elevate such politicians to power. Even a short reign of such men, tends to shake the public confidence in the duration of republican forms; and even to cause doubts whether civil liberty was intended for man.

396. It is not surprising that the intelligent and upright men of a republic, who have such adversaries to contend with, are sometimes drawn into error. They have a difficult, and responsible duty. They often see their useful and honorable purposes defeated by an influence, which it is as impossible to countervail, as to change the organs of human perception. They have other difficulties. When they are not disgusted by experience, and attracted to the quiet of private life, they must yield to the universal law of the system of being of which they are a part. They must move onward. There is no contentment in *having* acquired. They are sometimes blinded as to the character of the means, by which their own purposes are to be obtained. They come, at length, to place an inordinate value on what they have, and may have. They become anxious and agitated; they have distressing apprehensions. They see through distorting lenses. In the course of the onward action, they are, sometimes, suddenly deprived of the public favor, and see that others obtain it, whom they believe to be unworthy of it. They complain of the ingratitude of republics. They discern, at last, the worth, and the vanity, of political ambition. These things are evils. All together, they make up a very bad world; a world in which talent and integrity may fail to find their reward. But after all, they are mere moral evils. All of them are of man's own making. They are not to be charged to the system which he belongs to, but to his own misunderstanding, and perversion of it. It would be happy for our country, happier for its statesmen, if they could say with an eminent judge who enlightened and adorned the country of our ancestors: "I wish *popularity*; but it is that popularity which *follows*, not that which is *run* after; it is *that* popularity

which, sooner or later, never fails to do justice to the pursuit of *noble ends*, by *noble means*. I will not do that which my conscience tells me is wrong, to gain the huzzas of thousands, nor the daily praise of all the papers which come from the press: I will not *avoid* doing what I think is *right*, though it should draw on me the whole artillery of libels; all that malice and falsehood can invent or the credulity of a deluded population swallow. I can say with a great magistrate upon an occasion, and under circumstances, not unlike, *Ego hoc animo semperfui, ut invidiam virtute partam, gloriam, non invidiam putarem.*" (*The unpopularity which may flow from an honest discharge of duty, I have always considered an honor, not a disgrace.*)

397. If we might venture to counsel the *young*, as to their political duties, we should say to them, that the Government of your country does not belong to those who are called to administer it, but to them, according to their numbers, and to the citizens, not in office, according to their numbers. *It is merely a partnership for the common good, in which some of the members are managers, by an election of the majority.* Those in office may be wise and honest, and yet, seeing things as they must, from points of vision peculiar to their position, they may see and judge erroneously. Public officers may be very unworthy of the trust confided to them; they may be weak, or unprincipled, and may think of office, only as means for the gratification of selfishness. The corrective authority does, or soon will, reside in you. If you are dutiful to yourselves, you will study the nature of the Government under which you are to live. You will discriminate between those citizens who are office seekers, and those whom office seeks. You must ever bear in mind, that to strive for power is natural to man. That power can be had, for political purposes, only through the tenure of office. That the selection and elevation of individuals to office, rarely occurs but through the combination of numbers, that is, of a dominant party. That, one party excites and exasperates, its opponent party.

That inflamed parties, are, to some extent, insane, just as any individual under the influence of a vehement passion is lost to the influence of reason. Each party will strive to increase its adherents. Each will have its orators, its newspapers, its policy. Each will labor to prove the other to be wrong. They will impeach each other's wisdom, and integrity. The members of both parties may often disqualify themselves to see any object in its true light. Rational intelligence is the only remedy for such evils. The preservation of the existing forms of Government, and pure administration under them, are the objects confided to your care. In these you will find the security of all things, which are adapted to make of life, a blessing. It is deeply to be regretted, that so large a portion of intelligent citizens, in this country, hold it to be no part of their MORAL DUTY, to take an effective agency, and to use their just influence, in the preservation, and proper use of political power. This negligence is one of the threatening dangers of the republic. If the great mass of the community, who have no desire for office, were dutiful to themselves, there might be little cause for complaint; and no fear of wicked or indiscreet perversion of republican Government.

CHAPTER XL.

SOCIAL DUTIES.

Duties which public laws might enjoin, or of which such laws might aid the performance.

398. If the object intended has been accomplished, it has been shown, that a social state, is the natural one for men, and that it is capable of progressive improvement. It is not reasonable to suppose, that it is as perfect, anywhere, as it can be. Is there not something more to be done by legislative power, than has been, hitherto, done?

Most of the existing laws, are made to punish crimes, to provide remedies for breaches of contracts, to subject trespassers to the payment of damages, to give power to individuals to do some acts for their own benefit, or to provide for public expense, or security. As the Governments of this country are instituted for the common good, as there is no good so important as MORAL GOOD in this life, how does it happen that legislatures have never exercised their power for the purpose of PREVENTING *moral evil* ? How does it happen, that they have done nothing for the encouragement, and support of the virtues, which adorn human life ? Why do they leave it to individuals, at their own expense, and by their own labor, to carry on the great duty of bettering human condition ?

399. Will it be maintained that the government of a Christian state, can do no acts *constitutionally*, to *prevent* pauperism, intemperance, and crimes ? Ought they to satisfy themselves with providing, that there shall be *learning*, without providing for any teaching, as to the purposes to which learning is to be applied in social life ? Is it inconsistent with the dignity of legislation to do any acts, in aid of the all-important knowledge, how human life should be passed ? Public laws may and ought to provide, that property, arts, science, and labor, shall be applied to prevent human sorrow and misery, and to increase the blessings of life ? However distant the day may be, when such purposes will be regarded as proper objects of the paternal regard of governments, that day will come. Meanwhile, there are no other means to advance social welfare, but those of individual exertion, and private munificence.

400. *Pauperism*. This subject, although one which is clearly within legislative power, and although one, which occasions great expense, yet, it is left entirely to individual agency, as to prevention. The causes of pauperism are partly of foreign, and partly of domestic origin. Government has the power to prevent the coming of foreign paupers. If State governments have it not, these, and the

National Government, together, certainly have. Whether natives or foreigners, *ignorance* of all duties to one's-self, to others, and to society, leads to gross sensual indulgence, to depraved habits of body and mind, to intemperance, to domestic misery, and to shocking crimes. All poverty cannot be prevented, but vice and crime may be, so as to reduce the whole amount, to a very small proportion of that which now exists. There is an example in the class of citizens called Quakers. There are said to be 100,000, at least, in the United States. They prove, that though all poverty connot be prevented, vice and crime may be.

Who ever saw a quaker begging in the streets; or an intoxicated quaker ; or any one of this class of citizens, at the criminal bar ? Are not this class engaged in the common affairs of the world ; are not they merchants, mechanics, artificers, mariners, and otherwise employed in the ordinary business of life ? They, like the rest of us, are subject to the temptations, and perversions, incident to our state of being. Here, then, is a clear demonstration, that even without the aid of civil power, but by the mere force of moral influence, there is a class of men, in the midst of society, who do escape disgraceful poverty, and who are free from vice, and crime.

401. Let us suppose that a ragged, squalid, bloated, decrepid beggar, stops a *lawmaker* in our social community, and solicits something to supply his pressing wants. The sentiment that instantly springs up in the mind of the lawgiver, is of this nature : 'You odious, and shocking resemblance of a human being ! How dare you ask of me to minister to your depraved cravings ?' This miserable object might reply to him : 'I am all that I seem to you to be. I was called into being by Him who called you into it. I was formed as you were formed ; and charged with the same trust, and duties. I became at the moment of my birth, a member of a community, sustained and directed by intelligence, by philanthropy ; and enlightened by

the Christian revelation. I was born among men, who are justly proud of their blessings, and who know what man is, and by what rules, and laws, error may be prevented, and happiness promoted. You are one of these. Have you no duties to perform, in the relation which you hold in the social union, to save such a wretch as you see me to be, from that complicated degradation in which I certainly am? If you had obeyed the laws which your superior knowledge enables you to comprehend, and enforce, would not you have been spared the painful duty of uttering, and I the humiliating one of hearing, your stinging reproaches?"

402. It is maintained by some, that men have a right to be vicious; that they may dispose of time, property, and character, as they see fit, so that the public law be not violated; that if public opinion, and the fear of future condemnation, present no restraint, there can be none; that there is a limit to public law, which cannot be passed; that the cases alluded to lie beyond it. The public laws should be, and may be such, as to *prevent evil to the erroneous themselves*; certainly such *as will prevent misery to innocent persons*, who are connected by the very order of society, with the erroneous; persons who must suffer keenly, hopelessly, if the public law offer them no remedy, no relief. We believe that the great duties of legislation demand *prevention* much more than *punishment;* that hospitals may be used to save *commencing* sinners, rather than to receive far gone, and perhaps, incurable ones. The serious subject of public punishment, has attracted a benevolent, humane, and enlightened consideration. The American republics may honestly claim to be far in advance of the old world, in this respect. Jails are, *in some instances*, in this country, what jails should be, while there must be such places. Penitentiaries are, *in some cases*, what their name indicates. It is possible, nay probable, that a convict may be qualified, by his confinement, penitence and discipline, to return to society, prepared to be, what society demands that its members should be. How much more

honorable would it be, if the like cost, labor, thought, and benevolence, were devoted to *prevent* crimes, instead of punishing them.

403. As society is now managed, (that is, without any aid from public authority), its welfare must depend, in all matters of improvement, on private associations. Their means are limited; yet they have a well deserved influence. The feelings, common to all human hearts, are seen to operate in these measures, which tend to form the binding law of public opinion. Example, imitation, emulation, self-respect, refined moral sense, sympathy, compassion, in a word, the true spirit of Christianity, are at work in these commendable efforts. If there be some men, *wiser* than all others, who smile at some of these measures, and who doubt the utility of the general diffusion of knowledge, it is to be hoped that they will live to realize an agreeable disappointment, in the effect produced. All these associations deserve the notice, and the respect of the YOUNG. They ought, not from a cold sense of duty, but because it is among the best acts which they can do for themselves (as influencing the whole of life), to inform themselves of the purposes of these societies, and to become members of them. The money which they expend therefor will return them an abundant profit, in the fact, that themselves, and all around them, are growing wiser, and better; and that life itself will become, more and more, a beneficent gift.

404. Among the objects which are thus commended to notice, are bible societies, sunday schools, temperance societies, improvement in the moral character of seamen, public lectures, lyceums, associations for mutual instruction connected with libraries, owned in common; and the further most important one, associations for learning the laws of physical action, in reference to bodily powers. Why should the young persons of the United States, be round-shouldered, curved, and ill formed in their persons, and awkward in their bodily action? Their Creator did not intend them for such sort of beings;

but to be straight, full-chested, easy, and decorous, in all their deportment.

405. There are some things which may be said to belong rather to *local police* than to any general legislative authority. All of these are comprised within the range of moral and social duties, however varied by circumstances. A person of refined moral feelings will hold the observance of what so many in the world hold to be '*none of other folks business,*' imperative duties, for two reasons ; 1. out of respect to himself; 2. out of reasonable consideration for others.

406. Thus every one belongs to a *neighborhood*, which is both local, and social. Even those who have removed into new countries, and who dwell in solitary abodes, do not lose the sentiment of neighborhood. The nearest person to them is a *neighbor*, though separated by long distance. And when this sentiment cannot be preserved in fact, it may be in thought, and by that means it usually is so. Perhaps the last impressions that leave the heart of one who has wandered into far distant regions, are those made in his early days, in his native home. In general, as every one lives in a neighborhood, more or less dense, he can promote his own happiness, and that of those around him, by observing a becoming moral conduct. He has a right to enjoy life, and to use all things which he has, to that end; but he has not a right to any employment which necessarily disturbs the well being of others. Peace, tranquillity, and security within one's own walls, is the main purpose of life. No one has a right to interfere in these things, but by order of the public law. A neighbor, therefore, who so conducts himself, and those means of pleasure which he commands, as to vex, harass, and disturb those who are necessarily within sight, hearing, &c., violates the law of morality. It often happens to be the *pleasure* of one who dwells in a dense neighborhood, to keep one or more animals whose habitual noises disturb those who necessarily dwell within hearing, in the hours allotted to repose. Now, whatever the

rigid law of the land may say in such cases, the law of morality says, that the suffering party has an unquestionable right to remove his trouble, if the proprietor of the cause of such nuisance will not, on request, remove it himself. A more peaceable way would be, to have it removed by order of the public magistrate. Many of such petty nuisances, ought to be removable on summary verbal application, and not in the slow, written, and printed process, in which the movements of ordinary law are commonly made.

It often happens that in a dense population, in which there must always be many persons, who are visited by dangerous illness, loud and distressing noises are made within their hearing. Valuable lives may, sometimes, depend upon quiet and unbroken stillness. The spirit of good neighborhood demands, that the condition of such persons should be regarded; and that even lawful and useful sounds should, for that time, be suspended. Why? Look into your own heart for the answer. If it were yourself, your husband, your wife, your child, how would you that others should do to you, or them? Is there not a law written in your own heart? By WHOM was it written there?

407. The moral duties of neighborhood extend to all things which minister to the common comfort, convenience, and security. Each one of a neighborhood is bound to make his own dwelling place, as agreeable, and pleasant to those around him as he reasonably can. Each one is morally held to uphold, and sustain, a good name for his own little community. He is, therefore, to join, with a liberal and manly feeling, in all the improvements which tend to please, and adorn. Such things, even if they occasion some expenditure, are sources of self satisfaction; and one comes, at last, to take an honorable pride in hearing his street, his village, his town, or city, commended by observers.

408. *Duties to the poor.* If the power of legislation were effectively applied to prevention, as well as to relief of poverty, the duties of individuals would be

greatly diminished, in this respect. The poor are commonly spoken of as the *vicious*, and the *virtuous* poor. Those who look upon the former, as not entitled to charity, have not *considered*. These wretched beings may have come into life with worthy propensities, and may have been led by example, or through ignorance of the purposes of life, or from the perversion of them, to the degraded state in which they are seen. They are still human ; and sensibilities of mind, and body, yet live in them. Society and its members, owe them a debt, in having permitted, since they did not prevent, such mournful depravity. These persons are entitled to be comfortably taken care of at the public expense ; but not to be furnished with money *as beggars*, without first knowing to what purposes it is to be applied. If one who is solicited to afford relief would take the trouble to go to the place of abode of such persons, he would sometimes behold a scene of wretchedness, which would touch his heart, and possibly put him upon thinking of whose mercy it is, that he is not himself, what he beholds. He might, in such visit, have performed an act of humanity for which he would properly esteem himself, and he might perhaps return from his visit, *a better man*.

409. The *virtuous* poor are entitled to the tenderest sympathy. Consider how sorely tempted they are, to seek relief from distressing wants, by whatsoever means they can. They may have been independent of all charity, and sufficiently instructed to be entitled to the respect, esteem, and friendly society of those, whom the world justly respects. Causes, over which they had no control, even the performance of duties, may have made them infirm, and helpless, with all the keen sensibility of remembered independence. It is a noble duty of Christian benevolence to visit and console, and minister to the wants of such unfortunate persons. It is sympathy, and kindness, that they are grateful for, rather than for money. The busy world seems to have closed every heart, and hand to them, and to have condemned them to exile, in the very bosom

of society. How honorable it is, in such persons, amidst all their temptations, *to have done no wrong*; not even, perhaps, to murmur at the dispensations of Providence. A young and fervent heart, will learn far better lessons for the purposes of this life, in visiting, comforting, and relieving such objects of charity, than in many of the places which they are accustomed to frequent.* Helpless poverty, is a real, positive evil. But, it is not a natural evil. In most cases it is occasioned by ignorance, or wilful disobedience. Come as it may, it is a charge on society; and many a heart may beat with more complacency, in having done the duty of ministering to its relief.

CHAPTER XLI.

Dissatisfactions in human life, arising from supposed inequality and injustice in the distribution of good.

410. A poor man who looks at the outside of a splendid mansion, and imagines the means of happiness which are found therein, naturally compares his own condition, with that of the fortunate owner. One who is poorly clad, passes another on the high way, who is sumptuously adorned, and who is drawn in an easy carriage, guided by a servant, who is, like himself, human. One goes into a court house, or legislative assembly, and hears a man speaking, and commanding the attention of a numerous collection of persons. He compares his condition with that of the rich, the luxurious, and the well-educated. He finds that injustice has been done to him. His own home is a humble one; his garments are poor, and obtained

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* There has lately appeared a translation (by Miss Peabody) of Degerando's "Visiter of the Poor;" with an introduction by Dr. Tuckerman, which well deserves the attentive study of all, who are disposed to perform the duties implied in *Charity to the Poor.*

with difficulty ; he cannot ride, nor can he gain money, and applause by any intellectual effort. The world is, to him, a bad one ; and to exist in it, is to be miserable. Is he right in his opinions, and the world wrong ; or is he wrong, and the world right? The world may be wrong, in the action of some of the individuals, who compose it ; the complainant is wrong in this, he is not well informed of the purposes of life ; nor of the nature of society. He is deceived in supposing that riches, honors, and intellectual powers, are, *in themselves*, HAPPINESS. He is deceived, through his ignorance in this, that such incidents are only *means* to happiness, and may be means to misery, if ill used. Certainly there must be riches, and distinctions in the condition of men. There must be some men better informed, and with more intellectual power, than others have. But, he is greatly mistaken in supposing, that every one *must be happy*, because he has riches, distinction, and knowledge. Whether such an one is happy, or not, depends on the *moral character of his own mind.* For who does not know, that one may be very rich, highly distinguished, very intelligent, and very miserable. A false estimate of the value of wealth, in human life, that is, the covetousness of it, and the holding of it, as an ultimate possession, instead of taking it to be used for honorable and commendable purposes, is (as has been shown) one of the most degrading perversions that can be seen among men. So, also, distinctions are means of happiness or not, as the holder of them does or does not comprehend the *moral* use of them. Intellectual power is good or bad to the possessor, as he does, or does not use it, for his own rational good, and that of his fellow-men. The true moral perception, which a just, gentle, civil, temperate, industrious, healthy man may have, although he be comparatively poor (for such a one cannot be dependently poor) may insure to him a far happier life, than many a rich distinguished and intellectual man, ever knew.

If, however, such a man, as the last mentioned, should know, the proper use of wealth, of distinction, and of intellectual power, and should use all these means, honorably to himself, and usefully to others, is not this the very inequality, and injustice, which are complained of?

411. Let us see, then, if there be any thing wrong, and justly to be complained of, in this respect.

Can any *one man* be a minister, a physician, a lawyer, a farmer, a blacksmith, a merchant, a manufacturer, a shipbuilder, a mariner, a judge, a shoemaker, a miller, &c. Are not all these and many other classes, necessary in the division of labor, on which the prosperity of society depends? Are not all men, in whatsoever vocation they are, more or less gifted by nature; more or less instructed by education; more or less diligent in their vocations; more or less fortunate in the place, time, manner and circumstances, in which they carry on their respective callings? Do not the general laws of the Creator, in tempests, storms, peculiarity of seasons, in epidemic diseases, &c., sometimes derange the wisest of human plans? Do not unforeseen political changes, whether in one's own country, or in others, affect human prosperity, which no prudence, no intelligence, could foresee or prevent? Can every man be born to an inheritance, or keep one, if he happens to be? Are there not general laws in the action of society, as there are in the action of the material universe, to which individuals, and whole classes of individuals, must submit? Can any man be born to any particular condition? How can he influence the time, and the circumstances in which he shall become one of the millions of his nation? He must blame his progenitors if he do not like his natural qualities; his instructers, and most commonly himself, if his acquired qualities be not such as he would have them to be. Thus, it is plain, that from combined causes, partly such as no mortal can control, and partly such as he can control, and for the not controling of which he must blame himself, there must be, what is called, *inequality* of condition. It does not appear that men complain of not being wise, well instructed, amiable, virtuous, intelligent, gentle, temperate, industrious, as other men; but that they are not *rich* as other men; or not as much esteemed as they would be, if they were *rich*. Let us consider then what riches are, and what are the means of becoming rich.

412. It is apparent to every observer, that the members of society, are variously employed, and that they have, respectively, more or less of *property*. Is this inequality among men, an injustice, and society, therefore, wrong? If this sort of complaint were heard in a country, where certain individuals are immensely rich, raised above their fellow men, in general, by titles, and constituted law-makers, and judges, and even ecclesiastical dignitaries, *by the single accident of birth*, it would seem to have much of reason to support it. It is believed, that there is not any reason in it, among a people, where all such distinctions, *founded in birth*, are unknown; and where every one may, if he can, and will, raise himself to any reasonable distinction, which he may deserve. We see not how this complaint is properly raised in a community, which has the unquestionable privilege of choosing, as it may see fit, its public agents, of every description, and even its religious teachers, from among its own members. If there be errors, as undoubtedly there may be, in the public policy, the members of this community, have an easy and peaceable remedy, in their own hands. If they are sufficiently intelligent, and well informed to know, that a case has arisen in which the remedy is called for, it is their own fault if it be not applied.

413. *Riches* consist of that part of the surface of the earth, which can be used for human habitations and their appendages; of that part which can be used to produce vegetation; of that part over which, and near which, there are flowing waters capable of imparting motion; they consist of all personal estate, and of money, the agreed representative of

all property, which is, at the same time, property in itself. Possessions, of these various kinds, are acquired by inheritance, or by industry. Right by inheritance, is not wrong. Would any rational mind maintain, that when the father of a family, or any one who has no family, has acquired property, and dies, it shall belong, of right, to any, and to all, who can get possession, by fraud, force, or whatsoever other means they may ? Society could not be held together, if such were the rule of right. It is, at once, apparent, that if such were the rule, there would be nothing to contend for ; because all inducement to acquire for the benefit of one's family, and connexions, would be annihilated. Society would be forthwith reduced to barbarism. The right to acquire, and the right of inheritance, are wisely ordained to be a necessary consequence of society, and one of its strongest motives *to act to useful ends.*

414. If it be irreconcilable to justice, to convenience, and to the common good, to take by fraud, or violence, that which the *dead* must leave behind them ; much more so is it, to take from the *living*, by like means, that which they can honestly acquire, by the exercise of their own industry. If a member of a community were always liable to be despoiled of the fruits of his labor, the great principle of the system of being to which man belongs, would have been misplaced ; there would have been no sufficient motive to *action.* If one would know what society would be, if such were the law, and the practice, as to property inherited, or acquired, he must visit the northern coast of Africa ; the imperial city of Constantinople ; in short, almost any country on which the light of Christianity does not shine.

415. It is contended by some persons, that there should be a periodical division of land, and property, and that every member of the community shall have an equal share. How often should this division be made ? Should it be made once a year, once

in ten years, once in fifty years ? Why should it be made at one time, rather than at another ? Suppose it could be made, and were made, it must be but a very short time, before it ought to be made again, if the reason for making it be, that some have more and some less ; and that some are rich, and some poor. One must be wilfully blind not to see, that either the whole action of society must stop, or that inequality of condition would arise, in a single year, perhaps, in a single month ; and even such inequality as would call for a new division. In a country, where the statute law makes an equal distribution, among heirs ; and where the spirit of enterprize and speculation has an unrestrained agency, the causes of regret are, that sad reverses occur, and that property changes hands too often, rather than that it is unreasonably held in the hands of a few, and of their successors. A small number of generations is sure to bring equality, considering our community as a continuing one. Thus, property comes and goes, in this country, as fast as any one can reasonably desire to have it. The changes which are seen, as to the ownership of it, are regulated by authority far wiser than any of man's institution. Is it not enough that a *gracious Benefactor*, has made us free to act according to his laws ; has given us the power to comprehend, and obey these laws ; has taught us, that labor, and action, to useful ends, shall be a pleasure in themselves, and worthily rewarded ; and that if one would be comfortable in his circumstances, (and even rich, if he desire to be so,) he must study out, and apply, honorable, and virtuous means of becoming so ? It is exceedingly difficult, to discern, how the social condition of the people of this country, or of any country, could be placed on a foundation, better adapted to promote human happiness than it is. If it were rightly understood, and availed of, it would be among the most fervent motives to gratitude. For, we cannot but insist, that honest labor, whether with the head, or the hands, or both, is alike honorable in all classes; and constitutes the most enduring pleasure which is known in this life.

INDEPENDENCE.

416. The *moral* of all that has been discussed in these pages may be comprised in a single word, *independence.* So far as one's fellow men are concerned, who is he that may justly claim to be independent?

1. He who knows the laws of that material existence, of which he is, himself, a part, so that he can properly use whatsoever will sustain him in health, and vigor, and so that he can avoid whatsoever will disqualify him to perform his duties to himself, and to others.

2. He who properly obeys the irresistible impulse to action, in lawful modes, and to useful ends.

3. He who is instructed in some calling, whereon individual and social prosperity depend; and who can, by honorable industry therein, supply his own reasonable wants, and the like wants of those, who share with him, a well ordered, cheerful, satisfying *home.*

4. He who knows that he is not "to live to himself," but for himself, and for society; and that among his highest duties, is that of having, and of expressing a just judgment, on all men, and on all measures, on which the public security, and welfare depend.

5. He who is too frugal to give his earnings to vain and costly pleasures, because *others do so;* and who is too wise to sacrifice his personal freedom, and his peace of mind to irrational fashion, blind imitation; or hazardous scheming to grow rich.

6. He who realizes that life must be treated as a WHOLE; that youth, early manhood, and middle age are the seasons given to prepare for the winter, that is sure to come; and wherein the sole dependence may be on the gatherings which have been made in these seasons, which are gone, and forever.

7. He who fears no reproach from any mortal, for anything done, or omitted.

8. He who fears no intercourse with that monitor who dwells within, and which will go with him to, and beyond the grave ; and which cannot upbraid him with having sacrificed his duty, through fear, through hope of favor, or in weakness, to any mortal being.

9. He who believes that whatsoever is done on earth, by rational beings, should be done, in reverence of HIM who ordered, who upholds, and who governs all that is, or will be.

10. He who *dies* careless of all scrutiny which interest, envy, or malice may make, provided truth and justice be respected.

Such independence, it may be said, is a severe exaction from human nature ; no person can be *so* independent. Certainly, there have been, and there may be, such persons. There are always some who range between mediocrity, and the highest attainment. If there be one in an hundred thousand, this proves what human nature can be. How many such there might be, has never been proved by any fair experiment in moral education. There are phrases, often uttered, to show the character of the age, and among them these ; *march of mind ; the schooler master is abroad.* These phrases imply, that society is industriously employed in promoting its own improvement. Suppose, then, that able artificers are at work, on excellent materials, but each one, in a large proportion of the whole, *seeing* by his own lamp light, at noon day. Would it not be better to throw open the shutters, and let in that light, which was given for man to work by ; and which is the best light that man can use, in whatsoever work he is engaged ?

After all, it must be admitted, that even the wisest and the best, must sometimes hide a mournful sigh, and a scalding tear, in the bosom of philosophy and religion, as the disconcerted child hides its face in the lap of its mother. But it is only to be reassured, *that all goes right*, IF MAN, HIMSELF, GO RIGHT.

CHAPTER XLII.

Duties which the People of one country owe to those of another.

417. It is seen that all the people of the earth belong to some one of the many nations; that each nation has a distinct language, with the few exceptions of those who have become nations after having been colonies, as is the case with our own country. It is also seen, that nations are separated from each other, not only by language, manners, customs, religion, and forms of civil government, but, also by geographical boundaries. The origin of languages, the transmission of them, the changes which they undergoe, the loss of some which have existed, and the languages formed out of several, are subjects of great curiosity and interest, but foreign to the present purpose. As no nation can be supposed to have chosen its own language, and as there are so many varieties; as the whole family of mankind could not form one people, since they would necessarily break into fragments, it cannot be doubted, that the division into nations, conforms to the will of the Deity. There are obvious advantages in this division. There is, probably, some natural, and necessary geographical limit to political power. Beyond this natural limit, power must be delegated; and those who are submitted to it, must suffer. The security, and prosperity of a nation may have been intended to result, from having a certain number of persons united in one territory, and bound by common interest; and also, that one nation should act on another, through the influence of emulation, as well regulated individuals act on each other. That by such means the common interests of nations, generally, should be promoted. Whatever may be thought of such suggestions, (which are admitted to be merely speculative) it is very certain, that the people of

the earth have always been divided into nations, and most distinctly marked from each other.

418. National intercourse is two-fold. 1. That which is conducted by those public officers who represent the nation ; (or who call themselves the nation.) 2. That which is carried on by the individuals of different nations, in commerce, hospitality, or in the interchange of thoughts. The common relation which any two nations sustain towards each other, is that of peace, or war. Under the former, there may be an unlimited, or a modified intercourse, according to the policy of each nation ; under the latter, the relation is well known, as to character, and consequences. What changes are to occur in the belligerent acts of nations, is matter of curious, and interesting speculation, but not connected with the objects under consideration. As nothing stands still in this system of being, there will be changes in the matter of war. They may be very slow, as much so as some kinds of formation, and decomposition, in the natural world ; they are, nevertheless, it may be presumed, to come.

419. There are certain moral duties, it is believed, which the individuals of every enlightened, and Christian nation owe, to those of every other, when the public relations permit the lawful performance of them. The commendable policy of one nation, may instruct another. If the arts, the sciences, and the social improvements in one nation, advance its welfare, other nations may imitate its enterprize, and emulate its success. If there be obvious errors, and consequent disadvantages, or sufferings, in one, another may so shape its policy, as to avoid the like evils. The benefits which arise from comparing books, with the actual state of things, by means of personal observation, cannot be too highly valued : Certainly, not by those who think, that the present is a progressive state of improvement, in which the whole family of mankind are alike interested. It seems consistent with such a view of things, that all strangers who visit any country, with commendable motives, and

who are of worthy deportment, should be kindly received; that they should be made to feel that they are welcome; that they are secure, in property, and person. It is the common interest, to treat all such visiters, with courtesy, and civility. Sometimes the manifestation of such feelings is misplaced; but in general, in the course of natural justice, there is an ample return for all that is properly rendered. It may never happen to one's-self, to be in the way of receiving a return; but it will come to some of one's countrymen, or be kindly remembered of the country, which is an abundant return. The day, happily, is gone, and it is to be hoped forever, when all who are not citizens, are to be regarded as barbarians, or enemies.

420. This division into nations, is thought to be favorable to the diffusion of Christian knowledge. If it be practicable to translate the Scriptures into the language of any heathen country, and to approach, teach, and convince, persons who are in authority, and who exercise an influence over the mass of persons, it may be presumed, that the work of diffusing Christianity may be essentially promoted. Efforts to teach the sublime truths of Christianity, are a hopeless labor, until the mind has been prepared to receive them. This has been proved in the Pacific Isles. Instruction in reading, and writing, appears to have been among the earliest steps. The result of labor in this respect, has insured to many teachers, the highest consideration; and has proved that the barbarous ignorance of the pagan world will, at some time, be made to disappear. A kind and friendly international communion, is, on this account, as well as on all others, a high moral duty. If it be seen that Christians who visit heathen countries conduct themselves while there, according to the precepts of the religion which they profess, it must be a strong recommendation of that religion itself. It cannot be doubted, that such deportment must be *understood* every where, because it is natural to every heart that is not perverted. Although political duty certainly forbids the inter-

ference of individuals, in national affairs, which are necessarily confided to public agents; yet, duties, no less imperative, exact, that at all times, and under all circumstances, when countries are at peace, the command 'to do as you would have others do to you,' extends to the whole family of mankind, whenever, and wheresoever it can be applied.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Duties to the Creator.

421. In attempting to show what these duties are, it is, by no means, intended to assert any *sectarian* opinions. On the contrary, it is assumed that conceptions of the character and attributes of the Deity, the manner in which the Scriptures are to be read, and understood, and the forms of homage, which are to be observed towards the MOST HIGH, are matters which concern every one for himself. Each one is to be finally responsible for the manner in which he has performed his trust and duties. It is entirely foreign to the present purpose, to dictate, or prescribe, to any one, what he may or may not believe, on disputed doctrines; in what terms he shall offer his supplications, express his penitence, or present his gratitude.

422. Religion arises from man's perception of his relation to the system of being of which he is a necessary part; and from each one's conception of the relation in which he stands to that power from whom this system proceeded. The presence and influence of Religion, is to be felt and manifested, throughout the duration of human life, in all that is thought, and done. Certainly, religion cannot be something which one is to feel, and show, at stated days and hours, and at no other times; though there may be times, and seasons, properly set apart, for that homage which is to be rendered, *as well for the gift of religion itself*, as for all other bounties which call for the gratitude of man. As to those duties

which each individual may consider himself bound to perform, disconnected from all other individuals, in the form of worship, he must judge for himself. If he err, he is accountable, and not another.

423. From the earliest ages, Christians have been accustomed to assemble for the purpose of social worship. They have offered, *unitedly*, their prayers, their penitent supplications, their praise, and their adoration. They have been accustomed, with devout humility, to acknowledge the superintendence and government of the Deity, in all the serious events, and changing scenes of life ; and to beseech his blessing in all acts worthy of the acknowledged relation of created, and dependant beings. Although these various duties arise, directly between every mortal, and the Author of his being, yet there have always been individuals, who were intended to be, in some degree, separated from the ordinary scenes of life, and whose days have been devoted to the study, the practice, and the teaching, of religious duty. It has been the usual course, especially in this country, to invite the presence of these teachers, in all solemn transactions, and when under visitations of Divine Providence ; and, through them, to express the sentiments, and feelings, called for by the occasion. These teachers have properly acquired the name of *pastors*, and those who have gathered around them, that of *their flock*.

424. As it has been usual for Christians to assemble periodically, and to unite in public worship, according to the various forms and rites, of which they have respectively approved ; so they have devoted one day in a certain number of days, for this public service. This day they distinguish as their sabbath. The word *sabbath*, is said to be taken from the Hebrew, and to signify *to cease*, or *to rest*. The word *sunday* is in common use. It is said, that certain heathen nations in the north of Europe, dedicated their day of religious worship to the *Sun*. Whence their Christian descendants called the Christian sabbath, Sunday.

425. We pass over the inquiry as to the time

when, and the manner in which, the *Jewish sabbath* was instituted. This is, perhaps, still an open question among biblical critics, and one not involved in the present object. It may also be a question, whether the Saviour did, by precept, or example, set apart any day of the week for social worship. It is said that no command, or recommendation of this nature, appears in the New Testament. Yet, it is believed, that there was some command to this effect, because in the life-time of the Apostles, it was usual for Christians to assemble on the first day of the week. This day was selected, it has been supposed, because it was the day of the resurrection, whence it has been called '*The Lord's day.*' However these things may be, it has been the practice of Christians, from the earliest time, to regard the first day of the week, as their sabbath ; and to keep it with more or less strictness. Among many classes of Christians it is kept with nearly the same strictness, which was habitual among the Jews. That people seem to have carried the observance of the day to the full extent of divine command. In the long-continued siege of Jerusalem, which ended in its destruction, and in that of the Jews as a people, they are said to have so far overcome their scruples, as to defend their persons when attacked on the sabbath ; but not so far as to feel justified in resisting the enemy on that day, when they were filling up the trench before the wall, to facilitate the conquest of the city.

426. It is well known that great diversity of opinion exists among Christians, as to the manner in which the sabbath should be kept. In catholic countries the sabbath is observed, in a manner which *Protestants* have neither copied, nor approved. Among the latter, there are various opinions as to the proper mode of keeping this day ; and these opinions have been repeatedly expressed, and publicly discussed. This matter must be left, at least on the present occasion, to the proper influence of public opinion. There are some points, in which it is to be hoped all Christians accord, and which

are proper to be remarked upon. There are some others, on which it may not be deemed obtrusive to express an opinion, although all may not entertain the like view.

427. It is clearly settled from earliest usages in *this country*, and alike by all denominations, that the first day of the week is their sabbath; and settled in like manner, that there shall be two meetings, the one before, and the other after the middle of the day. Besides these two meetings, some denominations do, and others do not, have a third meeting, at some hour of the evening. There are meetings, among some denominations, on other days of the week. The object in all these meetings is social worship, according to the religious sentiments which the assembled entertain. Thus one thing is clearly settled, that all Christians hold to social public worship, especially, on the first day of the week. It is reasonable to suppose, that a practice of such antiquity, and so universally observed, must be founded in some principle natural, or agreeable, to the human mind. There have been, also, modes of keeping the sabbath prescribed by political authority; and also many requisitions, as to forms and modes of worship, arising from ecclesiastical discipline; and these have been, in many ways, sanctioned and enforced by the same authority. The history of Christian nations, down to a late period, is made up mostly of wars, civil commotions, and controversies arising out of religion. During the last fifty years, in the United States, there has been a gradual separation of the ecclesiastical, from the political authority. The like change seems to be going on in Europe, and it is not improbable that the present tendency is to dispose of religion, and of worship, as has been done among the people of the United States: that is, to leave these things to the care of conscientious duty. Supposing that there should be no requisition, on the part of public authority, to do anything concerning religious associations and establishments: that this authority should only tolerate them, and afford them the like

protection, which it extends to all the lawful, peaceable, and praiseworthy meetings of associated citizens; suppose the public authority should withdraw all support and countenance of the sabbath, and even attempt to abolish it, as was done by a nation in Europe, at the close of the last century: Then the question would be, *What is the obligation to maintain public worship, on the sabbath?*

428. The respect to be paid to the sabbath is supposed to rest on the following considerations:

First. It is clear, to every well-informed person, that the material system of being (which is apparent to every human eye that is not wilfully closed,) did proceed from supreme Intelligence; that it is ordered by incomprehensible power, and adorable goodness; that man in his marvellous physical organization, and in his intellectual powers, and in his adaptation to partake in the bounties of this system, proceeds from the same Divine Author; that he begins, continues, and ends his connexion with that Author, on earth, in subjection to his will; that this complicated, and astonishing system, could not endure, and go on through its destiny, (whatever that may be,) without the unceasing presence, government, and providence of the Almighty. That, as man is so constituted, as to be enabled to discern, and be assured, that all these things are so, the natural and inevitable sentiment, that arises in his mind is, that he owes the reverence, submission, and gratitude due from the created, to the Creator.

Second. That this natural sentiment is confirmed by Divine revelation, whereby man is enabled to know what his true relation is to the Deity; that his duration does not terminate with the frail tenement of earth in which he abides, while human life is in process; but that he is surely intended to renew his existence, according to the manner in which he shall have obeyed, served, and rendered his homage, to the Author of his being.

Third. From these undeniable truths it follows, that as all men proceeded from one, and the same Creator, and as they are bound together by common interests, duties, sympathies, affections, and must act together, in the most important concerns of life, that concern, which is the most important of all, *the reverence of* God, should be manifested at convenient times, and in convenient *assemblies*, and with one heart and with one voice; that such social worship is encouraging, monitory, consoling and honorable, and is worthy of the Deity, and of the objects of his common bounty.

429. If these opinions are received and admitted, as founded in the obvious relation of man to God, then it would follow, that some time should be set apart, in which all may join in the duties, which arise from it. There was a time assigned by Divine command among the Jews, which was each seventh in the succession of days. This appropriation is convenient to man's own nature, and to that of the creatures who are held in servitude to him, since it is the day of cessation from that labor which is necessary to man's well being; and hallowed as the day of rest in the earth, and the day of homage to Heaven. It is one more among the innumerable proofs of divine goodness, that the mind of man is so ordered, that there may be a day of periodical return, when, by universal consent, and approbation, the busy and anxious scenes of life may be shut out, and an opportunity given to turn the course of thought to the design of life, its progress, its termination, and its consequences.

430. Viewed in its earthly relations, merely, and, if it were possible to disregard the sabbath in its acknowledged relation to the Deity; still it is a precious day, to rational, social, sympathetic man. It is that day on which he knows that all men who acknowledge the existence, the presence, and the attributes of the Universal God, are engaged in rendering to him the duties of that acknowledgment. From the city, from the village, from lonely abodes, from the bosom of the deep, every where, rational, thankful, penitent, supplicatory man, offers, at the same time, his humble tribute to the Most High. It is grateful to know, that throughout the

earth, millions of voices are raised at the same moment, in praise, and adoration.

431. There are still nearer views of the sabbath, as connected with social and temporal happiness. They are peculiarly striking in this favored country. The sabbath may be a *better day* in the United States of America, than it is almost any where else in the world. It is surprising to an American to know, how small a portion of worshiping Christians, in Europe, hear clergymen of their own choosing; and how large a proportion of the places of public worship, are destitute of the accommodations, which are common in all our churches and meeting houses. It is unknown to any one, in this land, to conform to rules, and to use expressions, of which he does not approve in his acts of worship. It would be entirely inadmissible here, that any man should partake of the sacrament, and make a profession of religious creed, to qualify him for trust, and office. Here, there are no dignitaries in ecclesiastical power, who claim to be princes, because they are Christians ; nor any who live in the pomp and splendor of this world, to show to an admiring populace, the equality, and the humility, of spiritual perfection. Here, there are no classes shut out from social privileges, and rights, because they cannot conscientiously believe, profess, and worship, according to *statute law.*

432. The profession of Christian faith elevates, among us, no one to an unnatural, and merely temporal distinction. All Christians stand on the same level, as to rights and duties. Each one may choose for himself, what he will believe, and with whom he will worship, and by whose ministry he will be guided. There are few who can have anything, who may not have a place, appropriately their own, in the house of worship. No one is held to pay the tenth of the product of his labors, whether he wills to do so, or not, for the support of a ministry, whether he likes it, or not. All who appear in the house of worship, are where they would be ; and are understood to be performing

that duty, and service, which they prefer, and none other. It would be surprising, then, if the places of assembly on the sabbath, were not filled by a grateful, and respectable population; more surprising, still, that there should be any, in such a population, who are not suitably affected by the example of those who know the nature of their privileges, and who are disposed to derive the proper benefit from them. There are a few, and but a few, (comprising the unfortunate ignorant, and the habitually dissolute,) who do not regard the sabbath. There are some young persons who show their want of education, their acquired depravity, and their disregard of public opinion, by using the sabbath, and even the time devoted to religious instruction, *for purposes which they sadly mistake to be pleasure.* They are seen to be riding furiously to places of public resort, and returning from them, heated by intoxicating drinks. Such young persons are *marked* by those who see them. When they come to be men, and claim to be members of society, *they find they have been marked*; and that they have given to themselves a name, which they will find it very difficult to change. They will need the recommendation of worthy persons for employments, for introductions to respectable connexion. They cannot be justly dissatisfied that their claims are disregarded; and that they have lost their proper rank; and must pass anew, through a probationary time, which they have sacrificed. They cannot, otherwise, reclaim the rank which is common to all the orderly, and virtuous.

433. There is a social sentiment in religious worship, in this country, which is likely to be felt, but in few Christian assemblies, in other countries. Those who meet, have a bond of union, in the common proprietorship, in the election of the clergyman, and in being accustomed to see each other, in their respective places. It may be, that some who so meet, rarely meet on any other occasion. But the sentiment of common interest, brotherly regard, and good will, grows up from the very

fact of so assembling, though the occasions for personal expression of it may be very few. There is something, from the very constitution of human nature, which creates a common interest among those, who use the same terms of devotion, and to whom the same sentiments of instruction are addressed in common, by a teacher of their own choice. There is no compulsion in all this, but the common sense of duty, right, and propriety; nor any binding association, but in the zeal, and fidelity of the teacher. It is greatly to the honor of the clergy among us, that they are zealous and faithful, and merit the respect, confidence, and affection which they so generally obtain in our community. The inducements to engage in the ministry must be regarded, in many instances, as arising from a sense of duty; because the same labor and ability which are often known among the clergy, might command much more of what are called the goods of this world, in other vocations, than the ministry usually affords.

434. We dare hardly express an opinion, which we trust will some day find more favor than it is likely to do at the present time, in relation to that part of the service which is called the *sermon.* We do not understand this to be an address to the Deity; though in His presumed presence, and in honor of *Him;* in social worship. It is the sentiments, and opinions of the pastor, to his flock, on their worldly, social, and pious duties. As we conceive of Religion, the contemplation of the Deity, in all his stupendous works; the scale of being far inferior to man, and down to the lowest; the whole order of vegetable being, and the connexion and mutual dependence of all, are subjects to be regarded in public worship, as well as the intellectual power of man, and his moral and religious perceptions. We know not, why subjects of this nature, should not be spoken of in assemblies of Christians, reverentially and piously; nor do we know why the thoughts, and considerations, which lead to the great progress of improvement, among the human family, are not

subjects worthy of the place and the occasion. We rather incline to think, that in some modified manner, they are so. There are many persons, (whose opinions constitute an important part of the sum of opinion, on which everything depends, in a free country,) whose unavoidable occupations preclude them from satisfying inquiries, which it cannot be unbecoming to find answered, from the sacred desk.

435. It is undoubtedly true, that society is advancing in the knowledge of its rights, and duties, especially in our own country, in an unprecedented manner. It must be obvious to all reflecting minds, that the clergy must keep even, at least, with the very front of advancement. There are, and probably will continue to be, controversial discussions on religious subjects, often depending upon the most diligent and learned researches. It is expected by parishioners, that they are to be occasionally instructed in the character, and progress of these discussions; and that they shall, on proper calls for it, have the judgment of their own teacher. It is expected too of the clergy, when out of the desk, that they shall, at proper seasons, make known, that the passing world is not unobserved, nor unstudied by them. They are, on many important occasions, (conducive to the general welfare, in morals, the improvement in which all are interested), able counsellors, and effective agents, no less from weight of character, than from sound judgment. We, therefore, with the most respectful consideration for long continued habits, venture to suggest a doubt, whether more is not expected from the clergy, in the disposal of their time, than is useful to those to whom it is devoted. It is dutiful, and pleasant, to every clergyman, to visit in his parish; but the necessity for this visiting, is not what it once was. There are means of instruction, through the use of the press, and from the diffusion of knowledge, which make the personal instruction of the clergy, less essential; and in truth, parishioners, generally, are so much more enlightened than their predecessors were, that, it would be doing them in-

justice to insist, that parochial visitings are as necessary as they once were. If any one should, in these days, take into consideration the number of hours, and days, which must be spent in visiting, in an extensive parish, and all other indispensable claims on a clergyman's time, he will be surprised to find how small a portion of time will be left, to present those results of study from the sacred desk, which the actual condition of society demands. In most populous places, (it is believed) the practice of mere formal visiting, has yielded to the reason of the thing ; and it is not expected as a duty. This is one of the proofs of increasing good sense. Parishioners are compensated for the loss of a visit, by their share in the honorable fame of their minister, and in the general improvement of the character of society.

We have ventured these remarks from the exalted respect which we entertain for the clerical duties in a country, where they must be performed, if performed at all, because the refinement and good sense, of the community, call for them ;—and, because, we entertain the like respect for the clergy, as a body of men, to whom this country ever has been, and as we hope, and believe, ever will be, gratefully indebted.

436. With respect to the manner in which that part of the sabbath shall be passed, which is not given to public worship, there is a well-known difference of opinion. No public law can regulate this matter. It can go no further than to provide, that those who engage in worship, shall not be disturbed ; and that it shall be a day of rest, and cessation from the common business of life ; except, that we believe, that it is constitutionally right in most of the states, to prohibit resort to public places, for purposes inconsistent with moral duty. We entertain no doubt that it must be competent to any, and every truly christian, and moral people, to interdict all acts which tend to immoralities, and especially on the sabbath. It cannot be doubted that the good sense of the public, would sustain the law-

making, and executive power, in going much farther than they do now go. Surely some of the modes of passing the sabbath, in this country, are not such as are useful, or justifiable, on the part of those who might be restrained, if there were no other motive than their own good. All this depends on the will of the community, who have the power, if they choose to exert it, of making changes for the benefit of all, and without the least violation of any right, or proper privilege.

437. There is an appropriation of part of the sabbath day, which has lately attracted the public attention, and patronage, and which, it is believed, cannot be too much respected, and commended. We allude to SUNDAY SCHOOLS. Many very young persons, and many who are between tender age, and adult life, have not the means, during the week, from various causes, to obtain the instruction, which is essential to their welfare. There are many persons, who have attained full age, who would be benefited by instruction no less than their juniors. Persons who are busily engaged in factories, and in other occupations, which take up all the days of the week but the sabbath, would, it is hoped, if they had the opportunity, gladly employ a part of the latter day, in receiving instruction. It is due to some of the proprietors of manufacturing establishments to state, on all proper occasions, the sense of obligation, which this community feel, for their liberal provision to maintain sunday schools. It is to be hoped that such praiseworthy examples will have their just influence, and be everywhere followed. It is well known that many persons *of both sexes* who have been blessed with the advantages of education, have *voluntarily* given their services, and their pecuniary contributions, to promote and effect this truly charitable, and moral purpose. Next after the services, due individually and socially, to the *Almighty Benefactor* of the human family, surely, there can be no sabbath duty more worthy of the created and the Creator, than those which open the mind to a knowledge of HIS *works*, and of

the duties which he has prescribed. Such employment of the sabbath is philosophically consistent with the nature of man, and of society. It is action; it is action to the most useful purposes. It is the sowing of seed which falls, not on a rock, nor by the way side; but in good ground; it will spring up, and bear precious fruits, the fragrance of which will ascend to heaven.

438. With some persons, the stillness and tranquillity of the sabbath are favorable to *self-examination.* By this, we do not mean the contemplations of diseased fancy; nor attempts to feel and express emotions, which the human mind cannot rationally entertain. These are unprofitable delusions; they are unknown to well informed and intelligent persons. True, practical self-examination arises from considering man as he is, and not in relation to an imaginary state of being, alike unfit for him, and irreconcilable to the true conceptions of the Deity. Man is a material, intellectual, moral, social, and religious creature. His self examination can only relate to himself, *as such.* Its purpose is understood to be, a conscientious inquiry, whether one has lived up to the laws of nature, and of the Creator; and to discover wherein these laws have been departed from; and to strive to live in future, according to what one knows to be best, just, and right. A self examiner may be supposed to ask himself such questions as these: Have I duly considered my bodily frame, and its wonderful constitution, and uses;—have I endeavored to preserve it in a fit condition to render to myself, to my connexions, to society, and to its Creator, the duties for which he ordained, and gave it; have I misused, or abused, this frame, in any of its parts; have I failed to obey the universal command to preserve by care and industry, all things for use, which were meant for use? If I am in pain, sickness, weakness, or inability, what acts of mine have brought this trouble upon me; and by what course can I better perform my duties, and prevent mistakes and errors, in the week to come?

Such examiner, might be supposed to question himself, also, after this manner: I find that another of the few weeks of this transitory life, is gone; how many more are allotted to me; *is there certainly even one more:* if time, if life itself, be a trust, what account have I to give, of the week that is gone; have I learned any thing; am I wiser or better, or more worthy of my own respect, and that of others, then I was on the last sabbath; have I let the hours run by *unmarked*, by any useful act of mine; have they gone by, stamped and forever, with marks which I shall, and must, behold again; shall I then find that this week went by, as it could, and would, if I had known its value, and as I may hereafter vainly wish it had? Have I begun any thing of which I have not well considered the end; have I considered before I acted; have I taken care of irrevocable deeds?

In what manner have I disposed of this week in the performance of my *social* trusts; have I done to others, as I would that they should do to me; have I escaped vain and criminal anger; have I said of any one, unlawfully, that which I should not dare to say to him; have I been gentle, charitable, civil, cheerful, kind hearted; have I rendered that which is due; have I made promises, which I cannot perform, or any which I should not make; whom have I offended; to whom have I given just cause of complaint that I knew not the laws of individual, or social life; if my peace of mind is disturbed, if a blush tinges my cheek, if a sigh bursts from my heart, if a tear dims my vision; *must* this have come over me, or could I have prevented it; might not this tranquil, blessed morn, have been to me, to my inmost heart, that which it is to those who know what is right, and who practise as they know?

Can I go, as I shall hereafter wish I had done, with a pure, healthy, earthly frame, becomingly covered with the products of ingenious and commendable industry, and with a peaceful, grateful, and devout mind, into a social assembly of Christians; can I enter the temple of the Almighty, to thank him, that I live; that I am a rational being; that I live in a land of civil and religious freedom; that I can, and may, cultivate all the powers which he has given me, to my own benefit, and to his honor; that I am permitted to come into his presence, with intelligent, rational, virtuous, and devout citizens, who know, feel, and are grateful for, the blessings of the gospel, and the unrestrained right of profiting by the exalted hopes, and rewards, which it promises?

439. There is a portion of the sabbath day, after the public services are concluded, and also the evening of that day, which are passed in different modes by persons, who agree in most respects (it is believed), as to the manner, in which the preceding parts of the day should be passed. By some persons this portion of time is, in whole, or in part, devoted to reading, either the scriptures, or some other book, connected with religious instruction. By some persons, it is devoted, in whole, or in part, to domestic instruction on christian duties. Others, again, consider that the evening especially, is a proper timefor family friends, who are prevented from seeing each other at other times, to meet in a quiet and unoffending manner, for social intercourse. There seems to be no reasonable objection to either of these modes. It is to be remembered, that the sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath.* It is, therefore, to be passed, in that way which seems to be reasonably adapted to man's religious, moral and social character. There is one consideration of serious importance in relation to children. Certainly care should be taken, that they do not associate with the sabbath, privations, re-

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* Those who are accustomed to read the scriptures, know that in the 2d chapter of Mark's gospel, these are the words of the Saviour: 'And the pharisees said unto him, "Behold, why do they on the sabbath day, that which is not lawful?" And he said unto them, "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath; therefore, the son of man is Lord also of the sabbath."'

strictions and exactions, which make the approach of that day, unwelcome. On the contrary, it materially concerns their welfare, and that of society, that their feelings, as to the day, should be such, that they can anticipate it with pleasure, and look back on it with continually increasing satisfaction.

NOTES.

CASPAR HAUSER.

(Referred to in page 212.)

The account given of *Caspar Hauser*, in a little volume lately published by Carter and Hendee, Boston, is thought to be so well authenticated as to be received as true.

It is remarkable in two views; 1. as being a most extraordinary, and (probably) unprecedented case, in the history of mankind. 2. as being exceedingly instructive and interesting, from its connexion with philosophy. In the first view, it is extraordinary that any motives should have led to the imprisonment of any human being, from early infancy, until he was seventeen years of age, in a dark apartment; and in perfect solitude, so that he had never seen any human being, nor heard any voice but his own; still more extraordinary, that he should always have been kept in one position, that is, seated on a floor, with his back against a wall; that he should never have been permitted to stand upright, nor to stretch himself out at length. It is not extraordinary that he should be ignorant of all things going on in the world, and of all words, or means of expressing himself; nor that he should have been a mere child, when born into the world at the age of seventeen.

When Caspar was between 17 and 18 years of age, he was found, on the 26th of May 1828, in a street of the city of Nuremberg, (Germany.) He, of course, could give no account whence, or how he came. He was considered, and treated, as an idiot, or an impostor. It was not until he had learned the language of the country, that he could state what his condition had been.

In the second view, this case is exceedingly interesting from the singular opportunity which it afforded, of demonstrating the process by which the senses, the moral principle, and the intellectual power are developed, by discipline, and education. Most unfortunately, it was not known, and could not be known, until sometime after Caspar had been at Nuremberg, what his former situation had been. It was then too late to watch the progress of development, or to do any thing but collect facts, from those who had seen him, from the time that Casper was thrown into Nuremberg, but before his case was known. When it was known, his faculties had already undergone a course of discipline, and the favorable opportunity for *philosophy*, had passed by. So far, however, as can be discerned from Caspar's history, it completely agrees with all the theories which are adopted in this volume, concerning the nature of the senses, the moral principle, and intellectual power. If it could have been, that the philosophers of Germany had known on the 26th of May 1828, what a treasure they had in poor Caspar Hauser, the most important and instructive light would have been cast on the phenomena of human nature: instruction, however, which, (it is to be hoped) no similar and unaccountable perseverance in crime, will ever again offer to human curiosity. The eminent author of this narration, properly calls the acts done to Caspar Hauser, by the striking name of, *the murder of the soul.*

ON SLAVERY.

(Referred to in page 292.)

The principle, that all men are born free and equal, applies to all white *citizens*, throughout the United States, and to all *persons*, except in the slave-holding states.

There was a time when a right to persons, as *property*, was recognized throughout the civilized world. There was no exception as to *color*. Some philosophers, whose names have survived more than twenty centuries, were slaves. Until very lately, the *slave trade* was lawful among the people of all Christian countries, as well as others. Our own country has the honor of ranking it with one of the most aggravated of crimes, *piracy*. When our ancestors settled here, no one doubted that slaves might be acquired by purchase, or inheritance, like any other property. Within a few years afterwards, there were slaves in all the colonies. The declaration of rights in Massachusetts, in the year 1780, was understood to put an end to slavery here. It would have disappeared, without the aid of that declaration, long before the present day, for many reasons, and among others, from *interest;* that is, that slaves cost more, *in the whole*, than their labor could produce. This fact, (if no other motives operate,) will finally abolish slavery far to the South; how far, it is difficult to say. Whether there be any part of the United States in which the white man, *who drinks no ardent spirit*, cannot safely labor in the summer sun, remains to be proved. The hot valley of Egypt was southward of any latitude in our country. The Jews labored in fields which are in the same latitudes with the southern part of Georgia.—The Greeks celebrated the Olympic games, for nearly a thousand years, in the month of July, unprotected from the sun, near the city of *Elis*, which is in the same latitude with the middle part of Virginia.

Recently, in *Virginia*, the opinion has been publicly maintained, that the absence of prosperity there, is to be attributed to the presence of slavery; and some of the eloquent and manly orators of that state have declared, that there is a moral degradation, springing out of slavery, which may be expected to disappear with that evil. Have the labors of northern philanthropists had any tendency to produce such opinions? Probably, none, whatever. But they are believed to have had other effects, *injurious to the interests of this part of the country, and on the disposition to preserve the Union.* Whatever may be said, or thought, the owners of slaves are no more reponsible *morally*, for the existence of slavery, than they are for the elevation of their mountains, or the depth of their rivers.

There are a few persons, in this part of the United States, who *may be* more commendable for good intentions, then for good information, on the subject of slavery. Those who deserve to be called philanthropists seem to forget, or not to know, what a length of time it takes, to effect a moral revolution, which must change for others, all the social, and many of the political relations of a whole people. They overlook in their zeal, that they assail *rights*, (for such they are claimed to be, and cemented by ages) of communities, who are in no wise accountable to them. Information, humanity, temperate and wise union of thought and action, among all who desire emancipation; and especially *rational interest*, more than all other things put together, are the only means by which the great purpose in view can be accomplished. *The principle of slavery is one thing; the abolition of long continued slavery, is entirely another;* and it may well be doubted whether discussions thereon, in non-slave holding states, are profitable to any purpose.

This is a subject which the most Christian heart, and the wisest head, must approach with great solemnity. Suppose a competent authority should declare to a Northern philanthropist—'You shall devote your life to the abolition of slavery, and your life shall be prolonged for fifty years, in full vigor of body and mind. You shall have an inexhaustible treasury. The national and state governments shall enact, and execute, every law which you see fit to propose. But you shall effect your purpose within the term of your life; and in effecting your purpose, you shall not violate any principle of conventional, natural, or divine law; and the manumitted shall not be in a worse condition from your labors.' *What would be the successive steps of this philanthropist?* Slavery will gradually recede far to the South, if rationally, and philosophically treated, and it is hoped, more for the sake of the white man than the colored, beyond the limits of our national republic. But, if this glorious achievement should ever be effected, it will not be through the honorable benevolence felt among those who dwell *where slavery is not;* but through the systematic and prospective measures which originate among those, *where slavery is*, and who are most interested to see its termination.

THE END.

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